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Abstract 
The thesis is concerned with the British perception of Soviet foreign policy between 
1951 and 1956. In particular it examines the understanding that British diplomats, 
politicians and civil servants had of the process of change which the death of Stalin 
stimulated in the Kremlin's relations with the outside world. The core of the study centres 
around 1955, as this was the pivotal point for the British. With the ascendancy of 
Khrushchev there was perceived not only a new emphasis in Moscow on the necessity of 
avoiding global war between East and West, but also a new interest in economic 
competition. 
By 1956 Whitehall and concluded that there were a number of factors informing the 
Soviet re-evaluation of foreign policy. Among which were: the stabilisation of the 
Western alliance culminating with West German rearmament in 1955; the cost of defence 
expenditure both in armaments and in supporting the satellite regimes and China; the 
development of American and Soviet thermonuclear potentials. The latter was thought by 
the British to be the most profound in its implications on the Soviet approach to the future 
of international relations. The Soviet leadership certainly appeared eager to be friendly 
and particularly to communicate an awareness of the grotesque futility of a war employing 
the latest weaponry. To this end they agreed to the Geneva Summit of 1955. Anthony 
Eden and Harold Macmillan were convinced by this meeting that, in Macmillan's words, 
"there ain't gonna be no war". For a few brief, golden months, it seemed in London as if 
the Cold War might even be negotiated into history. 
However, by the end of 1955 it was apparent to the British that Geneva did not mean 
the Kremlin had liven up aspirations to global supremacy, rather that the means to this 
end were now to be different. Khrushchev, according to the Foreign Office analysis, 
placed a new emphasis on the role of economic power in the process of undermining 
Western forms of politics and society, both directly in the potential of Soviet style 
economies to out-perform capitalist and in the use of economic muscle as a conduit of 
political influence through economic aid and trade. The latter policy appeared to play a 
crucial role in the Soviet attempt to take advantage of the birth of post-colonial states in 
Asia and Africa. 
The thesis does not go on to discuss in any detail the implications of the above for 
British foreign policy, but it does make a broader point about the bearing which British 
perceptions of Soviet policy had upon their attitude to Egypt before and during the Suez 
Crisis. The threat of global war might have receded, but the Soviet Union was now seen 
to be posing a new challenge to British influence in areas of the world which were still of 
vital economic importance, Egypt being chief among them. Britain's influence in the 
Third World was not only challenged by the rise of indigenous nationalisms, but these 
nationalisms could now turn to the Soviet Union for succour and support. From this 
perspective Britain's position was more precarious than it had ever been before. 
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Preface 
There is something of a hiatus in the historiography of Britain and the Cold War. 
Most research has up until recently concentrated oll the issue of greatest controversy, 
the part played by Britain in the initial developnlent of East-West rivalry. This is 
understandable, not least because the releasing of official documents imposes its own 
delay, it does, however, leave the reader wondering quite what was to happen next? 
Indeed some discussions of the decline in Britain's world role in the years after 1945 
treat the Cold War almost as a side show which impinged very little upon the main 
course of events. Britain may have had a more substantial role to play immediately 
after 1945 than many have given her credit for, but very quickly her lack of super 
power standing left her as not much more than an interested observer. Such a state of 
affairs might not be so very bad if the Cold War were a static thing which once set up 
an running, remained true to the original pattern. This was, of course, not to be the 
case. 
In fact the Cold War underwent very considerable changes in the course of the 
1950's, and it is the British understanding of these changes with which this thesis is 
concerned. In particular it will examine the way in which British diplomats, 
politicians and civil servants perceived the process of re-evalution in foreign policy 
which the death of Stalin stimulated within the Kremlin. The discussion will 
concentrate around the year 1955 because - as far as the British were concerned - this 
was the pivotal point. Khrushchev's ascendancy marking a new departure for the 
Soviet Government in its relations with the outside world. So great was the innovation 
that the British were forced to think of the threat which the Soviet Union posed to 
Britain's vital international interests in a fundamentally different way. 
Stalin's death cane at an interesting point in the technological rivalry between 
East and West. With the development of thermonuclear potentials in the Soviet Union 
and America a new stage in the military balance was reached which had the most 
disturbing implications for either side's war-making potential. The Soviets fumbled 
towards an understanding of these implications between 1953 and 1955 and by 1955 
they were persuaded to change their foreign policy, at least partly, to take account of 
the unacceptable level of destruction which these new weapons promised in a future 
war. 
There were to be substantial manifestations of this during 1955; the Geneva 
Conference, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and the visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev 
to India and the Far East. In essence the Soviets wanted to ensure that the use of their 
new capacities would not prove necessary. To this end a warmer relationship was 
needed with the West, and thus the Geneva process was begun. However, this did not 
mean that the Soviets had given up their aspirations to global supremacy, rather the 
end was to be achieved by different means. Herein lay the impetus behind the Soviet 
Union's new found interest in sponsoring the armament of Egypt and in attempting to 
extend her influence into the "underdeveloped world" by providing economic aid and 
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trade agreements with countries such as Burma. By 1956 it was apparent to Britain 
that she was dealing with a Soviet foreign policy which posed a lessened danger of 
war, but an increased threat to the maintenance of her position in a number of 
important parts of the world. 
This is, essentially, as far as the thesis will run. It is not part of the present 
limited exercise to investigate in detail the impact which the above perception had 
upon British policy. Yet there are important issues which this discussion does throw 
some light upon. The Soviet role in the Siez Crisis itself has not benefited from close 
examination and certainly she did not play any very dramatic role until the very end of 
the affair. Nonetheless, it is only possible to fully Understand the international context 
in which the British Government was operating if the role of the Soviet Union is also 
understood. For example, the panic which surrounded Eden and his confederates 
during the crisis has been the cause of considerable bafflement to historians. Why did 
an apparently able and experienced politician take leave of his senses and sanction 
sordid skulduggery which moreover was inept in conception and inadequate in 
execution? This panic is, perhaps, more explicable when we understand the increasing 
frustration which was felt in London; from September. 1956 the Soviets had seemed 
almost to take over the position of influence in Egypt which Britain had herself once 
enjoyed. Much of the surprise at Nasser's announcement of the nationalisation of the 
canal was because Whitehall was so exercised by the likelihood of the Soviets stepping 
in to finance the Aswan Darn. The sense that Britain was facing a supreme challenge 
was not merely a rhetorical conceit used by Eden to justify folly, it also expressed 
something of his sincere understanding of the problem. 
This illustrates a broader issue. British defence and foreign policies were not 
simply the construct of domestic forces, they were also a response to her perception of 
what was going on in the wider world. The following is offered as an attempt to 
examine part of that perception at a crucial point in the decline of British fortunes in 
world affairs. 
I ought also to make a few words of acknowledgement to the many people, 
mentioned and unmentioned below, who have helped in a wide variety of ways to 
make the writing of this thesis possible: nay Supervisor for his patience and wisdom; 
the staffs of Glasgow University Library, the Public Record office and the British 
Library: Mike Black and Morna Black for assistance in the battle to overcome my 
technophobia. There were also those who helped with accommodation in London, 
Gordon and Carolyn Clark, Hugh Hunter and Nichola Swann being the chief who 
suffered my visitation with forbearance. 'Many, many thanks must jo to my parents, 
brothers, sister and sister-in-law for their support and encouragement. And at the last 
apologies to those who over the past year have had to live in the same flat as I through 
the lingering half-life of my thesis, Clara Donnelly and Judy Wakelincy . 
Chapter 1 
Soviet Foreign Policy And 
Its British Interpreters, 190-196 
As this thesis is concerned with the perception which the British Government had of 
union. 
developments within the Soviet von it seems sensible to start by examining, from the 
perspective of our own time, what was actually going on in Russia between 1952 and 
1957, particularly in respect of foreign policy. This is not least the case because the 
chronology of events in the Soviet Union largely provides the agenda for what is to come. 
Needless to say there is insufficient space to do the subject justice, but it does not seem 
necessary for the present limited purpose to be exhaustive. Also, this preliminary 
analysis, with the assistance of hindsight and a large amount of secondary work by 
historians and political scientists, will set down something of a bench mark against which 
the British view at the time may be judged and, perhaps, vice-versa. 
Once this has been attempted there will be a discussion of the means by which the 
British Government formulated its opinion of Soviet developments. Some of the 
characters who played central roles in this process, at the level of the British Embassy in 
Moscow, the Foreign Office in London and the politicians, will be introduced. The inter- 
relationship between these different groups in the apparatus of foreign policy will also be 
examined. It is important to gain some understanding of the means by which the Foreign 
Office developed its opinions and disseminated them throughout Whitehall. 
The personal roles of the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister in the formulation of 
Britain's foreign policy in the 1950's must equally be addressed, at least to some extent for 
there is probably a whole thesis awaiting to be written on this issue. The imperatives of 
personal prejudice and ambition are crucially important in understanding reactions at the 
highest executive level which did not always fall neatly in line with the opinions being 
canvassed by permanent officials. In this Churchill was more guilty than Eden, but even 
Eden's complicated personality and diplomatic peccadillos led him, at times, to attitudes 
subtly at variance to those of his civil servants. 
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1952-1956 
The move from British history to Soviet is in many ways a disorientating one. The 
former provides an embarrassment of government publications, records, private papers 
and public sources which, although inevitably flawed, provide an invaluable basis for our 
understanding of the past. In the case of the Soviet Union even basic matters of fact can 
still be issues of some controversy. Despite the appearance of recent titbits, mainly 
memoir accounts, and the possibility that more may still be put into the public domain, 
1 See R. Conquest, Power and Policy in the U. S. S. R., pp. 50-7 , on the issue of evidence and the 
study of Soviet politics. Also, Un Ra'anan, The U. S. S. R. : What is Ascertainable and how can 
such Knowledge he Obtained" in Uri Ra'anan and Charles Perry eds, The U. S. S. R. Today and 
Tomorrow, Problems and Charges, pp. 1-16. 
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very little material concerning the operation of Government itself is yet available. 2 The 
main sources for study of the Soviet Union remain the speeches and pronouncements of 
the executive and the newspapers which acted as a major conduit of such opinions to the 
Soviet public. These have already been exhaustively raked over by a large body of 
commentators. 3 Over the past decades there has been very little added to the information 
on which to base analysis .4 
Indeed the greatest change to happen in Soviet history over recent years has more to 
do with the perspective from which we view it, rather than in the sources themselves. 
Now that the Soviet satellite system has collapsed in Eastern Europe and Communism 
within Russia is no more, it is possible to look upon Soviet history as a discrere subject 
with its own, separate, alpha and omega. The Cold War itself becomes a truly historical 
phenomenon, the development of which can be traced from beginning through maturity to 
its end. It is now possible to see more clearly, although by no means for the first time, the 
significant turning points in its existence; one of these was the new approach to foreign 
and domestic policy embarked upon by Khrushchev in 1955. Khrushchev's initiatives 
were to set the parameters of Cold War rivalry for the rest of the Soviet period. 
However, it was dimly apparent even under the stifling rigidity of Stalin's last years 
that all was not entirely satisfactory with the Soviet Union's external relations. 6 Indeed 
even during the Khrushchev period Western commentators such as Marshal Shulman 
were going so far as to suggest that the changes towards a more flexible foreign policy 
which came to a climax under Khrushchev had already begun before Stalin's death in 
1953.7 Shulman dated the turning point thus, 
2 These include Andrei Gromyko, Memories, Feliks Chuyev, Sto sorok beseel c 4t4olotovym (One 
Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov), an enticing title if ever there were one, the 
testimony of Malenkov's son Andrei and various addenda to the material on Khrushchev. This 
latter category encompasses N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, the Glasnost Tapes, and 
other additions to the already extent memoir account. Khrushchev's speech writer from 1960-64 has 
written his version of the Khrushchev years, Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian 
Spring. There has also been the publication by Izvestiia of the July, 1953, Central Committee 
stenographic record, "Delo Beria", Izvestiia TsK KPSS (January-February), 1991. This was the 
meeting at which the arrest of Beria was settled. 
3 See F. J. Fleron, Jr., E. P. Hoffman and R. F Laird (eds. ), Soviet Foreign Policy, Classic and 
Contemporary Issues, pp. 1-2 for an illustration of the relatively stable nature of the study of Soviet 
foreign policy. 
4 See James Richter, "Re-examining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum", 
for a discussion of the latest primary evidence which has become available 
5 For an overview of the period up to Gorbachev see Erik P. Hoffman, "Soviet Foreign Policy Aims 
and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev", in Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp 49- 
71. 
6 See William M1cCa, ý_. Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948, for an in depth analysis of Stalin's foreign 
policy. 
7 Marshal Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Shulman, whose book was First published 
in 1963, sums up his argument on paffe one as follows, 
The prevailing interpretation of recent Soviet foreign policy emphasizes Stalin's death as the 
great watershed event, from which is charted the shirt toward a more flexible policy, broadly 
known by the term "peaceful coexistence. " Although this emphasis properly draws attention to 
the new departures of the more recent period and to the dynamic character of Soviet policy, it 
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From the end of the Berlin blockade in 1949 to the Nineteenth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, 1952, there were unmistakable 
sins of a marked evolution in the Soviet strategic outlook toward Western 
Europe, of a ,, roping toward a more effective adaptation to the new political and 
technological facts of life. 8 
Chief of these new "facts of life" was, of course, the implications of atomic warfare. ` 
Shulman goes on to argue that Stalin's foreign policy expressed this new thinking in a 
softening of relations with the West. Restraint was shown where hitherto the Soviets had 
indulged in provocation and more subtle encouragement was now given 
to centrifugal 
'forces in the "capitalist" world, in particular neutralism and anti-colonialism. 10 This is 
seen by Shulman as Khrushchevism before Khrushchev. Stalin's refurbishment of policy 
was furthered by an increasing commitment on the part of the Soviet Government to the 
"international" peace movement, which had been kicked off during 1949 in Paris by a 
World Peace Conference hosted by the French Communist parts'. 11 This trend is awarded 
by Shulman the familiar tag of "rightist", as opposed to more orthodox and belligerent 
"leftism". 
However, earlier and more recent opinions stress the continuity in Stalin's late years 
rather than the change. 12 Indeed some su rest that Stalin was becoming more inflexible 
in his approach to the outside world than the reverse. John Van Oudernaren, in a recent 
and very substantial study of Soviet foreign policy since 1953, argues that in Stalin's 
increasing emphasis upon foreign Communist Parties as a means to conduct foreign 
policy, rather than dialogue with `Western countries in the United Nations or Foreign 
'Minister's meetings , the 
Soviet policy was in fact becoming more radical. 1' The key 
contrast with his successors lay in Stalin's desire at all cost to maintain direct political 
control from Moscow over the international Communist movement, 
gives insufficient attention to significant changes in outlook and behaviour which bean to be 
manifested before the death of Stalin. 
8 ibid. p. 1. 
9 ibid. pp. 111-114. 
10 ibid. p. '259. 
11 ibid. pp. 92-99. For an alternative view see J 
World War II, pp. 97-99. 
1' See Soviet policy Since World War 11, p. 
conclusion, 
L. Nogee and R. H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy since 
100. Nozee and Donaldson come to the following 
[T]actical changes during 
__ 
Stalin's later life were not sufficient to brine about a major 
reorientation of the Soviet approach to the world. What was needed was a more 
thoroughgoing reassessment of the international situation, which in turn necessitated a 
disavo'.. al of some of Stalin's own fundamental theses on foreiggn policy. In a very real sense, 
the ageing dictator had outlived his usefulness to his country, and only with his death... would 
a more venturesome strategy to attempt to break the stalemate of the Cold War emerge. 
Also see Adam B. Ulam. Expansion and Coe_ristence, The History of Soviet Foreign Polic. , 
1917- 
67, p. 01. 
11 John Van Oudenaren. Detente in Europe, The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, pp. 1^-ýO. 
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[T]he innovative element in the Malenkov and Khrushchev policies was not that 
the USSR sought to mobilise Communists and fellow travellers in support of 
Soviet policy objectives, but that they reached out to organizations and 
institutions that they did not control and that were often overtly hostile to the 
USSR in a long-term effort to promote the "relaxation of tensions. "14 
The more Stalin's policy eschewed direct contact with those he had no control over, in 
particular the West, the more conservative and inflexible it became. Shulman, in essence, 
had grabbed hold of the wrong end of the stick. This is the reading which I find most 
convincing, not least because it fits best with the British Government's view of Soviet 
foreign policy at the time. 
This is not to say that there were no nuances of future change, especially in the area 
of "doctrine". Indeed the British were to pick up the rumbles of ideological adjustment in 
1951 and 1952, as will be discussed below. However, in terms of the development of 
policy the new thinking was yet to be put into practice. l5 
Certainly, the jockeying for the succession which was to preoccupy the leadership 
after Stalin's death in 1953 and 1954, is discernible in retrospect during the very early 
fifties. 16 Indeed Robert Conquest interpreted the Doctor. ' Plot, which was publicly 
announced in January, 1953, as the prelude to a selective purge by Stalin upon those who 
were attempting to establish personal power bases from which to launch their claims to 
the succession. 17 The plot's origins and history are far from clear, but the accusations 
implicated a number of important and largely Jewish physicians in an attempt to kill 
leading Communists. '8 Fortuitously for all concerned, Stalin's health took a very sudden 
turn for the worse and before such sinister cunning on his part as may have intentioned 
the affair became clear, he went to his eternal reward. In the aftermath of Stalin's death 
the Doctor's Plot was swiftly discredited by the new Government. On April 4th, 1953 the 
tables were turned and they who had been accusers became accused. 19 In line with this J 
14 ibid. p. 20. 
15 ibid. p. 17. 
16 See Power and Policy, pp. 79-191; British and other Western observers of the time were more 
impressed by the ,, -rip which Stalin maintained on power up to the very end. This is an issue which 
will be dealt with in chapter 2. 
17 ibid. pp. 185-191. Conquest argues that Lavrenty Beria, the chief of the secret police, was the main 
victim which Stalin had in his sights in 1952 and early 1953. 
18 There is an account by Khrushchev of the Doctors' Plot, which lays the emphasis very much upon 
Stalin's insane paranoia, N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 282-287. This was the 
line which Khrushchev took on the matter in his Secret Speech to the 20th party Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956. Conquest points out that Stalin probably had more 
rational political ends in sight than Khrushchev was prepared to admit. A key objective in 
Khrusihchev' s revelations was to foist all the blame for the errors of the past upon Stalin, thus 
leaving, the Communist system of government itself and Stalin's acolytes blameless. On this point 
see P(m-cr and Policy pp. 171-1 2. There is a recent English translation of the memoir of a Doctor 
who fell under suspicion, Yakov Rapoport, The Doctor's Plot, Stalin's Last Crime. It dives a 
valuai-, le and moving account of the late Stalinist state's impact upon its citizens. Also by Louis 
Rapoport is Stalin's 'ar iizainst the Jews. The Doctor's Plot and the Soviet Solution. 
19 The fate of Dr Lydia T, imashuk, whose letter had sparked of the original investigation, is a fitting 
testimony to Soviet ter,, iversation. On April 4th, 1953. Pravda announced that she was to be 
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sudden change in the political atmosphere, Molotov was re-appointed as Foreign 
Minister. He had lost the post in 1949 to the prosecutor of the great show trials of the 
thirties, Andrei Vyshinskii. `Molotov had increasingly fallen victim to Stalin's suspicions 
and anti-semitism, the latter through Madam Molotov who ývas sent to a concentration 
camp on account of being Jewish. 
From the 5th March 1953 to before the 4th April Stalin's heirs engaged in what might 
be termed the first round of the succession battle. It was clear from the start that the 
emphasis in the new regime was upon "collective leadership". -'(? To this end Malenkov, 
thought by many to have been Stalin's favourite, was forced by the 14th March to choose 
between his positions of Prime Minister and Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. 
Malenkov did not choose wisely, perhaps beguiled by Stalin's preference for State as 
against Party titles in the latter years of his reign. ' 1 As a consequence of this 
Khrushchev, who was left as the senior secretary and in effect promoted, gained the pole 
position within the Party Secretariat from which he was to launch his ultimately successful 
bid for power. However, in the interim the key issue was that no one figure should inherit 
sufficient political power to be able to turn himself into a "new Stalin. " 
Indeed it was largely because of his challenge to this news principle of "collective 
leadership" that Lavrenty Beria was arrested in the June of 195 3. He was to be tried and 
executed later in the year. Beria, whose position as overseer of the M. V. D. arm of the 
security service had been confirmed in the aftermath of Stalin's death, seems to have been 
the first to put forward a clear bid for untrammelled power and for his pains won the 
distinction of being the last top-level leader to Low, his life as a direct result of conflict 
within the Soviet elite. 22 By the end of 1953 "collective leadership" seemed, at least to 
foreign observers of Soviet politics, to have become firmly entrenched and to have 
weathered its first real challenge. 
This turmoil at the top was accompanied by a softening of the domestic rigours of 
Stalin's last years and was also to have important implications for Soviet foreign policy. 
Despite considerable debate between 1945 and 1953 over the importance of consumer 
industries, the Soviet economy was still very substantially biased towards heavy industry. 
This resulted, inevitably, in considerable privation for the Soviet domestic consumer. 2 
The new leadership, at least in its perception of the popular mood in spring 1953, seems 
to have feared that the loss of Stalin's authority might fatally undermine the regime's 
stripped of the Order of Lenin which she had been awarded by a grateful Stalin on January the 20th. 
See Power and Policy, pp. 206-207. 
For an in depth analysis of domestic politics at this point see Power and Policy'. pp. 195-227. 
1 Stalin's authority after 1945 was not based upon any position within Government or Party, but upon 
the very peculiar personal power which he had developed over the years of his grotesquely ruthless 
dictatorship, see for example. R. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 445-463. 
22 See Khrushchev Remembers. pp. 321-311. 
23 Althouý, h there had been some dalliance with expansion in the supply of consumer foods in 1945 
and 1946, as the international situation turned more chilly the demands of security and 
reconstruction favoured a renewed emphasis on heavy industry. For more detail see Timothy 
Dunmore. Soviet Poiirics, 194-5-1953, pp. 42-73, and also by Dunmore, The Stalinist Command 
Economy, The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy 19-J5-53. pp. 95-11 5. 
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standing within the Soviet Union. Consequently. a relaxation of economic tempo ww as 
embarked upon which was to give the consumer a higher priority in the planning of 
industrial consumption. This willingness on the part of the "collective leadership" to 
pander to its people, as we shall see, was the subject of considerable comment by British 
observers at the time. In the words of a more modern commentator, George Breslauer, 
Perhaps because of fear, perhaps for other reasons, a rather broad consensus 
emerged within the national leadership on the need to break with the past, and to 
offer a new deal to the urban and rural consumer. Malenkov, Khrushchev, even 
Kaganovich endorsed such a program, while -Molotov grudgingly accepted it as 
something of a regrettable necessity. 24 
This policy was to be maintained through 1953 and into 1954, when it too began to 
become a pawn in the continuing competition between `Ialenkov, and Khrushchev for 
authority. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Leadership's need for calmness at home informed a new 
flexibility in the Soviet approach to external relations. This tendency was bolstered by an 
awareness of the counter productive nature of the extremes of Stalin's diplomacy. 
Malenkov's utterances in the matter were to have a particularly profound effect upon 
Churchi11.25 However, the problem which preoccupied Soviet foreign policy in 195-3) 
seems to have remained very much that which it had been in 1952, the dander of West 
German re-armament. On this there was considerable debate within leadership as to the 
best course of action. 26 
It appears that Beria, at one extreme, was even prepared to see a united capitalist 
Germany as the price for its neutralisation. Ulbricht and the nascent regime in East 
Germany were, in this view, little more than diplomatic cannon fodder. '-7 Malenkov, 
apparently, tended towards this end of the spectrum, although he was not quite as radical 
in attitude as Beria. 
This preparedness to deal with the West was also informed by a sanguine view of the 
changing nuclear balance. '8 As the Soviet Union developed her own thermonuclear 
bomb, on top of the atomic weapons already manufactured, Malenkov's and Beria's 
24 George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Sorer Politics, 
p. 5. 
25 A matter which will be afforded considerable attention below. 
26 On this see Richter, "Re-examining Soviet Policy Towards Germany". He makes very interesting 
use of the latest material to come out from the Soviet Union to examine the debate over German 
policy which went on within the leadership during 1953. My treatment of the issue is essentially 
his. 
1, See Richter and Victor Baras, "Beria's Fall and Ulbricht's Survival, " Soviet Studies 27: 3 (July 
1975), pp. 381-95. Also there is a very recent biography of Bena which deals with his role in the 
succession struggle and foreign policy, Amy Knight, Beria, Stalin's First Lieutenant. pp. 176-200. 
25 Malenkov was to develop this theme in 1954 with his Supreme Soviet election speech of the 12'th 
March. A full English translation is in Current Di est of the Soviet Press, 1954, Vol. 7, No. 11, 
pp. ti-S. For a very recent and detailed study of Soviet nuclear capacities which , uses the latest 
Soviet information see, Steven J. Zaloga, Target America, The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms 
Race, 1945-1964. 
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confidence in the Soviet ability to deter Western aggression increased. So much so that, 
some would argue, the West may have missed an opportunity to end the Cold War in the 
months after Stalin's death. 29 
James Richter suggests that these opinions were also informed by a desire to reduce 
the importance of ideology in policy. Given that both Beria and Malenkov relied upon 
State structures for their power bases, such a move could only have increased their 
control over the reigns of power. 30 
On the other extreme, Foreign Minister Molotov retained a diehard, Stalinist 
commitment to the defence of Ulbricht's regime. Furthermore, on ideological grounds he 
was not one to consider that a "modus vivendi" with the West was desirable, even if 
attainable. ' 1 Khrushchev was associated with this opinion, although not with quite the 
same devotion. As a man whose power was rooted in the Party he had a clear interest in 
maintaining the importance of orthodox doctrine in the prosecution of foreign policy. ''- 
It was this more traditional, Molotov-Khrushchev view which emerged triumphant by 
the summer of 1953 and the arrest of Beria. Thereafter `Iolotov's position within the 
leadership allowed him a crucial role in the development of foreign policy. From the 
middle of 1953 to the beginning of 1955 that policy revolved around attempts to break up 
29 This is a view canvassed by some historians of Western foreign policy, see NI. Steven Fish, "After 
Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American Debate Over a New Cold War, " Diplomatic History 10: 1 
(Fall. 1986). It is also a view which James Richter seems to support in his Ph. D. dissertation. 
"Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy: How Leadership Politics Affect Soviet 
Responses to the International Environment". However, Richter himself does not think that the 
most recent evidence from the Soviet Union supports the thesis. On Soviet policy towards Germany 
he concludes that the most opportune moment for dialogue was the period before Beria's arrest. 
Given that in the immediate post-Stalin period Soviet policy was in flux and that not until after 
Beria's arrest, in the late summer and autumn of 1953, were Western observers prepared to stick 
their necks out and make longer term estimations of Soviet foreign policy (see below on this), it 
would have required a very substantial leap in the dark for Western Governments to drop their 
existent policies and go achasing after a flicker of light from Moscow. There may well have been 
more to Churchill's intuitive grasping after summit diplomacy in 1953 than many thought at the 
time, but few Governments are prepared to take grave risks with their nation's security based 
largely upon subjective feeling. Moreover, in "Re-examine Soviet Policy Towards Germany". 
Richter concludes, 
In sum, the new information suggests that no realistic opportunity to reunify Germany existed 
in the months after Stalin's death. The Soviets had decided in late May [19531 not to abandon 
East Germany in return for a demilitanzed, united Germany... no Western proposal could have 
chan_"ed their mind in the short time before Beria's arrest in late June. 
30 ibid. pp. 15-16. 
31 ibid. p. 17, Using One Hundred and Forrv Conversations with Molotov, Richter outlines Molotov's 
position as follows, 
His [Ltolotov's] vision of socialism's unrelenting struýýle against the forces of capitalism 
caused him to reject Beria's suggestion that a capitalist Germany could ever be neutral or 
"peaceful". Even if the government ostensibly supported neutrality, a capitalist Germany 
necessarily would support the imperialists in case of war. Furthermore, as Molotov conceived 
war to be inevitable, the strategic significance of Germany's industrial potential and position in 
the centre of Europe was far to great to hand the country over to the class enemy. 
Richter goes on to point out that ýiolotov's use of conciliatory rhetoric was ýntireIy ýYnlcal. It v. -as 
designed to prise the Western Alliance apart rather than brink East and West together. 
32 ibid. pp. 11-19. 
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the Western Alliance over the issue of German rearmament in particular, what was known 
by the British Foreign Office as "wedge driving". It had its greatest success during 
August, 1954 in the failure of the European Defence Community. 
By the reopening of the Foreign Ministers' Conference season in January 1954 after a 
hiatus of some six years, it was clear to the West that the Soviets were not prepared to 
give way on any fundamentals. Indeed, the new and more subtle Soviet diplomacy was if 
anything creating more difficulties, particularly for West Germany's rearmament, than 
Stalin's elephantine blundering. If there had been a "window of opportunity" which all in 
the West but Churchill had turned their backs upon, it was not open for very long. 
1954 saw the intensification of a new round of domestic, Soviet political dog- 
fighting. Beria having been "legally" disposed of, the competition increasingly centred 
around the ambitions of Nlalenkov and Khrushchev. ' t This expressed itself in 
controversy over a number of issues, the most substantial of which were agricultural and 
economic policy. 3' 
On agriculture Khrushchev saw himself as something of an expert and it was in this 
area that he devoted much of his energy in 1954.36 In essence the view with which he 
associated himself was that the Soviet grain problem could best be dealt with by 
increasing the amount of land under cultivation. This "virgin lands scheme" became a 
preoccupation for Khrushchev in the years to come. Indeed, the increasing troubles 
which it ran into by the early 1960's contributed to the groundswell of dissatisfaction 
which led to Khrushchev's own fall from power in 1964. However, in 1954 it gave him 
an issue with which to campaign against Malenkov. Malenkov, by contrast, remained 
happy with the Stalinist approach which emphasised mechanisation and centralised 
control in the intensification of agriculture upon such land as was already in use. British 
observers were well aware at the time that this argument was raging, however, as we shall 
see they did not go on to draw the right conclusions regarding the struggle for power 
within the Kremlin. 
The other domestic issue around which the Malenkov/Khrushchev rivalry cris fII isecl 
was the balance between heavy and consumer industries in the economy. As late as 
August 1954 the argument seemed to have been won by those who advocated the 
33 See below. 
34 For a detailed examination of this period see, Power and Policy, pp. '? 8-ý6' and "action and 
Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy", pp. 144-166. 
35 At least this is the view of most subsequent Western analysts of the power struggle, for example, 
Power and Police. Richter suggests that such accounts tend to downplay the importance of foreign 
policy. However, he provides little in the way of concrete evidence to support his claim that 
foreiý: n policy was the deciding, factor in the decline of Malenkov. Having, said this there can be 
little doubt that the Soviet failure to prevent West German rearmament in 1954 came as a substantial 
blow to both \Ialenkov's and Molotov's prestige. "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign 
Policy". pp. 162-165- 
336 For a thorough treatment of this whole question see Martin McCauley, Khrusiichev and the 
Development of Soviet . -igriculture, the Virgin Land Programme 1953-1964, pp. 40-75. Also, W. 
Hahn, The P(, iitics (ý Soº'iet Agriculture. 
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sacrifice of heavy industrial to consumer production. '? It was only in 'November, 1954, 
that the argument began to hot up once again. `lalenkov remained a firm champion of 
the consumerist approach while Khrushchev seemed to ally himself with those who 
retained a Stalinist predilection for the primacy of the industrial staples. Despite being 
aware that the reactivation of this debate was laden with political overtones, once more 
the Foreign Office in London would fail to conclude that the political infighting was 
about to reach another climax. 
This was indeed the issue which, at least superficially, precipitated Nialenkov's fall 
from Premiership on the 8th February, 1955. In his letter of resignation of the same day, 
Malenkov confessed his error in the areas of agricultural and economic policy. From this 
point onwards Khrushchev was clearly primus inter pares, his ally Bulýanin replaced 
Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, `Ialenkov was not yet 
definitively beaten as he retained his seat as one of nine members on the Party Presidium. 
It was not until 1957 and Khrushchev's route of the "Anti-Party Group", that he was able 
to exclude his immediate rivals from their positions of power at the centre. 38 
Nevertheless, a decisive phase in Khrushchev's bid for control had been passed, hereafter 
he was to be concerned with the consolidation and defence of the dominant position 
which he had established for himself. 
Despite these developments, in the area of external relations Khrushchev was yet to 
stamp his own character upon policy. In order to topple Malenkov from the Premiership, 
during the consumer industry debate Khrushchev had allied himself with %Iolotov and 
those within the leadership who remained loyal to Stalin's approach, although even at this 
point it was clear that Khrushchev and Molotov did not see eye to eye on all matters. 39 
Once this end had been achieved Khrushchev had no further use for such attachments, 
indeed they became a positive hindrance to his attempt to revamp and update Soviet 
thinking in important areas of policy. Given that Molotov remained the Minister for 
Foreign : airs until June, 1956, it is hardly surprising that during early 1955 the debate 
within the Kremlin shifted its focus from internal to external issues. 
Uri Ra'anan argued that this debate is illustrated in the inconsistencies of Molotov's 
8th February, 1955, key note speech on foreign affairs to the Supreme Soviet. This was, 
of course, the same convocation at which Malenkov was forced to resign. On the issue of 
relations with Yugoslavia Molotov remained firmly Stalinist in blaming Tito for the 1948 
split in contrast to the conciliatory attitude which Khrushchev was to take in the following 
months. However, on the question of the reunification of Austria, Molotov gave 
evidence of a softening of the Soviet attitude which was shortly to result in the 
37 ibid. pp. 73--4. 
38 See Power and Policy, pp. 292- 28. Also, Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 
1957-1964, pp. 22-57 : Roy and Zhores Medvedev. Khrushchev, the Years in Power, pp. 66-80. 
39 Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 88-92. 
According to Ra'anan Molotov was already being squeezed out of important foreign policy 
decisions by Khrushche". most notably in September 1954 when Molotov did not accompany 
Khrushchev and cronies to what was effectively a summit meeting with the Chinese Government. 
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withdrawal of Soviet troops from that countrv. 40 It is at this point that the opinions of 
Khrushchev are to be seen. As Molotov was later roundly to condemn Khrushchev for 
the loss of Soviet control over her Austrian occupation zone under the terms of the 
Austrian State treaty it seems unlikely that this was a course foreshadowed on 8th 
February by Molotov's own inspiration. 41 Ra'anan argued that the sr `ech was a 
compromise cobbled together from two very different understandings of how the Soviet 
Union was to behave. Niolotov continued to stand for the cautious approach which Stalin 
had maintained in his dealings with non-Communist countries. 42 Khrushchev, on the 
other hand, was eager both to take advantage of the opportunities which seemed to Titter 
in the decolonialised areas of the "under-developed world" and to reduce tensions 
between East and West. An Austrian settlement seemed in this latter view to give the 
Soviet blessing to "neutralism" so much in vvo(-, ue in Asia and went a long way to 
persuade the West of the value of negotiation. Indeed, the British were left in some little 
confusion as to exactly where Soviet foreign policy was joint at this point, back to Stalin 
or forward to something altogether new. 
A further point at issue was nuclear doctrine. Molotov remained of the Stalinist 
opinion that unconventional weaponry did not fundamentally alter the way in which the 
Kremlin should think about and fight a future % orld war. Khrushchev and his associates, 
however, displayed a much keener awareness of the need to bring Soviet military thinking 
into line with recent developments in thermonuclear technology. In particular that it was 
no longer possible to conceive of any useful purpose for a war which would bring into 
play such destructive explosives. Malenkov's premature assertion in 1954 that total war 
would now spell the end of civilisation was about to enjoy its vindication as it was 
Khrushchev whose star continued to ascend. 43 
By the end of 1955 NIolotov was looking decidedly dog-eared as his position within 
the leadership was eroded by Khrushchev's swelling power. At the Foreign L'linister's 
Conference at Geneva in October Western officials noted that Molotov seemed 
subservient to directives from Moscow in a manner which had been unthinkable in 
1954.44 It was Khrushchev's fresh and venturesome approach to domestic and foreign 
affairs which triumphed through 1955 and into 1956. 
40 ibid. pp. 102-122. 
41 ibid. pp. 104-105. 
42 ibid. pp. 6-7. Ra'anan argues that the dichotomy between the old and the new approach is acutely 
demonstrated in the contrast between 'Molotov's and Khrushchev's attitudes towards Egypt in late 
1954 and early 195",. Khrushchev was keen to be_in the cooperation between the two states which 
led in September 1955 to the selling of arms to Egypt via Czechoslovakia. Molotov considered it a 
deflection from the Soviet Union's crucial interests, European security and relations within the 
Communist Commonwealth. Also see Karen Da wisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, pp. 
4-11, Mohnez Niahmond El Hussini, Soviet E,. ptiaii Relations, 194-5-35, pp. 25-43 and Galia 
Golan, Soviet Policies in the . Diddle East from WIV71 to Gorbachev, pp. 7-13. 
43 For a more detailed analysis of the stru_g`, Ie between Khrushchev and Molotov see Richter, "Action 
and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy", pp. '00-303. 
44 In October, 1055, Molotov was also forced to publish a humiliating mea culpa :, onceming his 8th 
February speech of the same year to the Supreme Soviet. Molotov's error concerned his reticence 
to accord socialism its full triumph within the USSR, see Power and Policy, pp. 2-63-270. 
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Khrushchev's "new look" was underpinned by the realisation that it was no longer 
acceptable to conceive of the Cold War coming to a hot resolution. However. 
Khrushchev's commitment to the struggle for socialism without the Soviet Union 
remained fundamental. The Cold War was now to be won by reliance upon economic and 
social means, in the treasure house of Soviet jargon, the old Leninist term "peaceful co- 
existence" was dusted off and given a new coinage. No longer did it merely mean a 
delaying of the cataclysmic show-down between capitalism and socialism until a more 
propitious hour; at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev would spell out clearly 
that such a show-down would involve an unacceptable degree of mutuality Rather, the 
Soviet Union would demonstrate its economic and social superiority by out-producing 
and out-living the West. In the new historical circumstances there was no need of war. t5 
The 20th Party Congress was the culmination of a trend of thinking which had become 
the dominant strand in Soviet foreign policy by 1955. 
Even before the 20th Party congress the dimensions of the new policy were visible 
As it was necessary to persuade the West that the Soviet Union did not at any point want 
war, it was also necessary to ensure that the West itself would not consider that war was 
in its own interests. In order to achieve this Khrushchev flung. himself with some aplomb 
into summit diplomacy. The Geneva Conference in the summer of 1955 was the first and 
most impressive fruit of this new effort. 46 
The other key area in which Khrushchev presided over profound change in Soviet 
relations with the outside world was in its policy towards the third world. Stalin had 
largely ignored one of the defining trends of the post 1945 era, the end of the European 
Empires overseas. Although sparkles of interest in Asia were already to be discerned 
before 1955, Khrushchev embarked upon an ambitious and innovative attempt to woo 
newly independent countries to the Soviet influence by the use of economic power, 
regardless of the political nature of their regimes. 47 This meant that he was prepared to 
spend vast amounts of money courting countries such as Egypt whose Government ,.,,,, as 
inflexibly hostile to native Communist Parties. 48 The two most spectacular incidents of 
Khrushchev's new policy in 1955 were the Czech-Egyptian arms deal of September and 
Bulganin's and Khrushchev's tour of India and the Far East at the end of the year. 
er the ylobalisation of Soviet Alvin Rubinstein argues that Khrushchev presided o,, 
foreign policy. The Soviet Union was attempting to draw into its sphere of influence 
states which were not contiguous with its borders and which were by no means 
Communist. Indeed, in an ironical way, the Soviet Government was behaving in a 
49 manner reminiscent of Britain during her imperial zenith. 
45 For a discussion of the importance of Khrushchev's role as innovator see Soviet Forei, n Policy since 
World War 11, pp. 114-126- 
46 See Detente r'i Europe, pp. 31-50, and Khrushchev Remembers. pp. 392-400. 
47 Elizabeth K. Valkenier, The Soviet U, zion and the Third World, an Economic Bind, pp. 1-11. 
48 On the complex and turbulent relationship between Nasser and Khrushchev : ee Mohamed Heikal. 
Sphinx and Commissar, the Rise and Fall of Soviet In Jluence in the . Arab , Vorld, pp. 11-147. 
49 Alvin K. Rubinstein. Moscow's Third World Stratet'v, pp. 3-38. 
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The crises of Suez and Poland and Hungary in the second half of 1956 would play a 
defining role in this process. They did not fundamentally change Soviet foreign policy, or 
indeed the way in which the British Government had come to view it. However, they did 
draw very clearly the limitations which Moscow placed upon the process of detente and 
"peaceful coexistence". Some of the wilder hopes given birth by the "Geneva Spirit" of 
1955's summit diplomacy were proved unfounded and it was made apparent, if it were not 
already, that Khrushchev's innovations were about changing the parameters within which 
the rivalry between East and West was to be expressed, rather than bringing that rivalry 
to an end. 
From the perspective of our own time Khrushchev's innovations look somewhat 
foredoomed. The 1950's and early 60's were the last years in which the economic threat 
of competition from the Soviet Union was to be taken very seriously in the `'est. With 
the advent of the information revolution of the late 60's the Soviet economy looked ever 
more dowdy. From the stagnation of the Brezhnev years and the economic and social 
breakdown under Gorbachev there was to be no resurgence of Soviet power. By 
Khrushchev's criteria, as set out at the Twentieth Party Congress, there can be no doubt 
as to who lost the Cold War. Although Khrushchev was right in emphasising the 
importance of domestic social and economic strength in peaceful competition with the 
West he was wrong to have faith in the Soviet Union's capacities. 
Molotov's attitude towards Khrushchev's foreign adventurism seems, historically to 
have been right. It was not in Egypt, India or Cuba that the Soviet Union was delivered a 
mortal blow, or indeed fatal wounding was inflicted on the West. Rather it was at home 
and in Europe within the immediate satellites that the regime began to come apart at the 
seams. In emphasising the importance of devoting resources and attention to 
strengthening that which was clearly under Soviet control, Molotov's approach might 
have better equipped the Soviet Union to keep up economically and socially with the 
West. Instead, billions of roubles were spent on regimes, such as Nasser's, which 
stubbornly maintained their independence or at the very best provided the Soviets with 
only a limited return on their capital. However, the fall of the Soviet Union is a study 
quite beyond the bounds of this present work. 
THE BRITISH PERCEIVERS 
Attention now turns to the machinery with which the British Government formulated its 
opinion of Soviet policy. -`') There were two sections within the Foreign Office which 
were particularly concerned with the gathering and interpretation of information about 
50 There is a very useful Appendix, __ivin- a hrief resume of the F. O. hierarchy and short biographies 
of personnel, in Victor Rothwell. Britain and the Cold War, 1941-194,. pp. 45; -461. 
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developments in the Soviet Union; the Northern Department and the Research 
Department, Soviet Section. The Northern Department's purlieus also included 
Scandinavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, the rest of the Communist East 
Europe and Yugoslavia was the concern of the Southern Department. This geographical 
division was a hangover from earlier times when it made more political sense. Given the 
importance which changes in the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
were to play in Moscow's foreign policy throughout the fifties, such organisational 
eccentricities cannot have helped the Foreign Office in its task. 
The Northern Department was much the senior in the partnership, although it was in 
the Research Department that the greatest expertise on Soviet affairs was to be found. In 
the preparation of briefs and submissions for politicians such as the Foreign Secretary, it 
was the Research Department which provided much of the detailed analysis and the 
Northern Department which had the final say in the process of drafting the finished 
product. 
The third direct influence on the British view came, unsurprisingly, from the Embassy 
in Ioscow. This was one of the top ranking British Embassies, however due to the 
limitations imposed upon its size and operations by the nature of the Soviet regime it 
attained nothing like the prestige or importance of its sister in Washington. It was indeed 
regarded by those fortunate to enjoy its florid architecture as, in the words of Sir William 
Hayter's memoir, "a difficult Embassy". 51 Although access, both to the Soviet people and 
Government, was to improve very substantially over the period of Havter's 
Ambassadorship, the Embassy's view on Soviet affairs was informed by little more than 
that which was available to the Foreign Office in London by other means. Much of the 
reportage back to Whitehall was concerned with resumes of press coverage, learned 
articles and books, public pronouncements by the leadership and so forth. 
This point should not, however, lead us to devalue the role which the Embassy 
played. The Foreign Office "view" was constructed by a process of dialogue between 
these three parts of a wider institution and although the Embassy may have had no more 
information on which to base its analysis it did not have any less. Furthermore, staff as 
well as ideas were transferred from one area to another and it was in the Embassy 
opposite the Kremlin that many had their first direct experience of the Soviet Union.; '- 
51 Sir William Hayter, .4 
Double Life, pp. 98-154. Hayter described the frustrations of his position in 
1953 on arriving in Moscow in the following passage from p. 98, 
It is customary for an ambassador newly arrived at his post to send a despatch to the Foreign 
Office recording his first impressions. I conformed to this custom, but with some reluctance. 
Of what value. I asked, were the reactions of a sold-fish in a bowl, peering through opaque 
and refracting `_lass at an utterly alien world, all contact with which was denied him' 
See also Sir Curtis Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-89, pp. 2,38-266. 
52 Sir William Hayter. for example, returned from his Ambassadorial post to London in January 1957, 
to become a Deputy Under-Secretary with responsibility for both the Southern and Northern 
Departments. This was the second hi,, hest rank which a permanent officiai could achieve .,. ithin the 
Foreign Office. See .1 Double Life, p. 155. 
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What impact the Secret Service may have had upon the development of Britain's 
attitude towards the Soviet Union is difficult to say as no records are available on which 
to base an analysis. However, as this thesis is interested with the end result in terms of 
the Government's broad understanding of Soviet policy rather than the means by which it 
was reached this is perhaps not so important. -' 
The staff who populated Foreign Office departments were essentially split into two 
groups, the "generalists" and the "specialists". The former were the more exalted 
category who dominated the high profile ambassadorial appointments, and upper reaches 
of the Home Departments. As such it was these people who had the most frequent and 
direct contact with Government Ministers. They tended to come from rather exalted 
social backgrounds and were shuffled around diplomatic posts and responsibilities at 
regular intervals. As they were supposed to be informed as to the overall direction of 
British foreign policy, so the theory went, it was necessary that they should not limit 
themselves to anyone particular part of it. 54 
The "specialists", who from the Research Department's provided in depth analysis 
bringing to bare a much greater degree of linguistic, economic and political 
understanding, remained, on the whole, at a relatively lowly "clerical" level. -'-"' They 
included people who were to go on to develop notable careers without the Foreign 
Service, Violet Conolly and Robert Conquest being perhaps the most prominent examples 
in the Soviet sphere. 
This dichotomy can be over emphasised, an absence of specialist Soviet knowledge 
was not a prerequisite of Northern Department appointments. Indeed Thomas Brimelow, 
who became the Head of the Northern Department in 1957 was exceedingly 
knowledgeable. He acted as an interpreter during the Bulganin and Khrushchev visit to 
Britain in 1956. Most of those operating within the Northern Department had spent some 
time at the Moscow Embassy. 56 However, officials above the departmental level in the 
53 There are a number of works, particularly on the late 40's and early 50's, dealing with the issue of 
intelligence. For example see the volume of articles edited by Richard J. Aldrich, British 
Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51. In his introduction to the volume Aldrich 
emphasises the need for more research. See also Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, (ed. ), The Changing 
Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat. 
54 A Double Life, pp. 51-52, Hayter discusses this dichotomy in terms of his experience in China in 
the thirties. A mordant critique of the impact which this philosophy had upon British diplomacy 
since 1945 is developed by Geoffrey McDermott, a one-time F. O. official, in The Eden Legacy and 
the Decline of British Diplomacy. In essence he asserted that the gentlemanly amateurism which the 
traditional approach fostered ill-suited Britain to deal with an increasingly complex and dynamic 
international situation. 
55 See Anthony Adamthwaite's criticism of the Forei`_n Office's disdain for, and lack of, expertise, 
particularly in the increasingly crucial area of economics, "The Foreign Office and Policy Making", 
pp. 18-19, in John W. Young, (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 
1951-1955. 
56 For example the career of J. A. Dobbs as recorded in the Foreign Office List. He was stationed in 
the Moscow Embassy Secretariat form 1949-1950, the Northern Department from 1951 to the end 
of 1954 when he returned to the Embassy, where he stayed until February 1957. In December, 
1954, he qualified for an allowance in Russian. This meant that he had attained sufficient aptitude 
in the language to be awarded a bonus. In February 1957, however, he was seconded to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and sent to New Dehli. 
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main did not share the detailed knowledge of those o 'er whom they had responsibility and 
those within departments enjoyed career paths which worked consciously against 
specialisation. After working for four years as Head of the Northern Department, H. A. 
F. Hohler went on in 1957 to become the Minister at the British Embassy in Rome. 
This tradition was in contrast to that of the United States. American diplomats up to 
the highest rank were trained with specialism very clearly in mind. The careers of the two 
most prominent State Department experts on the Soviet Union of the fifties, George 
Kennan and Charles Bohlen, provide an instructive comparison with those of their British 
counterparts. 57 Bohlen was the U. S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1953 to 1957 and 
spent most of his career as a diplomat in Moscow or as an expert in the State Department 
on Soviet affairs, in which capacity he attended the great war-time conferences at Yalta 
and Potsdam. He did spend two and a half years in Manila from 1957 to 1959, but his 
transfer there had more to do with personality and political problems and it caused him 
considerable frustration that his Soviet expertise should be so wasteVY Hayter's reaction 
to his own equally unexpected promotion to be Ambassador in Nfoscow, as recorded in 
his memoirs, reflects the difference between British and American approaches to overseas 
representation. 59 Bohlen's last big diplomatic post was as Ambassador to France from 
1962. 
Putting the question of staff development to one side. some thought must be given to 
the hard data on which the British Government based its analysis of Soviet developments. 
It will become very clear in the course of this dissertation that the Foreign Office was 
dependent on the public pronouncements of the regime as the most substantial indicators 
of Soviet policy. Newspapers, public speeches, learned journals, plan results, budget 
announcements and so forth formed the meat of the Embassy's reportage and the basis of 
the Research Department's work. All of which contributed the building blocks with which 
the Northern Department put together its assessment of what was going on in the Soviet 
Union. When Robert Conquest published his book, Power rund Policy in the U. S. S. R., in 
1961, he was using the same kind of sources as he had whilst working for the Foreign 
Office up to 1956. The only new advantage which he had as a historian was that of 
perspective. 
57 See George F. Kennan, Memoirs, and Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969. From the 
opening of formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet liltiion by Roosevelt in the thirties the 
Americans had gone to considerable effort to build a cadre of Soviet experts to man their new 
Embassy and assist the State Department in the formulation of policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Some historians have , one so far as to argue that this tradition had a profound impact upon the way 
in which the Americans viewed the Soviets after 1945 and played an important role in the 
development of the Cold War, particularly Daniel Yergin in Shattered Peace: the Origins of the 
Cold War and the National Security State. 
58 Witness to History, pp. 441-458 and in particular pp. 450-45 1. The Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles seems not to have been overly fond of Bohlen. Neither was the right-wine of the Republican 
Party which harboured suspicions of Bohlen's sympathies with Soviet ideoloý, y. He was tainted, in 
their eyes. by the supposed dishonourable appeasement of Stalin it Yalta. 
59 A Double Life, pp. )5-97. 
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This dependence on "official" sources for information is an important point. Debates 
about Soviet policy were carried out in a shadowy world of supposition. Much depended 
on the Foreign Office's reading of very limited and prejudiced evidence. For example, the 
British were to accept the Kremlin's lip-service to "Collective Government" and entirely 
misinterpret the rumblings of competition between Nlalenkov and Khrushchev for power 
during 1954 and early 1955, so that Malenkov's fall in February, 1955, took them quite by 
surprise. 
Even after the liberalisation of Soviet dealings with foreign diplomats once Stalin was 
dead, there was little to be learned by direct and private contact between Embassies and 
the Soviet Government, or for that matter the Russian people. 6° Tuch of these new 
contacts consisted of unrevealing, if entertaining, diplomatic receptions which Stalin's 
successors enjoyed with alcoholic aplomb. Contact with the Soviet on the street was no 
more enlightening. 61 Western Observers were little advantaged by the improvement in 
atmospherics which the death of Stalin had allowed. 62 But then this was a long, -standing 
problem which was not to have improved very much despite Khrushchev's new style of 
government. 633 
The process by which the Foreign Office refined its raw data down into a digestible 
assessment of Soviet policy is reasonably easy to follow in the Records available. A 
central purpose of the Foreign Office paraphernalia was to reduce Soviet affairs to 
intelligible summaries for Ministers as the basis for the development of policy. This was 
achieved by the production by the Embassy of quarterly summaries of events in the Soviet 
60 ibid. p. 105, Sir William Hayter puts it as follows, 
Like my colleagues, I had high hopes, when the Soviet leaders started their new policy of 
accessibility, that this would mean the beginning of normal diplomatic activity in Moscow. 
We would, we thought, engage in frank confidential discussion with our new friends, in which 
the serious issues between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world would be sorted out in 
genuine dialogues. But it did not turn out like that. Each of the Soviet leaders carried his own 
private Iron Curtain around with him. Responses were predictable: conversations were like 
Pravda leading articles on one side and The Times leading articles on the other; well-grooved 
long-playing records went round and round. 
61 The post-Stalin thaw allowed two distinct sub-genres of embassy reportage to flourish. The 
trawling of casual conversations with Soviet Joe citizen and the diplomatic junket. Of the former 
FO 371 111671 NS 1015i2, Moscow Embassy Despatch, Chancery to Northern Department, 4th 
January, 1954, is a good example. On the latter, the Minister at the British Embassy, Paul Grey's 
account of the Indonesian Embassy's drunken celebration of their independence day at FO 371 
111823 NS 1965/1, Moscow Embassy Despatch, Grey to H. A. F. Hohler, 18th Aut ust, 1954, 
provides an entertaining picture of the convivial side to peaceful coexistence in all its essential 
vacuity. 
62 FO 371 111671 NS 1015/2, Despatch from Washington Embassy, J. H. A. Watson to Northern 
Department, 3rd February, 1954. Watson was commenting on the opinions of American Soviet 
watchers, 
As George Kennan likes to say, there are no experts of the Soviet Union. only varying degrees 
of ignorance... In the circumstances every fact and every probable deduction is precious; and I 
have great sympathy with Violet's [Conolly] desire to know just how the various experts arrive 
at the conclusions they Jo. 
63 Conquest discussed the matter it `reater length in Power and Policy, pp. 50--5. published first in 
1961. 
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Union and ad hoc despatches on matters . hich were considered of importance. Day to 
day diplomatic activities and reporting was generally dealt with by telegram. The 
Northern and Research Departments drafted memos and reports on matters of immediate 
moment and on long-term trends indicative of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. There 
was a process of dialogue at work between the home departments and the Embassy by 
which opinions were tested, refined and approved. In this process the Northern 
Department assumed an executive role, having the final say in submissions to politicians 
and Permanent Under-Secretaries. However, such submissions were representative of a 
broad spectrum of contribution. 
There was also the need to keep other departments within Whitehall and foreign 
postings conversant with the most recent developments in the Soviet Union and 
assessments of Soviet policy. To which end Moscow despatches of importance were 
circulated, in particular Quarterly Reports, as summaries. These were bolstered by the 
production of Intelligence Reports on questions of importance. 64 The Northern and 
Research Departments in tandem with the Moscow Embassy played a crucial role in 
developing understanding of Soviet affairs throughout Government. 65 
Thus it is reasonably easy to trace changes in the perception of the Soviet Union on 
the part of the Foreign Office. More problematic is the relationship between this barrage 
of opinion and the politicians whose responsibility it was to make decisions. The Foreign 
Secretary's position is perhaps clearest, in so far as he was the direct recipient of much of 
what the Northern Department produced and his submissions to Cabinet in turn reflected 
the opinions of his permanent officials. As regards the Prime Minister the Prime 
Minister's Private Office Papers are an important indication of what was physically placed 
before him, although they are by no means a reliable guide as to what he had time or 
inclination to read. Furthermore, the briefing papers which formed the prelude to 
international conferences were prepared by the Foreign Office Departments concerned. 
Their advice might have been dismissed, as was often the case with Churchill, but it was 
impossible to avoid. 
The case of Churchill's positive attitude to Summit diplomacy is interesting in another 
sense. Churchill's personal conviction in favour of a meeting with the Soviets in 1953 and 
1954 was pitted against a Government which was united in support of the contrary 
Foreign Office view. Despite Churchill's wriýýliný it was, fundamentally, the majority 
which carried the day. In order to gain an accurate understanding of what the British 
Government's attitude to the Soviet Union was it is necessary to examine the thinking of 
that Government at a very much wider level than merely its political chief. 66 
64 For example, FO 371 111706 NS 1073/37, Draft Intel. [intellitzence report] on Peaceful 
coexistence. 
65 Another good example of the process of cross-fertilisation by which Intels were created is at, FO 
371 111672' NS 101515,. ), Minute by R. A. Lon; mire of Soviet Section F. O. R. D.. January lath, 
1955. 
66 James Richter falls into the error of confusing the opinion of the British Government with that of 
Churchill. In "Re-examinin: Soviet Policy Towards Germany", p. 10 he contrasts the Lukewarm 
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Ho% ever, banal as the observation may be, the thought processes of an individual do 
not admit of precise or easy analysis. Only Harold `'1acmillan seems to have been in the 
habit of committing his ruminations to paper, in memorandum for the benefit of himself 
and others within Government. Indeed as Anthony Adamthwaite has commented this 
problem is made much worse by important gaps in the records . vhich make it difficult to 
follow with any precision the decision making process. 67 The most damaging trend post 
1945, from a historian's perspective, was the increasing dependence upon the telephone 
and informal meetings to do business. Most of these conversations have gone 
unrecorded. With the ever increasing pressure of work and the complexity of problems to 
be dealt with, the paper centred operation of the pre 1939 Foreign Office became 
compromised. 
Nonetheless, there is a very substantial body of material available to the historian on 
which the following analysis is based. Furthermore, the task is perhaps made easier as I 
am more concerned with the general context within which policy decisions concerning the 
Soviet Union were made, rather than the decisions per se. 
response of the Eisenhower Administration to the Malenkov Government in 1953 with "Bntain's" 
reaction, 
Britain responded more boldly: on April 20 and more explicitly on May 11 Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill suggested the leaders of the four victorious powers hold a summit meeting. 
o7 The Foreign Office and Policy-making', pp. 2-3. 
Chapter 2 
Churchill, Malenkov and the Search for a Summit 
"Whoring after the Russians" 
"One is in danger of thinking of Molotov as a sort of benevolent middle-man - Auntie 
- he smiles so nicely and talks so gently to us. " 
Evelyn Shuckburgh. 
Churchill's re-election in the October of 1951 had been despite the best efforts of the 
Labour Party to portray him as a warmonger; efforts which culminated somewhat 
hysterically in the excitement of election day with the Daily . Mirror's infamous banner 
headline, "Whose Finger On the Trigger"? l However, over the subsequent four years 
Churchill was to prove himself such a passionate crusader for the cause of world peace 
that it seemed to many of his colleagues he was willing to sacrifice even his country's 
basic security interests towards that end. After the death of Stalin in March, 1953, his 
search for a confabulation between East and West grew to an almost childish 
obsession. Indeed Churchill's attempts to realise his last great vision came close to 
wrecking his own Government in 1954 before they petered out into the long twilight of 
his retirement in 1955.2 By that point it was clear that the Daily Mirror's persiflage 
was very wide of the mark. 
The explanation for this disappointing dichotomy between hopes and 
achievements must be sought, largely, in terms of what was in fact the substantially 
unchanged nature of Soviet foreign policy up to 1955. Churchill was alone in his 
perception of a "window of opportunity" in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death. 
Although others, including the Americans under Eisenhower, were prepared to make 
peaceful noises, they were born essentially of publicity considerations rather than any 
upwelling of confidence in the efficacy of dialogue. Indeed the Foreign Office quickly 
came to the conclusion through 1953 that in terms of their international stance, in 
essence and in tactical detail, there was little to choose between Stalin and Malenkov. 
Some of the excessive Soviet cussedness of the past had been discarded, but then it had 
been largely counter productive anyway. Churchill's restless striving for talks with the 
Soviets was, at least within the limited circles of government, a rather private 
obsession. 3 However, this melancholic footnote to Churchill's career is not in itself 
the main subject of the following exposition. 4 
I See John Young, The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, pp. 55-5-17 . 
2 ibid. pp. 55-S0. 
3 FO 337/ 1 106527 NS 1021/108G, contains a minute written by Sir Alvery Gascoigne recording a 
meeting between himself and Churchill on the 19th August, 1953. The record was kept without the 
knock ledge of No. 10. It -, 
ives an interesting vignette of the differences and limitations thereof 
between Churchill and the Foreign Office. It was over Churchill's touching faith in the meeting of 
minds that he and Gascoigne disagreed. rather than in the fundamentals of Soviet policy. This, in 
essence, was the division between Churchill and the rest of his Government up until 1955. 
4 For a substantial treatment of this subject per se see : Never Despair, pp. 653-1128. Gilberts 
account of Churchill's last years in office is dominated by this theme. Indeed. Churchill's rational 
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The crucial basis of Britain's Cold War policy throughout Churchill's 
administration was, much as it had been on Attlee's departure from office, the 
development of the strength and cohesion of the Western Alliance. However, the 
means which were applied to this end under Churchill differed. The British 
Government after 1951 was to place an increased emphasis upon the rearmament of 
West Germany rather than the extravagant expansion of Britain's armed forces which 
Labour had envisaged in 1951. ' Until the developments of 1955 the British 
Government did not, in the main, consider that Soviet foreign policy had materially 
changed, at least not so that any substantial realignment of British policy were required 
in response. 6 The military rehabilitation of Germany continued to be a vital objective 
which even Churchill was not prepared to surrender in the hope of Soviet concessions. 
In this context his restless wooing of the Soviets was a positive hindrance to the 
execution of policy and perhaps even vaguely dishonest. The French in particular 
proved all too willing to delay the evil hour of German rearmament for the sake of 
Summitry. 
Yet despite this rather gloomy outlook the two years between the death of 
Stalin and the fall of Malenkov were not without their share of diplomatic interest and 
in comparison with the immediate post-1945 period, some success. In 1954, first at 
Berlin and even more so at Geneva. Eden as Foreign Secretary proved able to act the 
role of intermediary between the Soviets and the Americans with considerable skill and 
achievement. Furthermore the Foreign Office began clearly to discern a number of 
trends of substantial long-term significance, a discernment which allowed the British 
Ambassador in 1956 to view the innovations of the 20th Party Congress with a certain 
dejä vu. Even in the last days of Stalin's life it was apparent that the focus of Soviet 
policy was beginning to move away from the stalemate of Europe to virgin territory in 
what was then referred to as the Under-Developed World. 
However, it was not apparent during NMlalenkov's Premiership what these early 
indications were to become. In many ways they were embedded within a resolutely 
traditional Soviet foreign policy which, for example, was more concerned to subvert 
existing "bourgeois nationalist" regimes in Asia and Africa than it was to court them. 
Malenkov's foreign policy caused not a fraction of the surprise and consternation 
which Khrushchev's bold initiatives through 1955 inspired in Whitehall. 
Nor were the Foreign Office prognostications of the Soviet scene necessarily 
always accurate. The consensus opinion through 1954 was that such controversies as 
for hanging on to power, apart from elf'-centered sentiment and a growing disillusionment with 
Eden. seems to have been the fulfilment of a fate-decreed role as Peacemaker General for the world. 
5 C. J. Bartlett dwells on the irony of a Conservative Government reducing a Labour defence budget. 
The Long Retreat. a Short History of British Dcfr ice Polio,, 1945-1970, p. 78. Also on German 
rearmament and the European Defence Community see Full Circle pp. 29-52. pp. 146-174, and The 
Foreisrr Police of Churchill's Peacetime, -Itlmiiii. vtrcatioli. pp. 81-102. 
6 See the discussion of the British Govern nment'ý view of Soviet foreign policy at the start of 1955 
below in chapter 3. 
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there existed within the leadership were merely policy debates between colleagues Who 
accepted the constraints of collective leadership upon their individual ambitions. The 
most embarrassing error of judgement came over the interpretation of the relationship 
between Khrushchev and Malenkov through 1954 and into 1955. The fall of the latter 
in the February of 1955 caught all the foreign Legations in Moscow quite by surprise. 
As in Stalin's day the British still observed the Soviet Union as through a glass darkly. 
THE END OF THE STALIN ERA 
By the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party the British Government had come 
to the firm conclusion that Soviet policy towards the outside world had settled into a 
stable orthodoxy. In contrast to fears about the outbreak of war at the turn of the 
decade, by 1952 it seemed to the British highly unlikely that the Soviets were about to 
launch an attack upon the west. Rather they had settled into a long period of political 
hostility, thrOU211 which, according to Stalin, the West would be defeated without 
recourse to World War III. It was apparent to the British that such a rivalry might yet 
lead the Soviets inadvertently into war, but military experts, Foreign Office officials 
and politicians all considered it very unlikely that Moscow actually wanted such a 
conflict.? This was a view with which the Americans were fundamentally in 
agreement by the beginning of 1952.8 Yet these relatively sanguine assumptions about 
Soviet policy did not give much of a fillip to Churchill's personal search for a Summit. 
Throughout the First years of Churchill's second administration it proved impossible to 
bring even the Foreign Ministers to the Conference table. 9 In the context of a military 
stalemate, bitter political rivalry and continuing diplomatic frustration, the outlook for 
Conference diplomacy continued to look bleak. 
As early as 1951 it became apparent to the Foreign office that the political 
struggle was becoming more important than the military in Soviet foreign policy. 
Through 1951 a series of "Partisans for Peace" conferences were held in Moscow, 
attended by the representatives of the international "Peace Movement", at least so 
7 PREM 11 369, this tilt contains an extensive documentation of the British rationale for scaling 
down the military timetable. a, -, reed 
in consultation with NATO. during 1951, desi`_ned to meet a 
Soviet threat no longer considered imminent by 1952. See also Defence Committee reports and 
memos for 1952 at CAB 131/14, by 1952 the Chiefs of Staff did not consider war at all likely in 
the period up to 1955. It soon became clear that Stalin's death did not necessitate any change in this 
opinion. Churchill, however, did not want their views passed on to the Americans for fear they 
might lead them to reduce their defence expenditure. He does not seem to have considered, in his 
self-assurance, that the Americans were capable of drawing their own conclusions, which were in 
fact not so very different from the British, see footnote S. D. (53) 13th Meeting, 14th October, 
1952 and D (53) 45. 
S FRUS 195_-1954. Vol. VIII, pp. 954-961: National Intelligence Estimate 48,8th January, 195?. 
9 Churchill had himself proposed talks with the Soviets in late 1951, to little avail, see Churchill's 
In, (/in Summer, pp. 396-397. Such attempts as , Lere made by Eden to get meetings between 
Fore[, 
-, n 
Minister's started were concentrated around the unfinished business of German unification. 
There was inevitably concern that Soviet moves on the issue were designed more with West German 
rearmament in mind than a relaxation in international tension. See, for example, Cabinet 
conclusions for 12th \Iarcn and 16th April, 195_. CAB 1281-`4 
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called by the Soviets-10 It became ever more clear, both from Soviet diplomatic 
innovations such as the peace conferences and in the ideological tone of Soviet articles 
and commentaries, that the fear of a "preventative" war launched by Stalin was indeed 
a chimera. The Soviet emphasis was increasingly seen to be on political methods as 
the means to achieve their external ambitions. It appeared that they had now accepted 
a long period of "coexistence" with the West. 
However, British observers were very careful to define the limitations of this 
period of grace. On the 15th December 1951 the Moscow Embassy's Secretariat sent 
back to London an analysis of one of a recent spate of articles which they felt 
representative of the general trend in Soviet thinking on foreign policy. The article by 
G. Deborin had been published in the Soviet journal "Questions of Economics" and 
was concerned with a definition of peaceful coexistence. The then British 
Ambassador, Sir Alvery Gascoigne, in summing up the views to which his staff had 
arrived, made the following comment, 
The conclusions suggested by this memorandum are of some importance. 
They imply that, when the Soviet authorities speak of peaceful co-existence, 
they mean not co-existence without conflict, but only co-existence without 
major war. Nor do the Soviet authorities regard this peaceful co-existence as a 
state of indefinite duration, but only as a temporary (though possibly 
prolonged) postponement of the complete victory of Soviet Socialism over 
capitalism. 11 
This Embassy despatch sparked of considerable discussion in the Northern 
Department of the Foreign Office and the Soviet Section of the Foreign Office 
Research Department. The debate centred around the ideological implications of this 
10 FO 371 100815 NS 1013/35, From Sir Alvery Gascoigne, Moscow, to F. O., 17th July, 1952. 
Gascowne, the Ambassador, in the Quarterly Report for April to June 1952 condemned the Peace 
Campaign in no uncertain terms, 
The aim may be summed up in once sentence, to convince the free world (and dissidents in the 
Communist world) that they cannot be saved by reliance on the United States,... the Kremlin is 
intent on two things; to undermine the resolution in Germany, France, and Great Britain to 
proceed with the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, and to rob the United 
States of the fruit of any victories which they may secure. 
11 FO 371 94848 NS 101515, From Sir Alvery Gascoiýne, Moscow to the F. 0., 15th December 
1951. Gascoigne continued to spell out the implications of Soviet thought on external affairs in 
195 1, although he also counselled caution in predicting likely Soviet action rrom theory, as follows, 
The Soviet authorities regard it as an opportunity to change the balance of power in their 
favour, partly by building the power of the U. S. S. R., partly by winning over the countries 
defeated in the second world war, together with the colonial and "semi-dependent" countries, 
to the Soviet camp and partly by allowing time to weaken the capitalist camp by the 
development of its internal contradictions. The alternative to peaceful co-existence thus 
conceived is a third world war. This like peaceful co-existence [in the Soviet view], would 
lead to the final overthrow of capitalism and "imperialism", but only at enormous cost in lives. 
This the Soviet Government would prefer to avoid. 
The difference between Stalin's coexistence and Khrushchev's to be is quite clear. No third camps 
and neutrals and no definitive renunciation of the Leninist theory of "triý_htful collisions" was vet 
even hinted at. 
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change, from overtly belligerent to political tactics. In particular the validity of the 
Leninist dogma, which insisted that the triumph of socialism over the capitalism of this 
world could only be achieved through violence, seemed to be called into question. 
Would the Soviets chaff to discard it, ignore it, modify, or adhered to it with all the 
rigour of the past? Members of F. O. R. D. canvassed the view that. in the words of 
Violet Conolly, "the "frightful collisions" theory may, as a result of the interplay of 
"creative Marxism", have gone by the board". 12 Despite this the Northern 
Department decided that it was far to rash to conclude on the given evidence that 
Lenin's collisions had been entirely abandoned rather than merely postponed. Mr 
Lunghi of the Northern Department asserted that, "[w]e have not even had indirect 
evidence that "creative Marxism" has rendered Lenin's theory obsolete". 13 
H. A. F. Hohler, the Head of the Northern Department was in full agreement with 
his immediate colleague. "Frightful collisions" had most likely not yet been written 
out of capitalism's Gotterdämmerung. 14 This was the view officially supported by the 
Foreign Office. However all the contributors to the discussion were quite sanguine 
that the Soviets were not about to pre-empt their own eschatology by immediately 
indulging in war. Stalin seemed far too cautious and confident in the inevitability of 
Socialism's superior place in the onward rush of History to countenance the destruction 
which such a war would inevitably entail. 
The Foreign Office was not the only department in Whitehall which gave 
greater emphasis by 1951 to the political rather than the military threat posed by the 
Soviets. In November 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a Report for a meeting 
of NATO which was to be held in Rome on the 24th of that month. After 
summarising the basic objective of the Soviet Government and the means disposed to 
achieve it the report went on to assert that, 
12 FO 371 94848 NS 1014/15, Minute by I. V. Conolly, F. O. R. D., of the February, 1952. 
Robert Conquest, also of F. O. R. D., shared the view that Soviet ideology might well have been 
allowed quietly to take account of new realities. The supporters within the F. O. for accepting 
some flexibility in the Soviet approach to ideology put their case no more strongly than this. If, 
pace Marshal D. Shulman, Soviet ideological and policy changes in the mid to late 50's can be 
traced as far back as the end of Stalin's regime. the controversial brilliance and novelty such 
developments had inspired in the new leadership by 1956 can not. See Soviet Foreign Policy Since 
World War 11, pp. 79-80 and Detente in Europe, pp. 17-20. 
13 FO 371 94848 NS 1015/30, Minute by Mr Lunghi. Northern Department, of 22nd February, 1952. 
Lun,, hi went on to offer his own supposition, 
fly own guess. and of course it can only be a guess, based on open Soviet sources, is that the 
majority of opinion among Soviet leaders led by Stalin, hopes to avoid the "frightful 
collisions" for as long as possible until the capitalist world is weakened by the "falling away" 
of the majority of the countries of the non-socialist world from the capitalist-imperialist camp, 
and their incorporation into the "democratic anti-imperialist" camp, but at the came time their 
'realism" leads them to believe that eventually the "frightful collisions" will be unavoidable... 
There may, of course, be others among the Politburo who believe that the time for the 
"frightful collisions" is now it hand. 
14 ibid. H. A. F. Hohler, the Head of the Northern Department, had already adopted this line as the 
Department's in his letter to the Embassy in \los,; oýý, or the I Sth February, 1952 on the subject. 
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[W]hile the Soviet leaders have in some cases, e. g. Korea and Indo-China, 
utilised the Armed Forces of the Soviet Satellites to commit armed aggression 
by proxy, they are skilful tacticians and their actions have so far shown their 
aversion to jeopardising Russian national security by the direct use of the 
Soviet Armed Forces to further their objectives. 15 
The Chiefs of Staff did not altogether rule out the possibility that the Soviets might 
yet launch a war to nip Western rearmament in the bud. However, the report made 
clear that the main threat which Soviet military superiority posed to the West was in 
terms of the political leverage it afforded to them. By the summer of 1952 such was 
the Government's mood of confidence in the Soviets' abstinence from military force, 
that Anthony Eden went so far as to warn the Cabinet against the danger of public 
complacency as a consequence. 16 
As the 19th Party Congress approached in the autumn of 1952, the British 
Government was provided with further support for this view of Stalin's foreign policy. 
The Embassy continued to deliver reports which asserted that the Soviets were 
prepared for an extended period of political rivalry. Moreover they seemed confident 
of their ability to defeat the West by non-military means. In the Moscow Embassy's 
Quarterly Report for July to September 1952 the Minister Paul Grey made comment 
on the interest which the coming Congress had created in Moscow. 17 Yet, he thought 
that, 
This unsatisfied curiosity did not, however, remove the impression that the 
Soviet Union is now set on a rigid course, which involves no concession to 
the West and no relaxation of internal effort. To judge by all the signs, Stalin 
regards the external world as still doing his way and the Soviet Union as well 
15 PREM 11 369, this report was put before the NATO Council meeting, in Rome of the 24th 
November, 1951 along with an American consort submitted by a committee which Averill Harriman 
chaired 
16 CAB 129/54 C(52) 257, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 23rd July, 
1952. Eden, in terms that were after Stalin's death to he applied by him to Churchill's Soviet 
diplomacy, confessed his reservations, 
I atn a little disturbed by recent indications that public expressions of satisfaction about the 
increased strength of the West and the reduced chances of Soviet ain ression, however 
justifiable in themselves, may create the impression that we are out of the wood and can afford 
to relax our efforts. Her Majesty's Ambassador in Brussels has recently reported that 
authoritative statements of this kind are already lessening the will to keep up the defence effort 
in Belgium. And in other countries, opposition to the defence effort, particularly in France 
and Germany, is already so strong that it is vital not to dive it any further encouragement. 
17 FO 371 100S15, NS 1013/49. From Paul Grev. Moscow to the F. O.. 10th October, 1952. These 
Quarterly Reports, it should he noted, were the main means by which Whitehall and the Foreign 
Office, including overseas posts, were kept informed of developments in Soviet politics, economics 
and foreign policy. There were, indeed, a number of complaints made on the reports for 1952 by 
staff in London due to their increasing length and turgidity. This made them unsuitable as they 
were supposed to he easily assimilated summaries of the collective Embassy and Northern 
Department view. Some of these criticisms were indeed made on the above report itself at the same 
PRO reference. Sir William Hayter's tenure in Moscow was to see the institution renovated to the 
Northern Department's satisfaction. 
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able to stand up to any strains in which the antagonism between the two 
camps may involve it. 
The Embassy considered that the forthcoming Congress was not to be a stage for 
innovation but a consolidation of the existing direction of the reime. Furthermore, 
Khrushchev's publication in the summer of 1952 of his thesis detailing forthcoming 
innovations in Party structure and in particular the change in nomenclature by the 
dropping of Bolshevik from Party's title were taken as indication of "the change in 
character of the rulers of the Soviet Union from revolutionaries to technocrats". 18 This 
was considered a further evidence that the Soviets were unlikely to be tempted by 
military adventurism in foreign policy. 
The one aspect of the Congress which had sparked some speculation about the 
possibility of change within the regime was the appointment of Malenkov as linkman 
between Party and Congress. This seemed suggestive of his grooming for the role of 
heir apparent, or as H. A. F. Hohler had it, "deputy Fahrer". 19 However, on the 
future of Stalin's command of policy, Grey made the following comment, 
His [Stalin's] distinctive characteristic is that he has perfected the machine 
which now drives the Soviet Union along the course laid down by Lenin. It 
may be that with the perfecting of the machine a younger generation can be 
given more powers of management, but the direction and the driving will 
surely remain his. 
However, Stalin was not prepared even to make a semblance of concession in 
favour of his lieutenants. During the Congress in the October of 1952 it became 
apparent that Stalin's control had been tightened rather than relinquished to a putative 
successor. "'O Furthermore, in terms of domestic and foreign policy, the Congress 
18 FO 371 100823 NS 10110/2, Minute by H. A. F. Hohler, 28th August, 1952. Hohler was clearly 
not convinced that. as Khrushchev had it, Bolshevik and Communist "now expressed the same 
meaning". 
19 ibid. Hohler went on to suooest that, 
It is equally possible that the decision was motivated by the desire to spare Stalin the ordeal of 
a four hour speech which might have lead him to appear aged and ailing on such an important 
occasion. 
Hohler also made the following comforting general observation about the details of the next Five 
Year Plan which had been announced in tandem with the convocation of the Congress. He thought 
that the priorities outlined 
[slu`, gest that the Soviet Union is continuing a policy of developing its economic and military 
potential rather than concentrating on immediate military striking power. 
20 FO 371 100823 NS 10110/7, Report from Embassy, Moscow to F. O.. 17th October. 1952. On 
Stalin's role at the Congress and position within the Party they made the following comment, 
The Congress has left Stalin in the position he occupied before it bean. It has not conferred 
on G. M. \talenkov any added lustre beyond the fact that he was chosen to speak on behalf of 
the Central Committee. It is probable that Stalin could not have stood the strain of making so 
lone a speech as that '. hich \lalenkov delivered... There was no vestige of independence or 
originality in Nlalenkov's speech. It , %a: a faithful reflection of Stalin's expressed views. Nor 
\cas there any indication that Ntalenkov was heing `, roomed for the succession. The 
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demonstrated that Soviet policy was to carry on as before. The Embassy summed up 
its impressions thus, 
The XlXth Party Congress has produced no surprises as regards Soviet 
internal or foreign policy. For some time to come it seems, there is to be no 
significant change. 
Indeed so apparently redundant did the Congress' proceedings seem that the 
Embassy considered the only reason Stalin had called it was the necessity of obtaining 
its rubber stamp on important changes in the Party Statutes and the methods and 
membership of the Central Committee. 21 These were developments which the Foreign 
Office thought could only further entrench his personal authority. 
The Embassy summed up the implications which the Congress had specifically for 
Soviet foreign policy in a despatch of the 27th October. 22 The Congress, despite its 
prolixity, had been a sterile affair, 
The policies laid down in the previous Congresses and adhered to with 
astonishing fidelity through reverses and successes will remain the same. So 
will the aim, which is, ultimately, world communism and, as a first stage to 
it, communism in the U. S. S. R. ... Stalin has set his 
face against 
reconciliation, and has reaffirmed the old thesis of his party that imperialism 
must be destroyed. 
Stalin gave the impression of a man supremely confident in the rightness of his 
cause and in the particular policies by which it was to be furthered. Although the 
Soviet Union was now thought much less likely to indulge in aggressive adventurism, 
the Embassy concluded that in essence Soviet policy in 1952 was no different from that 
of 1948.23 The Cold War had settled into a stable but bitter rivalry. Given this bleak 
outlook it is little wonder that Churchill's attempts to play the role of peacemaker 
achieved nothing during the first two years of his administration. 
uncertainty in this respect which existed before the Congress has, therefore, not been dispelled. 
On the contrary Stalin's status as sole prophet of the Party had been enhanced by the 
publication on the eve of the Congress of his lengthy "Cor mentaries" and there is still no one 
else who seems able to till this role. 
'I ibid. 
, 
From Grey. Moscow to F. O., 23rd October, 195'. The despatch was FO 37 1 100831 NS 10'6/32 - 
seen by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Sir William Stran`_ went so far as to 
suggest that a letter of thanks ought to be sent to the Embassy for its clanty. Grey went on to make 
the following observations about Soviet policy, 
[T]he holding of the Congress this year is a sign that a long process of stock-taking and 
calculation has reached a culminating point: and that the conclusion has now crystallised that 
there is no immediate emergency and that the cold war has not only paid dividends but that the 
Soviet union can stand it better and loner than can the Western Powers. we must accept an 
indefinite period of economic, political and psychological pressure. It will be applied no less 
ruthlessly... Stalin seems fundamentally to he relying on t long, prods of attrition to gain his 
ends. 
'_3 ibid. 
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MALENKOV TAKES OVER 
The first real encouragement which Churchill received came on the 5th March, 
1953.24 In the Prime Minister's eyes the death of Stalin was a cloud laden with silver 
opportunity. '' %Ialenkov's insistence that there were no international problems which 
could not be settled by negotiation provided further encouragement for Churchill. 
Despite the fact that this sanguine attitude was shared neither by the Americans nor the 
Foreign Office, he continued through 1953 vigorous in his search for a "parley". 
It was very quickly apparent to the British Government that there was to be no one 
successor to Stalin. By April it was clear that authority lay in a Committee of five, of 
whom Malenkov, Molotov and Beria were believed to be the most important. ''6 
Malenkov was considered to be the most influential, but by no means a replacement 
for the dead man. 27 The appointment of Khrushchev to the position of Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 14th March, when it became public 
knowledge after a Government announcement on the 21st, was not considered to have 
weakened Malenkov's position. 28 There was no perception in early 1953 that the latter 
two were to become the main contenders for power, nor that Khrushchev would use 
his new position at the head of the Party Secretariat in Stalin's manner of old. Indeed, 
as we shall see, all the way up to Malenkov's fall in 1955 neither the British nor the 
Americans drew the right conclusions on this point from the available evidence 
Although the softer tone adopted by this new Soviet Government towards the West 
was not merely sneered at by the Embassy in Moscow, the Foreign Office remained 
profoundly doubtful that it presaged any fundamental change. '-9 Their reaction to 
24 PREM 11/540, Sir Alvery Gascoigne attended Stalin's funeral on the 9th 'larch, 1953. In a report 
to London of the 16th March he expressed some doubt as to whether the 5th had actually been the 
date of Stalin's death, not least because it would have `_iven little time for the embalmers to do their 
work. He relayed the following appreciation of the ceremonial, 
To say that I was impressed by the funeral ceremony would be an under-statement. The lying 
in state in the Hall of Columns, while it was a somewhat sinister and barbaric display with no 
religious atmosphere about it, brought back with full force the history of communism and of 
those who have invented this particularly vicious but powerful form of ideology. Stalin will, I 
presume, rank in history as a cruel, cold-blooded and ruthless tyrant. And yet there is no 
gainsaying, the fact that he was a great man... As I looked for the last time on his face, I 
envinced the bitterest feeling of regret that he should have chosen because of the canker of 
Marxism and of his overweening desire for power, the path which has led him and his country 
away from the comity of civilised nations. 
25 See, "Churchill, the Russians and the Western Alliance: the three-power conference at Bermuda. 
December 1953" in The EnQiish Historical Review. Vol. Cl, 1986: p. 894. Young makes clear that 
the Bermuda Conference was as much a French and American attempt to dampen Churchill's 
enthusiasm as it ', as a preparation for a four power conference. 
26 PRENI 11/540, Telegram No. '_S2, from Gascoigne. Moscow to London. 72nd April. 1953. 
i PRE`l 11/540, Despatch from Gascoigne to London, "Analysis of the Changes in the Government 
of the U. S. S. R. Following the Death of Marshal Stalin", 16th %larch. 1953. 
28 PREI 11/540. Quarterly Report, Gascoi_ne, Moscow to London, 13th , -\pril. 1953. 
29 PRE\1 11/429. In a telegram of the 25th . -\pril, 1953 from Moscow, Gascoigne reported on the 
Soviet reaction to Eisenhower's "chance for peace" speech of the 16th April (see Eisenhower, The 
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Churchill's renewed enthusiasm for talks was 
far from positive. Evelyn Shuckburgh 
recorded this unease in his diary, 
The PNI suggested that there should be a Molotov-Eden meeting. A. E. is 
attracted... Past troubles are forgotten in a new atmosphere of optimism. I 
am very disturbed about this. The Russians have not made any concession 
which is more than a trifle [Shuckburgh was referring to the negotiations 
towards a settlement for Korea], but they look as if they are going to adopt a 
much cleverer policy for dividing and weakening the %ýý est than Stalin ever 
30 did. If so we should be cautious and not rush in. ' 
Indeed Shuckburgh records that Eden was initially as eager as Churchill over talks 
with Molotov, to the dismay of the Foreign Office. 31 This alarm was shared by the 
other members of the Government who expressed similar concerns in a meeting of the 
Atlantic Committee of the Cabinet. 32 Gascoigne and the Moscow Embassy were also 
of this opinion. Malenkov's beneficence, they suggested, probably had as much to do 
with the internal weakness of the new regime as anything else. ý3 The West, Gascoiýne 
President, pp. 94-96). The Soviet reaction, he pointed out, was conspicuously lacking of Stalinist 
vitriol. In terms of substance, however, the new Soviet leadership had very little new to offer. This 
last point was underlined in a covering minute of the same day by Sir William Strang for the Prime 
Minister (PREM 11/540). Changes in domestic policy, particularly the release of those condemned 
by Stalin in the "Doctor's Plot", also caused considerable surprise. In the Moscow Embassy 
Quarterly Report for January `larch 1953, dated lath April, Paul Grey made the following addenda 
The apparent departure from attitudes which while Stalin was alive, seemed immutable, is 
astonishing enough. But even more remarkable is that the process of change should have been 
initiated before he was cold in his grave... 
30 Descent to Suez, p. 83; Diary entry for the 24th to 30th March, 1953. Shuckbur; h went on, 
But the idea of a meeting with Molotov becomes exciting. Winston said, "if it is Mol, you go. 
But if it is Mal, it's me. " More punning of this kind appears in minutes from the PM about 
Ike and Egypt. Something about "unwise counsels moving in by the Byraode" [Byraode was 
to become the U. S. Ambassador to Cairo]. I was instructed to obtain the [Foreign] Office 
view on a possible Eden-Molotov meeting. I do so through Strang who organises a meeting 
with Bob Dixon, Paul Mason and Harry Hohler. All are against the idea... 
31 ibid. pp. 84-86. In his diary entry for April Ist Shuckburgh was sufficiently exasperated with 
Churchill's idea to describe it as "whoring after the Russians". Eden was able to summon 
significantly more enthusiasm for the project despite his worsening illness. See also Anthony Eden, 
pp. 361-362. 
32 CAB 134/766, Atlantic (Official) Committee of the Cabinet, "Conclusion of Foreign Office Paper 
on recent Developments in the USSR", 17th April, 1953. See also Vever Despair, p. 817. 
33 PREM 11/540, Despatch from Gascoi`_ne. Moscow to London, 9th April, 1953. Also Telegram 
No. 282. Ga,, coiý_ne. Moscow to London, 22nd April, 1953. In his Despatch Gascoione considered 
the most important moves towards a more relaxed international stance by the Soviets to be the offer 
of their "f=ood offices" with the North Koreans over sticking points in the ne zotiations at 
Panmunjom, acceptance of Dag Hammarskjold as tN Secretary General and certain conciliatory 
gestures in German. He concluded in terms which gave some cheer to Churchill's attitude, 
So little is known of the character and views of `lalenkov and Bena that it would be wise to 
keep an open mind in interpreting Soviet motives since Stalin's death. It is much to soon to 
draw any firm conclusions. But the Soviet internal situation, coupled with the problems of the 
new leaders in consolidating their power in a totalitarian state, could themselves explain the 
new and apparently more cautious trends in Soviet forei`_n policy. there is no evidence of any 
active challenge to the present rulers, but they have )h%, iously found it expedient... to make the 
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concluded in a summary of Soviet policy on the 9th April 1953, would need to handle 
the problem carefully if it were not to get its fingers burnt. 
However, despite the reservations of permanent officials, Churchill was able to 
use his control of the Foreign Office to mischievous effect during Eden's incapacity 
after a botched gall-stone operation on the 12th April, 1953.34 On the 11th May 
Churchill made his famous appeal in a House of Commons speech for a meeting with 
the Soviets, much to the consternation of a recuperating Eden and an unconsulted 
Marquis of Salisbury who at this point was Lord President of the Counsel. 35 
Churchill's speech ended with the following stirring coda, 
If there is not at the summit of the nations the will to win the greatest prize 
and the greatest honour ever offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility 
will fall upon those who now posses the power to decide. At the worst 
participants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At 
the best we might have a generation of peace. 36 
However, illness was to fell Churchill himself before he was able to take his 
initiative any further. 37 On the 23alJune, 1953, during a dinner for the Italian Prime 
Minister, he suffered a stroke which was to put him out of active politics until 
October. It was the Marquis of Salisbury, ironically given his distaste for the speech 
of 11th May, who was left carrying the high hopes which Churchill's rhetoric had 
stirred in the British public as he now took over control of the Foreign Office from 
Churchill. 
carrot more evident than the stick in their handling of the Soviet population and also to adopt 
more fluid and even more conciliatory tactics in foreign policy. Such tactics might well prove 
more dangerous to western cohesion and to the building up and maintenance of the military 
and economic strength of the West than the bludgeoning xenophobia displayed by Stalin since 
1946. but this change of tactics offers an opportunity to the Western Powers, who should meet 
Soviet conciliatory moves half way with a view to reaching: agreement on specific outstanding 
questions. 
34 PREI 11/421, despite also the advice of Eisenhower who, in a telegram of 5th May, 1953, voiced 
reservations very similar to those of the Foreign Office. He expressed particular concern over the 
impact that such a meeting would have on the other Western Allies. There were no indications, in 
Eisenhower's view, that there had been any substantial change in Soviet policy. Some words in the 
final sentence, underlined by the Prime Minister himself, give the key to Churchill's Soviet 
diplomacy; "Naturally the final decision is yours". His search for a Summit between 1951 and 1955 
was very much a private odyssey. 
35 See Anthony Eden, pp. 3622-6 and , Never Despair, pp. 827-833. Salisbury made one of his many 
threats to resin by way of futile retaliation. John Colville recollected in The Fringes of Power, p. 
667, that, 
He [Churchill] made his speech wholly contrary to Foreign Office advice since it was felt that 
a friendly approach to Russia would discoura_'c the European powers working on the theme of 
Western union... I thou, -, ht it a statesmanlike initiative and knew it to be one which was 
entirely Churchill's own. 
36 Never Des pair, pp. 83l -3' 
F See "Churchill, the Russians and the Western Alliance", pp. S93-896 
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Salisbury's estimation of Soviet policy, which he put before the Cabinet before his 
departure to Washington, very much followed the lines of the M oscow Embassy's 
opinion. He commented, 
In the external field there have been many steps to reduce international 
tension, although without affecting basic Soviet long-term policies. These 
steps can be explained by, (i) a desire on the part of the new rulers to acquire 
popularity and to establish their internal position free from external worries; 
(ii) fear of America (the atom bomb, industrial potential, and possible 
impatience); and (iii) a desire to weaken and divide the Western World. 38 
The most significant goodwill gesture had been Soviet support for an armistice in 
Korea, but even here Salisbury did not consider that anything of any substance had 
been conceded to the West. 39 Salisbury was also concerned with instability in the East 
European Satellites, evidenced particularly in East Germany during June. 40 He was 
anxious that they should not be put to any rash use by John Foster Dulles. 41 Despite 
these considerable reservations Salisbury was very much aware that the "initiative" of 
Churchill's 11th May speech had to be maintained; at least that is in so far as the 
public demanded it. The Prime Minister had, essentially, hemmed the Government in. 
Even as Salisbury was preparing to ;o to America there occurred a further 
substantial political convulsion in the Soviet Union. 42 On July 10th, 1953 the Soviet 
38 PREM 11/373, C: v1(53)187,3rd July, 1953; Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State for 
Forei, 
-, n Affairs. 
39 PREM 11/540, Telegram No. 510, from Gascoi`=ne, Moscow to London, 11th July, 1953. In 
preparation for Salisbury's Washington visit Gascoiýjne reported on Soviet policy. He emphasised, 
once a, -vain, that much of the 
"softer" approach to internal and external matters was born of the new 
regimes attempt to entrench its position. Internal liberalisation was largely to be explained by its 
anodyne effect on the Soviet population. Ltalenkov's international concessions were described by 
Gascoivne as "cheap lifts". The situation in Eastern Europe was, though, considerably more 
unstable, largely because of the strains of forced Stalinisation and Industrialisation, the pace of 
which had been considerably increased to meet Western rearmament. This was particularly so in the 
case of East Germany. Here, if anywhere, was the success of Western policy which Dulles had 
been vaunting in America. 
40 On the East German disturbances see Arnulf Baring, Uprising in East Germany: June 17th, 1953 
41 ibid. Salisbury outlined Anglo-American differences in respect of the satellites in the following 
way, although some Foreign Office officials took another view (FO 371 106527 NS 1021/97), 
making a prescient warning, 
The main difference between ourselves and the American Administration is that the American, 
no doubt partly influences by their different domestic situation, have hitherto wanted to let 
events behind the Iron Curtain develop further before embarking on any high-level talks. 
There also seems now to be a new and more dangerous American tendency, which has its roots 
in the Republican election campaign and was illustrated by a recent statement by Mr. Dulles, 
to interpret the situation behind the Iron Curtain as already very shaky and therefore to 
advocate new although unspecified measures to encourage or even promote the early liberation 
of the satellite countries. It is my intention to resist American pressure of this kind. A policy 
of pin-prick is calculated to exasperate the Russians and is most unlikely to help the unhappy 
peoples of the occupied countries. The last thin,, we want to do is to bait the Russian and 
satellite Governments into taking, violent measures against them. 
42 On the Allied Foreign Minister's meeting in Washington ACC Churchill, the Russians and the 
Western Alliance" and also FRUS 1952-54, Vol. V. pp. 1607-1696. 
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Government announced the arrest of Beria. 43 In the immediate aftermath of the event 
neither the British nor American observers in Moscow were, very sensibly, prepared to 
stick their heads and predict the long term consequences of the event 44) gjthough 
Churchill was eager to put it into as rosy a light as possible. 45 In terms of its 
significance to Soviet internal affairs, even after Beria's execution in December, the 
matter remained largely opaque. 46 However in the area of external policy, the dust 
seemed to settle altogether more obligingly. 47 
On the 8th August, 1953 Malenkov gave a substantial speech to the Supreme 
Soviet which included detailed coverage of internal and external affairs. 48 Nlalenkov's 
most startling revelation concerned the development of a Soviet Hydrogen Bomb. By 
the end of August Paul Grey was bold enough to send a prognosis of Soviet policy 
back to Whitehall. 49 This analysis went substantially beyond defining Soviet 
motivations in terms of the new regime's entrenchment. 50 In it he grappled with what 
appeared to be a contradiction in Soviet policy. Soviet rhetoric continued to promote 
negotiation whilst they effectively rebuffed any concrete proposals for talks which the 
West put forward. Having allowed for an amount of confusion on the part of the 
Kremlin after events in Eastern Europe and the fall of Beria, Grey concluded, 
Malenkov's speech of August 8 indicated that the Kremlin has a perfectly 
clear, consistent and sensible general strategy. Like Stalin, the new 
Government wish to keep out of major wars and to devote their energies to 
increasing the strength of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, 
including East Germany. They seem to have realised that this policy was 
threatened by the extreme degree of international tension which Stalin's 
policies provoked in the last years of his life, by the existence of a "focus of 
war" in Korea and by the danger of a revival of German armed might in 
Europe. The new Government have taken three decisions: first to reduce 
43 Both the American Embassy and the British were well aware that Beria's fate had been sealed at 
least 12 days before. Bohlen thought that the 27th June was the most likely date. see FRUS 1952- 
54, Vol. VIII, p. 1207 and PREM 11/540, Gascoi-gne Telegram No. 510. 
44 FRUS 1952-54, Vol. VIII, p. 1207 and PREM 11/540, Telegram No. 507, from Gascoigne, 
Moscow to London, 11th July, 1953. Both Ambassadors considered it possible that a Stalin style 
purge would follow Beria's dismissal. There was further speculation among the diplomatic corps in 
Moscow that Beria had been the main agent of liberalisation. This view was not positively 
supported in either the British or American Embassies. 
45 , 'ever Despair, pp. 862-863 
46 FO 3-71/106519 NS 1011/59 
47 PREM 111540, Minute by Evelyn Shuckburgh for John Colville, 14th August, 1953. Shuckburgh 
thought a note on the rise of Khrushchev should be brought to the Prime Minister's attention as this 
phenomenon was "one of the more important recent developments inside Russia". Although the 
Embassy Quarterly Report for July to September, 1953 (PREM 11/540) emphasised that the Party 
Secretariat remained firmly under the control of the Presidium. 
48 FRC'S 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 1210, In a telegram of 8th August, 1953 to Washington Bohlen 
described it as "certainly the most important and realistic statement of current Soviet policy since 
Stalin'- death. " Apart from any thin; --Ise \lalenkov hinted at the Soy iet development of a 
Hydrogen bonmb. 
4a PREI-1 1/540. Despatch from Grey, Moscow to London, 24th . August, 1953. 
50 FRUS 1052-34 Vol. VIII. In his telegram of 10th August Bohlen thought Mtalenkov's speech a 
confirmation that changes in policy since March stemmed from "sources deeper than simple 
manoeuvre or even function of palace intri`, ue. " 
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tension; second, to liquidate the focus of war in Korea; and third, if at all 
possible, to prevent the revival of German militarism. 51 
The Soviet Government had already achieved a reduction in tension and an end to 
the fighting in Korea. Their main interests were now to find a political settlement of 
the Korean war, control atomic weapons and stop the rearmament of Germany. Such 
vacillations as they suffered were over tactics rather than strategy. Although there was 
some difference of opinion in the Northern department over the detail of Grey's 
report, there was no dissension from the main lines of his analysis. 52 Furthermore to 
Sir William Strang it came as the most melodic of music, in appropriately warring 
disharmony with Churchill's romantic attitude towards summit talks. 53 
To translate the essence of Grey's view into the language of modern politics, the 
new leaders in the Kremlin thought that Stalin had erred not in the fundamentals of 
policy, but in his use of rather dowdy "packaging". 54 This judgement has, I think, 
stood the test of time. For the Soviets, so the British Embassy concluded, negotiations 
were advantageous only within very strictly defined limits. 55 And that advantage was 
for them to be had at the expense of both Western cohesion and the success of the 
E. D. C. 56 
By the arrival in Moscow of the new British Ambassador, Sir William Hayter, 
Grey's impression of Soviet policy had been further underlined. On the 24th 
November, Hayter sent the Embassy's view of Soviet policy to London by way of 
contribution to the preparations for the three power meeting (Britain, France and the 
United States) at Bermuda in December 1953. 
51 PREM 11/540, Grey's despatch of 24th August was received with considerable approval in 
Whitehall, so much so that Sir William Strang brought it to the Prime Minister's attention. Minute 
of 3rd September, 1953 by Mr. T. Grady for Mr. A. A. D. Montague Browne. 
52 FO 371 106527 NS 1021/99, Minutes by H. A. F. Hohler of 27/8/53, P. Mason of 27/8/53 and F. 
Roberts of ? 8/7/53. 
53 See footnote 50, also footnote 4. 
54 PREM1 11/540, Grey further developed this view in a despatch from Moscow to London, of the 5th 
October, 1953. In it he discussed the ideolo,, ical dimension of Soviet foreign policy in more detail 
and came to the conclusion that, 
At present, in fact, the evidence suggests that, where Malenkovism departs from Stalinism, it 
is in the direction, not of innovation, but of a reaffirmation of traditional principles neglected 
or believed to he neglected or wrongly applied by Stalin in his last years. 
55 This is contrary to the faith placed in Churchill's reading of Soviet policy by M. Steven Fish in his 
article ". After Stalin's Death: The Anglo-American debate over a New Cold War" in Diplomatic 
History, 1986 (10: 1). His belief that %talenkov fought alone in the Kremlin for detente seems 
similarly ill founded. British and American observers were of the firm opinion that the Soviet 
Government acted collectively throughout 1953 to 1955. Indeed, in 1953 the most likely candidate 
for the title of lonely liberal was, ironically, Beria. (PREM 11/540, Telegram No. 580, Gascoigne, 
Moscow to London, 10th August. 1953). If Dr Fish's analysis is right. then the fundamental flaw in 
British diplomacy lay in its perception of Soviet policy rather than in its execution. See John Young 
in "Churchill the Russians and the Western Alliance" for a judicious comment on the "missed 
opportunity" debate. 
56 On Britain and the E. D. C. see Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policý' for West German Rearmament 1950- 
195i 
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The first important point which seems to me to be established is that there has 
been no real change in this country's foreign policy as a result of Stalin's 
death... It is now clear that the new Soviet Government still adhere to the 
twin policies of consolidating their own extended empire and of undermining 
the rest of the world. They talk of co-existence, but they visualise it as the 
co-existence of the snake and the rabbit. ', 
Hayter went on to emphasise that "the only real change is a change of method. " 
Stalin's abrasiveness had become counterproductive and consequently "other and more 
subtle methods of weakening the Western World are henceforward to be adopted. " 
H. A. F. Hohler noted that Hayter's views, which were hardly startling, were in very 
close accord with those of the Northern Department and it was in this vein that the 
Foreign Office advised the British delegation at Bermuda about Soviet foreign 
policy. 58 This was advice which Churchill did not appear eager to benefit from whilst 
flying to Bermuda, preferring as he did to read C. S. Forester rather than Government 
briefs. 59 Given that the collective wisdom of the Foreign Office was little more than a 
cold douche to his expectations this is not surprising. 60 
1953 ended with little in the way of refreshment for Churchill in his search for a 
summit. Indeed the concensus view of the British Government was that underneath the 
new cordiality, nothing very much had changed in Soviet policy at all. Such change as 
there had been was quite possibly even dangerous in the effect it might have on 
Western unity and public opinion. The Soviet acceptance of talks at the Foreign 
Minister level on the 26th November, 1953, was interpreted by the Foreign Office in 
this context. 61 In particular its attempt to place World security on the agenda was 
considered little more than a ploy to reduce the potential for a Soviet embarrassment 
over Germany whilst allowing them maximum room for mischief. Churchill's 
disregarded brief explained Soviet policy thus, 
They have evidently decided since the riots of 17th June and Adenauer's 
victory in the West German elections that they cannot afford to relax their 
own position in East Germany and at the same time to step up their diplomatic 
and propaganda offensive against the Western alliance, playing especially on 
French fears of a rearmed Germany. 62 
57 FO 371 106527 NS 1021/118, Despatch from Sir William Hayter, Moscow to London, 24th 
November, 1953- 
58 FO 371 106527 NS 1021/118, Minute by H. A. F. Hohler 3/ 12'53. Shuckburgh consigned similar 
reservations about Soviet policy to his diary on the Ist December, 1953; Descent to Suez p. 111. 
59 Never Despair, p. 916. The novel was aptly titled Death to the French. 
60 FO 371 106542 NS 1075114 and 15. The final revision, after the Soviet note of 26th November, 
saw the Soviet regime after Bena's fall as stable. The course which it had adopted, despite its 
consumerist and less extreme manner, was in essence i continuation of Stalin's policy. 
61 FO 371 111669 NS 101313, the opinion of the . anxncan Ambassador was very similar, see FRUS 
1951-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1220-1` 22 
63 FO 371 106542 NS 1075/15. 
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The Bermuda Conference itself was an inconclusive and disappointing affair. 
Talks with the Soviets at Berlin for January 1954 were agreed by the Western powers, 
but that could equally have been done by less glamorous means. 63 Bermuda is perhaps 
more interesting because of the light it throws on inter-allied relations than any 
revelation of attitudes towards the Soviet Union. 64 
1954 was to prove a more active year in terms of conference diplomacy, although 
it was to be through Eden's approach rather than Churchill's. 65 At Berlin and more 
especially at Geneva Eden's flair for detailed negotiation and conciliation was to be 
used at its best. However, the impact which this diplomatic contact had upon the 
British perception of the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy was very limited. 
FOREIGN MINISTERIAL MEETINGS 
After considerable discussion between the four powers on apparently unimportant 
issues such as the location and timing of a Foreign Ministers Conference, agreement 
was reached. 66 It was finally settled that it would take place in Berlin from 25th 
January to 19th February, 1954. The conference lived up to the limited expectations 
which the British had of it. Much of their planning for negotiations with the Soviets 
was concerned with how best to turn them to the advantage of the E. D. C. Little hope 
was expressed as to the probability of achieving a respectable settlement. Indeed Eden 
was quite explicit about the aim of British policy in a Cabinet Memorandum of 11th 
January 1954 on "The Problem of Security in Europe". 
The Russians have built up a most effective security system in Europe. Their 
basic objective now is the withdrawal of the U. S. A. from Europe. 67 Despite 
N. A. T. O., the Western Powers have not yet completed an effective security 
63 A full record of the conference proceedings can be found at FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IV, pp. 1710- 
1837. 
64 For detail on the Bermuda Conference see "Churchill, the Russians and the Western Alliance". 
Also, Never Despair, pp. 916-942 and Descent to Suez, pp. 110-116. 
65 PREM 11i668, P%1/53/334, Memorandum by Eden for Churchill. 25th November, 1953. In this 
memo Eden put the case for negotiating from specifics to general issues, 
If we were to press prematurely for a Five-Power meeting we should risk increasing our 
difficulties with the Americans over the Far East and thus playing into the Russian's hands. 
But if we can agree to work towards such a meeting by stages, beginning with the Korea 
Conference, there is a real chance of our being able to gradually overcome them. 
66 PREM 11/664, considerable energy was expended on debating whether the conference should take 
place half in the West of the city and half in the East, the Soviet view, or a quarter in each of the 
different W. W. II allied zones, the Western view. In the end the West conceded. Churchill, in a 
minute of the 14th January, 194, quoted Bismarck in support of the "sensible party giving way". 
This advice, unacknowledged, found its way into Eden's memoirs, Full Circle, pp. 61-62. Eden's 
account manages to -, 
tve the impression that the Soviets too were forced to compromise on their 
position which was. in tact, not the case. 
67 ibid. Eden predicted, "The Russians are likely to pose as the champions of "Europe for the 
Europeans", including themselves but not the Americans". This was very much the line which 
Molotov-. diplomacy was to take in the wake of the Berlin conference, through to the entry of West 
Germany into NATO. 
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system of their own. It must be completed by associating Western Germany 
in the common effort and so denying the potential resources of a reunited 
Germany to the Soviet Union and preventing a reunited Germany from 
playing of the Western Powers against the Russians or vice versa. 68 
In line with this strategy Eden's recommendations for Britain's tactics at Berlin were 
more concerned with how best to wrong foot the Soviets than coming to an agreement 
with them, 
The main positive Western objectives in Berlin will be to make progress 
towards a German Peace Treaty and to conclude the Austrian Treaty. An 
important negative objective will be to ensure that French ratification of the 
E. D. C. treaty is not further delayed by the Berlin Conference. We must 
avoid creating the impression that we (and more particularly the Americans) 
are in such a hurry to get on with the E. D. C. that we are not aiming at 
serious negotiation on Germany and Austria. We must therefore establish the 
position that we, unlike the Russians, have a practical plan for German 
reunification, which would produce a representative all-German Government 
with which alone a peace treaty can be negotiated. 69 
Inevitably, Eden recommended that the break up of negotiations should be over the 
Soviet refusal to agree to free elections in Germany rather than on their pet issue, the 
removal of American military bases from Europe. 70 
Evelyn Shuckburgh, who accompanied Eden as his Private Secretary, expressed 
his approval of British policy in the lead up to Berlin. 71 He thought the biggest 
problem that they had to deal with was caused by Churchill's preoccupation with 
summitry and the false expectations in the public which it seemed to have aroused. 
Shuckburgh's disdain was, perhaps, a little misplaced as Churchill himself was in 
complete agreement that the West could not afford to sacrifice the commitment of 
Western Germany to the E. D. C., or failing that NATO, in the pursuit of a settlement 
68 PREM 11/664, C(54)10,11th January, 1954; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. Eden went on to make allowance for the Soviet need for reassurance as to the defensive 
character of the E. D. C. However, the fundamental point remained, the West could not afford to 
come to an agreement over Germany which sacrificed the opportunity of adding German military 
strength to that of NATO. 
69 PREM 11,664, Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, 11th January, 1954. Eden concluded as 
follows, 
This analysis may seem rather sombre. But I do not wish to leave my colleagues under any 
misapprehension over the difficulties and clan-gers of this meetin-, -,, 
desirable as it is as a 
contrihution to the reduction in world tension and to a less abnormal relationship with the 
Soviet Union. 
70 PREI 11/664. \lcmorandum by the Foreign Secretary. After a conversation with the Soviet 
. Ambassador 
in London. Malik, on the 23rd December, 1953, Eden noted the Russian's expression 
of concern for Europe. This Eden interpreted in the context of their attempt to brand American 
bases as an alien blight on the continent. See Anthony Eden, p. 3,5 for Robert Rhodes lames' 
positive response to Eden's positional diplomacy. 
71. Descent to Suez, p. 12S: for Bohlen's preview of the Conference see FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 
pp. 1.3- L25. 
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at Berlin. 72 In essence Churchill's attitude towards Soviet diplomacy differed with the 
Foreign Office in terms of tactics rather than strategy. No-one suffered under the 
illusion that the Soviets were at all likely to respect Western interests. Ultimately there 
was less difference between Churchill and the Foreign Office than some might 
imagine. The biggest problem was Churchill's fundamentally romantic approach to 
foreign policy. 
It was, indeed, on the issue of free all-German elections before unification that the 
Conference stumbled. There was simply no way that the Soviets were prepared to 
Lose their control over the eastern half of the country merely to watch the whole 
become a powerful addition to the west. 73 Equally, even Churchill asserted that a 
neutralised, united Germany would be a substantial blow to western interests and 
security in Europe. There was in fact no common ground to afford room for Eden's 
undoubted diplomatic charm to come into operation. 74 His, and Churchill's, policy 
devolved into an attempt at damage limitation, in particular the salvaging of 
Ministerial talks on Korea and the Far East from the wreck. 
The Berlin Conference was little more fruitful as a guide to Soviet domestic 
politics and in particular the relationship between individual leaders within the "new 
team". On this issue Eden found Molotov to be uncommunicative, 
I have tried in my dinner conversations with Molotov to penetrate a little his 
personal relations with Malenkov... I must confess that I have not got very 
far. He has never once volunteered a reference to Malenkov himself and when 
I have done so, though perfectly correct in his comments, he has shown no 
particular enthusiasm. 75 
Eden suggested this might merely have to do with a lack of personal warmth between 
the two Soviet Statesmen, though this did not tally with the Moscow Embassy's 
72 PRENI 11/664, Telegram from Churchill, London, to Eden, Berlin, 27th January, 1954. The main 
difference between the two men was in their attitude towards the timing of conference diplomacy. 
Churchill made the following comment in response to Eden's reportage, 
I find it hard to believe that any settlement can be reached about Germany. We must stand by 
the principle of a German continent either to E. D. C. or amend NATO. This alone `! fives the 
West the chance of obtaining the necessary strength by creating a European or internationalised 
German army but not a national one. I think we are bound in good faith to Adenauer to bring 
this about and we should in no circumstances agree to Germany being, reduced to a neutralised, 
defenceless hiatus which would only be the preliminary to another Czechoslovakian process. I 
Lind it hard to believe that the Soviets will relinquish their grip on Eastern Germany if the 
above is true. 
,3 On the details of negotiations and for Eden's reports on Conference meetings and his own 
conversations with Molotov see PREM 11/664. Also Full Circle pp. 87-89. 
74 Descent to Suez. P. 131. 
75 PREM 11,665, Berlin Telegram No. 78, Eden to Churchill, 3rd February, 19 4. Eden went on, 
with blithe disregard for the rough patch in Miolotov's relationship with Stalin , vhich was endured in 
the years immediately before the latter's death. 
I do not mean to suggest by this that his relations with `lalenkov are ether than -, ood, 
but it 
may be that they ýýtre Ieýý close personal friends than we know that Molotov and Stalin were. 
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reading of the relationship. 76 An alternative explanation, which Havter endorsed, was 
that Molotov considered foreign affairs to be his exclusive province and thus resented 
Eden's references to Malenkov. Eden's telegram continued, 
He clearly has a very free hand and has never even hinted in any of our talks, 
public or private, at the need for reference home. I suppose he could be 
regarded now as the elder statesman of the Kremlin. 
However, there was no apprehension, on the part of Eden, that there were any serious 
divisions within the Soviet leadership. At least there were none which might be 
inferred from the pursed lips of Molotov. 
Once it became clear that the British Government's lack of expectation over the 
Berlin Conference was to prove entirely justified, Churchill's main concern was that 
his hopes of summit diplomacy should not be dealt a death blow by a complete 
breakdown in negotiations. 77 His attitude towards talks on the Far East was dominated 
by this consideration. He advised Eden in a telegram of 27th January that, 
The great thing is to avoid a deadlock with all the disappointment and danger 
that would flow from it. For this purpose the institution of a Five Power 
Conference, as defined, could do no harm and might do much ýood. 78 
At least according to Evelyn Shuckburgh's diary, Eden's diplomacy was heavily 
laced with personal vanity. A desire to cut a peace brining dash contributed 
substantially in his eagerness to achieve some "success" from a conference which was 
clearly deadlocked over Germany. Hence his passion for talks about East Asia. 
Shuckburgh expressed misgivings regarding the effect on Dulles of this potentially 
impolitic enthusiasm. 79 
76 PREM 11/668, Moscow Telegram No. 883, Hayter to F. 0., November 28th, 1953. Hayter had 
enjoyed the first official call of any non-communist Ambassador on Mlalenkov. Hayter thought, 
"relations between Malenkov and Molotov seemed excellent". 
77 FO 371 111690 NS 1051/6, Minute by F. Roberts to Ivone Kirkpatrick, Berlin, January 29th, 
1954. This is an interesting sideline on the information which was and which was not passed onto 
Churchill regarding the Soviet attitude to him personally. It would seem that the Foreign Office 
was not prepared to challenge comfortable delusions which informed Churchill's search for a 
summit despite their irritation with him. 
I think you should know that Molotov's attitude towards the prime Minister when we dined 
with the Secretary of State on January 27th was in no way cordial. He was of course perfectly 
polite when the Secretary of State gave him the normal `_reetin`s from the Prime Minister, but 
he immediately went on to say, with some feeling, that Sir Winston Churchill had had some 
very hard things to say about the Soviet Union after the war, as any reader of Volume VI of 
his memoirs could see for himself... The Secretary of State had thought of passing this 
information on to Jock Colville but decided not to do so. We thout-, ht however that you should 
be aware or it and that it should be on the record in the Foreign Office. 
78 ibid. Churchill went on in this telegram to insist that the search for better relations with the Soviets 
was not incompatible with + policy of increasim_ western strength and unity. 
,9 Descent to Sue" p. 133. the problem was essentially the visceral attitude of the Americans, 
domestically as much as __overn mentally, to China, 
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Indeed. Eden seems to have spent more time at Berlin smooth talking with 
Molotov than with the Secretary of State. However, it would be wrong to make too 
much of this point. Eden was well aware that on the issue of a conference on the Far 
East the Americans proved as ready to make concessions as the Soviets, if indeed not 
more so. On February 12th he reported to Churchill on the issue, 
This is becoming a very difficult question. There is no doubt that Molotov 
has gone some way to meet us... I am sure that Dulles has gone as far as he 
can in accepting the French Text [setting out the basis for great power talks 
on the Far East] It fully meets all our requirements and is defensible in all 
respects. I was much heartened when Dulles eventually accepted it. If 
Molotov will do the same all will be well. But I fear that he will not. Then I 
think we should stand with Americans on French text. 80 
Eden clearly conceived his role in regard of a Far East Conference as that of a 
facilitator. This was not the last time he was, flatteringly enough, to see himself in a 
bridging role between the Soviets and Americans. 81 Indeed the first substantial 
meeting of east and west since the break down of the post war Foreign Minister's 
Conferences ended with a certain chuminess between the British and Soviet 
delegations. Despite Eden's initial impression of the Soviet party as "an inhuman 
platoon", by the end of the conference Soviet affability left a considerable impression 
upon the British. 82 Shuckburgh recorded, 
Tonight the conference is over, and no feathers lost, to my great surprise. 
Molotov came round through our seats at the head of all his gang, and shook 
us all by the hand. It must be admitted that after being shut up all day with 
these people for nearly a month one has a sort of fellow- feeling for them 
which was absent before, and I suppose that this is all to the good. 83 
I am worried about A. E. 's attitude towards the Far Eastern business. He is so keen to "Fet a 
conference, so as to have some "success" to vo home with, that he seems to forget how terribly 
danVgerous this topic is for Dulles. 
Interestingly, Eden, no doubt with a scapegoat for Suez already in mind, delivers some home truths 
re`warding Dulles' behaviour in his account of the Berlin Conference, Full Circle, pp. 62-64. Also 
see James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina. pp. 43-44. The level of tension 
between Eden and Dulles was not as high as Eden might have liked in retrospect, see Full Circle. 
80 PREM 111665, Berlin Telegram No. 156, from Eden to Churchill, 12th February, 1954. The key 
issue was the status of Chinese representation at such a conference. The Soviets were insisting that 
the Chinese be accorded full great power status; the Americans were not prepared to afford such 
prestige to the "illetntimate" People's Republic. A Compromise formula courtesy of Molotov was 
eventually agreed on. 
S1 Full Circle. p. 13ý. 
52 ibid. p . 
65. 
33 Descent to Sue;, p. 13 3. PRE .1 I1j 664. Churchill and Eden expressed this in their own inimitably 
precious way in tele rams of he 15th and 16th February respectively. On the best atmosphere in 
which to end the negotiations at Berlin Churchill su_'ggested. "... sd au revoir not good-bye. " Eden 
replied. "1 think this %%ill he the mood. though perhaps do , vidanie . '. ill he the expression. " 
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However, despite such bonhomie, Eden reported to the Cabinet on the 22nd of 
February that the Berlin Conference had changed nothing. 84 The Soviet attitude 
towards Europe and Germany had been one of "extreme rigidity". This Eden thought 
was a due to the weakness of their position, they could not afford to make any 
concessions even over Austria because they feared that one accommodation would lead 
inexorably to many more. All in all the future did not hold out much hope of 
improvement, although due to the lack of "bitterness" the discussions had, at least, not 
been positively harmful. Eden was indeed surprisingly sanguine about the Soviet 
attitude towards the E. D. C., although he did highlight the strength of the French 
delegation under Bidault in resisting "Russian blandishments and bullying ". s' Western 
unity had been maintained despite Molotov's efforts at "wedge driving". Soviet 
foreign policy offered the West nothing new despite its apparently greater tlexibility. 86 
Molotov's considered comment on the Berlin Conference after his return to 
Moscow offered little more joy to the British. Sir William Hayter's report on the 
Soviet press coverage of Molotov's public pronouncement's on Berlin concluded in 
the following vein. 87 The Soviet position on German unification had been maintained 
immutable with flourishes contra German rearmament. Furthermore, 
Molotov tacitly admits that aim of "Soviet diplomacy by conference" is not to 
reach agreement with his western colleagues but gradually to influence 
Western public opinion. "No Ministers" he says "can reject the idea of the 
collective security of the peoples of Europe... this idea... will constantly find 
new paths to the hearts of millions of people. " 
This facet of Soviet diplomacy was for Hayter the key to understanding the 
barrage of Notes, largel y concerned with European problems, which the Soviet 
84 CAB 128/27 Part 1, [0th Conclusions, Minute 1,22nd February, 1954. 
85 ibid. He commented, 
He did not think, however, that the Russians had any real fear of the Germans in the 
immediate future or that they would regard the ratification of the European Defence 
Community as a serious threat demanding any form of military counter action. It was even 
possible that M. Molotov had recognised that the E. D. C. was itself an insurance against 
future German ag`gression. 
86 PREM1 11/649. F. O. Telegram No. 969 to Washington Embassy, March 16th 1954. On the 
possibility that Molotov might see fit to raise the issue of Germany at the Geneva Conference Eden 
was quite adamant, 
There is in . ny view nothing to be gained by reopening the exhaustive Berlin discussions on 
Germany and Austria unless the Russians are prepared to modify their position. Of this there 
is no sign whatever. Indeed, the Russians themselves would seem to have no interest in 
resuming, such discussions in the near future. since- they could only confirm Western public 
opinion in the impression left by the Berlin Conference that Soviet policy on Germany and 
. -\ustna \. as entirely rigid. 
S PRE\t 11,6c)4, Mýýýýo\ý Trlr_rarn No. _09, from Hayter to F. 0., 5th larch, 1954. 
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Government issued during the rest of 1954. On the Note of 27th March, 1954.88 He 
commented, 
7Molotov presumably has no serious hope that his proposals will be accepted by the 
Governments to which they are addressed. Recent personal attacks on Dulles, and to a 
lesser extent yourself are sufficient evidence of this. 
the Note is clearly addressed to 
the peoples over the heads of their Governments and is designed to create confusion in 
the latter's foreign policy. It has also of course an eye on the forthcoming French 
debate about the E. D. C. It is in fact a propaganda document. 89 
This commentary set the tone for Britain's reaction to Molotov's Note campaign 
throughout 1954.90 It was clearly interpreted by the Moscow Embassy in the terms of 
a traditional socialist appeal above the heads of Governments to the people of the 
West. This was also Eden's explanation of the emphasis placed by the Soviets on their 
European Security proposals made first at the Berlin Conference itself. 91 Molotov had, 
it seemed, his fire focused upon the convoluted process of ratification which the 
E. D. C. treaty was undergoing in Western parliaments, particularly and successfully 
that of France. 927' Little wonder then that the British, always excepting Churchill's 
personal diplomacy, increasingly emphasised the need for tokens of Soviet sincerity 
either over an Austrian treaty or Germany before a Summit conference could be 
contemplated. 
Ironically, it was Molotov's obsession with all European Conferences which let 
Churchill of the hook in the summer of 1954. Churchill's attempt to single handedly 
start the summit process while returning from his visit to Washington of late June and 
early July almost proved the undoing of his Government. 93 Eden's complicity in the 
88 PREM 11/670, Moscow Telegram No. 274, from Hayter to F. 0., 27th March, 1954. Contrary to 
Molotov's reputation for greyness, Hayter reported that, 
He informed me with a cheerful smile that the Note was principally concerned with American 
participation in his proposed European Security Treaty and Soviet participation in NATO... 
LMolotov's campaign against German Rearmament was not without its absurdist moments. 
89 PREM 11/670, Moscow Telegram No. 280, from Hayter to F. 0., Ist April, 1954. 
90 For Example, PREM 11/670, Eden's Minute to Churchill PM/54/115 of 30th July, 1954; Hayter's 
Telegram No. 1030 of October ? 3rd, 1954; Kirkpatrick's Minute to Churchill PLIiIK/54 143 of 
20th August, 1954, in which Kirkpatrick reports on the Tripartite Drafting group which had been 
set up to discuss a reply to one of many Soviet notes. Interestingly. Kirkpatrick refers to Eden's 
instructions to push for an inclusion in the Western response of reference to the necessity for a "sign 
of good faith" on the part of the "Russians", either an Austrian State Treaty or agreement to free 
elections in Germany before unification. Also FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VII; pp. 1232-1235. The 
American opinion was very much in accord with the British. 
91 PRE`1 11'649, F. O. Telegram No. 969 to Washington Embassy, 16th March, 1954. 
[TJhe Russians have shown some desire to focus increasing public attention in the West upon 
the Soviet European Secunty proposals tabled at Berlin. This however is presumably aimed at 
Western public opinion rather than Western Governments and designed to encourage French 
opponents of the E. D. C. 
92 For a detailed discussion of the British role in West German rearmament see Saki Dokrill. Britain's 
Policy for West German Rearmcunent 19.50-195-5. 
93 See The ForeiQ>i Poiic . of Churchill's Peaceuime Administration, pp. 67-70 and Never Despair pp. 
1012-1040. 
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matter had more to do with his hunger to succeed Churchill than any faith in the 
soundness of the initiative. The Cabinet, almost to a man, were against any unilateral 
approach to Moscow. Molotov's Note to the Western Powers of 24th July offered 
Churchill the means to escape the hole into which he had willfully jumped. 9`ý In a 
Telegram of July 26th Churchill informed Molotov that the Soviet proposal for a 
formal conference to discuss European Security superseded his suggestion of an 
informal meeting of Heads of Governments. 95 Churchill, however, did not go on to 
outline the domestic political considerations which disposed him so favourably to this 
particular twist of Soviet diplomacy. Molotov was, apparently, too set upon his own 
path to notice the advantage which might have been made from the stumbling of 
others. 
THE 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE 
East West relations in Europe were little advantaged by the absence of Stalin. Indeed, 
if anything the stalemate became even more arid during 1954. Nlalenkov's comments 
in 1953 upon the efficacy of negotiation were beginning to ring more than a little 
hollow. This dismal situation was to stand out in even starker contrast against the 
relative success of negotiations over Indo-china. 
The main subject on the agenda of the Geneva negotiations which opened on the 
26th April, 1954 was a settlement for Korea. 96 However, it was the situation in 
Vietnam which stole the limelight. 97 Not only was the French position in the war 
against the Vietnamese Communists becoming critical, but, unlike their position over 
Korea, the Soviets were willing to exert their influence in order to achieve a 
settlement. 98 From the moment the Conference began to consider Indo-China it 
became apparent to the British delegation that Molotov wanted a success. 99 
Eden's approach at Geneva, both in 1954 and 1955 was much concerned with 
what might be termed dinner-time diplomacy. On the evening of the 5th of May Eden 
94 Anthony Eder, p. 381 
95 PREM 11/670. Telegram No. 987, from P. M. to Molotov, 26th July, 1954. 
96 For a detailed examination of the Geneva Conference, 1954 and the role played by Eden, see James 
Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina. Cable combines the advantage of access to 
British Government records with his personal experience as a member of the British delegation. For 
a more American view see Robert F. Randle, Geneva, 1954. Also there is the vast accumulation of 
American documents within FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. XVI. 
97 Evelyn Shuckburgh's diary provides an illuminating and critical account of the First stau of the 
Conference. He accompanied Eden as Private Secretary, leaving on the 14th May to take up 
another Foreign Office position, Descent to Suez, pp. 168-214. 
98 According to Khrushchev's memoirs it was the French who were doing most of the compromising. 
Khrushchev's account is, however, a little unclear. Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 481-483. 
99 Although from the start Molotov seems to have turned on the charm. Evelyn Shuckburgh even took 
to referring to him as "Auntie Mol" in the privacy of his diary, 
One is in danger of thinking, of Molotov as a sort of benevolent middle-man - Auntie - he 
smiles so nicely and talks so __-tntly to us. 
Descent to Suez, pp. 181-182. 
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had one of his most successful prandial sessions with Molotov and choice members of 
the Soviet delegation, including Andrei Gromyko. On the following day Eden sent a 
report back to the Foreign Office, 
M. Molotov dined with me last night... We had a friendly and useful talk. 
ANI. Molotov was in an unusually relaxed mood, and talked freely on a number 
of subjects unconnected with the present Conference... On matters 
concerning the Conference itself he was also most amenable. I do not think 
that throughout the evening he disagreed with anything that I said in the 
course of a frank discussion of our problems here, nor did he ever seek to 
make a merely debating point. His whole attitude was in contrast to our 
experience of him in Berlin. He seemed genuinely anxious that the 
Conference should succeed, and also considerably worried over the situation 
in Indo-China. 100 
Eden went on to conclude that although such amity could be interpreted as another 
symptom of Molotov's attempt to drive "wedges" between the Western Powers, no- 
one from the British delegation who was present at the dinner thought such a shallow 
motive adequate explanation for Molotov's enthusiasm. However, this was not the 
impression that Evelyn Shuckburgh recorded in his diary. Indeed Shuckburgh was 
concerned that the success of Eden's dinner was largely due to overmuch denigration 
of the Americans. 101 Eden had spent much of his time with the Soviets emphasising 
their joint role as moderating influences, the British on the Americans/French and the 
Soviets on the Chinese/Vietnamese. 
Even despite the positive outlook for Indo-China negotiations the Conference was 
not to come to a settlement without considerable time and effort. 102 The Soviet, 
Chinese and Vietnamese delegations required all the tact and accommodation which 
Eden had at his command. However, throughout Eden was keenly aware that success 
was predicated upon the attitude of both the Soviets and the Chinese. 103 In Eden's 
correspondence with London throughout the Conference up to its closing session on the 
21st July, 1954, the fruitfulness of his cooperation with Molotov plays a fundamental 
100 FO 371 112060 DF 10711446G, Geneva Telegram No. 161, Eden to F. 0., 6th May, 1954. 
101 Shuckbur_h was not actually present, his opinion was based on an impression of Eden's "exalt6 
frame of mind" immediately after the Soviets had left and the reportage of other British officials 
who had attended the dinner. Not everyone was as convinced as Eden of the benignity of Molotov. 
By his diary entry of the next day Shuckburgh seems to have been more sanguine in his opinion of 
Eden's behaviour. Descent to Suez, pp. 191-193. 
102 FO 371 112064 DF 1071i527D, Geneva Telegram No. 271. Eden to F. 0., 13th May, 1954. 
Despite the assertions that Khrushchev makes in his memoirs, Eden was convinced at the time that 
serious concessions would be required of the Communist delegations in order to reach an agreement, 
particularly over Cambodia and Loas. Separate treatment for these two lesser players in the tragedy 
was considered an important gain by Eden. Cab 1'-9/69, C(54)207,22nd June, 1954, 
Memorandum by the Fore _n Secretary. Also see Full C, rcle. pp. 127-130. 
103 ibid. In Eden's memo of the 22nd June, prepared for the visit of Churchill and himself to 
Washin`_ton. he considered that the Soviets and the Chinese wanted a settlement, "but they may 
have difficulty in restraining the Vietminh who are in s position to demand a high price. ' 
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part. too This was not least in consequence of Molotov's role as co-chairman of the 
Conference in tandem with Eden himself. Indeed at times Eden expressed more 
exasperation with his Western Allies than towards any of the Communist Powers. 105 
Yet, the success of proceedings had, eventually, as much to do with the determination 
of Mendes France to end France's East Asian imbroglio as anything else. K6 
On the role of the British delegation in the negotiations James Cable comes to the 
following wise conclusion, 
Although the Geneva Settlement was of more enduring advantage to Britain 
than the other diplomatic achievements of Eden's annus mirabilis in 1954... it 
also engendered more lasting delusions of grandeur. In 194 Britain had 
indeed outfaced the United States and negotiated on equal terms with China 
and the Soviet Union the peaceful resolution of a major international dispute 
on a basis first conceived in London. This was nevertheless as much the 
result of a fortuitous combination of circumstances as of greater foresight or 
superior diplomatic skill. It was not founded on any balance of real 
power. 107 
Cable goes on to suggest that this illusion of power may well have had pernicious 
consequences at Suez. Certainly it was an illusion which Eden's diplomacy in 1955 
and early 1956 was happy to play upon, as shall become apparent. Eden tended to lay 
too much store by the process of negotiation itself, rather than the prior interests of 
parties in a settlement. 
However, the Foreign Office did not think that Soviet flexibility in Geneva offered 
any hope for Europe. On the 27th June an analysis of the most recent Soviet Note 
concerning European Security proposals was sent to the British delegation to the 
"tripartite drafting group" in Washington who were cooking up the Western response. 
The Foreign Office was forthright in its opinion, 
It is natural that the Soviet Government should try to profit from the Geneva 
Conference to forward their policies in Europe. There is however no 
evidence in the Soviet Note that these policies have changed or that the 
Russians are now more tractable on any major European questions such as 
Germany, Austria or European Security. Indeed the language of the Note is 
so sharp and combative that the Soviet Government can scarcely entertain any 
serious hope that the Western Powers will accept it as a reasonable basis for 
104 Eden's communications are held in the Foreign Office's South East Asia Department records at FO 
371 11204 -11`087. 
105 FO 371 1 1207 3 DF 1071,715, Geneva Telegram No. 27, Eden to Churchill, 15th June, 1954. 
106 The Geneva Conference, p. 115. 
107 Ibid. p. 14'). For the United States' irritation over Eden's policy at Geneva see FRUS 1952-1954, 
Vý)J. XVI, pp. 6S0-698.204th Meeting of the National Security Council, 24th June, 1954. Harold 
Stassen made the following perceptive Comment at the very end of the discussion. 
Governor Stassen offered the philosophical observation that we must expect to 
-go 
through a 
period in the course of which the British try to assert their tailing world leadership. 
Sadly, over the issue of Vietnam it was the Americans who were to assert their strengthening world 
leadership. 
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negotiation... The conclusion can only be that Soviet policy has not 
changed... The agreement on Indo-China at Geneva does not afford a parallel 
for the settlement of European problems and of the disarmament 
question ... 
108 
The Geneva Conference's success was conceived in very limited terms by British 
officialdom. All in all both Berlin and Geneva seemed little to have changed the 
British view of the Soviet Union's relationship with the outside world, even although 
Eden gained considerable encouragement from Molotov's apparent reasonableness. 
TOWARD THE FALL OF NIALENKOV 
On March 5th, 1954, Sir William Hayter sent London the Moscow Embassy's opinion 
on the Soviet Union a year after Stalin's death. 109 He laid out the main differences 
between the new and old dispensations. The principle of "collective or committee" 
leadership seemed firmly established, particularly after Beria's execution. The 
extremes of Stalin's self-deification were now eschewed for a more rational, but still 
respectful, attitude to the dead leader. Moreover, this humility extended to 
agricultural and economic policy. The vast schemes for the "transformation of nature" 
which Stalin had developed in his last years had been abandoned. 110 In the 1954 
Budget considerably more weight was given to the production of consumer goods. 111 
Altogether the demands being made of the Soviet citizen were becoming more 
forgiving. 112 In ideological terms the trend was no different, Stalin's opinions were 
tempered, but not discarded. 113 Hayter went on. 
108 PREM 11/670, F. O. Telegram No. 3687, F. O. to WashinLton, ? 7th July, 1954. Sir Roger 
Makins replied that the Americans agreed with the British analysis, Washington Telegram No. 
1612, Makins to F. 0., 27th July, 1954. 
109 FO 371 111671 NS 1015/18A, Moscow Despatch, Hayter to Eden, 5th March, 1954. 
110 On the issue of agriculture see Martin McCauley, Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet 
Agriculture, pp. 40-75. 
111 FO 371 111708 NS 1102/9, F. O. Memorandum, "Soviet Economic Policy since Stalin's Death", 
14th April, 1954. This memo have an assessment of both economic and agricultural policy. Also in 
same file at /22 , 
Moscow Chancery to Northern Department, 29th July, 1955, is an assessment of 
the Soviet Government's "Plan results" for 1954. Hayter did not think that this new emphasis on 
consumerism would seriously reduce the potential of either Soviet heavy industry or military mi2ht. 
There is a Moscow Embassy analysis of the 1954 Budget itself at FO 371 111711 NS 1111/2, 
Moscow Despatch. from Hayter to Eden, 28th April, 1954. 
11`' However, Hayter did not consider that there had been any loosening up in terms of the right to 
express dissent or intellectual freedom, despite the Soviet Government's rhetoric. On this issue the 
Northern and Information Research Departments took considerable exception to Isaac Deutscher's 
san`_uine opinions which were carried in The Times of 17th, 18th and 19th November, 1954. 
Deutscher talked of a "ferment of ideas" being sanctioned by the Malenkov Government. Violet 
Conolly in particular thought Deutscher's journalism inaccurate and pernicious. The Moscow 
Embassy was equally unimpressed by the articles. FO 371 1116712 NS 1015'55, Minutes by R. H. 
Mason, 10th January, t955 and V. Conolly, 19th January, 1955. Deutscher had published a 
hopeful study of post-Stalin Russia in ; 953, entitled enigmatically. Russia after Stalin. 
113 FO 371 111775 NS 16701/1, Foreign Office Research Department Memorandum, 25th %larch, 
1954. This production commented upon the latest (4th) edition of the Soviet Short Philosophical 
Dictionary which had been published at the end of 1953. F. O. R. D. considered it an important 
indicator A. orthodoxy. Despite ý, uhstantial revisions they came to the following conclusion, 
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In ideology the new leaders have made no pronouncements of note. They 
seem content to adhere to the established doctrine, not rejecting Stalin's 
additions to the heritage of Lenin but showing no desire to make additions of 
their own. Their chief preoccupation seems to be the-practical administration 
of the Soviet Union. 
These concerns also informed foreign policy. Hayter explained the Kremlin's new 
found affection for negotiation and pacific pronouncements as follows, 
Their aim, it seemed, was to avoid dangerous international complications and 
to make it possible for the Government to deal at leisure first with domestic 
questions and subsequently with those questions of foreign relations which 
they regarded as ripe for solution... In all its fundamental concepts, the 
foreign policy of the new Soviet Government remained indistinguishable from 
that of Stalin. 
Even after Eden's success at Geneva the Foreign Office did not think that very 
much had changed. The settlement in Vietnam was as much in the interest of the 
Soviet Union as the West and, furthermore, afforded considerable leverage in the 
Soviet attempt to prise the Western alliance apart. It was in this context that H. A. F. 
Hohler interpreted the comparatively lenient treatment Britain received in the Soviet 
press during the summer months of 1954.114 The United States, on the other hand, 
had been unremittingly pilloried. Hohler's opinion was in accord with his Northern 
Department colleagues, 
I am not inclined to regard the "softer" Soviet policy towards this country as 
anything more than a tactical and probably temporary phenomenon... 
Indeed, in the second half of 1954 "wedge driving" became a metaphorical 
commonplace in British comment on the Kremlin's foreign policy. 1 5 Until, that is, 
the Soviet temper frayed as the campaign against West German rearmament reached a 
screaming pitch. Molotov's triumph over the E. D. C. was shortlived and in his 
desperation to forestall West Germany's entrance into NATO, the fine distinctions 
between western countries drawn by Soviet diplomacy earlier in 1954 began to 
[N ]o fundamental change can be detected in the ideological approach of the new dictionary. 
The ý_eneral outlook is more moderate and reasonable than in Stalin's day, but certain hostile 
trends have grown stronger, notably towards patriotic national exclusiveness and towards 
vit-ilance. 
114 FO 31 111672 NS 1015140, `linute by H. A. F. Hohler of 22nd July, 1955. Hayter's Quarterly 
Report. a copy of which remains with Hohler's minutinýg, was berated for not making sufficiently 
clear the contrast between British and American treatment in the Soviet press. Hohler also pointed 
out that the Soviets had made specific, if minor, concessions to butter up the British. one of which 
was the extension of the . an; lo-Soviet fisheries agreement for another year. 
115 For example, FO 3-1 1116-2 NS 1015/40, Moscow Embassy Quarterly Report, 7th October, 
1954, and Northern Department minutes thereon, or Violet Conolly's mordent criticism of a rosy 
Pravda article of '27th July, 195-1, on Churchill's attitude to peaceful coexistence at FO 371 111706 
NS 1073/12. Minute by V. Conolly, 30th July, 1954. 
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blur. 116 Blustering threats of retaliation against any and all of the nations associating 
themselves with the creation of a \Vest German army were at this point the meat of the 
Soviet's international discourse. 
A sceptical attitude also informed the Foreign Office's interpretation of the vogue 
expression, "peaceful coexistence". In the wave of euphoria which his experience at 
Geneva created, Eden had himself made so bold as to suggest that it might be possible 
to come to a modus vivendi between East and West. 117 The limitations of Soviet 
enthusiasm for such a project were quickly apparent. R. A. Hibbert of the Northern 
Department summed up the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexistence", in a minute 
of the 6th November, 1954, in four points, 
a) The avoidance of major adventures (such as the Korean War) b) The moral 
and physical disarmament of the West. c) The maintenance of Soviet and 
Communist pressure on and in Western countries. d) The wooing of Asia. 
This is not a policy which the West can view with any gratification: but it 
does mark some progress compared with the more violent Soviet attitude 
which led to the Korean War. It is essentially "hostile co-existence" and not 
an acceptable form of international amity. 118 
In fact Soviet Doctrine and practice was not considered to be fundamentally different 
from that of Stalin. 119 
116 FO 371 111672 NS 1015/59, Moscow Embassy Quarterly Report, 21st December, 1954. The 
report began, 
During this quarter Soviet diplomacy was obsessed by one idea - to torpedo the ratification of 
the London and Paris agreements. This overshadowed all their other preoccupations... France, 
as the weak link in the Western chain, received the hardest battering, which culminated in the 
Soviet threat to annul the Franco-Soviet Treaty if the Treaties were ratified. A similar threat 
was subsequently directed at the United Kingdom. 
117 Hansard Vol. 529; cols. 428-441. Also Foreign Office Intel on peaceful coexistence at FO 371 
111706 NS 1073/35, Covering Minute by Lord Jellicoe, 16th December, 1954. By November 
Eden was quite clear in his public pronouncements that the Soviet line was, in fact, little different to 
that held under Stalin, see above Intel. 
118 FO 371 111706 NS 1073/22, Minute by R. A. Hibbert, 6th November, 1954. Hibbert wrote by 
way of commentary on a lengthy Moscow Embassy Despatch on the same theme of 26th October. 
The Embassy was, if anything even less sanguine in its appreciation of the new Soviet position. Sir 
William Hayter concluded. 
I believe that the Soviet Government propagates the policy of "peaceful coexistence" for no 
better reason than because it no longer sees any advantage in pursuing V an adventurous or 
dynamic foreign policy, where all its gains mit-, ht be hazarded, and prefers a more static policy 
which may in the end secure it the gains it need without exposing it to the attendant risks. 
The Americans developed a similar interpretation, FRUS 19522- 1954. Vol. 11. p. 71?, Paper by State 
Department, 15th November, 1954. 
119 The Intel referred to at footnote 122 made much of Soviet effort; to "brush up" the theory of 
peaceful coexistence "to serve the ends of Communist propaganda" without any fundamental 
reappraisal. The Stalinist line, for example, regarding the two camps was ; till a very living 
orthodoxy. This as an anale:;; shared by in the U. S. State Department. expressed if anything in 
even starker terms, see FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. II, p. 7; '; Paper by State Department, 15th 
November, 10-54. 
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There were, though, some areas in which the British Government did consider that 
a new work was being done by the Malenkov Government, in particular the emphasis 
which Soviet foreign policy was increasingly giving to Asia. Eden himself was well 
aware that the focus of the Cold War was beginning to shift away from a stalemated 
Europe. In a statement of British policy at Geneva, he commented, "... our aim should 
be to draw a line and create a modus vivendi in Asia of the kind already created in 
Europe--. 120 However, the means by which the Soviet lion was seeking to exert 
influence into this new battleground were familiar ones, infiltration, subversion and the 
support of Communist insurrection. 121 There was no hint of the kind of revisionism 
which Khrushchev was to introduce into Soviet diplomacy during the following year. 
Molotov was not prepared to recognise non-Communist regimes in the "under- 
developed world" as brothers in arms, there were still only two camps. The Soviet 
interest lay in gathering as many nations as possible into their side of the great 
divide. 122 
Another profound change of 1955 which was foreshadowed in 1954 was the Soviet 
response to the development of thermonuclear weapons. Malenkov's 12th March, 
1954 speech to the Soviet electors was the most important indication that something 
was stirring in this respect, even although he was later forced to retract his heterodox 
speculation that all, not just the capitalists, would be consumed by a war which used 
the latest weaponry. 123 
However, in its analysis of this development, the Foreign Office did not come to 
any clear conclusion. The novelty of Malenkov's admission of Communist 
vulnerability was commented upon, but it was at best placed in the context of the 
"soft" foreign policy which the Soviet Government had been following since Stalin's 
death. 124 At worst Foreign Office officials overlooked it almost altogether. 125 Sir 
120 PREM 11/649, Geneva Telegram No. 415, Eden to F. 0., 22nd May, 1954. Eden was concerned 
about the political pressure which non-communist regimes in the area would face post Geneva. It 
was in this context that he viewed the importance of setting up a treaty organisation in South East 
Asia, PREM 11/650, Geneva Telegram No. 899, Eden to F. 0., 12th July, 1954. 
121 FO 371 111706 NS 1073/35, Covering Minute by Lord Jellicoe, 16th December, 1954. It advised 
that, 
There are no sins that the Communist leaders have abandoned their ambition of absorbing the 
non-Communist world piece-meal into the Communist orbit... The proof of the pudding lies in 
the fact that recently there has been an increase in Communist propaganda directed towards the 
undeveloped and "colonial" countries; there has been a reversion to the technique of appealing 
to peoples over the Heads of Governments and no sign of any weakening of Communist 
support for political subversion, especially in Asia... they would like the West to curtail all 
forms of political warfare, while they were free to pursue their aims by all means short of war. 
122 The Americans agreed, see for example, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. II; Paper by Allen Dulles, 18th 
November, 1954. 
123 See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U. S. S. R., pp. 22 S-262. 
124 FO 371 111671 NS 1015/21, Minute by Lord Jellicoe, 15th March, 1954. H. A. F. Hohler even 
wondered if Malenkov's reference to the "destruction of world civilisation" was not part of an 
attempt to resuscitate the Peace Campaign of the very early fifties. He did though recognise that 
Malenkov's was the "frankest allusion to the horrors of atomic war by a Soviet leader which I have 
noticed. " NS 1015/28, Minute by H. A. F. Hohler, 23rd March, 1954. 
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William Havter in a despatch of the 26th October, 1954 on peaceful coexistence, did 
go so far as to suggest that, 
Whereas in Communist doctrine wars of all kinds were regarded as likely to 
weaken and eventually destroy the capitalist system... the development of the 
hydrogen bomb may well have made the Soviet leaders of today doubtful of 
the validity of these arguments; in a thermo-nuclear age, conflict between the 
two worlds might well lead to the extinction not merely of capitalism but of 
communism too, and in such a hypothesis there could be no alternative to a 
policy of "peaceful coexistence". '26 
But, this perceptive comment was buried at the end of a list of other reasons for the 
Soviet's enthusiasm for peaceful coexistence and it was offered only as a tentative 
suggestion. The despatch itself, although considered "interesting", was not deemed by 
the Northern Department of sufficient importance to merit a very wide circulation 
within Whitehall. 127 The impact of the ghastly possibilities of thermonuclear war was 
to have dramatic effects on Soviet foreign policy in 1955. During 1954 these changes 
were still embryonic and largely passed over by British observers. 
The most embarrassing interpretative error committed by the British Government 
was in its assessment of rivalry within the Kremlin. Even after the "liquidation" of 
Beria, it was clear that there remained frictions underneath the facade of collective 
leadership. Indeed in memorandum of the 18th December 1953, F. 0. R. D. 
attempted to explain the contradictory nature of Soviet foreign policy, in particular its 
hot and cold rhetoric on summit talks, by reference to splits at the top. 128 However, 
this line of analysis was less popular with the Northern Department and the Moscow 
Embassy. 1'-9 
Disharmony became even more apparent in 1954, particularly, as far as British 
observers were concerned, over Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands Scheme". 130 Yet, 
125 FO 371 111672 NS 1015/41, Minute by V. Conolly, 13th July 1954. This chronology of principle 
events in the Soviet Union drawn up by F. O. R. D. makes no special mention of Malenkov speech 
at all, merely listing it with all the other election speeches. 
126 FO 371 111706 NS 1073/??, Moscow Embassy Despatch, Hayter to Eden. 26th October, 1954. 
Hayter went on, 
\lalenkov recognised this when he said in his speech of March 12,1954, that another war 
would mean the end of civilisation, though a month later he reverted to the older formula that 
it would mean the end of capitalism. 
I. 7 FO 3711 11706 NS 1073/22, Minute by R. A. Hibbert, 6th November, 1954. 
128 FO 37 1/111675 NS 1015/1, F. O. R. D. Minute, 18th December, 1953. This is a precocious piece 
which is suggestive of J. Richter', Doctoral thesis, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign 
Policy". However, unlike Richter, throughout 1954 and early 1955 the Foreign Office did not 
think that foreign policy played a crucial role in the course or events. The British Government 
thought that domestic policy debates informed the substance of political divisions. See Richter pp. 
103-166. 
129 FO 3,1 111675 NS l0 I S' l. Moscow Embassy Despatch, Chancery to Northern Department, 3rd 
February, 1954. 
130 FO 371 111.34 NS list,,, Minute by J. A. Dobbs. 11th March, 1954. See Khrushchev and the 
Development of Soviet . -4''r tculture, pp. 4-4-, 5. 
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although the political implications of policy disagreements were not altogether 
overlooked the tendency was to interpret such differences within the context of the 
collective, rather than as an attempt to undermine it. 131 
Even at the end of 1954 and the very beginning of 1955, the British failed to draw 
conclusions which became all to obvious in retrospect. In a despatch of the 22nd 
December, 1954, Sir William Hayter pointed out that a change in Soviet industrial 
policy seemed once more in the air. The emphasis upon the production of consumer 
goods which had played such a prominent role in 1953 and much of 1954 now seemed 
to be called into question, 
I have the honour to draw your attention to certain signs of a possible change 
in the Soviet internal line. It looks as if the Party may once again be insisting 
on the supreme importance of developing heavy industry for the sake of 
strengthening Soviet defences. 132 
He then went onto comment that the most important indication of this change was in 
an article in Pravda of 21st December, by a V. S. Kruzhkov, a deputy head of the 
Central Committee Department of Propaganda. Hayter also pointed out that articles in 
lzvestiya, which was of course significantly the State as averse too Party organ, 
remained more loyal to Malenkov's consumerist policy. The Embassy was well aware 
of the possible political implications of such divided Council. 133 However, by the 28th 
December, Hayter was "inclined" towards the view that the debate was anyway of 
little importance and certainly no precursor of a significant rupture within the 
leadership. 134 Indeed, the Supreme Soviet meeting on the 8th February, 1955, at 
which Malenkov would be forced to resign from the Premiership, was thought by the 
Embassy to have been called in order further to debate the relationship between heavy 
and consumer based industries within the Soviet economy. 
The increase in Khrushchev's public prominence through 1954 was noted, but 
misinterpreted. The Embassy was well aware that this development was at odds with 
131 For example, FO 371 111789 NS 1751/19, Moscow Embassy Despatch, 19th November, 1954. In 
this despatch Sir William Hayter examined the publication of a Central Committee decree "on 
mistakes in the carrying out of scientific-atheistic propaganda among the population. " It was 
noteworthy not only because it propounded a more moderate line on religion, but also because it 
was signed by Khrushchev alone and not by the collective as a whole. Hayter explained this as 
follows, 
I do not suggest that this is necessarily an indication of Khrushchev's personal ambition. It 
seems to me rather to be a sign of his own interest in and personal responsibility for the public 
relations side of the present regime. 
132 FO 371 111710 NS 1104/2, Moscow Despatch, Hayter to Eden, 22nd December, 1954. 
133 ibid. Hayter commented, 
The difference between the approach of Pravda and Isvesriya to this question has `iven rise to 
some speculation here; it is even being suggested that it reflects a divergence of views at the 
top level. 
134 FO 371 11710 NS 1104/2_ Moscow Embassy Despatch, Hayter to F. 0., 28th December, 1954. 
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Malenkov's supposed eminence as Premier. Hayter, in a communication of 5th 
January, 1955, cleverly explained the conundrum thus, 
In normal countries it might well be supposed that this contrast indicated some 
kind of competition between the two men. But the U. S. S. R. is not a normal 
country; competitions for power are not conducted in the open, and if one 
were going on we should paradoxically hear much less of it than we hear of 
Khrushchev's movements. Though a competition of this kind cannot be 
excluded as a future development, I should be much surprised if anything of 
the kind were going on now. 135 
The Embassy was, small wonder, caught quite unawares when `falenkov delivered his 
resignation speech to a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on the 8th February, 1955. In a 
telegram of the same day Hayter expressed his astonishment, "the change in 
government has been as much of a surprise to all my colleagues as it was to me. None 
of us could believe our ears when we heard it announced". 136 Britain's Soviet experts 
had triumphantly misread the tea leaves. 
*X* 
The British Government witnessed considerable change in the Soviet Union's approach 
to internal and external policy between the 5th March, 1953 and the 8th February, 
1955. The new regime introduced a refreshing concern for the individual Soviet 
citizen, both economically and socially. In foreign policy the Kremlin began to 
proclaim its concern for the "under-developed world" and the importance of economic 
competition. Moreover, it seemed aware that the bristling hostility of Stalin was no 
longer an advantage in the prosecution of their diplomacy. Molotov in particular cut a 
refreshingly reasonable dash at the Berlin and Geneva Conferences of 1954. This 
made a considerable impression upon Eden. 
However, the limitations of these developments were equally apparent. 
Malenkov, in the British view, was presiding over a period of retrenchment which was 
intended to purge the excesses, but not the fundamentals, of Stalinism. There was 
nothing sufficiently radical in Soviet domestic or foreign policy to cause very much by 
way of surprise. The years 1953 and 1954 had the character of a breathing space for 
the Soviet Government and people. 137 There was little that fundamentally challenged 
the assumptions about Soviet foreign policy on which Britain's view of the Cold War 
135 FO 371 116631 NS 101511, Moscow Embassy Despatch, Hayter to F. 0., 5th January, 1955. Also 
minuting at NS 1015/5. 
136 FO 371 116631 NS 1015/11: Moscow Telegram No. 30, Hayter to F. 0., 8th February, 1955. 
Further to this Telegram in a letter to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick of the 9th February, 1955, Hayter 
likened the interpretation of Soviet politic, to the unravelling of an Agatha Christie plot. He was 
adamant that none of the other Embassies in Moscow had been any better at second ýuessinýý Soviet 
politics. 
137 Or interregnum as ogee and Donaldson put it, Soviet Foreic', i Policy since World Wear II, p. 88. 
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was based. It was only during 1955 that novelty in Soviet external relations began to 
take on proportions at once exhilarating and profoundly disturbing to the British. 
Chapter 3 
The Austrian State Treaty and the Soviet Diplomatic Thaw 
Vienna, Warsaw and Belgrade 
"[I]n my opinion they [the Soviets] are now more likely to come to an agreement with 
us than they have been for many years past, no doubt largely owing to the success of 
our recent policies and perhaps also because they have at last, in spite of their brave 
words, begun to realise what the hydrogen bomb means to them" . 
Sir William Hayter. 
It is one of the great ironies of Churchill's later career that he should have 
resigned in April 1955 just before the realisation of his hopes for a meeting of the great 
powers. I Indeed so closely did Eden's conversion to the cause of summitry follow his 
appointment as Prime Minister that it is tempting to see it as a conviction born of 
superficialities. Seduced by the glamour of his long coveted Premiership and mindful 
of the necessity of re-election, Eden, in this view, found it easy to forget his opposition 
to Churchill's own abortive Conference diplomacy. -' However the burden of the 
following chapter is that to accept this interpretation of events would be to 
underestimate the complexity of both Eden and the British Government's perceptions 
of what was happening in the Soviet Union itself. 
It is important to understand that in early March 1955 it was the Americans 
who provided Churchill with the last glimmer of hope that his proposals for great 
power talks might yet succeed. On the 10th March Sir Roger Makins reported from 
Washington that Dulles had mooted that Eisenhower should visit Germany in May 
1955 for the forthcoming ratification of the Paris Accords and the establishment of the 
new fully independent state of West Germany. ' Dulles thought that this would be an 
ideal opportunity to discuss what steps should be taken to approach the Soviets over 
Summit Talks. 4 Churchill's desperate expectations were, however, soon disappointed. 
Indeed Eden had already communicated his reservations over Dulles' suggestion in a 
1 See Never Despair, pp. 1117-2 
2 Eisenhower in particular rather sneeringly canvasses this view in his memoirs, Mandate for Change, 
p. 505, 
On April 5,1955, Anthony Eden replaced Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister. For some reason, 
whether because of the political exigencies of his new position or the turn of events in the 
world, Anthony had now reversed his former opposition to a meeting at the Summit. In the 
campaign for the general election in May he announced that he was now in favour. 
Churchill in his retirement commented to Macmillan. "How much more attractive a top level 
meeting seems when one has reached the top. " Tides of Fortune, pp. 586-587. 
3 PREM 11/893. Telegram No. 539 from Sir Rower Makins, Washington to F. 0., 10th March, 
1955. Eden's minute on the tele`_ram for the Prime Minister of March 11th 1955. Eden ended with 
the following, rather plaintive suggestion regarding the response which they should make to Dulles, 
"I would also like to mention that in May there is the possibility of our own domestic affairs 
reaching a : ntical phase and that our international activities may well be hampered just then by 
developments at home. " 
4 ibid.. Eden. in his 1 Ith March minute for Churchill, did not think much of Dulles' proposal. 
s 
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telegram of %larch 15.5 By the end of March the Americans had made clear that they 
did not have a direct invitation to the Soviet leaders in mind at all; merely Western 
discussions on a similar level to those of Bermuda in 195-3.6 There was no indication 
at this point that a change in Soviet policy might require a reconsideration of the 
Western stance on talks. As far as either the British or Americans were concerned 
there had been no substantial change in Soviet policy, Churchill's hopes were fuelled 
by what briefly appeared to be new thinking in the White Novse and not the Kremlin. 
However, despite the apparently unpromising position in early 1955, the British 
analysis of Soviet policy was shortly to undergo fundamental change. Between the 
months of March and June 1955 the first indications of a far reaching re-thinking in the 
Kremlin of Soviet foreign policy became apparent to British observers. This shift is 
clear from the sharp contrast in British attitudes between April and June 1955 to the 
substance of Soviet policy. At the start of 1955 tentative Soviet moves to come to an 
agreement over the Austrian State Treaty were interpreted almost exclusively as one 
more diplomatic tactic in a long standing engagement. Equally the British espousal of 
Conference diplomacy in the March of 1955 was conceived largely, at least by Eden 
and the Foreign Office, as an endeavour unlikely to succeed, but necessary in respect 
of Western public opinion. It was a policy which the British recommended to the 
Americans in March 1955 regardless of the attitude of the Soviet Union. By the Soviet 
disarmament proposals of the 10th May, and even more so after Bulganin and 
Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia, it was clear that the Soviets sincerely wanted a 
reduction in international tension for its own sake. By the July of 1955 Eden himself 
was sufficiently impressed by this change in Soviet behaviour to express considerable 
hope for the outcome of the meeting which had by then been arranged at Geneva. In 
the first half of 1955 the British and Soviet Governments were moving towards a 
summit meeting both simultaneously and independently. 
By June 1955 the causes of Soviet candour had also become substantially clear 
to British observers. In the opinion of both the British Embassy in Moscow and the 
Foreign Office this novel situation was largely the result of the Kremlin's growing 
awareness of the hydrogen bomb's destructive capacity. This was an appreciation 
which the July Summit in Geneva was to confirm emphatically in the minds of both the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. These are issues which will be dealt with more 
PRE M1 I1S9 3, Telegram No. 1057, From F. O. to Makins, 15 March 1955. The Telegram 
contained a polite rebuff to Dulles which lvtakins was asked to pass on. In his l1th May minute to 
Churchill Eden had at least emphasised that the Americans should not be discouraged from an 
attitude which was more favourable to the Soviets by harsh words about the inappropriateness of 
specific proposals. 
6 See Never Despair, pp. 1102-16. In a further note sent via the U. S. Ambassador in London, PREM 
I1 %S9 3, March 17 1955, Dulles emphasised that it was not envisaged that the Soviets should be 
invited to take part in talks during Eisenhower's visit to Europe, nor indeed that an invitation to 
talks at a later date would arise out of Western conversations. The Americans merely wanted to talk 
things over with their Western allies. On Churchill's final attempt to cling on to power see also 
. , 4, rrnoniv 
Eden, pp. 400-03 
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fully in the following two chapters. However, this chapter will make clear that the six 
months leading up to the Geneva Conference were an important period of flux in 
Anglo-Soviet relations. For the first time since the early post-war period the British 
found themselves reacting to what they saw as radically new Soviet policies.? This 
was the beginning of a process which by the end of 1955 was to leave the British 
Government pondering its strategy in a novel kind of cold war. 
It should be stressed that Eden's proposals for top level meetings with the 
Soviets preceded the resignation of Churchill. Indeed they grew quite reasonably out 
of the diplomacy which he had undertaken in Europe from 1952 in order to pave the 
way for the rearmament of Germany. 8 Britain's policy towards the Soviet Union and 
Cold War in early 1955 continued that of the previous three years. The premise of 
Eden's opposition to Churchill's approach to the Soviets was that such an attempt 
should only be made when the west was united and fully re-armed. Talks had to come 
after West German had been allowed to play its crucial role in strengthening western 
defences and not before; Eden's "conversion" to conference diplomacy was a matter 
of logic, rather than a leap of faith. 9 Ironically it was to one of the last cabinets of 
Churchill's government that Eden outlined the reasons why it now seemed wise to 
make attempt to start talks with the Soviets. In a Minute of the 26th March, 1955 he 
began by making reference to previous Foreign Office studies of Soviet policy, carried 
out in 1952, which had concluded that the West should talk to the Soviets only once a 
position of equilibrium between east and west had been achieved, 
We are this year as close to "terms of equality" with the Soviet leaders as we 
are likely to be in the foreseeable future. It seems unlikely that with the 
passage of time our relative position will improve. On the contrary, once 
"saturation" in thermo-nuclear weapons is reached, our relative military 
strength declines even though we may improve our position in conventional 
weapons. The ratification of the Paris Agreements may represent a high point 
of Western. political cohesion [my italics]. 10 
It is important to understand that this meeting was considered desirable by the 
Foreign Office because of the political advantage which might be accrued thereby 
FO 371 118025 RY 10338/4, Telegram No. 89, from Sir Frank Roberts, BelLrade to F. 0., 22nd 
February, 1955. Roberts -, ave the \lalenkov regime the following epitaph, "what concessions did 
the Soviet regime in fact offer to the West during Mlalenkov's period apart from smoother talk about 
co-existence and minor gestures of no political significance". 
See Full Circle, pp. 2S8-_'S9, where Eden paraphrases his Cabinet submission. 
9 See John W. Young, "Cold War and Detente with Moscow", in The Foreign Policy of Churchill's 
Peacetime Administration. 
10 CAB 12y, Vol. 74. Ck5 ), 20th \larch, 1955, "Talks with the Soviets", note by the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. The substance of this Cabinet Minute was passed on to the americans via 
`lakins in Washington on the same day; PRE%l 11/893. Telegram No. 1246,26th March, 1955. It 
as evidently regarded h%, Eden as a statement of intent to the other Western Powers. In a covering 
note of telegram no. 1247, Eden made clear that the information was also to be sent to the French 
and the Germans. The latter he thought should now he consulted as an independent entity. 
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rather than because of any reasonable hope of coming to agreement with the Soviets. 
Eden continued to explain under the subtitle, "The Dangers of Our Present Position", 
Apart from the probability that our relative military strength will not increase, 
we may have to reckon with a further expansion of Communism in the Far 
East. Nor can we regard as anything but dangerous the present situation in 
Europe, particularly in Germany. Although the division of Germany, to 
which all the powers have now grown accustomed, is not without its 
advantages to all of us, even to Soviet Russia, the Russians hold as hostage 
the town of Berlin, where a conflagration may flare up at any moment. 
Furthermore, they have German unity in their gift at any time, and, if they 
wished, could offer it to the Germans on tempting terms to-morrow. Unless 
we make a serious effort to re-unify Germany, which the Germans will regard 
as serious, they will be restive, and cannot be relied upon to resist Russian 
blandishments. So long as Germany is divided the attachment of Western 
Germany to the Western Group will be precarious. 
Eden concluded by reminding the Cabinet of the imperative of Western rhetoric, 
The Western Powers have all repeatedly declared their desire to talk to Soviet 
Russia once the Paris Agreements are ratified. It follows from the foregoing 
arguments that we should at talks seriously intended to bring results even of a 
limited character rather than talks which would be no more then a propaganda 
exercise. Nevertheless, serious talks ought to be so in that, if they break 
down, Soviet Russia may be shown to be at fault. 
The crucial point here is that negotiations were important to Eden in respect of both 
public opinion and, in the case of West Germany, the opinion of politicians. He did 
not view conference diplomacy with Churchill's perfervid hope of success. Eden was 
not so much concerned that the West should talk to the Soviets but that she should be 
seen to be so doing. Whereas it would seem over cynical to suggest that Eden was not 
prepared to make considerable effort to come to a compromise with the Soviets over 
Germany; his attitude was that of a pragmatic diplomat. There is nothing of 
Churchill's confidence in a leap of understanding between protagonists developed 
through personal contact. Indeed talks in Eden's appreciation of the situation were 
little more than part of an on-going diplomatic engagement. 
The need to keep Western public opinion content and the western powers united 
in the aftermath of the Paris agreements was further emphasised by Eden in a telegram 
to Washington of the 28th `-larch 1955. Bulganin had on the same day issued a public 
statement favourable towards great Power Talks. 11 Eden asserted, 
11 Reportes! on for London by the British Embassy in Moscow on the same day. PREM 11193, 
Telegram No. 300, from Hater to F. 0.; 28th March, 1955. Hayter also continued to interpret 
Soviet foreign policy in terms of the usual diplomatic rough and tumble, 
Timing of Bulganin': statement on the Great Power talks suggests anxiety to cover up, with a 
new Soviet initiative. the Soviet diplomatic defeat involved in French ratification of the Paris 
. A, reement.. 
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Now that the entry into force of the Paris Agreements seems assured, we 
cannot afford to give any appearance of dragging our feet in seeking talks 
with Russia. Moreover, it may be that the Soviet Government are aiming to 
inveigle us into talks on Austria with a view to then refusing to talk about 
Germany. It is urgent to established an agreed position on these questions. l' 
There are those who explain Eden's Soviet diplomacy in the first part of 1955 
almost exclusively in terms of domestic politics. 13 There are two points in particular 
raised by the above discussion which this monocausal analysis overlooks. Firstly, 
Eden was concerned with Western public opinion as a whole, as much as British. 
Secondly, the policy which Eden was developing was no spur of the moment 
electioneering convenience. Although Summit diplomacy may have had very 
important implications for the way the May 1955 election was to be fought, not least 
providing the Conservatives with their pithy campaign slogan "working for peace", 
Eden's attitude was clearly informed by the long term sweep of his diplomacy. 
However, in the more limited terms of the British perception of Soviet policy, 
there is no doubt that Eden was in the beginning of 1955 carrying on with the cold war 
as normal. As far as the British could see there was no indication from the Soviet side 
that there had been any change at all. Eden's diplomacy, as much as Soviet, was 
formulated in early 1955 with a keen regard for cold war point scoring. His eagerness 
to press for a Western proposal for Summit talks with the Soviets were justified to the 
Cabinet in terms of diplomatic advantage. In his reasoning he did not betray any 
serious hope that the Soviets might by that point have been sincere in their desire to 
reduce international tensions. There was no insistence, as with the Americans, on 
Soviet achievement of certain conditions, or "hurdles" before negotiation could begin. 
In contrast to the British the Americans were very sceptical as to the value of Summit 
diplomacy. 14 Yet where the British differed with the Americans was not whether 
talking itself would lead to any kind of settlement between East and West, but rather 
over the publicity value of talks themselves. 
12 PREM 11/893, Telegram No. 1294. To British Embassy Washington from Foreign Secretary, 
`larch 28th 1955. 
13 The Failure of the Eden Government, p. 10. Lamb even goes so far as to suggest that the Americans 
colluded in the electoral interests of the Conservative Party by a`treein`T to Summit Talks in time to 
take the wind out of Labour accusations that the Conservatives were stalling them. That this issue 
played a very important part in the election campaign and was a consideration in Conservative 
foreign policy up to the election there can be no doubt. However it seems a little simplistic, not to 
say unfairly cynical, to su`--, est that getting elected was Eden's only reason for supporting talks with 
the Soviets. 
14 See Mandate for Change, pp. 505-06 and also Eisenhower, The President, pp. 248-49. Eisenhower 
emphasises that there were two developments at work in the lead up to the Geneva Summit; 
changing views on the Western side and concrete action on the Soviet over the Austrian State 
Treaty, It is to the latter that he gives the most importance on p. 506, 
Because of the Soviet's action (the Austrian State Treaty], and not wishing, to appear 
senselessly stubborn in my , attitude towards a Summit meeting - so hopefully desired by so 
many -I instructed Dulles to let it be known through Diplomatic channels, that if the powers 
were genuinely interested in such a meeting we were ready to listen to their reasonin_. 
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Eden made clear this divergence in British and American view points in his 
annotations on a telegram from Sir Gladw` n Jebb, the British Ambassador in Paris, of 
8th April. 15 Jebb reported French fears that the Americans had merely used the 
promise of considering an approach to the Soviets after the rearmament of Germany as 
a carrot which now the French Assembly had ratified the Paris Agreements would be 
withdrawn. Jebb commented, 
When I was in London recently the Prime Minister impressed upon me the 
strong desirability from the point of view of public opinion of our organizing 
preparatory four power talks with the maximum speed ["Yes I did, A. E. " 
scribbled in the margin]. I must say I have not detected any note of urgency, 
still less enthusiasm, in Mr. Dulles communications on this subject to Mr 
Dillon [the United States Ambassador in Paris]. Is it not possible. therefore, 
that on this particular point our position is rather nearer the French than the 
American ["Yes, A. E. "]. 
This outlook on Anglo-Soviet relations is further illustrated by the British 
Government's react ion to what in retrospect was the first concrete sign that Soviet 
foreign policy was undergoing a process of very radical change. In early 1955 the 
Soviets gave notice that for the First time since the war they were prepared to give 
serious attention to ending the occupation of Austria by t he victorious powers. t6 By 
March the Soviets had gone so far as to invite the Austrians to Moscow for 
consultations on a Treaty. 
A brief on Soviet policy towards Austria, signed by Sir Geoffrey Harrison of 
the Southern Department, was prepared for Eden on the '25th March. 17 Harrison made 
clear that a change in the Soviet attitude had been apparent from Molotov's 8th 
February speech to the Supreme Soviet. However this new Soviet line was considered 
to be little more than an attempt to manoeuvre the western powers into an unflattering 
position by landing them with the blame for failing to agree to an Austrian 
settlement. 18 Harrison commented, 
15 PREM 11/893, Telegram No. 138, Secret, from Sir Gladwyn Jehb, Paris to F. 0., 8th April 1955. 
16 See Sven Allard, Russia and the Austrian Stare Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe for 
a detailed study of Soviet policy over Austria in 1955. Allard was the Swedish Ambassador in 
Vienna during= the negotiations. 
17 FO 371 117787 RR 1071172, Minute by Sir Geoffrey Harrison for The Secretary of State, 25th 
March 1955. 
18 ibid., Harrison gave the following rational for the Soviet moves which were clearly considered to be 
little more than political manoeuvring, 
It is arguable that the Russians are no more ready now than in the past to conclude a Treaty, 
that they are merely 
}ýiaýºn up the question of `_uarantees against an Anschluss as a successor 
to the Trieste and other issues on which they have so long held up the conclusion of the Treaty 
[Allied Military Government of Trieste had come to an end on the 26th October, 1954, see 
Full Circle. pp. 175-188. Harrison continued to explain that the Soviets considered a German 
Treaty prerequisite to an Austrian] Such a Treaty [the German] is, however, being rendered 
impossible by the Western decision to re-arm Germany, which will itself threaten Austrian 
independence. They [the Soviets] rrught thus hope to establish that it is the Western decision to 
re-arm Germany and not Soviet intransigence that is holding up the Treaty, leaving the onus on 
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It is tempting to refuse to chase yet another Russian hare. In the past year, we 
have accepted the disadvantageous disagreed Articles of the Draft Treaty and 
the Austrians have agreed to military neutralisation, yet we are no nearer a 
Treaty. Now we are being asked to guarantee the independence and integrity 
of Austria. Even if we do so, we have no certainty that a new hare won't be 
started. 
Dr. Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Ambassador to London, had called on the 25th 
March, 1955 to consult with Harrison regarding the British attitude towards the latest 
Soviet moves and what the Austrian reaction ought to be. After expressing the deep 
suspicion that the Foreign Office had for Molotov's motives, Harrison went on to say 
that it was, afterall, a matter on which the Austrians would have to d ecide for 
themselves. This does not seem to have satisfied Eden, who in his wanton manner 
scribbled at the end of the minute in red ink the following rather condescending note, 
I am sorry that the Austrians were not warned more firmly against Russia's 
wiles. I hope we shall not wake up some morning soon and find Raab [the 
Austrian Chancellor] in Moscow. A. E. March 26th. 
Quite clearly the British Government, and in particular Eden, did not in March see 
Soviet moves over Austria as indicative of any fundamental change in Soviet foreign 
policy. Rather, Soviet blandishments towards the Austrians were explained in the 
limited context of cold war one-up-manship. 
Even those observers who tended to take the Soviet move as a more serious 
one, went on to explain it in terms of the tactical advantage which the Kremlin hoped 
to accrue thereby. On the 22nd March the British Ambassador in Vienna Sir Godfrey 
Wallinger had already reported to London on more or less these lines. 19 He 
emphasised in particular the Soviet desire to ensure that Western Austria was not 
drawn, as Western Germany was about to be, into NATO. Yet on one further point 
Wallinger pointed to a development which was to become ever more emphasised in 
British reporting on the Soviet Union as 1955 wore on. He suggested that there might 
be a similarity between the Soviet line over Yugoslavia and that over Austria, 
the West to think up "effective" guarantees against the allegedly increased danger of an 
Anschluss resultin_ from the re-armament of Germans'. 
19 FO 371 117757 RR 1071/83. Confidential, From Sir Godfrey `Vallinger, Vienna to Sir Geoffrey 
Harrison, London: March 22nd 1955. Walliný_er commented, 
My first thought is that I find myself in a measure of agreement with the Austrians in thinking 
that there has been some shift in the Soviet position, due possibly to the realism of the Soviet 
leaders in accepting situations of fact and specifically to their acceptance of the inevitability of 
the ratification of the Pans Treaties. It would therefore seem logical that it should now 
become a Soviet objective to ensure, if that is it ill possible. that Austria itself should never be 
incorporated in the Western European Union. 
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It looks from here as if the development of Yugoslav "neutralism" has not 
been unpleasing to Moscow and that Austrian "neutralism" might at some time 
become acceptable. 
However, Eden's concern that the Austrians should not be taken in by Soviet 
blandishments was further emphasised to the Austrian Chancellor by Wallinger in 
Vienna on April 5th 1955.20 Although the Austrians accepted British rese-ovations they 
felt, not surprisingly, that they were best placed to decide were , -\ustria's interest lay. 
Raab seemed set on taking up Moscow's offer regardless of Eden's conce--;. As to any 
further indication of what Soviet motives might be \Vallinger was still unsure. ' 1 Even 
supposing that their interest were sincere Wallinger thought, as he had on March 22nd, 
that their interest most probably lay in establishing an independent and neutral Austria 
compatible with Soviet security interests. 
The British continued to be highly suspicious of Soviet motives even as the 
Austrian delegation enjoyed conspicuous success during their visit to Moscow between 
the 11th and the 15th April 1955. It quickly became evident to Sir William Hayter, as 
the Austrian delegation indicated the progress which the talks were making over detail, 
that for the first time the Soviets themselves wanted to come to an agreement. " By the 
15th April and the Austrians' departure, all the Western missions in Moscow, 
according to Hayter, concurred that the Soviets had set their hearts on an unoccupied 
and neutralised Austria following the Swiss model. 23 However, in a despatch sent to 
London on the 15th April, Hayter drew the following conclusions about the motives 
behind these apparently good intentions, 
I have no doubt that the main Soviet motive is their desire to prevent the 
absorption of Austria, or at least of Western Austria, into the western defence 
system. Subsidiary Soviet motives are probably the elimination of a question 
in which the Soviet Union is in a bad international posture and which has now 
ceased to serve any vital Soviet interest. the desire to present Germany with a 
useful pattern to follow, and conceivably the wish to demonstrate Soviet 
?0 FO 371 117789 RR 1071/130, Despatch from British Embassy, Vienna to London, 6th April, 1955; 
Sir G. Wallinder to Sir G. Harrison. 
21 ibid., Wallinder thought, 
As is always the case with a Russian initiative - and I think we may take it that Molotov's 
words on Austria in his speech of February 8 was an initiative - the first problem with which 
one is faced is the attempt to analyse from the very caLev words used what may be the Russian 
intention. In the present instance, it seems to me that only one point, and that a very 
subsidiary one. is reasonably clear. The Soviet Government intend, if they possibly can, to 
divest themselves of the onus tor the delay on the Austrian Treaty which was firmly laid on 
their shoulders at Berlin. 
FO 371 11 S' RR 1071/128. Telegram No. 352, From Hav'ter, Moscow to F. 0., 13th April. 
1955. The Soviets ', \, ere prepared to compromise to an extent over the quantity of oil that Austria 
was to he obliged to continue supplyin , them and payment by Austria for : its of the Danube 
Navtcation Contranvv. 
-3 FO 371 11 : '; 89 RR 107 1/1_8. Despatch from Havter, `1o cow to F. 0.. 15th April. 1955. 
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willingness to settle outstanding questions as a preliminary to wider great 
power negotiations. '-4 
Eden added his own comment: underlining the phrase, "the Soviet Union is in a bad 
international posture", he asserted that, "This seems good advice. "25 
Only at the very end of Hayter's list of "subsidiary" motives is it admitted that 
the Soviets might "conceivably" be clearing the ground for an attempt to get 
international negotiations of the ground. Clearly at this point the British were not 
interpreting Soviet foreign policy in any substantially new light. Once more, as in 
Eden's policy presentation to the Cabinet of 26th March. 1955, the emphasis was 
firmly on playing for the advantage. Yet despite these reservations as to the Kremlin's 
intentions no one on the British side thought that they ought not to ride along with 
Soviet good will, so far as it went. 
However, from this point onwards it became increasingly apparent that 
something altogether more profound was happening. The Soviet moves over Austria 
presaged a flood of concrete gestures towards improving the international atmosphere, 
which by June 1955 left Eden quite hopeful that a Summit meeting stood a chance of 
leading to serious results. 
On the 19th April 1955 the Soviet Government issued a formal note proposing 
that a Four Power Ministerial Conference should be held to discuss the issue of 
Austria. In a Foreign Office brief of April 20th, Sir Geoffrey Harrison considered that 
given the hopes this initiative had kindled at a popular level in Austria the West would 
have little option but to react positively to the Soviet suggestion. 1-6 This was despite 
his expressed concern that the Soviets move was intended, 
[T]o impede the re-armament of Western Germany... by raising in Western 
Germany the hope that Germany could be re-united if a settlement on the 
Austrian lines were accepted. 27 
Harrison did not think that the West should be diplomatically wrong footed by the 
Soviets and cast in the role of the obdurate one. He suggested that a Western reply 
agreed to by Britain, France and America should welcome the Soviet note, but he 
thought that although the Foreign Ministers should meet to sign a Treaty in the event 
of success, the "preparatory" work should be done by the Ambassadors of the Four 
Powers resident in Vienna. Talks might be started for that purpose from around the 
2nd May. 
This was very much the approach which Macmillan, now Foreign Secretary, 
put to the Cabinet in a Memorandum of the 26th April 1955. By this time preparatory 
meetings between the three western powers to discuss the form of a response to the 
24 ibiJ. 
25 FO ', 71 l1 :S RR 1071/12S, Prime Minister : Minute, P. De Zeluta, 16th April 1955. 
26 FO 3-1 11 791 RR 071/191, F. O. Minute by Sir G. Harrison. April 20th, 1955. 
i ibid. 
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Soviet proposal had already been agreed. '-' Macmillan's emphasis was once more 
upon the shadow Austrian neutralisation might throw over West German politics. 29 
However, in terms of fundamental principles the British could have no real objection to 
the neutralisation of Austria. 30 Macmillan commented, 
It must obviously be our aim to retain for Austria the maximum possible 
freedom to determine her own policy in the political and economic fields. 
provided this purpose can, within reasonable limits, be achieved, I do not see 
any serious objection to recognising Austrian neutrality. 3 
In a meeting on the 27th April, the Cabinet, in the anodyne words of the minute 
takers, "approved generally " the proposals which had been put forward. " 
THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY 
So it was on the 2nd May 1955 that the Ambassadors of the four occupying powers 
met in Vienna to begin detailed negotiations. 33 It was from this point onwards that the 
British began to comment on the very marked change in the Soviet attitude in terms 
which went substantially beyond realpolitik. Before the talks began Sir Geoffrey 
Harrison, in a minute of the 30th April, saw two articles of the Soviet draft of the 
28 CAB 129, Vol. 75, CP(55)12, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26th 
April, 1955. On the 15th April, 1955, Harold Caccia had been informed by the United States 
Minister at the Embassy in London that on all important points American thinking on Austrian 
"neutralisation" was very much the same as the British. Given the Soviet lead it would be 
impossible not to jTo along with negotiations; FO 371 117789 RR 1071/129, Telegram No. 1705, 
from Caccia, F. 0., to Makins Washington, 15th April, 1955. 
29 ibid., the memorandum made the following estimation of Soviet motives, essentially a rejinking of 
Hayter's original, 
Soviet motives are no doubt mixed. they may have been embarrassed by the bad international 
posture in which they found themselves on the Austrian question; they may wish to 
demonstrate their willingness to settle this outstanding question as a preliminary to wider great 
power negotiations; they may feel that, by the further condition regarding neutrality which 
they have imposed on the Austrian Ministers, they will have been successful in preventing the 
absorption of Austria into the Western defence system. But I have little doubt that their main 
purpose is to unsettle opinion in Western Germany by holding" out the prospect of the re- 
unification of Germany on condition of neutralisation. 
30 R. A. Hibbert of the Northern Department in a minute at FO 371 117787 RR 1071/78, of the 8th 
April 1955 made the point, with which the Southern Department did not alto`_ ether area, that it was 
the Soviet Union that had most to lose by the neutralisation of Austria. They controlled the 
industrially most advanced parts of the country and such communications routes which might be 
valuable to NATO through the western zones could easily he secured in time of war. 
31 CAB 129, Vol. '5, CP(55)12, Macmillan continued to point out that an international guarantee of 
the territorial integrity of Austria was in the interest of Britian as much as the Soviet Union. On the 
rd March Geoffrey Harrison had expressed the opinion that it was "probably" illogical to think of 
any other solution to the Austrian problem than complete neutralization, FO '37 1 117787 RR 
1071/72; F. O. Minute by qtr G. Harrison, 23rd March. 1955. 
32 CAB l'ý. Vol. '19, CM1(55) 'th Conclusions, Minute 3,27th April, 1955. 
31 There is a substantial American record of these discussions at FRUS 1955-195 7, Vol. V, pp. 66- 
118. 
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Treaty in particular which the British should make a serious attempt to excise. 34 These 
were numbers 16 and 35, on "Displaced Persons" and "German Assets in Austria" 
respectively. They were felt to provide possible avenues for future Soviet interference 
in the affairs of a united Austria. 35 However. Harrison thought that the Soviets would 
probably use the fund of international goodwill which they had built up thus far over 
Austria to push through their version of the treaty intact. Wallinger was instructed to 
make his stand against them even though it might open up the British to Soviet 
accusations of obduracy. 36 Harrison did not hold out any great hope for the 
Ambassadorial talks coming to a resolution of these issues. 
However it was not long before Sir Geoffrey Wallinger was able to inform 
London that the Soviets were being quite remarkably obliging. In a telegram of the 
4th May, 1955 Wallinger reported, 
Sudden Soviet concessions on Article 16 took the whole conference by 
surprise and confounded our prediction that on no major issue would progress 
be achieved before the meeting of Ministers. It is, of course, a measure of 
the Soviet eagerness to get the Austrian Treaty out of the way and my Soviet 
colleague is piling on pressure for speed. 37 
The Soviets were less eager to move over article 35.38 Even so by the 6th May, 1955 
sufficient progress had been made for the Ambassadors seriously to consider a date 
which might be convenient for all the Foreign Secretaries to sign the Treaty. 39 
34 FO 371 117793 RR 1071/255, F. O. Minute by Sir G. Harrison, 30th April, 1955. Harrison's 
minute was approved by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. Article 16 would have prohibited the Austrian 
Government from helping any persons who had fought against the "Allied and Associated powers". 
Article 35 concerned Soviet economic rights within Austria. Here the problem lay in the fact that 
the Soviets had already unilaterally agreed with the Austrian Government that a fixed amount of 
compensation should be paid in their stead, the Soviet draft of the Treaty did not take this change 
into account, thus creating an anomaly. It perhaps says more about Western suspicion of Soviet 
motives than Soviet cunning, that such a comparatively minor quibble should have caused so much 
difficulty. 
35 FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. V, p. 43, Telegram Delegation at Vienna Ambassadors Conference to 
Department of State, 3rd May, 1955. The Americans were equally concerned about this issue, 
summing up their discomfort as follows, "[U]nder present [article] 35 Soviets retained 30 years right 
intervention... if Soviets felt violation had occurred they might reoccupy oil fields and leave the 
West no legal basis to object". 
36 FO 371 117793 RR 1071/260. The Austrians were prepared to accept the confusion over article 35 
in order to secure an agreement. On the 2nd May, 1955 Wallin` _er reported from Vienna in 
telegram no. 150 on a joint western "demarchý" with the Austrians over the issue, 
It was pointed out to these [Austrian] officials that even it the text of Art. 35 was signed in the 
present form (which God forbid) there was still ratification to come, and that our parliaments 
would become aware of the fact that the Austrians would have sacrificed not only their friends 
but their reputation for a Soviet mess of pottage. 
37 FO 371 117794 RR 10; 1, '9'-, Telegram No. 175, Wallin_, er to F. 0., 4th May, 1955 and FO 371 
117796 RR 1071/339, Telegram No. 443, from Hayter to F. O., 5th May 1955. In this latter 
telegram Hayter reported from Moscow that Molotov had said he now thought that the Ambassadors 
in Vienna to come to an agreement covering all the main points for the Foreign Ministers to sign. 
38 FO 371 1 l,: 'ýý5 RR 1071/306, Telegram No. 1S7. Wallin , er to F. 0.. 5th May, 1955. 
39 FO 371 11,505 RR 1071/3'0, Telegram No. 199, Wallim_er to F. O., 6th May, 1955. May 16th 
as bad for Dulles. \1: +v 14th was had for M1oloto% and Fnd. i' 13th \la' was felt by all to be 
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The argument over article 35 proved, however, to have one last kick left. On 
the 9th May it seemed that the Ambassadorial talks might yet be about to founder on 
the Soviet insistence that their original draft should not be altered. Wallinger thought 
that the Soviets were eager to leave at least one "back door" for use in the future. The 
Americans were adamant that they would not sign a Treaty with the offending article 
intact. Wallin; er thought the Soviet Ambassador "shaken" when the Americans had 
made clear their position. 40 By the 11th May, however, the Soviets capitulated with 
remarkable grace rather than risk calling the Americans' bluff. 41 This came as a 
further pleasant surprise to the Western delegations. By the time the Foreign Ministers 
arrived for the state signing their was little left for them to discuss but the possible time 
and place for a future summit meeting of the four powers. 4 The Americans had come 
round to accepting the wisdom of an approach to the Soviets on the issue with 
reluctance and largely at British insistence. 
This was for Macmillan his First meeting with Molotov whom he describes in 
his memoirs. It seemed to Macmillan that the years had not been kind, 
He seemed smaller to me than I had supposed and older (we are all older! ). 
He is grey, not black anymore; a very pale pasty face; a large forehead; 
closely cut grey hair. He wore a very respectable black suit - and looked 
rather like a head gardener in his Sunday clothes. 43 
Eden had made a formal expression of the British position on the issue of starting 
a top level dialogue in a telegram to Eisenhower of the 5th May, 1955 which was 
passed through the Embassy in Washington. 44 The British wanted to make a specific 
proposal for a meeting to the Soviets as soon as possible, although in his message to 
Eisenhower, Eden was at pains to point out that he regarded the proposed conference 
as a prelude to further negotiations, rather than an end in itself. 45 It took more than a 
"unpropitious". The date agreeable, Sunday 15th May, was however considered even more 
unpropitious by the Synod of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland who sent a letter to 
Macmillan on the 6th June, 1955. They complained of Her Majesty's Government's complicity 
with Sabbath breakers and asserted that the Austrian State Treaty was "struck thereby". FO 371 
117804 RR 1071/504. 
40 FO 
-3)t 
117797 RR 107L-347, Tele_, ram No. 215. Wallindºer to F. 0., 9th May, 1955. 
41 FO 371 117800 RR 1071; -412, Despatch from Wallinger to F. 0., 16th May, 1955 in which 
Wallinger outlined the last days of the talks. 
42 Tides of Fortune, pp. 598-602 and Full Circle, pp. 290-29 1. 
43 Tides of Fortune, p. 599. 
44 PRENI 11 89-3. TeIeý_ram No. 2139 from F. O. to Washington, from Prime Minister to President, 
5th May, 195. Indication had already been iven by British officials to their American 
counterparts during bilateral talks held a few days previously in London. 
45 FO 371 116700 NS 1071/15, \, linute by Sir 1. Kirkpatrick. 6th May, 1955, and also Tides of 
Fortune, pp. 584-5S7. This seems initially to have been %lacmillan's idea, although it was 
expressed in the press by the Economist of the 6th May 1955. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick brought the 
opinion of the Eco, i ' rear to \lacmillan's attention in a minute ot the same day, commenting, 
It seems to me that there is :i lot or sense in the views expressed. And it confirms your thesis 
that what wwe hay c to cater for is a Tong round of ne`_otiation rather than a short, sharp meeting 
followed by either success or irrevocable failure. 
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little gentle urging on the part of the British immediately before the Foreign Ministers 
were due to meet in Vienna to persuade the Americans of the desirability of such a 
summit. Macmillan himself met Dulles in Paris on the 7th May and canvassed his 
(and the British Government's) conception of a series of conferences designed to deal 
with specific problems over a long period of time, rather than a one off as at Yalta. 
The Americans were most anxious not to repeat what they saw as a baleful 
precedent. 46 Eisenhower's election in 1952 had involved considerable denunciation of 
the supposed betrayals which Roosevelt had presided over in secret in the Crimea. 47 
Macmillan was hard put to persuade Dulles of the value of the British proposal. He 
reported back to London in a telegram of the following day that, 
In my private talks with Mr. Dulles yesterday, I used every argument I could 
think of in favour of the "top level" meeting, on its mnerits, apart from any 
convenience which it might have in satisfying British and French public 
opinion [my italics]. 48 
Britain's eagerness to talk with th enemy was clearly at least partly informed by 
electoral considerations. 49 There is indeed a strong emphasis in the American side to 
the correspondence on the assistance that Summit diplomacy might afford the 
Conservative Government in its re-election. Yet the Conservative Government was not 
merely seeking another term of office in the becoming clothes of peacemaker. 
Macmillan's diplomacy in May 1955 was following a long established pattern. 50 The 
British attitude towards the Soviet Union, possibly influenced by her propinquity, had 
a more pragmatic air than the American. Dulles still seemed more concerned that a 
willingness to talk with the Soviet devil should not be interpreted as an acceptance of 
his works in Eastern Europe, than he was willing to start talks in the first place. 51 
46 PRE; `-1 11/893, Telegram No. 80, from U. K. Permanent Delegation to NATO., Paris to F. 0., 
from Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, 8th May, 1955. It is worth pointing out that Macmillan 
thought the most effective argument he employed was that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to 
make trouble over either the Offshore Islands or Formosa in the lead up to and duration of Great 
Power talks. Formosa and the People's Republic of China were to play a large part in the substance 
of neý, otiations at Geneva in July. 
47 Eisenhower. The President, pp. 269-274. 
48 ibid. 
49 The language used by both parties `_ives thinly veiled indication of the way in which British 
domestic politics impinged upon Anglo-American diplomacy in Mav 1955. In his Telegram of 5th 
May Eden added to a list of considerations a less than convincing denial of party political expedient, 
"I must also tell you that much in our country depends upon it [a conference]; this is not a party 
question here, but responds to a deep desire of our whole people". Eisenhower perceptively put this 
issue to the top of the at-, enda in his reply to Eden of 6th May 1955, "We appreciate the importance 
to you of this project under existing circumstances, and are naturally disposed to do everything we 
can to further it". Eden did not attempt to correct this more candid analysis in further 
correspondence. 
50 Consider Eden's submission to the Cabinet of the 26th ; March, 1955 discussed above. 
51 PRENI 1 11893, Telegram No. 1073, from Makins, Washiný., ton to F. 0., 6th May, 1955. In a 
private conversation \ ith Sir Rodger Makins after handing over Eisenhower's response to Eden on 
the 6th May. Dulles expressed . American reservations regarding the proposed summit. After 
insisting that China should not he brou`_ht in and complaining of the lack of co-ordination of 
Western \ lews on certain key areas, he \\, ent on to , av, 
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However, the Americans were reluctantly prepared to make an approach to the Soviets 
on the condition that the Foreign Ministers should try the waters first. 52 The conclave 
of Foreign Ministers on the 15th May in Vienna seemed to both the Americans and the 
British a most convenient time to get the process underway. This proviso was 
contained in the formal invitation to talks which was sent jointly to the Soviets by the 
Governments of Britain. France and the United States on the 10th May. 1955.53 
Once the Foreign Ministers meet in Vienna the process of sounding out went 
smoothly. Macmillan reported back on his conversations of the 15th May with his 
counterpart as follows, 
Although we do not expect the formal reply to the invitation for some days, 
Mr Molotov made it quite clear that he is very keen on having the White 
House, and at a top level [Macmillan's way of refering to Eisenhower]. He 
appeared to approve the general scheme set out in the invitation and said that 
it conformed with his ideas, viz, that a top level conference should be the 
beginning of a process of negotiation which must necessarily be prolonged. 
He agreed that any other suggestion would lead to disillusionment in all our 
countries. '4 
The only real area of disputation was the place in which talks were to be held. " 
Molotov's preferred location was Vienna. Both Macmillan and Dulles did not agree as 
it would have meant meeting in a city still under an occupation regime. The "Allied" 
forces were not due to withdraw from Austria completely until 1956 and a Swiss city 
was the option preferred by the west. However, Molotov gave indication that the 
Soviets might well be willing to bend to western pressure on the issue. The question 
of the agenda, often the sticking point in previous talks about talks, was sketched out 
more or less to the satisfaction of all. 
The main public function of the visit by so many foreign politicians to Vienna 
was carried off in some style. The Austrian State Treaty. bound in green Morocco 
(That it was possible to take the view that something like. an equilibrium had now been 
achieved in Europe and that there might be some prospect of scaling down the forces arrayed 
on each side in this area. But there were great difficulties here also since the US. certainly did 
not want to Live any colour of sanction to the Soviet position in the Satellite countries or to the 
Eastern European "N. A. T. O. -type" organisation which they seemed to be in the process of 
setting up. 
S2 PREM 11/893; Telegram No. 190, From Sir G. Jebb to F. 0., From Foreign Secretary to Prime 
Minister, 8th May, 1955. Dulles was still expressing his doubts to Macmillan in Paris on the 8th 
May. At this point his main concern seems to hay e been the unpopularity of summit diplomacy with 
the right wing of the Republican Party. 
S3 PREM 11/893, Text of Statement contained in Telegram No. 202. from Sir G. Jebb. Paris to F. 0., 
10th May, 1')55. 
54 PRE\1 11/893. Telegram No. 201, Sir G. Wailin`_er to F. 0., from Foreign Secretary for Prime 
Minister, 15th May. 1955. As so many of 'AacmiIlan's negotiations, this one bean "after an 
º, reeable dinner". Food play, a large part in Macmillan's diplomatic memorabilia, see Tides of 
Fortune, pp. -582-697. 
55 PREM 11'S03, Telegram No. 51 3, from Sir W. Hayter to F. 0., 26th May, 1955. A very positive 
official response to the Western invitation of the 10th may 'gas not issued by the Soviets until the 
'6th May. 
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leather by the same Firm which had bound the Vienna Treaty of 1815, was signed with 
due pomp and ceremony in the Belvedere palace on the 15th May. 1955.56 Macmillan 
records in his memoirs that the Viennese crowds and. less predictably, the weather 
were agreeably festal in aspect. 57 
SNOWDROPS AND CROCUSES 
By this point there had been even further indication that the Soviet policy towards 
summitry was becoming ever more positive. On the 10th May the Soviet Government 
lodged with the United Nations proposals for disarmament which, as the British 
considered them, were much more credible than any previous Soviet position on the 
issue. 58 Furthermore the manner in which the Soviets conducted the founding of their 
own "N. A. T. O. " in Warsaw from the 11th to 14th May, 1955 was interpreted, rather 
ironically, by British observers as another indication of the way in which the Soviets 
were softening towards the West. 59 It also gave one of the tust clear hints to the 
British that the prospect of thermonuclear war might be the one of the main factors 
prompting Soviet foreign policy to change. 
In a despatch of the 1 1th May Sir William Hayter reported on the detail of the 
Soviet Disarmament proposals of the previous day. He drew the following conclusions 
from what seemed a clear indication of movement on the issue, 
Soviet Government at present genuinely desire a measure of disarmament, 
partly for internal economic reasons and partly because the present state of 
international armaments seems to them menacing. To achieve this they are 
prepared for quite far-reaching sacrifices, including the loss of their present 
superiority in conventional armaments and the acceptance of a degree of 
foreign control activity [for the purpose of verification] in this country which 
is utterly alien to their tradition. 60 
Hayter considered that this desire to be pleasant to the West has as much to do 
with the internal weakness of the regime and the economic stress of rearmament than 
anything else. 61 It all fitted into a pattern which had begun with the opening of 
56 FO 371 117801 RR 1071/433, Wallin`; er described the circumstance Surrounding the signature in a 
Despatch to the Foreign Office on the 19th May. 1955. The full text of the Treaty is held at FO 
31 117799 RR 107 1/401. 
57 Tides of Fortune, p. 598. 
58 Hayter expressed his approval in a despatch of Ist June, 1955, FO 371 116652 NS 1021/38, Hayter 
to Macmillan. The Americans were however less san`_uine in their appreciation. FRUS 1955-1957, 
Vol. V, p. 1821, Memorandum of a Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the NSC, 19th May, 1955. 
59 For a brief study of the Warsaw Pact see M. Mackintosh. "The Warsaw Treaty Organisation: A 
History" in D. Holloway and J. M. O. Sharp (eds. ), The . Varsativ Pact, Alliance in Transition. 
60 FO 371 11652 `S 102-1/34, T, -1e, -, ram 
No. 464. form Sir W. Hayter to F. 0., 11th May, 1955. 
Hayter also thought that the Soviet proposals might have been designed to advance the closure of 
American bases in Europe. 
61 ibid.. Havter continued. 
Soviet leaders do not appear to be in the tough or a_-`_res. ive mood that . tie expected when 
Nialenkov ; ell. On he contrary, perhaps because of their undoubted internal weaknesses and 
Chaptcr 3/ Page 73 
negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty and which had been further developed by the 
Soviet disarmament proposals Only at the very end of his despatch did he speculate 
that, 
[I]n my opinion they are now more likely to come to an agreement with us 
than they have been for many years past, no doubt largely owing to the 
success of our recent policies and perhaps also because they have at last, in 
spite of their brave words, begun to realise what the hydrogen bomb means to 
thcin[my italics]. 
Hayter may well have been referring to the brave words which Khrushchev had 
publicly declared as recently as the 20th April, 1955. In a speech delivered in Warsaw 
on that day, in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish alliance, 
Khrushchev had re-affirmed the orthodoxy on nuclear war which had been established 
against Malenkov in 1954; and placed his emphasis firmly upon the inevitability of 
Soviet victory in the event of world war. ' Although he had also pointed to the 
necessity of peaceful co-existence, Hayter thought the speech bore Khrushchev's 
"personal stamp with its truculent, over-simplified approach to foreign affairs". 63 In 
his report (telegram no 464, referred to below) Hayter pointed out, "Soviet atomic 
superiority is not referred to, but third world war is described as undoubtedly leading 
to the destruction of capitalist countries". 64 
Hayter's speculation of the 11th May, 1955 on the possibility of a change in this 
Soviet attitude was to be confirmed in substance by the tenor of the Soviet delegation's 
speechifying at the Warsaw Conference, held from the 11th to the 14th of the same 
month. In a telegram of the 12th May commenting on a speech by Bulganin in 
Warsaw of the previous day, Cecil Parrott, the Minister at the British Embassy in 
Moscow, developed Hayter's line of reasoning, 
[H]is [Bulganin's] lengthy passage on disarmament proposals underlines their 
importance from the Soviet point of view. Like Zhukov he refers more than 
once to the calamity of an atomic war without referring to the possibility of 
uncertainties, they seem to me now to be anxious for a relaxation of tension and even perhaps 
for some kind of genuine settlement with the West. It is not that they have given up their 
ultimate objective; it is clear enough that all of them, Zhukov and the Marshals as well as 
Khrushchev and Bulganin, still think that Communism will ultimately prevail... But it seems to 
me that they are beginning to feel that the best way of achieving this is not by threats and 
menaces but by conciliation and appeasement and by sufficiently reducing, through 
disarmament, the strains on their own economy to enable them to compete with capitalist 
standards of living. 
62 Nlalenkov had made his "wobbly ' speech on the issue of mutual destruction on March 12th, 1954 
only to publicly "yualitý " it in a turther speech of the 26th April, 1954. Molotov's keynote speech 
of 8th February. 1955 was seen by the Foreign Office as an emphatic declaration of the old view 
that under the conditions of wordd war only capitalism would be destroyed and the Soviet Union 
would he victorious. See aho'e, SoOet Forei(,, º: Police Since WVorlel Wcºr 11, pp. 88-95 and FO 3,1 
116650 NS 1021/IS. 
63 FO -371 
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Communist victory. This again supports the supposition that the Soviet 
leaders are really anxious about the effect of the hydrogen bomb (see our 
telegram No. 464). 65 
The importance of thermonuclear weaponry in the Soviet Government's foreign policy 
calculations was to become increasingly obvious as the Geneva Conference drew 
closer. Parrotrwent on to comment that Bulganin's speech had also contained a 
number of conciliatory touches and was, "{v]ery different from the normal run of 
Soviet speeches, and the passages in which he spoke of the need for establishing 
confidence as a first step towards agreement and cited Austria as an example that 
problems could be solved piece-meal had a western ring about them". 
Perversely enough, the British saw the Warsaw Conference as a further indication 
of the Kremlin's new eagerness for sunlnlitry. The formation of a Soviet military pact 
was largely dismissed by the Foreign Office merely as a recognition of long established 
fact. E. F. Given of the Northern Department put it thus, "it [the Warsaw Pact] is, of 
course, a facade erected on an existing edifice, and will no doubt be used as a 
bargaining counter in four power talks". 66 The British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir 
Andrew Noble, sent his Slllllllling up of the Conference's significance to London on the 
17th May, 1955.67 Once more comment was made of the surprisingly "mild" tone of 
the proceedings, particularly in contrast to the "violent language" which had so 
recently been used in condemnation of the Paris Agreements. Bulganin's speech of the 
11th May was singalled out as a good example of this trend. However, Noble, looking 
for an ulterior motive, suggested that, 
Blustering tactics having failed to intimidate the Western parliaments, the 
Soviet Government apparently decided to assume a disposition of disarming 
reasonableness, calculated perhaps to appeal to uncommitted countries and 
opinion "68 
However suspicious of Soviet intentions the Foreign Office staff may have 
remained, there was an impressive list of Soviet goodwill gestures towards the west 
building up. These were soon to be followed by further startling changes in Soviet 
foreign policy. At the end of May, 1955 in the aftermath of the signing of the Warsaw 
Pact, Khrushchev himself was to make an attempt to soft-talk another formerly 
implacable foe, Tito. 69 Khrushchev and the accompanying Soviet delegation, 
65 FO 371 1161 18 N 1074/8, Telegram No. 469, from C. Parrot, Moscow to F. O., 12th May, 1955. 
66 FO 371 1161 IS N 1074/9, Minute by E. F. Given of 18th May, 1955. 
67 FO 371 1161ISN 1074/19, Despatch from Sir A. Noble, Warsaw to F. 0., 17th May, 1955. 
68 ibid., Noble also made clear that the East German Government's statement, clearing a future united 
Germany from any obligation undertaken by the existing regime, left "the diplomatic doors... 
, ostentatiously open'. 
The So% iet Union was keeping a careful eye on its freedom of manoeuvre. 
69 FO 3-1 118'0% R'Y" 10 338/74, Despatch from Sir F. Roberts, Belgrade to F. 0., ý' Ist May, 1955. 
Both the Yu, _osiaý s and the British were concerned from the , tart that the Soviets might have 
ulterior motives in wanting to visit. Publicly the Yu:, oslav, ý hailed Khrushchev's visit as a great 
vindication of their polic\ singe 1948, pnvatel` they w ere ICs assured as Roberts reported in the 
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conspicuously lacking ýtiiolotov, arrived in Yugoslavia on the 26th May, 1955.70 This 
was the same day as the British elections in which Eden was to be victorious. 7' It was 
also the day on which the Soviets made a positive formal reply to the Western proposal 
of the 10th May for a Summit meeting. 
The British had entertained the hope after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 that 
it might be possible to increase western influence in the country to the point at which it 
leant decisively towards the west. However, by April 1955 it had become apparent 
that Tito had not fallen out of one camp merely to fall into another. 72 The Khrushchev 
visit was taken by the British Government as confirmation that Tito had gone "Indian". 
It was also adduced by the Foreign Office as one more example of the new conciliatory 
look which Soviet policy had been developing since their first moves towards the 
Austrian State Treaty, although this did not mean that all had necessarily gone 
smoothly between the Soviets and their hosts. 
Indeed, the Yugoslav reaction to Khrushchex, ''s first speech of the 26th May, 
1955, delivered at the airport on his arrival in Belgrade, was far from positive. 
Khrushchev delivered a number of gaffes including reference to the supposedly 
unassisted role played by the Red Army in Yugoslavia's liberation from Germany. On 
the 27th May, 1955 Sir William Havter delivered the following judgement on 
Khrushchev's bravura performance, "the whole pleading, apologetic, clumsy tone of 
this speech is surprising, or would be surprising if we did not know that Khrushchev is 
like that". 73 Hayter also pointed out an interesting straw in a wind which was soon to 
increase to gale force proportions, 
above despatch. Hayter expressed Britain's concern in a letter of the 27th May, 1955 to the F. O. 
(FO 371 118027 RY 1033/97) as follows, 
It is of course obvious enough that this high powered Soviet delegation have not -one to 
BelL, rade with the sole purpose of saying mea culpa. They must have something serious and 
possibly (from out point of view) sinister to propose. I cannot imagine what this will be, 
though the composition of the Soviet Delegation suggests that it will have an economic element 
[the delegation included Mikoyan]. One can only hope that the Yugoslavs dispose of a very, 
very long spoon. 
10 Perhaps because of his unfortunate association with Stalin's foreign policy and perhaps also because 
of his increasing disagreement with Khrushchev over the basic tenor of policy post Stalin. 
71 Full Circle, pp. ? 76-287 and Tides of Fortune, pp. 602-604. 
72 FO 371 115025 RY 10338/25, Telegram No. 26, from Sir F. Roberts, Belgrade to F. 0., 8th April, 
1955 and Minute by H. B. Mckenzie Johnston, 13th April, 1955. Mckenzie Johnston commented 
as follows on the telegram which was an assessment by Roberts of the Yutoslavian attitude towards 
defence, 
There is really nothing in this to modify recent assessments by Bel`! rade of present Yugoslav 
policy... If anything it `_ives 
further indication of Yu__o>slavia "`_oinv-y Indian" (in the sense, 
presumably. of Nehru's neutralism]. 
73 FO 3371 1 1S02ý RY 1033897, Letter from Sir \Villiam Hayter to F. 0., 27th May, 1955. Hayter 
made the following report on the substance of the airport mech. 
Khrushchev's speech is very peculiar, and also very typically Khrushchev. It is full of his 
characteristics of blurting out surprising truths and also determined and narrow minded 
conformity to the Marxist line. From our point of view the most interesting feature is the 
suý_gestion that the responsibility for the breach between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was 
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It is also noticeable that Khrushchev is anxious to advertise himself as leader 
of the Party founded by Lenin, exploiting in a rather clumsy way the fidelity 
of the Yugoslav communists to Lenin. Stalin is not mentioned anywhere in 
the speech. The emphasis on the cooperation of the two Marxist-Leninist" 
parties is laboriously obvious. 
Khrushchev's airport speech was not the only outpouring which caused the 
Yugoslavs to wince. 74 But, despite the apparent coolness of the Yugoslavs towards the 
Soviets throughout their stay, the visit soon recovered, and by the time of the Soviets' 
departure was credited to them as at least a partial success. 75 On this point the 
Americans seem to have taken a marginally more negative view than the British. 76 
Although there was trans-Atlantic agreement that there had been successes for both the 
Soviets and the Yugoslavs, the fear that in the long term this new cordiality between 
Moscow and Belgrade would pull Yugoslavia increasingly back towards the Soviet 
the supply by Bcria, Ahakumov and other of false material about the Yu goslavv leaders. It is 
hard to imagine that the Yuvoslavs could take this apology seriously... the most wounding 
accusation of all was that almost the sole part in the liberation of Yugoslavia had been played 
by the Soviet army... 
74 FO 371 118028 RY 10338/125, Roberts reported in his summary despatch of June 11th, 1955 that 
Khrushchev had, allegedly, further alarmed Tito in his private conversations with him at Brioni by a 
renewed emphasis on the ability of the communist world to survive it Third World War victorious. 
75 FO 371 118027 RY 10338/98, Despatch from Sir F. Roberts, Belgrade to F. 0., May 29th, 1955. 
Roberts reported that, 
[Tihe atmosphere improved yesterday, so far as the substance of the talks is concerned. But 
the gulf between hosts and guests `rows deeper with each social gathering. This was 
particularly noticeable at Tito's major reception last night. Many of my Yugoslav contacts, 
high and medium, commented on this. One told me that after the passage of seven years the 
Russians and the Yugoslavs no longer even spoke the same lan`juage, adding that he now found 
it impossible to understand how they had ever done so. even during the honey-moon period 
between 1945 and 1947... I could not avoid the impression myself last night that the Russians 
found themselves rather more at home in the four power company of ourselves, the Americans 
and the French than of their former Yugoslav comrades. 
Roberts ended his despatch with an expression of western satisfaction as to the outcome of the visit, 
So far I think we have every reason to congratulate ourselves on the Soviet visit to Belgrade, 
although I naturally keep my fingers crossed until it is all over. As the Prime Minister of 
Croatia put it in a special article on Tito's birthday, "If the Yugoslavs have to choose between 
the two blocs, they know perfectly well which from their point of view is the lesser evil. 
76 FO 371 11802S RY 103338/109, Letter from Mr. Wilkinson, British Embassy Washington to Mlr W. 
H. Yount,. Southern Department, 7th June 1955. Also at the same reference minutes by Northern 
Department; R. A. Hibbert of 16th June, 1955 and H. Mackenzie-Johnston of 11th June, 1955. 
The State Department had reported their view of developments to the British Embassy. Wilkinson 
described the American view of events as "slightly less optimistic" than the British. If, as seemed 
likely to the Americans, the Soviets had not been aiming for it complete reconciliation with 
Yugoslavia, but rather a half-%\, ay agreement then, "in these circumstances, a perfectly adequate 
accommodation seemed to have been reached in Belgrade and Chip Bohlen had commented from 
\losco that he thought there had been a victory for both sides". Also FRUS 1955-5 7, Vol. X, p. 
13-15. Summary of Discussions of Le__islatt\ve Leadership Meeting. Washington, 28th June, 1955. 
. ->t this meeting with 
Senators Dulles was very ea_er that US. economic aid to Yugoslavia should 
not he reduced or refused by the legislature as. "Russia seemed to have raten humble pie at 
Belgrade, he (Dulles] said, and we should not take any action that would tend to drive the 
Yugoslavs back to their Russian connection". 
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camp was not as strong in Britain as in the United States. 77 Indeed Sir Frank Roberts' 
estimation of Yugoslavia's preference, in extremis, for the west remained bullish; the 
opinion of the Foreign Office as a whole was rather less robust. 8 
However, one of the most important impressions of their visitors which the 
Yugoslavs were so obliging as to communicate to the British was, once more, the 
Soviet eagerness to do business with the West. Sir Frank Roberts reported back to 
London on his conversation with Edvard Kardelj, a member of the Yugoslav Politburo, 
during a diplomatic reception held for the Soviet visitors on the 28th May, 1955.19 
Kardelj made comment that the Soviets had proved willing to compromise with the 
Yugoslav view of inter-communist relations by including a reference to "different 
roads to socialism" in the final communique. The Foreign Office's first reaction was 
to play down both the novelty of such a concession and even more the effect which it 
might have on the rest of Eastern Europe. 80 Of more direct importance to the West 
was the following information, 
[H]e [Kardelj] now thought positive results would flow from the Belgrade 
meeting. The Soviet attitude had convinced him that the Russians genuinely 
77 FO 371 116652 NS 1021/40, Despatch from Sir W. Hayter, ; Moscow to F. 0., 10th June, 1955. 
Hayter thought that, "As seen from Moscow the Belgrade talks look remarkably like a defeat for the 
Soviet Government. and a personal defeat for Khrushchev. " However Hayter continued to reason 
that although Khrushchev may have hoped tu persuade the Yugoslavs to wive emphatic support to 
the Soviet Union, he was enough of a realist to expect somethin`! rather less. To the Soviets' credit 
it could be argued that the visit had confirmed "neutralist" tendencies which had already become 
apparent in Yugoslav foreign policy. Hayter did not think that the Soviet success could be put in 
any stronger terms. Given the overall trend in Soviet policy, neutralism was probably good enough. 
78 FO 371 118028 RY 10338/125, Despatch from Sir F. Roberts, Belgrade to F. 0., 1 lth June, 1955. 
In his summing up of the Soviet visit in the above despatch, Roberts went so far as to su`gest that 
the Yugoslavs felt "western", particularly in reaction to the rather brutish and "uncouth" 
performance of Khrushchev and entourage. This Soviet display had gone some way to "dissipate 
some of 'Marshal Tito's airy confidence in a complete Soviet change of heart. " Amongst other 
Foreign Office minuters questioning, the basis of Roberts' confidence. Miss V. Conolly of the 
Research Department played down the element of novelty in the proceedings, commenting in a note 
of the 17th August that, 
I should not personally attach over much importance to the Soviet admission that there is more 
than one road to socialism, nor regard it as a landmark in Soviet thou, -, 
ht on revolution and 
violence. . Attar-all, the Lenin-Stalin doctrine of by-passing capitalism amounts to an admission 
of the same order though not couched in the same terms. 
/9 FO 371 118027 RY 10338, '81, Telegram No. 391, from Sir F. Roberts, Belgrade to F. 0., 29th 7 
\lav, 1955. Kardelj was the Yugoslav Foreign Minister from 1948-53. 
80 See footnote no. 70 and FO 3^1 116652 NS 1021/-40, Despatch from Sir W. Hayter, Moscow to F. 
0., 10th June, 1955. Har ter thought that although neutralism in the non-communist world was 
becoming increasingly favoured of Moscow, the Soviet leaders would have made it clear that this 
did not apply to the communist world. Indeed he felt that. 
Soviet condonation of Titoism i,, probably it measure of their confidence in the docility of the 
satellites and not a prelude to any relaxation of the Kremlin's control over its empire. It is 
conceivable that the Soviets may he prepared to trade it withdrawal of their troops from one or 
more of the satellites for e. _. a withdrawal of American forces form Europe. But I see no 
prospect of the Sov iet Government entertainin_, the idea of free elections in any satellite. On 
the contrary, any withdrawal of American forces ýoulcl probably be preceded by a 
streng then in_ of Communist control over the State apparatus in the country concerned. 
Chapter 3/ Page 78 
wanted peace and an international detente and that there were real prospects 
for big-Power negotiations although the road would be long and difficult and 
Soviet concessions hardly won. 
This was the main lesson from Khrushchev's sojourn in Yugoslavia which Macmillan 
took with him in his briefing material when he left in early June, 1955 to begin 
detailed negotiations with the other Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers at San 
Francisco. In a minute of the 10th June the Southern Department made the following 
summation for the Foreign Secretary of the Yugoslavs' understanding of where the 
general trend in Soviet policy was going, 
The Yugoslavs are confirmed in their view that a very important change is 
taking place in the Soviet attitude towards international relations and co- 
operation with other countries. The Russians had been very critical of their 
own past persuasions and in particular of their original disarmament 
proposal... Nevertheless, they still seemed to cherish many of their old 
conceptions and illusions, more especially concerning Yugoslavia. 8' 
The Yugoslavs thought. at least in so far as they communicated their opinions to the 
British, that there was a real possibility the Soviets might be willing to compromise in 
international negotiations. 
XXX 
It is important to stress that through the first half of 1955 the British were making their 
own foreign policy, as much as reacting to that of the Soviets. The line followed by 
the Conservative Government in Germany and Europe since 1952 developed naturally, 
once it had met with success over West German re-armament, into Eden's attempt to 
start top-level talks with the Soviets. There was no "U" turn or contradiction in the 
British Government's thinking. Yet in following this straight line, Eden had to 
overcome the deep-seated doubts of the Eisenhower Administration. He was partly 
assisted in this task, it seems, by the Americans' willingness to connive in the re- 
election of a British Conservative Government. This factor, however, in no way 
detracts from the logical force of Eden and Macmillan's policy, not least as it was 
decided without prior reference to the Americans. The British attitude towards the 
Soviet Union was intormed by a pragmatism which the Americans, it seems, did not 
share. More startlingly the likelihood of Britain achieving the consummation of that 
policy was very substantially increased by profound change in the Soviet attitude 
towards the west. The Soviet Union, not Great Britain, was the country which 
committed something of an "U" turn in early 1955. 
3l FO 371 116652 NS 1021 42. Minute by Southern Department of 10th June, 1955. This minute, 
which summed lip the wisdom of the British Embassy in Belgrade's commentary on the Soviet visit, 
was expressly asked for by Macmillan. 
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By the end of May, 1955 the Kremlin had gone a very long way in changing its 
relations with the external world. The Foreign Office was quite aware of the 
importance of what seemed to be happening. It was not however completely apparent 
in Whitehall why the Soviets had become so pleasantly reasonable in their relations 
with the west. Much of the emphasis in their explanations revolved around the Soviet 
search for diplomatic advantage. However, the weight of Soviet good-will had, by 
Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia, become so heavy as strongly to suggest that what 
motivated them was not merely realpolitik. The British Embassy in Moscow began to 
notice indications that the nature of thermo-nuclear war. already recognised in its full 
horror by the British, was causing profound concern within the Soviet Government. 
These indications were still confusing and unclear, but they were soon to crystallise. 
What could not be ignored was that Soviet foreign policy was undergoing a change 
much more profound than anything initiated under Malenkov. As Churchill's great 
hope for a Summit grew closer to its epiphany, this impression was further 
strengthened in the Foreign Office. The expectations raised by this new Soviet 
approach to the outside world formed the background to the Geneva summit itself. 
And so we move on to the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Prelude to the Geneva Summit, 1955 
Canute and the Rising Tide of' Soviet Amity 
"I think we have been right to emphasise the diplomatic and tactical advantages which 
the Russians see in reducing tension at present... On the other hand, I also agree with 
Sir William Hayter that this policy stems also from a "truer appreciation of the nature 
of modern war' . 
H. A. F. Hohler. 
Because of the July 1955 Geneva Summit's apparent lack of fundamental achievement 
it tends to be discounted as a matter of no importance in a longer view of East West 
rivalry. This, arguably, stems from a misconception as to where the Geneva Meeting 
fitted into the development of Soviet policy and consequently the way the West viewed 
and fought the Cold War. Historiographically the Geneva Summit has been considered 
worthy of very little attention. In his recent work on the Eden government Mr. 
Richard Lamb discussed the significance of the Summit in a few short paragraphs 
inserted at the end of a chapter on "The Far East 1954-56". He summed up its place 
in history as follows, 
The 1955 Geneva four power summit aroused great expectations all over the 
world because it was the First gathering since the end of the war of the 
Communists and the free nations. With Stalin dead and new Soviet leaders in 
charge there were high hopes of a new atmosphere of conciliation. These 
were not fulfilled, although during the six days of proceedings the Russians 
gut AJ a certain amiability which became known as "the Geneva 
atmosphere". I 
Equally Lord Blake, in his survey of Britain's twentieth century decline, accords a slip 
of a paffe to the summit in the beginning of his chapter on the Suez Crisis. His 
treatment is no less dismissive than Lamb's. ' Indeed on the issue of Eden's proposals 
for the unification of Germany Lamb does Blake the honour of approving quotation. 
This view is also very much that of Eden's biographers, the summit meeting was 
conspicuous by its lack of achievement. They accord it a minimum of space and by 
implication, as much as by direct comment. a minimum of importance. ' Macmillan's 
I Richard Lamb. The Failure Of the Eden Government, p. 126. The Summit meeting is dealt with 
over pp. 125-12-8. 
2 See Robert Blak.. The Decline uJ'Poitei-, p. 359. Blakt Jisnit es it with the follov. win_ words, now 
rather dated. 
The conference came to nothinv. Re-unification of Germany, one of its objectives, was and 
remains unattainable... Disarmament . , 
he other ohjective. was too closely connected with 
Germany to be separately soluble. The "Eisenhower plan" and the "Eden plan" are part of the 
debris of 
The toollowin, -- ununarise the treatment to it 
h,. Eden', most recent hiw-zraphers. D. Carlton 
deal, %% ith it on pp. car hi:. -mntholt E; ic"n. in ww hich he 'onc ntrates on the inter-Istin-, issue of 
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official biographer is no more spacious in his treatment of the Foreign Secretary's side 
to the first "full-dress" meeting of the great powers since Potsdam. 4 The consignment 
of the Geneva conference to the status of irrelevant, if harmless, side-show, may be 
taken as the orthodox line. Perhaps the best summary of this assessment being Blake's 
grudging last words on the issue, "However no positive ill will was created - and that 
was something. 5 
Yet this compares unfavourably to the place accorded to the proceedings in the 
memoirs of both Eden and Macmillan. Eden effectively devotes two chapters in his 
memoirs, to the diplomatic build up and the actual meeting itself, although the former 
is hardly extensive. 6 Macmillan also devotes a substantial chapter to it, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given that this was one of the most dramatic events to occur during his 
short period as Foreign Secretary. However the point is that they both attached 
considerable importance to the Geneva Summit. much more than might be expected if 
we were to accept Blake's damnation by faint praise. In his memoirs Eden considered 
that despite the lack of concrete results, "[T]he Geneva Conference taught some 
lessons, which were powerfully to affect the course of events in the next few years". 7 
Macmillan's post facto account also places emphasis on the influence that his 
impression of Geneva had in the future development of policy towards the Soviet 
Union. He asserted, "my experience at Geneva supported me in the efforts I was 
subsequently to make as Prime Minister towards a detente with Russia". 8 
There seems therefore to be a dichotomy between the opinions of historians and 
those British politicians who actually took part at the time. The following two chapters 
are largely concerned with arguing that Eden and particularly Macmillan were much 
more perceptive in insight than their late twentieth century chroniclers. The Geneva 
summit deserves rather more than the fag end pages to which it has tended 
retrospectively to be consigned. 
If as Eden and Macmillan we look at the summit in the context of relations with 
Russia, rather than in a sweeping narrative of British policy, for two reasons Geneva 
becomes a significant landmark. It can be seen on the one hand as a culminating point 
in western and British policy which started with Ernest Bevin's attempt to provide 
British prestige vis-a-vis the "super powers". R. Rhodes-James in his Anthony Eden on pp. 417-18 
gives it still less space, hardly even stopping to verbalise its inconsequence. Ironically for one so 
critical of the taint that the Suez Crisis has _iven to much of what has been written about Eden, he 
spends an intemperate amount of time on it himself. Indeed to this extent his treatment of Eden's 
prime-ministership up to July 1956 might be likened to the hurried overture of a grand opera. 
4 A. Horne. Afacmillan 1894-1956, p. 361. The Summit and the following autumn's Foreign 
Minister's conference are squeezed into a mere two paýges. He sums up Macmillan's opinion of the 
meeting as follows, "he... was left with a strong teelin_ that they really wanted detente with the 
West not war". Home however does not give the slightest indication why Macmillan might have 
thought that thy, as the Nor JoeS he spend any time on the importance such a conclusion 
have had in the eVUIutie)n of-subsequent thinkin`, re ardin`, the Soviet Union and defence. 
5 The Decline of P; )\/er, 1). 359 
6 Full Circle. pp. -2S8-3 
11. Tides ()Fortune 1945-55. pp. 582-628. 
Full Circle. p. 306. 
8 Tales cy'Fortune. p. o'-5. 
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Europe with a defence against the Soviet continental threat. At Geneva the effective 
division of Europe into the Warsaw Pact and NATO was, de facto, accepted. This 
was signified by a tacit agreement to differ over the reunification of Germany. The 
second point has as much to do with the way in which negotiations were conducted 
rather than what they actually achieved. In their eagerness to persuade the West that 
they no longer harboured any illusions as to the destructive capacity of thermonuclear 
weapons, the Soviets implemented changes in their foreign policy which were by the 
end of 1955 to lead to a new phase in the cold war. If measured in terms of concrete 
agreements then there can be no debating that Geneva was not a success. for there 
were none. And this despite the hopes raised in the west and the involved preparations 
of all three western parties. But the burden of the following argument is that such an 
accounting is misconceived in its premise. 
In relation to how the cold war was changing the Summit might be taken as an 
interesting example of Oscar Wilde's dictum that one should always judge by 
appearances. What seemed important to Eden and Macmillan was that the Soviets 
were keen to persuade the west that they did not want war. Their attitude was entirely 
pacific. That no agreement on concrete matters was achieved was in that sense 
immaterial. Geneva was taken by the British as the first irrefutable indication that the 
Soviet Union shared the west's appreciation of the utter destruction which a nuclear 
exchange would cause. The British concluded from the Soviets new found love of 
amiable atmospherics that deterrence was a viable policy of defence. 9 This is the 
kernel of the meeting's importance in the metamorphosis of the cold war. However 
detailed the diplomatic proposals may have been. they are basically subsidiary to the 
symbolic importance of the Summit Meeting. 
However, before fleshing out these conclusions as to the Summit's real place in 
the development of Britain's understanding of Soviet foreign policy, some account 
must be taken of the events that lead up to, and those that took place during, the 
Summit. This is not least because whatever Britain's post-summit conclusions were to 
be, they prepared for the meeting in the serious hope of arriving at settlements, most 
crucially over Germany. In this their emphasis differed slightly from the American. 
9 See Alistair Home. Macmillan, 195,7-1986, pp. 45-55, for a discussion of Macmillan's approach to 
deterrence and defence reductions as Prime Minister. From 1955 Vlacmillan's thinking was based 
upon the presumption that neither side in the Cold War was prepared to resolve their rivalry by an 
all-out . kar which would 
inevitably use thenno-nuclear weaponry. For a recent examination of 
British defence policy 'oncentratin`_ on the development and implications of deterrence see Martin 
S. Navias. Nuclear ýý'ett, ons" and British Strureýrc Planning, 1955-58. Navias concentrates on the 
SandyS' \Vhite Paper at 1957 and its ancestr . although 
he does not seem to brines into account the 
change,, which the British Government perceived in Soviet foreign policy between 1952 and 1956. 
In order to make 'hermonuclear deterrence the corner 'tone of defence policy it would seem 
essential to he sure that the enemy %,,: º. indeed liable to he deterred. lt ., -as only in 1955 that the 
British became convinced that the Soviet leadership believed global nuclear war to be a grotesque 
futility. 
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An agreement on German unirication remained the single most important issue for 
the British in "parleying" vv ith the Soviets until the September of 1955.10 On this 
issue the British government seems to have been quite sincere in its laboured attempts 
to come up With some answer to the conundrum. Furthermore it was an issue which 
they were to put before disarmament as the prerequisite to any solid progress on a 
wider East West agreement. Indeed despite Macmillan's conception of the summit as 
a generalised discussion preliminary to further specific talks, rather than a Yaltaesque 
end in itself, the British were to put together very detailed proposals on German 
unification. It was only because of American opposition that Britain's specific plans 
were not actually tabled. During the pre-conference discussions with the Americans it 
was to become apparent that the American view was not synonymous with that of the 
British. 
Geneva came as the happy contluence of developments in a number of countries. 
On the American side, for somewhat similar reasons as the British, the situation 
increasingly seemed to favour the calling of a summit. In Eisenhower's words,, 
Some two years [from the death of Stalin] went by with no positive results in 
developing a promising basis for high-level negotiation in spite of some new 
and, we thought, reasonable proposals concerning disarmament and atoms- 
for-peace. Then, in early spring, 1955, there seemed to arise a new wave of 
interest. The Western European Union was now a fact. More and more in 
Europe and the United States influential voices joined in the chorus... 11 
According to Eisenhower's biographer the crucial factor was the startling change in the 
Soviet attitude to a number of international problems and in particular Austria. 12 On 
23rd November, 1954, Eisenhower had stated that he was prepared to enter into 
summit talks with the Soviets once they had demonstrated their good faith in the shape 
of an Austrian treaty agreeable to the West. l' After this came to pass in the May of 
1955 the way to Geneva inevitably opened up. 
In all of this the western powers played an essentially reactive part. The greatest 
dynamic force in international politics in 1955 was the Soviet Union. It was after all 
they who met the "tests" as set out by the Americans and British. All of which lead to 
the question, what where the Soviets trying to achieve? 
10 See below on the actual substance of the Geneva negotiations. In his 26th March , 1955, Note to 
the Cabinet (see beginning of Chapter Three), Eden made the followim-, observation on the chances 
of an agreement on disarmament, 
Dis-armament and the Hydrogen Bomb - The prospect of any a`reement is so remote that 
discussion on these lines would he better avoided for the time hein_. But since these issues are 
so fundamental to the relax. ition of tension, we should hope. by achieving settlements on other 
and narrower issues to prepare the `. round for a subsequent accommodation. 
The, last sentence is very much .º key note in Eden', diplomacy, see Full Circle p. 9. 
11 Munclatefor Chanw, p. 505. 
12 Eisenhoº. ver. The President, pp. 247-249. 
13 ibid.. p. 246. 
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THE FOREIGN OFFICE EXPLANATION 
After the Soviet disarmament proposals of the 10th May the way to a Summit meeting 
appeared clear to the British. t4 Once the inevitable diplomatic "footsie" over dates 
and places was over the Soviets sent their final note of 13th June concurring in the 
calling of the summit on the 18th July in Geneva. 15 In this note the Soviets made it 
quite clear what they considered Geneva to be all about, 
In the present circumstances the efforts of the governments of all the four 
participating Powers in the conference must be directed above all to ensure 
the achievement of the basic task of the meeting - the relaxation of tension in 
international affairs. 
The first round of extensive bilateral discussions between the British and 
Americans regarding their policy at the summit had already begun on the 2nd June. t6 
At this meeting, according to Sir Rodger Nlakins' report, the British submitted a 
Foreign Office paper which outlined their attitude towards Geneva. The Western aims 
were set out on very much the same lines is Eden's note to the Cabinet of 26th March. 
As the West was considered to be at a high point of strength and unity which might not 
last, the time was right, according to the paper, for negotiations with the Soviets. 
Disarmament, rather than German reunification, was given centre stage as the 
summit's most important task. 17 Although the Foreign Office did stress the 
importance of making a serious attempt to solve the German problem, lest the West 
Germans become disillusioned and prey to Soviet blandishments. 18 The Americans, 
Makins reported, were in agreement with most of the above Foreign Office 
assessment. However matters were not to rest on this convenient point. In particular, 
Eden quickly came to the conclusion that the key issue of the conference ought to be 
14 These proposals were regarded with considerably less enthusiasm by the Americans. This Dulles 
explained as a consequence of differences between the American and the British and French views 
on disarmament. FRUS 1955-57, Vol. V, p. 182: Memo of discussion at 249th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 19th May, 1955. 
15 PREM 11/894, Tele,: ram No. 573,13th June 1955, from Havter. Moscow to F. 0. 
16 PREN1 11/894, Telegram. 2nd June 1955, from Makins. Washington to F. 0. 
17 PREM 11/894, Tele ram, 2nd June 1955, from Niakins to F. 0.. 
The entry into force of the Paris . A`reements 
has created a new situation in that Western 
stren_, th and cohesion relative to the Soviet Union has reached a point unlikely to he exceeded 
in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the further development of thereto-nuclear weapons, perhaps 
resulting in "saturation", could conceivably alter the position in a few years to our 
Jisadvanta_, e. Havin,, at the moment a comparatively firm position , we are 
interested in 
making firm pro,, ress towards a really effective disarmament plan ... 
In addition we seek the 
reunification or Germany on acceptable terms ... 
In a letter of the 13th June, 155, Dulles was to make a similar point about the impact of Western 
solidarity upon Soviet foreign policy to Adenauer. FRCS 1955-57, Vol. V, p. 79. 
IS This follows almost exactly alon`_ the lines of Eden'> analysis of the German situation in his note to 
the Cabinet of the 26th March. This is though hardly surprisin_-. _given that both were --ssentially 
the creation of the Foreign Ottice. See chapter t\%, o. 
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German reunitication, there being very little hope that discussions over disarmament 
might lead to any success. 
More interesting for the purpose of this study was the Foreign office's summation 
of why the Soviets had become converted to summit diplomacy. 19 The paper set out 
the following "assumptions" on Soviet policy, 
We assume that the long term Soviet aims have remained unchanged. The 
greater flexibility which Soviet policy has recently shown nii2ht be ascribed 
merely to a desire to prevent the execution of the Paris Agreements. which is 
now the major immediate objective of Soviet policy in Europe. On the other 
hand, this greater flexibility may have other causes. The Soviet Union is 
faced with internal and external difficulties. The internal struggle for power 
may be unresolved; we know that the Soviet economy is over-strained and 
unbalanced and the Soviet Government may be genuinely concerned at the 
added burden laid on the economy by the exorbitant cost of modern weapons. 
The Russians may also find the Chinese hard to handle. In addition while the 
Soviet leaders may seek a relaxation of international tension mainly with a 
view to getting the West to drop its guard, it is probable that they are also 
genuinely alarmed about thermo-nuclear war. But, since the Soviet 
government still assume that Communism will eventually win the world, they 
believe that time is on their side and wish, at the moment, to buy time. 
Apart from the suspicion of Soviet motives, in particular the old chestnut which had 
been used against Churchill that the Soviets would merely use summitry as one more 
weapon in the cold war, the above is an interesting indicator as to the British position 
on thermo-nuclear deterrence. The view on Soviet attitudes towards global war were 
very much the same as those expressed in 1952.20 The Foreign Office concluded that 
as Soviet ideology remained inflexible on the issue of its inexorable march to global 
triumph, there could be no fundamental change in its policy. The Soviet interest was 
in delaying the inevitable hour until a more propitious time of western weakness. This 
was a view which the Moscow Embassy itself and crucially Macmillan were 
increasingly calling into question. '-1 It was also an orthodoxy which as a result of their 
experiences at Geneva the British Government was to discard with very far reaching 
implications for future policy. 
The Moscow Embassy had already contributed a report on the ist June outlining 
its view of developments in Soviet policy for the coming Summit. - This report should 
be seen as a harbinger and consequently deserves close attention. After remarking on 
19 It is little wonder that the American and British officials in Washington should 
have been in concord 
as American intelligence estimations of Soviet policy were more or 
less the same as that set out by 
Makins' paper. See FR US 1955 -57, Vol. V, p. ? 47; 
Memo from Director of Central Intelligence 
to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Ist 
July, 1955. 
20 See chapter two above on the Foreign Office's interpretation of 
late Stalinism attitude to "frightful 
collisions". 
21 For Example Hayter's comments on the, Tripartite Workini 
Partys conclusions on the issue of the 
Conterence's opening statements, PREI 11/894, 
TelC, ram No. 5 76. June 15th 1955; from Hayter, 
Moscow to F. 0. 
'ý PRE, %1 1111015, Despatch, June ist 1955: Hcty tur. M'I005c0 w to Macmillan. 
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the change which the "Khrushchev-Bul; anin era" had brought to Soviet foreign policy 
- matching Malenkov's peaceful words, but quite surpassing him in putting them into 
action - Hayter emphasised the novelty of what %ýas happening, 
[T]he Russians have now met all these "tests", almost it seems of set purpose 
to demonstrate their willingness to negotiate (though of course action they 
have taken in each case can be justified on the grounds of Soviet interests). 
Austria is settled... Disarmament proposals have been made which, whatever 
we may think of them, are at least a major advance on previous Soviet 
positions and look plausible... they have accepted without any skulking and 
even with surprising meekness (very unlike their argumentative recalcitrance 
in the period preceding last years Berlin Conference) the general outline of 
our proposals for a Four-Power meeting. There is another remarkable change 
in their general attitude. Even during the Malenkov period the Soviet 
Government never admitted that neutrals could exist... All this has changed. 
Not only are existing neutrals recognised as such, but new ones are anxiously 
created. 
Despite what Hayter referred to as Soviet "doublethink, or even treble-think" in 
maintaining that their policy had not in fact changed, it was indisputable that there had 
been a fundamental shift. Not that this meant that the Soviets had relinquished their 
designs for World Socialism, but that, 
The truth is perhaps that there has been a change in the methods of reaching 
that objective, a change brought about by a more realistic appreciation of the 
world situation. The Communist leaders, viewing the world as it is and not as 
it was distorted by Stalin's senile megalomania, Must realise that methods of 
menace and violence will not now succeed. Not only has the West managed 
to consolidate and strengthen itself, but the level and still more the character 
of modern armaments are such that forcible action has no future, the Soviet 
Government never probably contemplated initiating forcible action. But they 
could regard it with a certain equanimity which has now gone. In these 
circumstances they must obviously re-think their whole political strategy. We 
can only guess where this re-thinking will have lead them, since unlike the 
leaders of free countries they are not obliged to announce and justify their 
policies to the public. 
Hayter continued despite the last sentence above to lay out his prognosis of Soviet 
policy. He ended by emphasising that though Soviet tactics might have changed the 
fundamental purpose was the same. conclusion which was summed up in the 
following vaguely condescending way, 
They are intelligent enough to want international peace and to realise that a 
price must be paid for it. But fundamentally they remain convinced 
communists and believers in the necessity for world communism. 
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Following on from this in a telegram of the 13th June, 1955, Hayter reported on a 
conversation which the American Ambassador, Charles Bohlen had had with Marshal 
Zhukov and, in particular, on an article that Zhukov had contributed to Pravda on the 
8th May. 23 Both of these dealt with the issue of thermonuclear war. In his article, the 
Embassy reported. Zhukov had made the following startling assertion, 
It is surprising how the leading experts, and especially those of Britain, can 
adopt such an irresponsible attitude to the problem of atomic and hydrogen 
warfare. We military men realise more clearly than anyone else the utterly 
devastating nature of such a war. One need but imagine what would happen. 
[Foreign Office underlining] 
Hayter also pointed out that some of Zhukov's Pravda comment had actually been 
suppressed, he thought that it was probable Zhukov had ; one on to make even more 
explicit the true horror of thermonuclear war. Zhukov's conversation with Bohlen 
supported what he had said in his article. H. A. F. Hohler, wrote an acute minute of 
16th June in which he posed questions leading on from the Embassy's report of 
Zhukov's written and spoken opinions. 24 After discussing the political leadership's 
possible position on the matter, Hohler came to the following conclusions, 
I am, therefore, inclined to feel that, although the Party leaders may not know 
quite as much about fall-out as Zhukov, they have a pretty shrewd idea of 
what nuclear war would involve. But they may not wish to say so publicly 
since: - (i) they fear the effect of the truth on Soviet morale, especially given 
the fatalistic streak in the Russian character; (ii) The theory that another war 
would mean the end of civilisation makes nonsense of the dialectic. It is 
difficult for them publicly to subscribe to a doctrine which would undermine 
the foundations of Marxist-Leninism. 
Hohler ended his minute tentatively, 
All this is of course very speculative. I think we have been right to emphasise 
the diplomatic and tactical advantages which the Russians see in reducing 
tension at present. These are, briefly, that it will cause the West to drop its 
guard and may contribute to the non-execution of the Paris-Agreements and 
the eventual withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. On the other 
hand, I also agree with Sir William Hayter that this policy stems also from a 
"truer appreciation of the nature of modern war". 15 
23 FO 371 116742 NS 1242/15G, Telegram No 569,13th June 1955; from Hayter Moscow to 
CANUTE. The G. suffix denotes a oreen guard tilg used for matters top secret. 
24 FO 371 116742 NS 1242/15G, Nl inute of 16th June 1955 by H. A. F. Hohler. 
25 ibid., Hohler's reasoning went as follows, 
Among the questions which Marshal Zhukov's statement poses are: - (a) Is there a division of 
Opinion between hirn and the Parry leaders about the implications of nuclear war. On the face 
of it there would appear to he. Malenkov said a year ago that a new world war would mean 
the end of civilisation. Zhukov's remarks suggest that he may think the same. But this view 
has become unfashionable, even heretical of late and Molotov and the others have been striking 
the note that another war would rather mean the downfall of capitalism. However: - (i) 
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It was becomin`, apparent to the Northern Department, as well as the Moscow 
Embassy, that a process of reappraisal was underway in Soviet foreign policy. Their 
reaction to the destructive capacity which science had recently unleashed was 
influencing a fundamental change in their attitude towards the cold war. It was no 
longer sufficient to explain Soviet policy merely by reference to the increasing strength 
of Western organisation or weaknesses in Soviet economy and society. Hohler in his 
minute pin-pointed the contradictions which Khrushchev was finally to grapple with 
head on, regardless of "Russian fatalism", at the 20th party Congress in the February 
of 1956. In June 1955 the conclusions which Hayter and Hohler expressed were still 
couched in cautious terms, which is in itself indicative of the radical nature of the 
change which they were commenting upon. The Soviets were themselves quite blunt 
about their hopes for the summit. The British conviction that the Soviets had at last 
accepted the awful equation that war equalled mutual devastation was to be further 
reinforced by the proceedings at Geneva. 
THE BRITISH PREPARE FOR THE SUMMIT 
In true cabinet tradition a committee had been set up consisting of the principal 
members of the government to deal with planning and preparation for Geneva. It held 
its first meeting on the lath June, 1955, in the Prime , Minister's room in the House of 
Commons and was called rather appropriately CANUTE. Whether this was intentional 
irony is not clear, the name did though prove singularly prescient. However there is 
very little information available on its actual proceedings. 26 The reverse is true of the 
planning papers which it spawned. Preparations for Geneva had begun in earnest. 
Eden was himself quite clear what was of crucial importance to the summit's 
work. He made his opinions known to Macmillan melodramatically in comments on 
the jointly agreed recommendations for the content of Eden's, Eisenhower's and 
Faure's opening addresses to the conference. The recommendations were relayed from 
Khrushchev, Buh-, anin and Molotov have all been identified with the current, more flexible, 
Soviet policies; (ii) The Yugoslavs `_ot the impression at Bel__rade, presumably from 
Khrushchev, Bulv, anin or \likoyan, that the Russians might he prepared to compromise on 
disarmament (para. 6 of Bel-, rade Telegram No. 421); (iii) dir. \ialik, who is a member of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, suz«ested in a recent conversation with the 
Permanent Under Secretary that he too subscribed to the bourgeois theory that war might spell 
the doom of civilisation. 
26 In the PRENI Il tiles on the Geneva Summit meeting. nlOst of the minutes of the proceedings of 
CANUTE have been 1Cstrovzcl, : avin, the last one. This ' as usual policy for copies of cabinet 
papers tiled in non-cabinet: tiles and it is a little stranl-lc that one should have escaped the attentions 
of the weeders. Ho ever in the Cabinet papers, where the ori, -, 
inals should he lodged. I have not 
been able to locate the minutes either. It seems therefore reamonahle to presume that they have not 
vet been opened ;o public inspection. There is in the PREM II riles an apparently almost complete 
record of the telegrams. reports. notes and memorandum sent to and created by and for CANUTE. 
Also there are the telegrams and memos \'ritten individually by Eden and `lacm. illan. These 
contnhute to to very Vizeahle riles indeed. From this information the above picture of British 
policy' has been reconstructed. 
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the Tripartite Working Group, which had been set up in Washington early in June, by 
Embassy telegram of the 1 Ith of that month. 27 The Americans wanted to speak on the 
satellites and international communism; the French wanted to speak on Germany and 
European security. Eden was then left with disarmament and the H-bomb. At this 
point it becomes apparent that Eden and his Foreign Secretary did not necessarily see 
eye to eye. In a minute of June 14th on these proposals Macmillan expressed the 
opinion that as there was little constructive to be said on any of the issues the French 
and Americans had taken, "It seems to nie that you will have the best of it". The 
Foreign Secretary was apparently quite happy with the way in which western 
preparations for the Summit were shaping L11). 28 However, on Macmillan's minute 
Eden responded in his inimitable red ink scribbles that Germany and European 
security, rather than disarmament, were in fact the heart of the matter. These were the 
issues on which the conference should be concentrating and upon which he should not 
be excluded from expressing an opinion. True to his fabled ballerina temperament he 
continued, 
This is just nonsense we are not staging a play I must be free to say what I 
like. I have already said this once. Apparently one has to say everything 2 or 
3 times about this conference. A. E. June 15 [Eden's punctuation]. 29 
Sir William Hayter also had reservations about the attitude the Tripartite planners 
in Washington seemed to be taking towards the Russians. In a telegram of 15th June 
he expressed the hope that the opening statements would not, given the recent 
indications of change in Soviet policy, lead merely to rehashing past recriminations as 
he feared the Washington telegram of 1 lth line seemed to auger. 30 He did not think 
27 PREM 11/894, Telegram No. 1370,1 1 th June 1955, from Makins, Washington, to F. 0. The 
British were to deal with the following, 
(a) the build up of Russian and (sic) military forces in the cold war; (h) the collective defence 
arrangements of the West; (c) the burden of armaments and the danger of the H-bomb; (d) 
general disarmament; (e) opportunities for the development of world resources. 
There is an American record of these discussions at FRUS 195-57, Vol. V, pp. 119-360. 
28 PREM 11/894. June 14th 1955, Minute to Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. This is also an 
interesting indication of where Macmillan's thinking was to lead. In this minute he quite clearly 
saw the issue of armaments, and particularly nuclear weapons, as the most important the summit 
would have to deal with. He treats Germany in rather a dismissive way. Eden's actual address (see 
below) was to start after all with a striking depiction of the thermo-nuclear "stand off" in which 
both east and west found themselves. Makins' telegram of June 11th, No. 1370, had ended on the 
forlorn hope that, "I should he __rateful if you would let me know as soon as possible if this is likely 
to he agreeable to the Prime Minister". 
29 In a more measured style Eden worked these words into his memoirs thus, Full Circle, p. 291, 
The more detailed preparations were ºnade at the official level in Washington. I thought that 
these were committing u. to too detailed a pro-gramme. Jividin-, up the topics which each Head 
of Government should raise. I did not think wC should he staging a play, but ought to allow 
each other plenty of room for manoeuvre to make use of such indications as there were of 
chances in Soviet foreign policy. 
30 PRE. Iv1 11/894. Tcleý_rdm No. 576. June 15th I953; from Havter, Moscow to F. 0. 
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that the west should "talk to Bulganin as if he were Stalin". 31 The view taken by the 
some in the Foreign Office seemed to be closer to that of Eden than Macmillan. 
From this point onwards, in line with Eden's opinion, British planning for the 
conference was largely taken up with the question of German unity and in particular 
the "Eden Plan", rather than disarmament. It was felt that this issue might provide the 
common ground necessary for the development of a broader settlement. 32 Indeed in a 
Foreign Office brief submitted by the Foreign Secretary to the CANUTE committee on 
the 29th June disarmament was dismissively treated thus, 
While it has been agreed that disarmament should be one of the subjects to be 
discussed at the 4-Power Talks, we do not consider that it should be discussed 
in any detail, as it is a highly technical problem and not suitable for detailed 
consideration at this level. 33 
Although the brief went on to make clear that the West should be prepared to deal with 
any Soviet suggestions which might arise, there was to be no Eden Plan for 
disarmament. 34 It would seem that Macmillan was quickly brought round to Eden's 
approach. 
From as early as Eden's first mooting of a summit meeting to the Cabinet in 
March the issue of German unity had been at the forefront of his thinking. The 
realisation that a serious attempt would have to be made to get a solution agreeable to 
east and west, at least to keep German public opinion quiet, was reinforced by Soviet 
attempts to ingratiate themselves with Adenauer. 35 On June 7th the Soviet 
Government sent a note to Bonn proposing the opening up of formal diplomatic 
relations with West Germany. 36 Macmillan arrived for his quadripartite talks in New 
31 This was a phrase which was to enter Eden's memoirs unacknowledged, Full Circle, p. 291, 
32 See Full Circle, pp. 292-294 and Tides of Forrune, p. 605. 
33 PREM 11/894, F. O. Brief, June 29th, 1955. During the first meeting of CANUTE Macmillan had 
been asked to provide the brief for the benefit of the committee. This information is imparted by a 
covering note on the brief by A. E. Burroughs of the Foreign Office. 
34 ibid., On the issue of abolition of nuclear weapons the brief summed up the international status quo 
as follows, 
The U. S. S. R. has also accepted an Anglo-French proposal that [nuclear weapons] should be 
totally prohibited after 75 % of the reductions in conventional forces have been completed, and 
that the conversion of all nuclear stocks to peaceful uses should begin at this point. This 
proposal was a compromise between the previous Western view that the prohibition and 
elimination of nuclear weapons should come after 100% of the conventional reduction had 
accrued and the Soviet view that it should come at the 50% point. Once again the United 
States and the Canadians have not yet accepted it for themselves. 
Macmillan's thinking was to take a new and rather more controversial line on the issue of the 
abolition of nuclear weapons after the Summit was over. 
35 The Soviets had begun their extension of feelers towards Bonn as far hack as 1954, according to 
Dallin, see Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin. pp. 261-63. 
36 For the full text of this note see H. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy since the Death of Stalin, pp. 57- 
60. 
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York on 16th June with a brief including the following telegrams from the British 
Embassies in Bonn and Moscow on this new Kremlin gambit. 37 
Hayter was quite clear as to what the Soviets hoped to do, although he did not 
think that it implied that they were about to abandon East Germany; unless they could 
find some settlement more to their advantage. He expressed surprise that the Soviet 
move, inevitable though it was, should have cone so quickly, only a few months 
previously Adenauer had always been referred to as a "revanchist". It was another 
example of "crude and hasty Khrushchev diplomacy" which, in his opinion, would be 
best treated coolly. 
The conclusions seem to be that: (a) The Russians are in a hurry. They fear 
that unless they intervene rapidly the German situation will crystallise in a 
sense unfavourable to them. (b) But they think that the German longing for 
reunion is so strong that they can get the West Germans onto a slippery slope, 
ending in a form of reunion that will suit Soviet aims. As seen from here, 
Adenauer's position seems quite a strong one, and it hardly seems as if he 
need fall in with the Soviet desire for speed. 
Sir F. Hoyer Miller, the Ambassador to West Germany, was even more sanguine 
as to the positive side of the Soviet move. He considered that the opening of 
diplomatic links might even have the salutary effect of opening German eyes fully to 
the fact that it was Soviet intransigence which stood in the way of reunification. 
Adenauer had made it clear that, given the pressure of public opinion, there was no 
doubt that he would have to agree to the Soviet suggestion. Although he was quite 
prepared to take both time and full consultations with his allies over the issue. 
Adenauer was in fact to travel to America and raise the issue with the western powers 
in New York before the Geneva summit. 
Hoyer Miller ended with a point which Hayter had also touched upon regarding 
the substance of what the Soviet note had said or at least implied, 
Incidentally, one good thing about the Russian note from our point of view is 
the way in which it tacitly suggests the possibility of there being two 
Germanys having to co-exist together for an indefinite period. This may be 
the best solution if no progress can be made with the Russians over 
reunification at the coming conferences, but in view of the German dislike of 
the idea it is all to the good that it should have been the Russians, and not 
ourselves, who should have taken the initiative in thus ventilating the 
matter. 38 
37 PREM 11/894. Moscow Telegram No. 555, June 8th; from Hayter to F. 0. and Bonn Telegram 
No. 350, June 10th; from Hoyer Miller to F. 0. 
38 Hayter's Telegram No. 555 of June 8th made the following comment, 
[I1 think it is too early to conclude that the Soviet Government are ready to throw over the 
DDR. It looks as if they have two alternative policies in mind, between which they will 
choose according to Adenauer': reaction. They will try to establish simultaneous relations 
with both German Governments. At the same time they will work for the entry of the DDR en 
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This was perceptive. 39 Geneva was to be a watershed in the cold war in more than 
just one way. In the context of western policy from the late forties onwards, and in 
particular British policy, it was something of a culmination. With the armament of 
West Germany and its embedding in the structure of NATO the defence of Western 
Europe seemed secured. 40 In the aftermath of the July meeting, if not indeed before, 
it was apparent that Europe had achieved something near to equilibrium, in the absence 
of a formal settlement. 41 
However, contrary to Eden's protestations about the need to maintain freedom of 
manoeuvre, the British proposals on Germany as they developed in late June and early 
July were complicated and involved considerable detail. 42 Eden was adamant that the 
West should have something to offer of greater substance than merely a rehash of the 
1954 Eden Plan that had been proposed at the Berlin meeting of Foreign Ministers of 
that year. `ý3 This had been concerned merely with constitutional provisions for free 
elections, there was at that point no attempt to cater for the wider security needs of 
east and west. 44 The situation in which diplomacy was to operate appeared to the 
British to be decidedly different from that of January 1954, when the Soviets had 
refused flatly to give anything on Austria or Germany. The confrontation then fitted 
into the pattern that had become familiar under Earnest Bevin. Now with Austria 
settled and the Soviets exhibiting much greater flexibility, Eden was not prepared to 
stay pat on the old battle lines. 
It would be invidious, not to say a little tedious, to go through the development of 
what was to become the second Eden Plan step by step. Particularly as it was to prove 
fruitless. However a brief outline and more importantly explanation of the rationale 
bloc into an ostensibly united Germany, and only if this tails will they fall back on the solution 
of indefinite prolongation of relations with both Germanys. 
39 See Full Circle, p. 292. This view had been expressed by Bohlen to the State Department in his 
assessment of the signiticance of the Austrian Treaty, Witness to Histoºv, pp. 375-376, 
I also pointed out that if the Soviet Union went ahead with the Warsaw Pact and armed 
Germany as part of the or`_anisation. this would be a clear indication that the Soviet Union, for 
the foreseeable future, was accepting the division of Germany as a definite fact and was not 
contemplating a radical revision in its German policy. 
40 See above on Eden's foreign policy from 1951-55, and particularly Young, "German Rearmament 
and the European Defence Community"; on Bevin's foreign policy up to 1951 see A. Bullock, 
Ernest Bevinn. 
41 Macmillan made the following comment on the discussions in America. Riding the Storm, p. 606, 
Behind this apparent concentration upon the problems of Western Europe lay more urgent and 
in many ways alarming dangers in the Middle and Far East. As the weeks proceeded, it became 
more and more apparent that these anxieties were more real than those in Western Europe, 
where at least a form of political and military stability had been reached. 
42 This was the cause of complaint from Dulles early in July, see below. 
43 On this issue Eden's red scribbles on a telegram from Dixon in San Francisco of 23rd June, 
reporting Molotov's remarks to Pinay on Germany, were to be expanded to eminently more legible 
print in Full Circle p. ? 93. PREI I lr'894. Telegram No. 58,23rd June, 1955; from Sir Pierson 
Dixon. San Francisco to F. 0. 
44 On the Berlin conference and the first "Eden Plan" see Full Circle, pp. 53-76 and also Descent to 
Sue:, pp. 127-132- 
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that lay behind it is necessary to understand the British position when they actually 
arrived at Geneva and what they hoped that it might achieve. Basically the plan 
centred around proposals for the disengagement of the two sides in Europe and the 
creation of what would effectively be a demilitarised zone. This did not mean that 
British troops would be withdrawn from Germany, but it was hoped that force 
limitations might subsequently be laid dovv n in particularly sensitive areas of the 
continent, with veritication provisions for East and West. In effect both sides would 
be forced to concede territory to a neutralised glacis in the heart of Europe. Thus the 
Soviet Union and NATO would be provided with some concrete guarantee of security. 
The final phase of the second Eden Plan consisted of a European security system 
which was to be elaborated involving Soviet and NATO forces, again the key words 
being "joint control". t' 
The Germans had also chipped in their piece with a suggestion for a plan earlier in 
June, which although similar to the British in that it involved demilitarised strips, did 
not contain elaborate provisions for an overarching European Security system. This 
was however quickly dismissed. 46 It was the Eden plan which was to form the basis 
of discussions over the Western position in the lead up to the Summit. Yet there was 
more hanging on Eden's proposals than just the unity of Germany. As far as Eden and 
the CANUTE committee were concerned it was the essential First step towards a 
complete settlement of the cold war and this more than anything else explains why the 
British were prepared to devote so much time to it. 
Indeed at this point the CANUTE committee seems to have been bullish in their 
hopes that the Soviets might be willing to do some kind of a wider deal, or at least this 
was the line which they took with their allies. The Americans and in particular Dulles 
were less enthusiastic. Dulles was worried that by making too specific proposals, such 
as the Eden Plan, the west might deliver itself a hostage of Soviet machination. His 
view is treated in greater detail below. However the British Government's attempts to 
persuade him of the ripeness of the moment for their plan `ive a valuable insight into 
exactly what they were trying to achieve by it. 
CANUTE telegrain med Washington on Stil July, 1955, in an attempt to calm the 
State Department's edginess regarding the Plan. 47 The view of the Turkish 
45 Eden Dives in his memoirs a quite lucid suniniary of the plan and his intentions, Full Circle, pp. 
292 294. There is a substantial body of hlannin , papers, Chicly of Staff reports, memos and some 
very attractive maps outlining proposed ",, trips' : ontaincd at the he_! innin_ of the PREM 11/895 
file. Much of the planners time was taken up %%nth dchating the advantage Western Powers might 
gain by various different ýýeo ýrahhical definition., ot the neutralised zone. 
46 As ever Eden's memoirs tend to pass as ilkv ; loss over events, see Full Circle, p. 2293. The 
CANUTE committee gave a less charitable treatment in the following teleiram to Washington, "I 
note that the Americans now agree with us that the Adenauer plan is not a starter. This is all to the 
Brood and we can now expunge the Adenauer plan as such from our minis". 
47 PREM 11/895. Telegram No. 3183,8th July. 1955, CANUTE to Washington Embassy. The 
telegram, presumably the hand of Macmillan, said that the remarks had been made by the Turkish 
Ambassador to Macmillan while both were in Strashourg. 
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ambassador in Paris was quoted with approval. The Ambassador, with forty-one years 
in the Turkish foreiLTn ser`-ice had said, 
[T]he Russians might now really wish to reach an accommodation, at least for 
a period of years, with the West. If the Russians had only been intent on a 
propaganda exercise, he would have had no concern. But that did not look to 
him to be the case. There was only one remedy in his opinion. The West 
should not pitch their demands too low... They should ask for something it 
would really hurt the Soviets to concede. 
CANUTE went on to express the following, which was described as "also the Prime 
Minister's strong personal view", 
Our favourable posture justifies us in displaying boldness and imagination at 
Geneva; and I see no reason to be paralysed by fears and indecision. Please 
try to fortify Mr. Dulles and the State Department, and persuade them that 
there is every ground for self-confidence. 
It was on the Eclen Plan that the British government wished to test the Soviets as 
to how far they were prepared to go in ending the cold war. Indeed the whole purpose 
of it was to seize the initiative in offering what Eisenhower was to describe - in 
relation to his open skies proposal - as a wL indow of opportunity. Behind the rather 
florid and evanescent optimism of these telegrams clearly lies the thought of Eden. 
Although there may have been a degree of playing up for the sake of American 
doubters, the CANUTE committee's telegrams to Washington give an emphatically 
hopeful view of what might be achieved. In his desire to open up the East West 
dialogue into a grand settlement of differences Eden resembles nothing in all the 
diplomatic world so much as Churchill. Here, more than in his original acceptance in 
March, 1955, that a summit was now desirable, he might truly be said to have changed 
his attitude with his ministerial office. However, for this purpose the Eden Plan had to 
be plausible as well as bold. 
In a further telegram from CANUTE to the Washington Embassy on 8th July the 
committee emphasised the consideration that the Eden Plan gave to "reasonable" Soviet 
security interests. 48 They defended the plan in the following terms against its negative 
American reception. 
(a) For the first time we are negotiating from a position of some strength; and 
the Russians have an interest in seeking an agreement. Consequently we need 
not concern ourselves unduly ... whether any particular proposals will be 
acceptable to the Russians in the First round. (b) I agree, however, that we 
should take account of Western public opinion. we must seize and keep the 
initiative by putting forward proposals which are not unfair and which dive 
the Russians reasonable security against and threat arising from a free, unified 
Germany. (c) Our proposal for a demilitarised strip does not purport of itself 
to afford the Russians security. It is part of a package deal designed to do so 
4S PRENI 11, S05. TeIe, rain No. 3IS. July Sth. 1955. r,, m CANLTE to \VashinLton Embassy. 
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(viz. demilitarized strip plus Security pact plus agreement on c;. ling of forces 
in the sensitive areas). 
The Eden Plan was specifically conceived as a proposal which would at once give 
the Soviets "reasonable security" and provide a crucial test of their future intentions. 
If the bait were bitten the way would be opened to a general settlement which would 
go much further than merely German unity. Here Eden, and for that matter the British 
Government, thought he was matching the boldness of his diplomatic initiative with the 
size of both the opportunity and the prize which were at stake. If he had been right 
Eden would have proved post 1945 peacemaker par excellence. However the Eden 
plan erroneously presupposed that the Soviets were prepared to be "reasonable" over 
Germany and that they considered the cold war to serve no further useful purpose. It 
is indicative of just how novel Soviet policy had so far been that it seemed plausible to 
the British Government that change might vet reach to the very heart of East/West 
rivalry. The Soviets had already come a very long way from the sterility of late 
Stalinism and even Nialenl: ovisn,. However. after Geneva it was quickly to become 
apparent that thou`h Bu1`ganin and Khrushchev were prepared to come to a tacit 
agreement over the division of Germany, they vet saw an active future for the Cold 
War. 
Nonetheless Eden cannot be accused of a lack of good will. In conception his 
proposals were every bit as imaginative as Eisenhower's at Geneva. They both seem to 
have been fired by a perception that there was a real possibility the cold war might 
have been grinding to a close. The following words from Eden's memoirs might, 
almost, have referred to Eisenhower's plan, 
The Russians were SUSPICIOUS of control. This was part of their national 
character and not just to be ascribed to communism. I felt that if a system of 
international control could be established, even on a limited scale, the dragon 
might be found to be not so very dangerous after all. 49 
The essential difference with American policy was in their understanding of where the 
key to ending the cold war lay. For the British it was in building confidence by the 
implementation of a plan for Germany that was beneficial and agreeable to both sides. 
Eisenhower's bold suggestion for aerial inspection identified disarmament verification 
as the central issue. Both, as it wearily transpired, were wrong. 
ANGLO-A1IERICAN DIFFERENCES 
The process of bilateral consultations in Washington throws an interesting light upon 
differences in the American and British approaches to the Soviet Union. The British 
49 Full Circle, p. 2ýý 3. Eden :. t OUnt or the Geneva preparations in his memoir., although it tends to 
little too , lýýiýluuuslý , i, not hu"lcally ; nl uratc. Given that he chose to weite so shortly 
. liter 
the =vents lie 'ý. ýý . 1Cýýrihin_U nl; lkln`_ -, moeth 
of he rou__h places Was no doubt inevitable. 
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exhibited a more accommodating attitude, although even so they were still awaiting 
considerable concessions from the Soviets. However, the United States was anxious 
that in the process of negotiation matters of principle concerning the "freedom of 
Eastern Europe" might be conceded. Dulles was, basically, not prepared to stop short 
of a complete Soviet withdrawal from its satellites. Indeed, in early May when 
enthusiasm for a Summit was picking up in Britain and France, Dulles had expressed 
considerable reservations about the reliability of America's allies in the continuing 
battle against Communism. 50 
Initially the State Department were in agreement with the basic outline for the 
conference that had been pint forward by the British. S L. Indeed in the discussions at 
Embassy level little divergence of opinion seems to have been registered between the 
two sides. Where perhaps there was divergence of opinion was over how inter-related 
these issues were; whether or not it might be possible to progress on disarmament 
without any advance over Germany. This was really the only indication, as far as I 
have found, that the Americans might have been prepared to try some bold individual 
initiative as they were less inclined to think in terms of an all inclusive package. 
Ironically, given their distaste for negotiation with the Soviet Union, the most striking 
proposal of the conference was Eisenhower's Open Skies plan of the 21st July. 
However, there was no consultation with the British on the issue in the lead up to the 
Summit. This it seems was most likely because the State Department had nothing to 
do with the idea and in the case of Dulles was positively lukewarm in attitude towards 
it. 52 The group of ex-officio "experts" who made the suggestion to Eisenhower were 
under the aegis of one of his historically shady ideas men, Nelson A. Rockefeller. 53 
50 FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. V, p. 174, Telegram from the Secretary of State to Department of State, 9th 
May, 1955. Dulles complained of the lack of substance behind European hopes although he did 
speak with approval of Macmillan's suggestion that the Summit should he seen as the start of a 
process of detailed negotiation. rather than an end in itself. In a conversation of 15th June, 1955, 
with Adenauer in Washington. Dulles went so far as to express his worries over the British and 
French attitude towards Geneva, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. V, p. 229. 
51 PREM 11/894, Telegram, 14th June 1955; Makins, Washington to CANUTE. 
American thinking was close to our own. They saw the meeting as developing in three stages: 
A. Frank opening statement by each Head of Government on the international situation... There 
should not be undue recrimination, but also there should he no pulling; of punches. B. Western 
exploration of Soviet motives and the chances of making an improvement in the situation.... C. 
Identification of problems at issue and discussion of methods for pursuing them. 
52 See W. W. Rostow, Open Skies, Eisenhoiver's Proposal of July 21,1955 for an insight into 
American unofficial planning for the summit. 
53 Rockefeller was a member of the Operations Co-ordinating, Board, which was chaired by H. Hoover 
Jr., and he was also himself the chairman of "a special sub-committee designed 'to exploit Sino- 
Soviet vulnerabilities'". Rostow, Open Skies, p. 26. His appointment as presidential aide lasted 
from 1954-57. His end was sealed by the enmity of Dulles, amongst others, Open Skies, p. 67. 
Rockefeller had in preparation for Geneva appointed a number of experts, from academia as much 
as government, to examine the "psychological" dimension of the cold war. According to W. W. 
Rostow who chaired the group. known rather colourfully as the "Quantico Panel", there was indeed 
a deLree of rivalry between Rockefeller and the Secretary of State. Rostow claims it was the panel 
which worked out the possibility of disarmament verification through aerial supervision. He gives 
substantial documentary detail in his short book on the subject. Furthermore he records its principle 
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It was with, and indeed at, the State Department that the British, not unreasonably, 
conducted all their co-ordination meetings in early June, both bilaterally and in 
tripartite consultation with the French. And it was with Dulles that Macmillan met at 
the United Nations in America in mid to late June. It is therefore not surprising that 
nothing was said by the State Department to the British about what was to become 
Eisenhower's publicity coup, as the State Department was not involved. 54 From 
Rostow's account the President's conversation to Open Skies happened only at the 
eleventh hour. 55 
Dulles had agreed with Macmillan's opinion that the summit should be about 
setting an agenda for future meetings, rather than an attempt to lay down any detailed 
proposals. Yet the reasons underlying their shared desire to avoid another Yalta were 
rather different. Dulles great fear was that it the west put forward clear plans for a 
settlement of any of the issues to be discussed the Soviets might then be able to use 
western commitments to their advantage. 56 He was also worried that any concrete 
settlement for Germany might be taken by the Soviets to imply that the west had 
finally accepted the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. '? Bohlen expressed the 
following opinion, 
I attended the Geneva Conference of 1955 simply because I was ambassador 
to the Soviet Union. I was not on intimate terms with any members of the 
administration, and in view of my association with Yalta, Dulles certainly did 
not want me in the foreground at Geneva. McCarthyism had finally abated, 
members were influential at Geneva in eventually persuading the President to use their ideas in his 
Open Skies proposal. Given the concern of the "Panel" with psychological cold war it is tempting 
to dismiss Open Skies as little more than a cheap propaganda gimmick. There is a memo in the 
State Department records outlining the ideas floated by the "Panel" which includes freedom of aerial 
inspection, however it does not feature in any of Dulles' productions concerning policy at Geneva. 
See FRUS 1955-57. Vol. V, p. 216, Letter from Chairman of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel 
(Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller), 10th June, 1955 and , 
for example, p. 
239, Memo from Secretary of State to President. I Sth June, 1955. 
54 Eisenhower's account in Mandate fir change pp. 503-531. puts Dulles in centre stage on the issue 
of pre-conference planning. 
55 See also Eisenhower the President, p. 264. 
56 FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. V., p. 188, Memo of discussion at 249th Meeting of NSC, 19th May, 1955. 
From the start Dulles had grave reservations about the consequences of a Summit meeting, 
Secretary Dulles brought the discussion to a close with the statement that one of the greatest 
dangers the United States would face at the forthcoming Conference was the danger that the 
Soviets would present projects and ideas designed to create the impression that the United 
States and the free world were willing to accept the current situation in the Soviet satellites. 
Under the circumstances it would be highly advantageous for the United States to take certain 
initiatives to prevent any such view gaining currency. 
Rostow's account of the American preparations. which uses some interesting documentary detail, 
_ºives the impression that Dulles spent most of his time trying, to detlect the President from making 
any detailed proposals of his own. Open Skies, pp. 34-56. 
57 Eisenhower made this point to Eden in a letter. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. V. p. 206. Letter from 
Eisenhower to Eden. 31st May. 1955. 
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but its effects lingered on. President Eisenhower even felt it necessary to 
assure the country publicly that he would make no secret deals. 5S 
Macmillan's hope was that through a gradual process of negotiation firm progress 
might be made towards an end to the cold war. According to Macmillan, the mistake 
made at Yalta had nothino to do with appeasement, but rather with tryin g to do much 
at the one time. Indeed during the meeting of the four foreign ministers at the United 
Nations in New York and San Francisco, Macmillan's soft talking was to contrast with 
Dulles' more direct approach. 
According to Eisenhower's account it was Molotov who put up the barriers in the 
preliminary discussions before Geneva in June. 59 Macmillan also indicates that the 
going with Molotov was not entirely smooth, although remarkably agreeable given his 
reputation. 60 However, Dulles himself was hardly blameless in the matter. The 
difference between the Macmillan and Dulles approaches is clearly illustrated in the 
reports which were made to London of their one to one dealings with Molotov. 
Macmillan talked to his Soviet counterpart on the 22nd June in San Francisco. 61 
Of this conversation Macmillan made the following comment to London, 
I asked what subjects he thought should be 
were broad possibilities but that "topics 
brought up. He replied 
which were undesirable 
that there 
from the 
point of view of one side or the other shou ld be avoided. " This may mean the 
satelli tes. Each side should however rai se the problems which worried it 
most. I said that the task of the Heads of Government would be to divide up 
these 
try to 
problems and perhaps to leave it to 
make some progress in settling them. 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to 
He agreed to this proposition. 
Dulles, on the other hand went straight in with his cold war obsessions flying as he had 
promised he would to the National Security Council on the 19th May. 62 Over 
luncheon with Molotov on the 23rd June he, 
[S]aid that he might also like to raise the question of the East European 
satellites. He understood that the Soviet Government might not accept this as 
a topic for future international discussion, but it was, nevertheless, a subject 
which contributed to international tension. It also raised the question about 
proper execution of wartime agreements. Mr. : Molotov replied that the Soviet 
position on this matter had been made sufficiently clear and he had no further 
58 Witness to Hi. vtorv, p. 381. 
59 , 'faº, cl(, ICfioº- 
Chun; c, p. 508 Dulles cones across very clearly as Eisenhower's right hand man, an 
opinion also toýr,, ýarded by Rustow. 
60 Ri(lirº, the Stoºiºº, pp. O05-61 1. He gives the tollowin rather affectionate account of his impression 
of \lolotov's character after the pre-Geneva talks were over. 
In : bite of hi. reputation for a hard, ne ati\ C. hrutal : attitude, when one saw him alone there 
appeared an unexpected attractivene", tnd even ý'cottne s. I felt that the Russians wanted a 
detente, that they \\. ere really tri,, htened hý the American hege. in Europe, and that they would 
Ilke toi rCýlUL: the : xpenditurc and eitert on armament`. 
bl PREý1 I I. ýýý-l. T: I: _ram No. 32. June '2nd. 1955. t'r ý1i \LtLmillan in San Francisco to F. 0. 
62 See tootnotc 55. 
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comment. Mr. Dulles said that he also wanted to - raise international 
Communisºn. Mr. Molotov replied that this was not possible without getting 
into internal affairs. NIr. Dulles said that what he meant were questions like 
international propaganda which had nothing to do with internal affairs. Mr. 
Molotov said he 1w nothing about this subject. 63 
The contrast with Macmillan's circumlocution is instructive, Dulles had evidently been 
imbibing rather less deeply of the Geneva spirit. Molotov's restraint in dealing with 
Dulles' attack is in its self an indication of how much store the Soviet leadership were 
setting by the summit and it is Dulles who comes across quite clearly in the British 
record as the most reluctant participator in the pre-Geneva talks. This disparity with 
British enthusiasm was to come out even more strongly when the Eden Plan was laid 
before the Americans in detail in a note of the 4th July. 
Dullessinitial reaction had seemed to Makins to be that he considered the British 
Plan gave far too much away in solid proposals, though he did not disagree with the 
basis of what was being suggested. Makins went on to report in his telegram of 6th 
July that, 
There is a genuine fear here of getting committed or trapped at Geneva into 
courses of action on points of substance, the implications of which have not 
been fully thought out. I understand that this feeling was strongly reflected 
by the President at a meeting at the White House this afternoon. 64 
By 8th July Dulles was offering his own "tentative redraft" of the British note, 
It is not desirable that any cut and dried proposals should be tabled at Geneva. 
That should be left to the conference of Foreign Ministers. But the Western 
Heads of States should inform the Russians that they understand the Russian 
desire for security. 
Dulles was hiding behind the Macmillan formulation that the summit should stick 
to vague agenda construction but for rather different reasons than Macmillan. It was 
in their attempts to persuade the State Department of the rightness of the British view 
that the telegrams of the 8th July quoted above were sent to Washington from the 
CANUTE committee. A degree of irritation was expressed to Makins by CANUTE, 
presumably in line with Eden's own view, scribbled on the Washington telegram of the 
63 Molotov in riposte raised the issue of a : ix power conference on the Far East. Dulles wondered if 
the sixth power were the Nationalist Chinese. %, Iolotov replied he meant India. This strictly 
confidential record of the proceedings was relayed to British officials through the State Department. 
PREM 11/894, Telegram No. 59.23rd June, 1955, From San Francisco to F. 0. 
64 PREM 11/895, Telegram No. 1563,6th July. 1955. from Washington Embassy to F. 0. Makins 
commented acerhically on the American political system. 
I am sure you realise too that another factor which is operating here is the extreme difficulty 
which an American Administration has in arriving at an agreed position on any important 
question. [to which scribbled by A. E., "we cannot really help that"] 
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6th. 65 By the 8th July CAtiUTE were still expressing their puzzlement as to what 
exactly Dulles' reservations about the British plan were. The British began to fear that 
State Department doubts and hedging would loose the west the initiative to the Soviets. 
Dulles made clear to Makins in further conversations on the 9th July what he 
particularly objected to. Although dubious about proposals for demilitarised strips, at 
least until the American military had had time to examine them in detail, Dulles 
wanted the British to know that he was not against using the British proposals, 
provided, that was, they were to go into no specific detail at the summit meeting. On 
the issue of European Security however, there was no way that the United States 
would be prepared to join in with the other western allies in providing a security 
structure which guarantied the Soviet position as it then stood. 
For political reasons there was really no question in the foreseeable future of 
the United States entering into a commitment to come to the defence of the 
Soviet Union, especially if there was an implication that this might involve 
action against the peoples of Eastern Europe who wished to liberate 
themselves 
Here was the crucial difference between the American and British views at Geneva. 
The British were prepared to accept that the Soviets' position in the satellite states had 
to be accorded some respect, provided that might lead to a settlement of the cold war. 
The Americans wanted to see very much more in the way of surrender from the 
Soviets before they would co-operate in an agreement, in essence a complete Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe. A Republican Party which had been elected three 
years e 1t+r on a pledged to role back Communism could hardly be expected to 
participate in its entrenchment in Eastern Europe. That would seem too much like a 
return to Truman's reviled policy of containment. 
Over the forthcoming few days before the Summit the American insistence that 
there should be no giving away of specific details was to prevail. Such matters were to 
be referred to the Foreign Rlinisteri Conference the following November, which 
became something of a 'tsin-bin 
" for the summit. This was perhaps a little unfair 
considering that Eisenhower was to come out with the most explicit detail of the 
summit over Open Skies. 
Macmillan put forward a Foreign Office appreciation of what the conference 
might yet achieve on the 1 3th July for a CANUTE meeting of the following day. 66 
65 See footnote 72- In a tole` Iram of 8th July CAN UTE expressed its frustration with the American 
ter, iversations communicated by the Washington Embassy on the 6th thus. 
[11f the Americans still have misgivings about our wording of the formula they should define 
them and sug`_est an amended draft. `e have not much time before us. Please put the above 
to Mr. Dulles and the State Department as soon as possible. We are on the threshold of the 
conference ºnd are entitled to more than "some preliminary views" promised you by Mr. 
MacArthur [of the State Department]. 
66 PREM 1hS95, Note by the Secretary of State tor Foreign . Affair:. 13th June, 1955. 
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The process of ne`otiation which he had originally suggested still seemed to have some 
promise of success, although the analysis was. perhaps. a little less rosy than it had 
been at the beginning of the planning process. 
It seems likely that the Russians will he torn by two conflicting emotions: a 
desire that the conference should not fail, and a determination not to give way 
to the West, in particular by agreeing to a German solution. The Western 
Powers have a similar interest in preventing anything in the nature of a 
breakdown or deadlock. Consequently, if we cannot get agreement on a 
reference to the Foreign Ministers of all the subjects listed above, we should 
aim at organising a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 
The one meeting of the CANUTE committee for which the minutes are available, 
the fourth and final one of 13th July, threw a further douche of cold water over the 
optimism which pervaded CANUTE's telegrams to Washington of the 8th July. 
Present on this occasion was Sir William Hayter, who at Eden's request gave the 
following prognostication of the "Russian attitude", 
[T]he plan set out in CAN/ 15/55 [for demilitarized strips] was asking a lot of 
the Russians. He [Hayter] did not think they would be ready to reach a 
settlement on Germany at Geneva... They would rather try to tempt the West 
Germans to accept unification on the Russian terms... There was no real 
reason why the Russians should make the sacrifices which our plan would 
require of them. 
Yet Eden continued to insist that they should offer his detailed proposals on Germany. 
However his mind seems to have been as much preoccupied with the necessity of 
maintaining a good propaganda profile as the prospects of a major break through. 67 
This is somewhat of a contrast to the opinions expressed to the State Department of 
less than a week before. Perhaps there had been a conscious degree of hyperbole 
involved for the sake of the half converted. As far as American opposition to laying 
out concrete proposals he still held out what was to prove the forlorn hope that, 
Although it might be INIr. Dulles' idea to avoid discussion of questions of 
substance, he did not think that the attitude of the President was nearly so 
negative. 
On the l7th July the last western confabulation before the summit proper started 
took place in Geneva. A compromise, between the American desire to avoid 
dangerous commitments and the British to make concrete proposals was reached during 
67 PRENI 1 liS95, Minutes of C. ANUTE committee meeting, 14th July, 1955. Eden had commented, 
[T]he main issue', should he brought out in the Jiseussion between Heads of Government so 
that, it the Russian,, were willing to discuss German reunification, they could he put in the 
position of refusing to . ºý:. rt it. He Jid not think that deadlock would necessarily he reached 
by this method. 
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this meeting. In conversation with Eisenhower Eden agreed with the President that a 
French plan put forte and by Faure, which offered e en more exact detail than the 
British, was dangerous precisely because it was too specitic. Compromise seems to 
have been more capitulation than anything else, 
I added that I agreed and that we had to be careful not to propound precise 
boundaries at this stage or we should be held to anything we offered. I 
thought the really important issue at this Conference was Germany. I hoped 
that he and I would press together strongly to try to move the Russians on 
this. The President cordially agreed. 
The President was in fact giving nothing on the line which Dulles had been taking all 
along. Dulles had been quite willing to accept the ideas that the British put forward, 
providing they were clothed in the form of loose suggestion and he objected to the 
detail which the Eden Plan afforded as to how such loose suggestion might be realised. 
Eden finally had agreed, in effect, that Dulles had been right all along. This seems as 
clear an indication as any of where the balance of authority lay between the western 
powers attending the Summit. The scene was Finally set for the superficially 
anticlimactic drama to begin. 
t- 
Chapter 5 
The Geneva Summit, 1955 
Thermonuclear Stand-off 
"There ain't gonna be no war" 
Harold Macmillan 
The Summit at Geneva was to convince the British that the Soviet appreciation of nuclear 
war was now very similar to their own. The conference acted in this respect as a 
confirmation of Foreign Office and Embassy opinion as has been outlined in Chapter 
Four. It also became clear that the Soviets were relatively happy to accept the stalemate 
which had been achieved in Europe between N. A. T. O. and the Warsaw Pact, even at the 
cost of a divided Germany. In both of these respects the Summit provides a turning point 
in the development of British perceptions of Soviet foreign policy and, indeed, the Cold 
War itself. However, it was not yet apparent in the summer of 1955 how the Soviets 
were shortly to redirect their energies in the prosecution of a cold war now to be fought 
within more limited parameters. 
ANGLO-SOVIET TABLE TALK 
Opinions differ as to the suitability of the old United Nations building, Geneva, as the 
venue for the July Summit. Eisenhower records in his memoirs a relatively favourable 
impression of the environment within which East and West met. Macmillan however 
most emphatically did not share this happy memory. Indeed he considered that, 
The room in which we met filled me with horror the moment we entered it. the 
protagonists were sitting in tables drawn up in a rectangle, the space between 
them was about the size of a small boxing rind... I could think of no arrangement 
less likely to lead to intimate or useful negotiations. I 
Whether or not the bombastic conference chamber in which the formal sessions of the 
conference were held had any negative impact or not, both Eden and Macmillan concur 
that the crucial contacts with the Soviet side were made in more informal surroundings. - 
Eden records that, "at a conference like this, it is usual for private discussion to be the 
most worthwhile. We entertained each other informally and made working occasions of 
1 The memoirs of Eisenhower and Macmillan differ in particular over the appropriateness of the 
rooms decoration. Eisenhower gave the following appreciation of the art which lowered down over 
the delegates, "The mural is effective. The brutish characters remind the participant in the drama of 
the grim seriousness of his task". As compares with Macmillan's, "the walls were decorated with 
vast, somewhat confused frescos depicting, the End of the World, or the Battle of the Titans, or the 
Rape of the Sabines, or a mixture of all three. ... 
The whole formal part of the conference was 
bound to degenerate into a series of set orations". 
See Tides of Fortune, p. 617, "it was only when the Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers met 
in a small room outside in a restricted meeting that any serious discussion could take place". 
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the meals". 3 Indeed, the most profound impressions that the British came home with 
were garnered after a private dinner with Khrushchev and Bulganin. `Macmillan's hopes 
for informal "dinner diplomacy" were to prove very well founded. 4 It was in an expansive 
post-prandial atmosphere that Eden and Macmillan found the Soviets at their most 
candid. 5 With this in mind a blow by blow account of the conference proceedings seems, 
in the context of the present study, unnecessary. 6 
However, that is not to say that the formal sessions were devoid of interest. They 
revolved around set speeches, an entertainment which the four delegations took it in turns 
to provide. Eden's contribution, despite his petulant qualms expressed in June, was very 
much in line with the division of the agenda agreed by Tripartite consultations in 
Washin(, ), ton. 7 The speech, which he gave on the afternoon of the 18th July, encapsulates 
what was to seem of importance to the British after the conference was over in respect of 
how they were to view the new Khrushchevian foreign policy. He bean by dwelling, in a 
manner appropriately reminiscent of Churchill, on the dangers and opportunities that the 
present state of nuclear technology afforded to the world. 
[T]his Conference is unique in history because the conditions in which we meet 
are unmatched in human experience. We all know what unparalleled resources 
the scientific and technical discoveries of our ade have placed within our reach. 
We have only to stretch out our hand and the human race can enter an age of 
prosperity such has never been known. It is equally clear how utterly destructive 
must be the conditions of any conflict in which the Great Powers are encraged. 
There was a time when the aggressor in war might hope to win an advantage and 
to realise political gain for this country by military action... nothing of the kind is 
possible now. No war can bring the victor spoils, it can only bring him and his 
3 Full Circle, p. 308 
4 PREM 11/894, Tel. No. 495, New York to F. 0., from Secretary of State; 17th June, 1955. 
During the Tripartite discussions before the conference Macmillan expressed the following opinion 
on the issue of entertainment, 
I agreed that we did not want banquets and I thought Mr. Dulles idea of buffets splendid. But I 
thought that, in addition, there could be useful contacts at informal lunches and dinners, and I 
knew that the Prime Minister would wish to feel free to invite members of other Delegations to 
quiet meals. This was generally accepted and we will discuss the subject on these lines with M. 
Molotov in San Francisco. 
Also Macmillan's hopes for the success of informal contacts expressed in PREM 11/893, Tel No. 
»3, from F. O. to Washington, from Secretary of State to Mr. Dulles; May 29th 1955. In his 
memoirs. Tides of Fortune, p. 616, Macmillan was candid enough to record his condemnation of 
Presidential cuisine after lunch with the Americans on the 17th July, "a disgusting, meal, of large 
meat slices, hacked out... and served... with marmalade and jam. The French were appalled". 
5 So important were these informal discussions in the eyes of Eden that a record of them was 
circulated around the Cabinet at his behest by Sir Norman Brook on the 2; th July, 1955 before the 
official record of the formal proceedings. A copy is to be found at the end of the PREM 11/895 
tile. 
6 There is . full record of the Bntish minutes of the conference's proceedings in the P. R. O. at CAB 
133/141. It is a bulky 141 page document which it would be invidious and pointless to attempt to 
summarise in any detail above. 
7 See above. Eisenhower %tias also keen to persuade the Soviets of the ghastliness of thermonuclear- 
nuclear zwar, Ambrose. Eisenhower, The Presideººr, p. 264. 
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victim utter annihilation. These are stern facts out of which can perhaps win 
enduring peace at last. ` 
Eden went on to concentrate on the need to work upwards from the detail to a 
general settlement. He had no time for Churchill's old emphasis upon a leap of human 
sympathy between the Heads of State which might lead from a broad understanding of 
each other to successful negotiation over particular problems. In this case Eden asserted 
the detailed matter crucial to the development of a modus vivendi was Germanv. 9 This is 
only what might be expected given the painstaking emphasis during British preparations 
for the meeting on the need to come up with some compromise answer to the problem of 
unification which provided suitable security guarantees for the Soviet Union. 10 The basic 
premise upon which British thinking turned is though quite brilliantly clear from the 
above. The British Government no longer considered that "world war" was a rational 
extension of foreign policy, it was rather an irrational act of global suicide. The question 
which Geneva was to answer with a conclusive yes for both Eden and Macmillan was, did 
the Soviets agree? 
On the issue of the specifics in either the formal negotiations or general discussions, 
Eden did not think his American allies showed sufficient enthusiasm. It was a point over 
which Eden himself was not prepared to let the planning of the past month -(--; o entirely 
to 
waste. On the 19th discussion concentrated on the German question. It was soon 
apparent to Eden that neither the Americans nor the Soviets seems quite to have shared 
8 CAB 133/141, Verbatim Record, Second Meeting of the Four Heads of Government in the Council 
the Palais des Nations, Geneva, at 2.45 p. m., 18th July, 1955. Compare to Churchill's words on 
the issue of the Defence White Paper for 1954 on Ist March 1954, see Gilbert, Never Despair, pp. 
1098-1101. The opening and closing statements of the Conference, of which this was one, were by 
prior agreement to be made public. They were printed for the House of Commons in Command 
Paper No. 9543, -Miscellaneous Series No. 14, July, 1955. 
9 Ibid. Eden went on to say with what from the perspective of today was almost a prophetic soundness 
of insi; ht, 
The deterrent against warlike action holds up a warning hand. But the deterrent cannot of 
itself solve international problems or remove the differences that exist between us. It is in an 
attempt to make progress with these problems and differences that we are met here today. And 
at this Conference we have to deal with them mainly in the context of Europe. What is the 
Chief among them? There can surely be no doubt of the answer. The unity of Germany. As 
long as Germany is divided, Europe will be divided. 
10 CAB 133/141, Record of Tripartite Discussions in Geneva before the Opening of the Conference at 
President Eisenhower's Villa, 1 th July, 1955. At this meeting Eden had expressed the following 
opinion on the issue of Germany. 
[B]y far the most important question to be discussed at the Conference was that of German 
unification. The Russians would not be anxious to discuss this. But the right tactics for the 
Western Powers would be to insist on discussing it and to put forward proposals which the 
Russians would find it difficult to reject. These tactics would be advantageous from the point 
of view of public opinion in Germany, but they were also likely to produce practical results. 
The pressure for in Austnan settlement \vhich the Nestern Powers brought to bear on the 
Russians at the Berlin Conference had in the -nd horn fruit. 
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his sense of urgency on the issue. ' l In his replies to Eden's offer of assurance for Soviet 
security, Bulganin made clear that the division between the two sides over the problem 
was very deep indeed. Despite this, and following Eden's insistence that the matter had to 
be discussed further, it was only in private conversation that evening that Bulganin and 
Khrushchev seem finally to have been able to persuade the British that they were not 
willing to change the status quo. That the Soviets were prepared to discuss the matter 
seriously in informal surroundings Evas in marked contrast, Eden reported back to London 
immediately before the meal, to the experience both the French and the Americans had 
had in their bilateral dinnertime exchanges with Bulganin and Khrushchev. 12 
Immediately after he had enjoyed his dinner and chit-chat with the Soviet leaders, 
Eden composed a minute recording his impressions of what had been said. Serious 
talking had, it seems, begun during the meal, Eden being sat between the two Soviet 
leaders. At this point Bulganin was exclusively Eden's interlocutor. Macmillan however 
recorded the clear impression that Khrushchev was the more authoritative of the two. 
The two topics under discussion -ý ere unsurprisingly Germany and the Hydrogen bomb, 
on which Bulganin expressed the Russian fear that Germany might again pose a serious 
threat to Soviet security. Even after Eden referred to the difference thermonuclear war 
must surely have made to such considerations, Bulganin continued to express his doubts. 
Bulganin did however go so far as to flatter Eden's ego, 
Bulganin said he thought that some of our suggestions were important and more 
than once in our conversation emphasised the part that we would have to play in 
trying to find a solution. 
11 PREM 11/895,19th July, 1955, From Prime : Minister, Geneva for Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Lord President, Minister of Defence and Sir Michael Adeane. Eden `rave the following account of 
the discussion in the Palais des Nations of that afternoon, 
[on the issue of guarantees to Soviet security] Bulganin had said the Soviets could not accept 
them because they were derogatory to a Great Power. Bul_anin made his replies good- 
humoredly but indicated firmly that he had nothing more to say on Germany. The President 
then staggered us by observing that the subject was exhausted. I said that we must return to it 
because of its very great importance, but that we should reflect tonight on what had been said 
by everyone [my italics]. 
Matters were not all sweet agreement and light of concord between Eden and Eisenhower. 
12 ibid. Eden continued to report an exchange between himself and Bulganin just after the formal 
session had closed, 
Bul, anin came up to me and admitted the reality of our divergence and how serious was the 
German question. He said that he thou-ht I understood their position. I said that I did 
understand that they did not want to see East Germany join West Germany in NATO. On the 
other hand how could we devise a security arrangement which satisfied him and allowed 
Germany to take her own decisions... he a`_reed that this was the heart of the problem, and 
made various complementary remarks about how I Could resolve it. ... 
We agreed to continue 
to examine the topic after dinner : Oni'ht. if rhis'wotv. s possible our eveninc should bei more 
useful than that (j the French and the . 4, nericuns, Wirelº ; 17e Russians left without any serious 
talk immediately after the coffee [my Italicsi. 
13 Minute of 19th July from Tides of Fortune, P. 619. Macmillan also recorded very Similar 
impressions to those of Eden regarding the Soviet attitude to Germany. 
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It was not until after dinner had been finished and as the memo puts it "when Khrushchev 
was present" that Bulcyanin got down to what Eden considered the real nitty-gritty 114 
Once their discussion had touched on the issue of the form a European ý ide security 
organisation might take Bulganin went on to confess, 
[T]hat he wanted to say something to me which he had said to nobody else. It 
was really not possible for his Government to return to `Iosco\". from this 
Conference having agreed to the immediate unification of Germans'. They were 
a united Government and reasonably solidly based in the country but this was 
something that Russia would not accept and if they were to aciree to it, neither 
the army nor the people would understand it and this was no time to weaken the 
Government. The people would say this was something Stalin would never have 
agreed to. On this therefore he simply could not meet us. 
Bulganin qualified this by admitting that although the Soviets could not agree on German 
unity immediately they would be prepared to discuss the terms under %vhich the Foreign 
Secretaries might later turn their collective abilities to the problem. Molotov was also 
present by this point. Both Bulýanin and Khrushchev seemed to agree cautiously with the 
agenda which Eden went on to su gest. l' However it was quite apparent that the Soviets 
had no enthusiasm for a solution, even if it were cacooned in the most favourable security 
guarantees for the Soviet Union. By the ? 1st July the West German Government had been 
made equally aware that the Soviets were not for criving any ground on the issue. 16 Eden, 
who had talked to Stalin in the lucid desperation of the war's worst moments, made the 
following summation of the implications of this unwonted surfeit of Soviet candour, 
In a long experience of talks with Russians, I think that this was the most 
important and certainly the frankest conversation I have known. I have not 
thought it useful to repeat the many compliments to Britain and references to a 
personal part in relations in years gone by. All this could properly be ascribed to 
a desire to divide us from the Americans. But I do not think that this would be a 
complete explanation. It is rather my impression that they regard us as the only 
possible bridge between themselves and the United States and that they are 
anxious that this bridge should be built. The French were never mentioned, the 
14 There is somewhat of an internal discrepancy in the memo. Dinner is specifically said to have been 
"between Bulganin and Khrushchev". However the post-prandial discussion is said to have been 
"... later ... when 
Khrushchev was present". 
15 Eden's suggestion consisted of, 
(1) an instruction to study the unification of Germany, having regard to the security of all 
concerned; (2) study of a security pact for Europe, or a part of it; (3) study of the limitation of 
forces and armaments in Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany, and (4) study 
the possibility of creating a demilitarised area. 
16 PREM 11/895, Minute by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 21st July, 1955. Herr Blankenthorn, the West 
German Ambassador in London, called on Kirkpatrick on the 20th July asking; for `_uidance as to the 
correct line the German press should take now it had become clear the Soviets opposed unification. 
Kirkpatrick counselled a restrained approach for, 
eil the Russians ere for the first time being civil in manner. It was therefore important that 
no Western nation should he the first to relapse into rudeness. (11) We were now at the most 
difficult and delicate part of the conference. 
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United States were always referred to with respect, and as being our friends - 
from whom we should not be divided. 1 1,1 
Eden was clearly quite taken with the flattery which the Soviets were, at least 
according to his record, paying him. This contrasts markedly with the opinions of some 
of the American delegation and both that of later biographers of Eden and historians. 
Emphasis has tended to be put on the inglorious comparison Eden must have been forced 
to make with his crucial importance in the 1954 Geneva summit over the Far East and the 
relatively humble role assigned to him as junior to the Americans in 1955.18 There is no 
hint of injured pride in any of the British records that have to do with the conference. 
Indeed the problem seems almost to have been on the contrary one of an inflated 
estimation of Britain's own abilities as go-between, particularly in respect of the Far East. 
What is important from the above is that this idea was not something that Eden was trying 
to force upon the Soviets, but something that he perceived in what they had to say. 
Eden was impressed by the apparent willingness on the half of the Soviet delegation 
to be at the very least frank, particularly, the cynical might suggest, as they seemed to be 
franker to him than anyone else. This was a perception that had a profound effect on the 
means by which Eden would seek through 1955 and 1956 to conduct his relations with 
the Soviet Union. Increasing emphasis was to be put, ironically once again in the manner 
of Churchill, on the efficacy of mind speaking to mind. Even in respect of Soviet 
intervention in the Middle East, Eden was to alarm the Americans by his eagerness to 
discuss Middle Eastern affairs with the Soviets. 
In this it might be argued that Eden was misinterpreting the Soviet motive. What 
seems to have mattered to the Russians in July 1955 was to persuade the West that they 
did not want to start a war. In their sweet reasonableness the Soviets very effectively 
managed to communicate this idea. Eden's misjudgement lay perhaps with his over 
sanguine view of the intrinsic power of diplomacy to lead to a settlement. Soviet niceness 
did afterall serve an ulterior motive which put very profound limitations on the scope for 
17 PREM 11/895, Memorandum of Meeting between Prime Minister and Soviet Delegation , 19th 
July, 1955. 
18 In particular David Carlton, writing before the official British record was publicly available, gives a 
rather negative account of the British showing at the conference in Anthony Eden pp. 376-380. 
Eisenhower, according to this view, stole centre stage as Eden was left floundering in the wins. In 
particular Carlton's impression of the Soviet reception accorded to Eden's proposals for German 
unification does not accord with the material dealt with above. Indeed Eden's subsequent 
enthusiasm for meetings with the Soviets hardly tallies with bitter disappointment, nor with the 
comments of Khrushchev in his memoirs quoted below. Khrushchev Remembers, p. 399. Even 
accepting that Eden was not likely to put things in an ill light himself, given the ebullience of his 
reportage to London the following judgement by Carlton seems a little sour, 
Nothing was to come of the Open Skies idea, at least not in Eisenhower's time, but for the 
duration of the Geneva Summit it held the world stage as something of glittering simplicity 
that might serve to end the arms race. Eden's plan, by contrast, was too complicated and too 
limited in scope to have any similar appeal; and it was received by the Soviets without 
enthusiasm [my italics]. 
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diplomacy. Indeed it was to become apparent very shortly after Geneva that the Soviets 
were not interested at all in having done with East/West rivalry. 
THE FAR EAST 
Eden's perception that both sides had come to what amounted to an agreement to differ 
over Germany is further illustrated by his attitude towards the Far East. This had, of 
course, been an important consideration in the lead up to the conference. '` Although 
there was no formal place in the Conference's agenda for discussion of the Far East, Eden 
considered this an area more fraught with danger in July 1955 than German- or European 
security. The Soviet attitude to German negotiations was further evidence that all sides 
were increasingly coming to an acceptance of the status quo. In his conversation of the 
19th July Eden and Bulýanin amicably came to the following agreement, 
I remarked to Marshal Bulganin that though the situation in Europe was difficult 
it was not dangerous. He cordially agreed and added that the possibility of war 
in Europe was so far away it was hardly worth talking about. He agreed 
however that the Far Eastern situation was much more anxious. He spoke of 
Formosa and the dangers there. I said that Quemoy and the MIatsus worried me 
much more. 20 
Eden, therefore, spent a very substantial part of his informal soundings with both the 
Americans and Soviets on the issues raised by Chiang Kai-shek and the off-shore 
islands. ' 1 
Indeed in his concern over the Far East Eden was consciously playing the role of go- 
between for the White House and Kremlin which, apparently, had been accredited to him 
by the Soviets on the 19th. '-2 A part which he had afterall made very much his own at 
Geneva in 1954. This was particularly evident in his separate conversations with the 
Soviet and American delegations on the 22nd July. Eden while at breakfast with the 
Americans suggested to Dulles that he might use his meeting with the Soviets that 
evening after dinner, the farewell function during which Eden was to invite Khrushchev to 
19 See above on the preparations for the conference and particularly Macmillan, Tides of Fortune p. 
61_2. 
20 PREM 11/895, Note by A. Eden; 19th July, 1955. The conversation continued as follows, with a 
characteristically flippant, but pointed, aside by Macmillan, 
Khrushchev interjected here that the Chinese had been very patient. He did not think that the 
Russians would have been so patient. I replied that he under-estimated his own statesmanship. 
The position of Quemoy and the Matsus was very difficult for the Americans and for 
everybody concerned. The Americans mi`, ht wish Chian_ Kai-Shek to reduce his forces on the 
island. It did not follow from that that they could compel him to do so.... The Russians 
appeared to accept this... The Foreign Secretary suggested that the . -americans would be very 
happy if Quemoy and the NIatsus were sunk under the sea. This suggestion appeared to 
receive universal approbation except, possibly. we all admitted from an absent Chou En-Lai. 
^_1 PREM 1 1, S05. Eden spoke specifically on the issue to Eisenhower on the 1 th July and with both 
Soviet and Amencan delegations separately on the 22nd. See also Fuil Circle, p. 3 11. 
_ý PRE\I I US95. Note by A. Eden; Ord July, 1955. 
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Britain, to urge patience on the part of their Chinese friends in respect of the of shore 
islands. Dulles had agreed that such an approach by Britain would be a good idea. '-' 
Thus it was that the main topic of conversation between Eden, Bulganin and Khrushchev 
on the evening of the 22nd was China and Chang Kai-Shek. 
Eden's conversation with the Soviets was, at least according to his own record, of 
some value. After Bulganin and Khrushchev had made clear their confidence in Mao, 
Chou En-Lai and the future of China, they pointed out that it was natural the Chinese 
should feel resentful of Chiang 's occupation of the off -shore islands and their debarrment 
from the United Nations. In response Eden made the following mediation: 
President Eisenhower was doing his best to keep his public opinion under 
control on the subject of Quemoy and the Matsus. The Russians should, 
however, recognise his difficulties. This was a subject on which emotions ran 
high in the United States... The President was doing his best, in spite of this, to 
calm thins down and to counsel patience. If lie were given more time, all might 
yet be well. Were the Chinese prepared to be equally patient? 24 
To this Khrushchev replied that " traditionally the Chinese were a patient people. He 
believed that they would not take any rash action at the present time", which is ironic 
given Khrushchev's later view of Nlao. 
It is little wonder that in his report to Cabinet and his ruminations in Full Circle Eden 
should have laid such emphasis on this flattering role. 25 He clearly seems to have 
conceived Britain's position between the Americans and Soviets as an independent one. 
As at Geneva in 1954 Eden was acting as honest broker, albeit in slightly less dramatic 
way. Furthermore his perception of the Soviet attitude towards the British delegation at 
Geneva tended to confirm this high opinion rather then anything else. Whether or not the 
Soviet delegation intended to dive this impression for quite the reasons Eden conjectured 
is another matter. 
"OPEN SKIES" AND OPEN INVITATIONS 
As regards the most startling incident in the conference proceedings, the Eisenhower 
"Open Skies" proposal, the British had nothing to do at all with its Genesis and even less 
23 PREM 11/895, Note by A. Eden: 22nd July, 1955. 
24 ibid. Eden drew the following contrast between British and American attitudes to China, 
Our own interests in China had been mainly commercial: we had traded there for a long time, 
and over the years had earned a `rood commercial return from what we had invested. But the 
Americans during the war and since had poured money into China; and the average American 
now felt that the Chinese had bitten the hand that fed them. As a result the Americans were 
specially sensitive about the present situation. 
25 CAB 128/29,16th Cabinet Conclusions, Minute 4: 26th July, 1955. Full Circle pp. 310-311, 
where in places Eden quotes almost verbatim from his record of 22nd July in PREM 11/895. 
However in his report to Parliament of 26th July, 1955, Hansard Vol. 544, Cols. 1212-1217, Eden 
concentrated on the attempt at Geneva to solve the German problem and the real relaxation of 
tension which Geneva had achieved. 
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with the theatre which surrounded Eisenhower's offer on the 21 st July during a formal 
session of the conference. 26 Consequently, the issue does not directly reflect upon the 
British understanding of Soviet policy at Geneva, although indirectly it says a 
considerable amount about the difference of approach to Soviet relations between the 
Americans and the British. It also says something about both power's lively concern to 
score a victory for Western propaganda over Soviet. 
Eden was informed at breakfast on the morning of the 20th July by Eisenhower that 
he was considering making an effort in the area of arms control verification in an attempt 
to break the stalemate over details which had descended over the conference's formal 
sessions. 27 It seems that the Americans were no more specific than this, despite the fact 
that the proposal had already been worked out in some precision by the "Quantico Panel", 
because they did not want to risk compromising the element of surprise by leaks from the 
British or French delegations. A fact which says much about the American attitude to her 
allies. On the whole both Eden and Macmillan thought Eisenhower's vague suggestion 
good as it would put the Soviets on the spot and reduce their ability to make propaganda 
about their own "ban the bomb" stance. The sticking point for the West was that the 
Soviets were not at all clear as to how to establish that the bomb had actually been 
banned. Macmillan in particular came away from his breakfast with the President more 
impressed by Eisenhower's abilities of diplomatic gamesmanship than the possibility of 
turning the Summit in a more fruitful direction. 
The British reaction to Eisenhower's more specific proposal of the 21 st July, as well 
as for that matter the French, was warm but not ecstatic. Indeed Eden's own response 
during the formal proceedings on the 21st is interesting. 28 As an alternative to 
Eisenhower's grand gesture Eden suggested that it might be helpful if the two sides bean 
by agreeing to inspections within a limited but increasingly wide radius spreading out 
from Germany. This was a proposal which he had discussed with Eisenhower , again at 
breakfast, on the 20th July. 29 By this means, Eden suýýested, the two side could build up 
26 Eden certainly could claim no control over the thunderclap which dramatically accompanied 
Eisenhower's proposal. See Amborse, Eisenhower, The President, p. 265. 
27 See FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. IX, pp. 398-403 for the American record of this conversation and pp. 
421-24. It was in a meeting of the American delegation at 6 p. m. on the 20th July, that Eisenhower 
decided to table his "Open Skies" proposal and that the British and French delegations should not be 
informed in any detail. It was noted that at breakfast that day Eden and Macmillan had been 
favourable to the general suggestion on inspection which Eisenhower had made. Both Dulles and 
Nelson Rockefeller were present during the evening meeting. See also Open Skies, for a discussion 
of the proposal. 
28 CAB 133/141, Formal Session of the Conference 21st July. Also see Eden, Full Circle, p. 304 and 
Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, p. 620. 
29 In Full Circle, p. 304 Eden is perhaps a little disingenuous in his account of events in his Memoirs 
when he gives the strong impression that this proposal on limited inspection rights was "my idea". 
This is especially so as much of his Memoir follows very closely on his contemporary record. The 
Suez Crisis is not the only incident which suffers at Eden's hands for the sake of posterity. His 
official record of the conversation, PREM 11/895, Note by Anthony Eden of 20th July, 1955, avers 
the following, 
[A]t'ter canvassing various possibilities we agreed that some immediate agreement to apply 
supervision to the forces of East and West in a part of Europe would be the best tangible result 
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their confidence in each other to a point at vL hich some ww ider settlement of the issue 
would at last be mutually acceptable. 3t0 In this Eden showed not only his wonted 
diplomatic rational, but also perhaps a more sincere concern to achieve a settlement than 
Eisenhower. 31 
Macmillan's reaction is also interesting in respect of the conclusions he was to draw 
about general Soviet policy in Geneva's immediate aftermath. He records in his memoir 
that during the Eisenhower and Eden proposals in the Palais des Nations of the 21 st, 
Thinking of the realities which lay behind all this diplomatic screen, I passed a 
note to Kirkpatrick: "To abolish the nuclear now would spread terror 
throughout Europe". For I was beginning to reflect more and more upon the 
strange fact that peace was being preserved, not endangered by nuclear power. ''- 
This point was to undergo substantial development in but a few weeks. It seems clear 
that the British reaction to "Open Skies", a proposal wvith which they had as little to do as 
the Soviets, had its critical side. Their approach to diplomacy tended to avoid the brand 
gesture in favour of limited and consequently, so Eden thought, more practical measures. 
The Soviet reaction was even more ambiguous. Bulýanin, who was in the Chair 
when Eisenhower introduced the idea, was initially welcoming. However, this had 
possibly more to do with being caught off ward as the Americans had hoped the Soviets 
would be, for Khrushchev made very clear during the buffet at the end of the session that 
"Open Skies" was simply not acceptable. " From this moment onwards Eisenhower 
addressed his energies to Khrushchev, who had demonstrated considerably greater 
authority in the handling of Soviet diplomacy than Bulganin. 34 
With Eisenhower's offer still left formally in the air by the Soviet delegation, the 
British went to the farewell dinner provided by the Soviets on the evening of 22nd July. '' 
we could hope for. The President suggested that there 'night for instance be such joint 
inspection to a depth of 100 miles or so on either side of the existing line in Germany.... [my 
italics] 
30 Khrushchev made the following comment in his memoirs, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 399, on the 
difference he perceived in the British and American approaches to negotiation. Although not as 
convivial as was his experience of the French delegation, 
[T]he atmosphere of our conversations with Eden was certainly warm. Naturally he was 
following the same general line as the Americans. but he seemed to be more flexible and 
receptive to reasonable ar`uments. 
31 This is so particularly in relation to the debate over the balance in Eisenhower's motivation between 
propaganda and diplomacy. Given that the Soviets would probably not have been able to add by 
over-fliL, hts much more intelligence to that which they already had, "Open Skies" might reasonably 
be dismissed as a little one-sided. See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 157 and pp. 191-193 
for an interesting insight into the American rational at Geneva. Eden's rather more prosaic proposal 
demonstrated his wonted concern with building confidence by starting from small and relatively 
undramatic agreements. Eisenhower's biographer is considerably more sympathetic to his subject 
over the issue, Eisenhower, Soldier and President, p. 393. 
2 Tides of Fortune, pp. 620-21. Macmillan went on to comment, "this paradox was to confuse and 
invalidate much of the subsequent arguments about disarmament. " 
,3 There is a memorandum of this conversation at FRUS 1955-5 7, Vol. IX, pp. 456-67. 
,4 Amhrose. Eisenhov er, Soldier , und President, pp. 392-93. 
35 It was only from Moscow that Bulganin was to make his distaste of the proposal public. 
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It was during this event that Eden invited Bul(yanin and Khrushchev to visit Britain the 
following spring. Indeed according to Eden's memoir there must have been something of 
a romantic air to the invitation, delivered as it was to Bulganin on the terrace of the 
Soviet delegation's small villa. 36 This however was no last moment flight of whimsy on 
the part of Eden. He had already been given cabinet approval that if he thought such a 
thing appropriate he should feel no compunction in asking the Soviets to visit Britain. In 
their response to a telegram from Eden immediately after the British delegation's arrival in 
Geneva the Cabinet had expressed through Butler the following opinion, 
We came to the conclusion that so much depended on the Geneva discussions 
that the judgement of yourself and the Foreign Secretary would be better than 
ours. All we can do is to assure you of the general support of the Cabinet in 
whatever you decide, since we think that no harm could come from the visit of 
the Soviet leaders. 37 
Butler went on to comment that the decision to invite the Soviets depended very much on 
how Eden gauged the "atmosphere" of the conference. Although the formal proceedings, 
particularly during the last couple of days, had produced nothing more substantial than 
rhetoric, Eden had been sufficiently impressed by the Soviet? private candour finally to 
pop the question. '18 As early as the 20th July Eden had given a relatively sanguine interim 
report to Churchill in which pointed out the following contrast between the formal and 
informal proceedings of the conference, 
So far the Russians show little sign of movement in our discussions. The 
Foreign Secretaries are to try tomorrow to work out the instructions which 
might be given to them on the subject of German reunification and European 
security. However, our private discussions have been more hopeful and it seems 
clear that both the Russians and the Americans want to get some positive results 
from the Conference. '9 
The Soviets' flattery on the night of the 19th, and their cautious reasonableness thereafter, 
had not been entirely without effect. 
In concrete terms the conference did not produce anything more solid than a bland 
communique of unexceptionable platitudes and the instructions which were to provide a 
basis for the Foreign Ministers to disagree over in the autumn. 4° But as Eden had made 
clear to Churchill on the -"Oth July this was about as much as they could expect. 
The 
36 Full Circle, p. 307: Eisenhower ,, gas informed after the event. 
37 FO 500/684, Telegram No. 52 from F. O. to UK. Delegation Geneva, from Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to Prime Minister; 19th July, 1955. 
38 Although the Soviets reserved their most serious blast of cold war polemic until the very last day of 
the conference, after the ins itation to Britain had been made, on the 23rd July. See Full Circle, p. 
306. Tides of Fortune. p. 623. Macmillan in particular thought that this final outhurst had much to 
do with Soviet "peevishness". 
39 FO 300/OS4. Teie, _ram No. 50 from UK. Delegation Geneva to F. O., from P. M. for Winston 
Churchill. 19th July, 1955. 
40 See Cmmd. 95-41 for the text of the Directives for the Foreign Ministers. 
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Conference's success was in the informal candour the Soviets had displayed. detailed in 
Eden's memos already discussed above. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SLN 1MMIT 
Eden and Macmillan reported their impressions of the conference to a meeting of cabinet 
on the 26th July. 4 t Eden, interestingly, concentrated first of all on his private discussions 
with Eisenhower and the relatively agreeable attitude he had displayed to%ý ards British 
concern regarding the antics of Chiang Kai-Shek. Eden was also convinced. again from 
his informal contacts, that the Soviets were prepared to use such influence as they had on 
the Communist Chinese to hold them back from precipitate action. After a long treatment 
of this Far Eastern theme he went on to comment, 
In the Conference itself discussion had turned mainly on the questions of 
German unification and European security. It had proved impossible to induce 
the Russians to modify their view that Germany could not be unified until a new 
system of security had been established in Europe. In this they were influenced 
by a genuine fear that Germany might re-emerge as a strong military power in 
Europe. Even if the Russian leaders could be persuaded that this could be 
prevented, their freedom for manoeuvre would be for some time limited by an 
instinctive fear of Germany among the Russian people. This evidently went so 
deep that even a dictatorship had to take account of it. At this Conference, at 
any rate, the Russians had seemed to be more apprehensive of the resurgence of 
Germany than of encirclement by the United States. The other outstanding 
impression left by the Conference was the desire of the Russian leaders to 
establish more normal relations with the Governments of the West. They 
seemed genuinely anxious to secure a relaxation of international tension and a 
friendlier relationship with the Western Powers. 
Macmillan expressed his "full agreement" with what the Prime Minister had said, he 
did however lay emphasis presciently upon the following in contrast to Eden's 
preoccupation with the Far East, 
The Russians had seemed far less anxious than he had expected about the 
possibility of encirclement by the United States. They were much more 
concerned about Germany and, in the long run perhaps, in the position which 
they might find themselves between a resurgent Germany and a strong China. 
He doubted whether the Foreign Ministers, at their meeting, in October, would 
make much progress towards the unification of Germany. But, if a steady 
pressure were maintained, a solution might eventually be found through some 
sort of security pact for Europe. Meanwhile it certainly seemed that the Russian 
leaders were anxious to follow peaceful policies in Europe. They had 
presumably concluded that, with the advent of nuclear weapons, European war 
would not serve their purposes. Moreover, with the end of the Stalin regime, 
they seemed less disposed to favour aggressive methods and would prefer, if 
41 CAB l2S ý`ý. 16th Cabinet Conclusion, 1955. \I inutc 4.26th July. 1955. 
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they could, to devote their resources to the development of their internal 
economy . 
42 
The predictions of both `Moscow and Bonn Embassies as regarded the Soviet attitude 
over Germany were born out. The Soviets, it was now clear to the British executive were 
not interested in coming to a settlement, preferring to accept a status quo which gave 
them the substance of what they wanted, a relatively enfeebled Germany. 43 
The Foreign %Iinistem) conference of October 1955 was to mark the final attempt to 
get some kind of agreement on the issue in line with the directives which had been 
worked out at the Summit. Even before Macmillan came up against the granite-like 
intransigence of Molotov the British were extremely doubtful that any settlement would 
be forthcoming. Although interestingly Macmillan seems not entirely to have given up 
hope at the Cabinet meeting of the 26th July, the rock on which such residual hope was to 
flounder was the West's insistence that Germany must be allowed freely to make her own 
security arrangements after unification, i. e. join NATO. Only if the Soviets accepted this 
as the basis upon which to develop a broader security system for Europe were the 
Western Powers prepared to go forward. The Soviets, unsurprisiný, ly, were no more 
prepared to loose their grip over East Germany for a united Germany to join the West 
than they had been in 195-4. Their proposals included the end of both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact before German unification and the construction of an entirely new pan- 
European security structure. The Western Powers, equally unsurprisingly, saw this as 
little more than a ploy to exclude America from Europe and expand Soviet influence into 
a disunited West. 
The prospects for a settlement at the Foreign Minister's conference were discussed at 
a meeting of the FLINT Committee on the 19th October. 44 If by way of concession to 
42 In his memoirs Macmillan records that he made a note of his impressions of the final "informal" 
meeting with the Soviets on the 22nd July. In its substance this very closely accords with the points 
that he made at the Cabinet meeting on the 26th of that month, see Tides of Forrue, p. 6??. 
43 Khrushchev in his memoir was quite specific on the issue of what the Soviets wanted to avoid in 
Germany, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 394. The order in which he lists the opposition is worthy of 
at least passing note, 
[W]e knew that the number one goal which the En, -, 
lish, American, and French would be 
pursuing in Geneva would he what they called "the re-unification of Germany", which really 
meant the expulsion of Socialist forces from the German Democratic Republic: in other words, 
the liquidation of Socialism in the German Democratic Republic and the creation of a single 
capitalist Germany which would, no doubt, be a member of NATO. As far as our own 
position on this issue, we wanted simply to sign a peace treaty that would recognise the 
existence of two German states and would guarantee that each state be allowed to develop as its 
own people saw Cit. 
44 CAB 130/111, GEN 506, FLINT, Minutes of Ist meeting, 19th October, 1955. Macmillan bean 
the discussion by reference to the following points arising from press speculation about the Foreigyn 
Minister's meeting at Geneva. 
[Tjhe "Times" leadin articles of the 15th and 18th October had caused some apprehension in 
Germany . 
These articles argued that the Russians would never agree to the reunification of 
Germany ýºmultaneou lv ww nth the conclusion or a European Security Pact, and drew the 
conclusion that we should offer the Russians some concessions on European security now, in 
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the Soviet view unification were entered on first without an acceptable security structure 
Macmillan thought that, 
[S]uch a course would be bound to brink upon us the hostility of the German 
Federal Government. Some concession would be justified to secure Russian 
agreement to German reunification, but he shared the view expressed by Sir 
William Hayter (telegram no. 158 from Moscow) that the Russians were not 
prepared to leave Germany. It was, therefore, very important that, despite the 
arguments which were likely to be put forward by misguided sections of opinion 
in Western countries, we should maintain our attitude that German reunification 
and a European Security Pact must go together [ensuring the German right to 
enter NATOI. 4' 
This proved to be a reasonable summary of why the the Geneva Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers was to prove entirely sterile. 46 Both Eden and Macmillan seem to have 
considered that the focus of the cold war had now shifted away from a relatively stable 
Europe over which, if only de facto, there seemed to have been an agreement to differ. 4 
There were certainly no ; rounds on which to develop a mutually agreeable settleuuce%fof ' 
the German question. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister's meeting, defined clearly the 
limits of the "Geneva Spirit", limits which had already become apparent with the Czech 
agreement to supply arms to the Egyptian Government in September (on which see the 
following chapter). Indeed, perhaps the most interesting issue to arise from the October 
advance of German unity, in the hope that as time went on we might be more amenable. [The 
Germans had been assured that this was not British Government policy] 
45 FO 371/116654 NS 1021/69, Confidential, from Sir William Hayter, Moscow to Macmillan, 4th 
October, 1955, is the despatch to which Macmillan refers in the quote. Hayter commented on the 
remarks Grotewhol, the East German leader, had made in the East German Parliament on the 26th 
September on the guarantees he had received from the Soviets regarding the future of his country, 
Put into English, this means "the Russians have promised to keep us in power until such time 
as Communists, fellow travellers or neutralists control Western Germany". ... Soviet policy 
may change. But a promise of this kind must undoubtedly have been viven. 
In these 
circumstances German unity is not now, or in the immediate future, achievable. 
46 For a full record of the proceedings see FRUS 1955-57, Vol. IX, pp. 537-808. 
47 ibid. Hayter went on to make the followin-, damming appreciation of the Soviet attitude to security 
guarantees. 
We are sometimes inclined to think that the Russians badly want a system of security in 
Europe. Perhaps they do. But they want it not because they think it would really offer them 
g. security ainst attack (they have no more confidence in paper guarantees from us than we 
would have in paper guarantees from them), but because they regard it as a step towards the 
liquidation of N. A. T. 0. and the consequent withdrawal of American troops from Europe. 
[thus Soviets unlikely to agree to a Security System that maintains both arrangements] No 
doubt the elaboration of se urity proposals including these elements is useful exercise from the 
point of view of Western public opinion, but we delude ourselves if we think it is likely to 
have any charm for the Russians. the Soviet Government do not go in for refinements. Their 
approach to most questions is unsophisticated and crude. So it will he to this question, and 
their answer is not difficult to foresee. 
Chaptzr 5/ Pa`_-1 I- 
get-together was the light it threw on the diminishing position of Molotov within the 
Soviet leadership. 48 
"THERE AIN'T GOYNA BE NO VAR" 
It is perhaps putting a little too fine a judgement in comparing the emphasis placed by 
Eden and Macmillan in their 26th July report to the Cabinet on the Summit meeting to 
conclude that there was a major difference between the views of Her Majesty's Prime 
Minister and Her Foreign Secretary. However Macmillan's over-riding concern with the 
nuclear dimension to the conference was shortly to be made much clearer in a private 
memo of the 8th August. It was given a limited, secret circulation amongst certain 
important members of the cabinet. 49 These included Butler and Lloyd, who were at this 
point Chancellor and `-linister of Defence respectively and also, appropriately enough 
given the slip of paper handed to him during the formal session of the Conference on the 
21st July, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. The note was, as lie minuted to Kirkpatrick, "... a little 
paper I have composed, to try to clear my own mind. "5') Although too much ought not to 
be read into what seem to have been jottings, it seems reasonable to take them as a fair 
statement of the process of thought which Geneva had caused Macmillan to embark 
upon. He expanded upon the crucial impression which Geneva had left with him 
regarding the Soviet's new attitude towards war in a thermo-nuclear age. His thinking 
was very much a development of the comments of the Moscow Embassy and the 
Northern Department in the lead up to the Summit on this subject. It was also a clear 
insight into the policy implications of the speech Eden had made to the Summit on the 
18th July, quoted from above. 
He began by stating very starkly what it was that had forced the Soviets to be so 
terribly nice to the West at Geneva, 
48 Molotov's position had faded very considerably since his 8th February, 1955 foreign policy speech. 
Indeed so low had it fallen by October that many had expected him to be replaced before the 
Foreign Minister's Conference, not least because of criticism of his methods in the journal 
Kommunist of the 10th October. Molotov's performance at Geneva was in stark contrast to that of 
the Berlin Conference in 1954 when he had been confident and authoritative in his diplomacy. By 
October, 1955 he appeared thralled to other authorities within the Kremlin to whom he was forced 
to refer final judgement. FO 371 116641 NS 1017/98, Memorandum, Hayter, Moscow to 
Macmillan, "The Power Relationship in the Soviet Union", 28th November, 1955. At this point 
Hayter's analysis still saw a vibrant future for the principle of collective leadership, albeit with 
Khrushchev in an increasingly powerful position. 
49 Again Macmillan was to be quite specific in his memoirs as to how Geneva affected his attitude 
towards the Soviet Union itself and consequently his whole philosophy of defence. He makes the 
following, comment about his attitude to Geneva immediately after the conference was over, 
In reflecting on Geneva, a strange, and to me novel, experience, I felt some encouragement, 
largely because of the strong impression left in my mind that all the great nations who were in 
the nuclear game now accepted that modern war, that is nuclear war, was quite impossible and 
could only lead to mutual destruction. 
50 He described the note in the following , enns in a covering letter to Butler of 10th August (FO 
800/668), "Please destroy or return my little memorandum. It is nothing more than a few notes - 
not tit for any tormal purpose". 
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1. Everyone knows that the improvement in relations between the Communists 
and the Free World which became evident at Geneva, is really due to Fear, not 
to Love. It is the first dividend of nuclear weapons. 2. But nobody likes to sav 
this - except with some courage, Mr. Grossman in the Sunday Pictorial (7.8.5 5) 
3. At present the Soviets are held back by fear of the American H bombs. In a 
few years everyone will be held back by fear of each other's H bombs. 4. This 
development, paradoxically enough, has brought a greater sense of security to 
the world than we have had for some time. 
Little doubt was left in Macmillan's mind that the Soviet attitude towards thermo-nuclear 
war was effectively synonymous with that of his and the British Government generally 
There then followed a grand construction from this basic premise which was to have 
fundamental implications for the future of British defence policy both before Macmillan's 
rise in 1957 and, more particularly, after. 
5. If disarmament means - agreement to abolish nuclear weapons, it follows that 
insecurity will result - at any rate in the Free World, a) because no real system of 
control or inspection can be devised, b) because another "conventional" war 
waged with all modern weapons short of nuclear would be destructive of 
European life and civilization, c) because we should probably lose such a war. 6. 
Security may best be maintained if nuclear weapons are held by the Great 
Powers and known to be so held. 
In his memoirs and at the time in private Macmillan expanded upon this point, laying 
bare the fallacy, as he saw it, at the heart of the argument for nuclear disarmament. 51 If it 
were fear of nuclear annihilation that kept the world at peace, it was no solution to 
remove the cause of fear. His philosophy of defence was based on a clear perception that 
the Soviets had just as great a horror of the consequences of thermo-nuclear war as did 
the west. Upon this premise a calculation was erected which may have been utterly 
abhorrent in the event of its inaccuracy or a human error, but was nonetheless rational. 5'- 
51 Macmillan records in his memoirs the following note penned on the 25th July, Tides of Fortune, pp. 
624-625, 
"Peace", say all the leader-writers, etc., "is now assured because everyone knows that there 
can be no victor in war today. " The after a fe w intervening para graphs , they go on to say 
"Ban the nuclear bomb. " But is this syllogism really sound? Is the deduction correct'? If we 
abolish the nuclear bomb (which has abolished war) shall we not brink back war" This is a 
dander, even if we succeeded in a water-tight system of control, inspection and all the rest. 
which is impossible. 
52 Macmillan is here frighteningly logical in his balancing of the argument. This contrast starkly with 
the kind of thought processes imputed to political leaders in respect of thermonuclear weapons by 
such proponents of disarmament as Bertrand Russell, albeit in the following with reference to 
Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1961, 
The most important question before the world at the present time is this: is it possible to 
achieve anything that anyone desires by means of war' Kennedy and Khrushchev say yes; sane 
men say no. On this supreme question Kennedy and Khrushchev are at one. If one could 
suppose them both capable of a rational estimate of the probabilities, we should have to believe 
that the time has come for Man to become extinct. [Bertrand Russell, Has Man a Future, p. 
1201 
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It seems clear from Macmillan's ruminations of July and August 1955 that Geneva was a 
turning point in the development of this crucial perception by the British Government of 
Soviet foreign and defence policy. 
Macmillan's memo of the 8th August was sent to Butler with a covering note of the 
10th August. It reflected on one of the main problems which was to concern the Eden 
Government until the Suez Crisis broke, namely defence review. This serves, once more, 
to underline the fundamental importance that the impressions garnered at and around the 
Geneva Conference had upon British thinking about the cold war. 
It is now clear to me that nuclear weapons are the real protection of the world 
against war... [he then discussed the desirability of conventional defence cuts, 
particularly in the sensitive area of the British army in Germany] ... 
I really 
believe that our economy cannot stand defence expenditure on the present scale 
indefinitely, and that we ought to consider abandoning those parts of it which are 
really useless... I 
The whole process of defence review is accorded a good chapter in Eden's memoirs. It 
would seem impossible, given the tenor of Macmillan's thinking after Geneva, to divorce 
from these policy considerations the British Government's developing understanding of 
the changes which were happening in the Soviet union through 1955 and into 1956.54 
It was not, however, apparent to the British in the summer of 1955 quite how far the 
Soviets wanted to cro towards a lasting settlement of the cold war. Indeed given that 
Soviet policy was in a period of flux it would be surprising if the British attitude were in 
turn anything more than plastic. Although the Geneva Summit had made it quite plain 
that the Soviets did not want to leave East Germany and reduce their insurance against 
another resurgence of German power, the British Government seem to have harboured 
quite expansive hopes for the future of East-West diplomacy. This is revealed most 
instructively in the correspondence which Macmillan initiated with Dulles over an 
American move to publish certain conference documents unilaterally in the August of 
53 FO 800/668, Note from Macmillan to Butler of 10th August, 1955. Macmillan also displayed a 
more subtle approach to the problem of deterrence than arguably was to prevail in the United States 
until MacNamara and "graduated deterrence". 
It looks to me as if we ought to work towards a position when we have: (a) nuclear weapons to 
protect us against total war, and (b) the rest of our forces by land and sea and air carefully 
or`_anised for two purposes: (1) in Germany to prevent minor aggression across the frontiers so 
that small incidents can be dealt with without calling the appalling sanction of nuclear attack, 
and (2) all the various semi-police purposes, Malaya, Kenya and all the rest 
54 Eden makes the followin_, interesting, comment on the issue of defence review in his memoirs, Full 
Circle. pp. 368-369. 
One consequenc,, of the : volution from the atomic to the hydrogen bomb was to diminish the 
aJv, tnta e of ph` sicallI lar-ger countries. All became equally vulnerable. I had been acutely 
conscious in the atomic age of our unenviable position in a small and crowded island, but if 
continents, and not merely small islands, were doomed to destruction, all was equal in the 
, rim reckoning... I knew that the Russians were husy applying, the new lessons. we had to do 
so in a situation made more difficult by our limited resources. 
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1955. Macmillan thought this a very bad idea for the following reasons, which were 
expressed in a note to the Prime Minister of the Sth August. 
This American proposal seems to me most undesirable and I have already 
instructed Sir Roger Niakins to do «hat he can to discourage the State 
Department from perusin it. My main considerations are- (a) our general 
objection to unilateral and premature publication of the proceedings of 
international conferences, (b) the understanding at Geneva was that our 
discussions should be confidential except for the opening, and closing statements. 
I am sure that this was one of the factors which enabled us all to speak more 
frankly...; (c) we are on the threshold of ivhcrt is gelierally accepted to he a 
conailluing process of co! ferennce and discussion >º'itli the Russianns. This makes 
it particularly ruudesirable to set the pattern of pOliccrtion, tit, hich call ollh 
diminish the chances of success. 4' should aim at "opeii ci reemeiuts secretI 
arrived at" [my italicsl. 55 
Eden scribbled upon this minute, "I agree entirely" on August 10th. The substance of the 
above was then relayed to Dulles in a telegram of Au<<ust 13th. 56 Dulles reply of the 15th 
August, although satisfactory to Macmillan, was far from the liking of Eden. Eden 
objected particularly to the suggestion that the restricted sessions themselves might have 
to be made public. "There can be no more conferences if Americans even think of 
publishing restricted sessions", Eden scribbled on the Washington telegram containing 
Dulles response. 57 Given that the most valuable discussions as far as the British were 
concerned had happened outside the Conference hall altogether, it is perhaps a little 
strande that Eden should have been so insistent on this point. Clearly, however, both 
Macmillan and Eden, impressed by Soviet candour at Geneva, were eager that the most 
should be made of the new opportunity for diplomacy to flourish. Their approach to 
relations with the Soviet Union was wholly pragmatic. 
Despite this August hope for the future of the Geneva Spirit, it was soon to become 
apparent that the Soviets willingness to negotiate was severely circumscribed within set 
limits. By the Foreign Ministers' Conference of October 1955, with the Czech Arms deal 
and Bulaanin's edgy response to "Open Skies" there was little room left for illusion as to 
the possibility of any concrete agreements on the main points at issue. Sir William Hayter 
in a despatch of October 4th 1955, in which he thought at best the Soviets wanted 
"... breeder conferences in an endless series", delivered his considered judgement, 
55 PREN1 11/879, PM 55/99, Note to Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary, 8th August, 1955. 
56 PRE 111/879, Tel. No. 36722. F. 0. to Washington, for Dulles from the Foreign Secretary; 13th 
August. 1955. 
57 PRENt 11/879, Tel. No. 1893, Washington to F. 0.. tor the Foreign Secretary from Dulles, 15th 
August, 1955.. -\Iso see The Failure o0 he Eclen Goter nn, c', ir, p. 128, were this exchange undergoes 
what might he termed the Suez effect, viewed as it is through the refracting lens of its significance 
tier developments in 105). Lamb contents himself in drawing the following conclusion, This 
betrays Eden's attitude to Dulles after Geneva, which was not a wood omen for the remainder of the 
premiership. " There is no consideration of the light which it might throw on the British attitude to 
Geneva and the Soviet Union generally in the August of 1955. 
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Soviet foreign policy now can, it seems to me, be summed up in five words 
(most of them foreivln), detente and the status quo. My U. S. colleague [Charles 
Bohlen] has formulated the same thought as "peace at no price". 58 
Macmillan's idea of a thermno-nuclear "stand-off" was to prove correct. Furthermore his 
brash, publicity conscious pronouncement "there ain't gonna be no war" seems an 
admirably apposite summary of the Conference's fundamental achievement. ý9 
The 1955 Summit holds a crucial place in the British Government's perception of the 
development of Soviet policy; most importantly in the conviction that the Soviets now 
saw nuclear war as a self-defeating exercise in global suicide. It is here that the 
importance of the conference lies. That it came to no concrete settlements of any of the 
issues it sought to explore is in this sense irrelevant. That was not, afterall, in the opinion 
of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow quoted above what the Soviets themselves had 
wanted the Conference to achieve. In communicating an awareness of certain rather 
appalling strategic facts, Geneva was a resounding success, so much so that in the words 
of Eden's memoir, 
[T]he Geneva Conference taught some lessons, which were powerfully to affect 
the course of events in the next few years. Each country present learnt that no 
country attending wanted war and each understood why. The Russians realized, 
as we did, that this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo- 
nuclear weapons. In the minds of men who commanded power in the world, the 
lessons of the Conference might result in a reduced risk of total destruction to 
the human race. 6° 
Eden went on, however, to comment 
A less comfortable conclusion could also be drawn. the communist powers 
would continue to prosecute their purpose by every means. To do this, they 
would work in areas and by methods, including the use of conventional 
weapons, which they believed would not entail retaliation by nuclear weapons. 
Quite what these weapons and areas were to be is the subject matter of the following two 
chapters. 
js op. cit. From Sir William Hayter, Moscow, 4th October, 1955. 
59 Macmillan, p. 361. 
60 Full Circle. pp. 306-07. Interestingly Eden `'oes on to comment that this lead to a Soviet 
determination to develop her nuclear technology to its fullest potential. This was also clearly 
implicit in Macmillan's private memo of August Sth 1955 as a priority for Britain. 
Chapter 6 
The Czech Arms Deal and the Aswan Dam 
Descent from Pisgah 
"The news of the proposed deal between Nasser and the Russian Government for the 
supply of munitions of the order suggested is a serious blow to all our interests in the 
Middle East". 
Harold Macmillan 
During 1955, Khrushchev's new foreign policy encompassed considerable complexities 
which in Whitehall's view seemed at times to reach the proportions of downright 
contradiction. Whilst courting the braces of Western statesmen and the press at Geneva 
in July, 1955, the Soviets must already have been well advanced in sponsoring a 
Czechoslovak offer of arms to the Egyptians. 1 This was done, most probably, in the full 
knowledge of the hostile way the West would react to such a development. Nor was the 
Czech arms deal the only event to disturb the "Geneva Spirit", which the Soviets had 
seemed so singularly eager to foster in the summer of 1955. During their tour of India, 
Burma and Afghanistan in December (see Chapter 7), Bulg. anin and Khrushchev whilst 
obsequiously courting potential allies would do their utmost to offend the feelings of the 
British, who as the ex-colonial power were a particularly obvious target. When this was 
considered in tandem with the economic blandishments which the Soviets offered, or 
seemed about to offer, to the newly independent "under-developed" nations, the Kremlin 
seemed to have opened up an entirely new "front" in their prosecution of the Cold War. 
The Middle East and South East Asia, hitherto areas were Western influence had been 
dominant, were now targets for peaceful Soviet penetration on a level which caused 
something akin to panic in Whitehall. This was not a straight forward way of ensuring the 
relaxation of tensions. 
However, to British observers, the contradictions in this new policy proved, on 
reflection, to be little more than apparent By January 1956 the British Embassy in 
1 See David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin. p. 279 who makes the following point about 
Soviet policy during the Geneva Summit: 
However, "relaxation of tensions" among the great powers was not the sum total of the Soviet 
foreign political course of the time. Behind the screen of "coexistence"... the Soviet 
government - and here Khrushchev was a`_ain the driving power - was pursuing a grand 
offensive in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. As the Geneva Conference was 
being prepared. the Soviet-protected Bandung Conference was declaring its offensive against 
the \Vest; this was followed by secret Soviet-Egyptian negotiations concerning Soviet and 
satellite arms for Egypt. At the very time that Bulganin and Khrushchev were attending a 
summit conference to "lessen international tensions", Dimitri Shepilov as in Cairo for talks 
with Colonel Nasser. 
Also Mohammed Heikal in Sphinx and Currunissar, the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the . -trab 
World, pp. 57-60 substantiates Dallin's view from the Egyptian perspective. 
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Moscow was expressing the view that the Soviet desire for detente and their probing of 
new ground in Asia, were in fact merely two facets of the one- policy. The Soviet leaders 
were anxious that relations with the West should not deteriorate to the extent that nuclear 
war became likely; given the annihilation which would ensue if it -tiere to lead to the use 
of the new hydrogen weapons that were being developed on both sides. However, 
despite this limitation, Communism was still to be victorious over Capitalism. The rivalry 
between the two world systems was merely to be sublimated into a battle between their 
respective domestic economies' capacity to provide a better society and for political and 
economic influence over the neutralist countries of Asia and Africa. A war which was to 
be prosecuted by loans, technicians, arms supplies, propaganda and superior economic 
organisation. The Cold War appeared to change radically in the aftermath of the 
junketings at Geneva, but it most certainly did not go away. 
The British had indeed noted a number of indications that the Soviets were becoming 
interested in new worlds to conquer early in 1955. By January of 1955 Khrushchev had 
already made clear his determination that in the area of economic and scientific 
competition with the West, the Soviet Union would catch up and overhaul their rival as 
soon as possible. In a despatch dated the 24th of that month, Sir William Havter reported 
on indications liven in the Soviet academic press of a new much freer attitude to scientific 
enquiry. The old Stalinist rigidities were, it seemed, to be a thing of the past. No longer 
was it acceptable merely to deride Western scientific research, it was now to be learned 
from and improved upon. There was also to be much greater emphasis on the application 
of science to industry. Hayter ended the despatch by commenting: 
I think it can be concluded from all this that the present Soviet reime not only 
attaches the highest priority to making the Soviet Union the leading country in 
world science, but is at last beginning to ýo the right way about it. Originality is 
being encouraged: there is to be no more dictatorship in science, and the Soviet 
scientists who take an active interest in foreign science will now run little risk of 
"toadying to the West". At the same time a more sensible attitude to science is 
supported by an immense effort to train the new generation of scientists and 
technicians. In 1954, according to the latest plan results, there were 1,732,000 
students following courses in higher educational establishments. This new 
stimulus, which is now being liven in the Soviet Union to science and 
' technology, deserves, I think, our most careful attention. 
2 FO 371/116709 NS 11031-33 1,24th January, 1955. Hayter quoted from two academic journals which 
were the Literar Gazette (of January 11) and Questions of Philosophy (No. 6 of 1954). Hayter 
pointed out that the Literary Gazette article by Academicians I. Knunyants and L. Zubkov, "whose 
names mean nothing to use, carried the development of a freer attitude to scientific enquiry "a stage 
further". . -\ process which thou, -, 
h started by Stalin as early as the summer of 1950 in his articles on 
linguistics, had to twkait his death for any further significant development. Khrushchev seemed to 
have taken an important part in the process. not least by helping to pull Lysenko from his pedestal 
during 1954. The movement appeared to be gathering pace. Although the Party itself was still 
reluctant to comment directly on the issue itself (Hayter pointed out that this was though very much 
in line with their policy of trying to het away from Party edict, in science), Pravda of the 20th 
January 1955 had complained of the conservatism of many Soviet "industrialists" in their attitude 
towards new technology. Hayter commented, "the party is at present deeply concerned with the 
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This was a trend that was to continue despite the tall of Malenkov in the February of 
1955. Indeed as the above report indicated it was Khrushchev more than anyone else 
who was associated with its development. In a despatch of the 22nd April signed by Cecil 
Parrotk the Minister at the Embassy, for the Ambassador, the following comment was 
made to London, 
In several recent reports I have drawn attention to the attitude of the present 
Soviet leaders to science and technolo«v They have allowed and presumably 
inspired the publication of articles for the encouragement of different schools of 
scientific enquiry. Even more than in Stalin's day they have stressed the need to 
create a closer link between science and industry and to promote the application 
to industry of the latest scientific and technological advances. Khrushchev 
himself has more than once said that much may be learnt from the capitalist 
countries, and scientists have been told that they must not neglect the scientific 
achievements in foreign countries because of the idealistic form in which, in 
capitalist society, positive contributions to scientific progress are often couched. ' 
The despatch went on to point out that the Presidium itself seemed to be taking an 
increasingly important role in the campaign. This role % vas further emphasised by the part 
played by leading figures in the "All-Union Conference of Workers in Industry" that was 
held in the Kremlin between the 16th and 19th of N lay 1955. In a despatch dated the 27th 
of May, Hayter commented that all available members of the Party Presidium and 
Secretariat had attended, with Buis anin triving the opening address and Khrushchev 
"winding" the proceedings up. Hayter concluded, 
Finally I have suggested that a motif running, through the conference was the 
lively consciousness of competition with the West. In the last few weeks many 
articles have quoted from Lenin to the effect that the decisive factor in economic 
competition between capitalist and socialist countries will be the relative success 
of each system in developing productivity per worker. Bulganin expressed 
confidence that in the economic competition between the two systems the 
Socialist system would win, but said that "in order to beat capitalism in economic 
competition, we must aim at better organisation of production and higher labour 
productivity". 4 
question of the practical application of science to the economy. " This was a theme to he developed 
on a `. rand scale by the 20th Party Con`_r: ss. 
3 FO 371 116709 NS 1103131,22nd April, 1955, the despatch made reference to a Presidium 
decision to hold a more wide ranging conference on 16th to 20th of May for all workers in industry 
on the application of now technology. This was the conference reported on in the despatch of the 
27th of May. 
4 FO 371 116709 NS 1103/31,27th May. 1955. Hayter began his despatch by commenting on the 
important organisational rctorms which the conlercnce introduced in control of the economy. 
Gosplan. the state economic planning, Kureau, ' a. to he Split into two,. One half forming a new 
Economic Commission. The responsihilitic" kor Ioon_- and short term planning were to he divided 
between these institutions. Also a State Coºmmiitýn for LIuc. ticros of Labour and wages was to be 
formed under the Chairmanship of Kaganovich. Hayter closed his report by assessing the 
importance of these structural changes. 
To sum up, I suggest that the industrial policies of the present Soviet leaders show little 
originality. The economic and technical measures which they are propa__ating are much the 
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Clearly the Soviet idea of "peaceful competition" was in the process of formulation 
long ere the 20th Party Congress have it the gloss of a ne' dolma. .,, 'or was the idea of 
the competition of domestic economies the only theoretical development whose gestation 
was traced by the Foreign Office at least from early 1955. An increase in Soviet interest 
in economic links with "under developed" countries was also remarked upon by the 
Embassy and Northern Department. Indeed as early as the 14th January a circular was 
sent around concerned embassies, under the name of no less a person than Sir Anthony 
Eden, asking for details of Soviet economic activity in their respective countries 
In a letter of March 25th Mr Slater of the Moscow Embassy commented that there 
had been a number of articles in the Soviet press in recent weeks on the theme of 
economic relations between the Soviet Union and "under-developed" nations. 6 He went 
on to say, 
The Soviet policy of economic penetration of under-developed countries for 
political ends is of course not a new one, but what is interesting is that this policy 
does not appear to have been affected by the change in priorities which we 
regard as mainly responsible for recent Soviet behaviour in the field of trade with 
the industrialised Vest. However, it remains to be seen whether words will be 
matched by deeds as far as the under-developed countries are concerned 
R. M. Russell of the Northern Department minuted on this letter on the 31 March that the 
Soviet offers of steel to Burma and of a power station to India, which were then current, 
were examples of what the future may well have held in prospect for Soviet economic 
diplomacy. Although the attitude evident in this commentary seems positively languid 
when compared to that taken over the Czech arms deal of the following September, these 
indications of how Soviet interests were developing were very definite straws in the wind. 
If the Northern Department could still afford to be languid in the March of 1955 the 
view of the Board of Trade expressed in a memo dated as late as June 6th was positively 
complacent. It set out to survey in detail the extent of Soviet interest in large scale 
construction projects in Asia and Africa and after a somewhat confused narrative came to 
the conclusion that at the time of its writing there seemed to be little to worry about. The 
Northern Department were themselves not particularly impressed. Mr. R. A. H. Hibbert 
minuted on the 15th of June as follows, 
same as those which they have advocated for many 'Cars... The organisational measures which 
have been adopted suggest political manoeuvrin`_ as much as economic need. I do not think, 
therefore, that any remarkable rise in industrial productivity in this country can be expected. 
Meanwhile there are signs that the relative economic stability of the Western world and our 
continuing technological progress are having a salutary effect on the Soviet leaders. 
5 FO 371 122094 N 1123/1, loth January, 1955. 
6 FO 371 116 716 NS 1123/1. Moscow. Embassy to Lord Jellicoe Northern Department, 25th %larch, 
1955. The minute by Russell, dated 31st March, is in the same envelope. Slater referred to the 
most important article in the then recent Soviet press as The Development or Economic Co- 
operation of the Countries of the Socialist Camp with Under-Developed Countnes" by A. 
Chistyakov in Questions o'1 Economics (No. I for 1955). The article underlined the %,, illin, ness of 
the Soviet Union to sign trade igreements '. ith under-developed countries. 
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I do not think this paper is very well done. After reading it I have no clear 
impression on the degree of Soviet competition which we are faciný,... I think the 
correct conclusion should be that the dangers of competition from the Soviet 
Union in the Overseas constructional market are at present small, perhaps even 
insignificant, but we may shortly witness a rapid growth of Soviet competition 
which would be aimed particularly at scooping the market in the under 
developed countries, and particularly in S. E. Asia. This threat could develop in 
the next few years and might become serious even in the short term. In the long 
term it would certainly be serious as it would mean that the Soviet Union was 
staking out the biggest claims in the market which held the biggest promise for 
the future.? 
The concern expressed by R. A. H. Hibbert was to be shared on a much wider scale 
by the end of 1955. Clearly although there was an awareness in Whitehall that the Soviet 
Union was interested in expanding its economic role in the neutral nations of Asia and 
Africa, that awareness was limited in its scope. However the dramatic events of the 
autumn and winter were to underline what the Soviets were trying to do in their economic 
diplomacy, that is to supplant Western influence. By the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary's visit to Washington in early 1956 concern had grown to a sufficient level for 
there to be very serious talk of a Soviet economic offensive. 8 From 1954 the British were 
dimly aware that the Soviet understanding of the Cold War was undergoing a profound 
change. This was gleaned by observers in Whitehall and the Moscow Embassy from the 
shifting emphasis in Soviet propaganda and official policy from early 1955. Yet it was a 
change that had nothing to do with a new identity of interest between East and West, save 
7 FO 371 116716 NS 1123/7. The Board of Trade Paper was entitled, "Soviet Competition in Bidding 
for Overseas Constructional Projects" and dated 6th June. It was not accredited to any particular 
individual, clearly being a statement of departmental policy which was sent on in due course to the 
Northern Department for their comment as the experts on Soviet policy. Hibbert went on to minute, 
As regards details, points which spring to my mind are that Burma was offered a small arms 
factory for which we and the Germans also bid (and the Burmese finally made no award) and a 
Soviet economic mission has recently visited Sudan and may be ýoing to tender for equipment 
for a dam there in which we are very much interested. I think too I have seen a report that the 
Russians have put out feelers as regards building bridges in Burma. There is no mention in the 
paper of South America and it may be that the Russians have not entered the South American 
construction market, but there has certainly been a fair amount of Russian propaganda about 
trade with South America and the B. O. T. ought to be sure that there is no fire behind the 
smoke. (para 3) As regards reference to technical assistance at the end of the B. O. T. minute, 
the point is I think that almost all countries have been reluctant to take up offers of Soviet 
technical experts, and the Russians themselves have not made it easy for anyone to find 
technical experts of the right quality. However a large Indian mission is at present in the 
Soviet Union inspecting Soviet training facilities and we may see a growing stream of trainees 
from under-developed : ountrie, `_oing to the Soviet Union for technical education and training. 
I doubt whether it is altogether safe to describe this as a long term political matter. The under 
developed countries are not rich in technically trained persons and if an important portion of 
their technical experts receive a year or t\ýos training in the Soviet Union, we may find that in 
two or three yyear's time that some of the countries begin to show a preference for Soviet 
equipment. 
3 FO 371 116716 NS 112-1112. Despatch from Moscow to Forei`m Office, 2nd December, 1955, and 
Northern Department minutin`º of the 30th December, 1955, being early uses of this military 
metaphor. 
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in the most general sense of the need to avoid thermonuclear war. It was a radical but in 
no sense a fundamental change. This at least was the British perception by the end of an 
eventful year in Anglo-Soviet relations. 
THE CZECH ARMS DEAL WITH EGYPT. 
Before going on to examine the impact of the Czechoslovak Government's agreement to 
supply arms to Egypt on the development of a new understanding of Soviet foreign policy 
in Britain, a little background might prove helpful. It would be quite wrong to suggest 
that considerations of Soviet power had no influence on British policy before the Czech 
arms deal was concluded. However the threats posed by the Soviet Union before and 
after that date seemed in Whitehall to be of quite different natures. Up until the Czech 
arms deal the Soviet Union was conceived as a potentially very serious military challenge 
to Western pre-eminence in the area, but this was in the specific context of war. Only in 
the event of actual hostilities was the Soviet Union considered to be dangerous. The 
Baghdad Pact was in its initial conception a military alliance to provide the same kind of 
protection against potential Soviet aggression as NATO did for Western Europe. It was 
in this sense that it was referred to by the Americans as the Northern Tier, a physical 
barrier against the incursion of the Red Army southward as NATO was westward. Sir 
Evelyn Shuckburc1h outlined one of the main principles of British policy on the Middle 
East, whilst he was the Foreign Office Under-Secretary for `fiddle Eastern affairs from 
May 1954 until June 1956, as follows, 
For the defence of the area and the oil against outside (author's italics) threat the 
idea was that our bilateral treaties with countries like Iraq and Jordan should be 
replaced by multilateral defence arrangements (Northern Tier, Baghdad Pact, 
etc. ) which would have a less "imperialistic" connotation for local opinion and 
which would spread the burden more evenly amongst allies. ` 
In the everyday political and economic relations between Britain and the Middle East if 
anyone it was the United States who was considered to be much the most serious threat 
to the British position. 10 The Czech arms deal with the Egyptian Government have 
Middle Eastern affairs, as much as the Cold War, a novel turn. The Soviets had entered 
into open rivalry for political and economic influence in an area that had hitherto been 
exclusive to Western and especially British influence. 
This new Soviet policy was a radical divergence from Stalin's which had viewed the 
world in a rigidly bipolar way. Working on the theory that if a country was not 
specifically for Communism than it must be against, there was no room for the 
9 Descent to Suez, p. 210. Shuckbur -h gives a brief resume of British policy in the Middle East in the 
miet-fifties up to the Suez Crisis on pp. 206-214. 
10 On the ins and outs of Anglo-American relations e er E, -, \ , pt up until 1956 see Peter L. Hahn, The 
United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956, " Strategv and Diplomacy in the Early Cold 
War, passim. 
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development of friendly relations with newly independent colonial countries eager to 
espouse the cause of "neutralism". The new regimes of post-imperial India and Egypt 
were little more than the lackeys that the departing British had put in power. However 
under Khrushchev that view was to change dramatically and it was the negotiation of the 
supply of arms to Egypt via Czechoslovakia which was the first bold success for this new 
foreign policy. One commentator describes it in the following terms. 
When Khrushchev leapfrogged over Turkey and Iran into the thick of politics, 
his political-military interest in non contiguous regions was something verv new 
in Russian and Soviet diplomacy. It signified the globalization of the Kremlin's 
outlook. Khrushchev exposed the weaknesses of the U. S. policy of containment 
in the Middle East and demonstrated to Arab (and other Third World) regimes 
who had little first-hand experience with the Soviet Union that \Ioscow was 
prepared to help those who opposed the west's efforts to retain a major influence 
in the region through its network of interlocking military alliances. 
Which brinks us to the British understanding of what the Soviet Union was trying to 
achieve in Egypt in September, 1955. 
Although negotiations between Nasser's government and the Soviet Union had been 
going on at least since the summer of 1955, it was not until late in September that the 
British learned of what was afoot. There seems though to be some confusion in the work 
of later day commentators as to when exactly the news broke in Britain. Keith Kyle 
maintains that 
On 21 September 1955, the foreign Office dot the first word ("from a delicate 
source") of an event that altered the Middle Eastern scene radically and was the 
first step leading to the Suez crisis. This was the Czechoslovak arms deal, which 
Colonel Nasser defiantly affirmed to be a Soviet arms deal in his Alexandria 
speech of 26 July 1956.12 
However Richard Lamb in his book on the Eden Government blandly states that "On the 
2 nd [September, 1955] the news of Nasser's arms deal burst around the world". l' Lamb 
does make the point that Nasser's sudden truculence with the British and : americans in 
negotiations over the "Alpha" proposals on the previous day was due to his conclusion of 
the secret arms deal with the Soviets ("Alpha" was the code-name for a tortuous Anglo- 
American proposal to bring peace between Israel and the Arab states by a complicated 
territorial compromise. Shuckburgh was the principal British fixer involved in the 
project). Shuckburgh's diary entry for the 21st September gives no hint of any indication 
of what Nasser had been about, rather concentrating on Herbert Morrison's muck-raking 
11 Alvin Rubenstein, . Woscmv's 
717ird World Strareýv, p. 24. In Chapter one Rubenstein talks of a 
"Khrushchevian watershed" in Soviet forei_n policy. However, he does tend to simplify the 
international situation circa 1955 in terns of a straiý, ht US/Soviet split. 
1' Keith Kyle, "Britain ind the Crisis, 1955-1956", in W. R. Ro, 2er and R. Owen (eds. ), Suez 1956, 
the Crisis crud rr. v Co, c. ýý 105. Kyle does not _; o on to illuminate quite what the "secret 
sources" he refers to in the above quote were. althou ,h they seem Jetinitelv to have been contacts of 
the American ambassador and not the British. 
13 The Failure of the Eden Government, p. 172. 
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in the debris of the Burgess and Maclean scandal. On the 22nd however he comments, 
"our calm deliberations about the next step in "Alpha" have been broken in upon by the 
news that Nasser is going to by arms from Russia. " 14 
The record of the PREI papers would seem to indicate that in fact the 22nd was the 
date. In a telegram from the U. K. deleý, ation at the U\ dated 22nd September Sir 
Pearson Dixon reported that, 
Mr. Dulles told me at luncheon today that he had had word from Byroade (the 
US Ambassador) in Cairo that the Egyptian-Russian arms deal had been 
concluded and would probably be announced within the next twenty-four hours. 
He was very worried at this development" 15 
This is the first indication in the PRE`[ file on the "Supply of Military Equipment to 
Egypt by the Soviet Union" of what the two countries had been contriving behind the 
backs of the West. However, this chronological problem possibly has more to do with the 
length of time it took for Ambassadorial telegrams to filter up to the higher reaches of the 
Civil Service and Westminster. For there is on file a telegram dated 21st September, 1955 
of Sir Humphrey Trevelyan's from Cairo indicating that his American counterpart, 
Byroade, had been informed by a secret, but reliable source that Nasser had clinched a 
deal with the Czechs. 16 Kyle does after all refer in the quote above specifically to the 
Foreign Office. And there can be no doubt that London was aware something regarding 
arms supply was being negotiated between the Egyptians and the Soviets well before a 
deal was confirmed. It would seem that both Kyle and Lamb are right about slightly 
different things. 
The first Ministerial comment was a minute of the 22nd from Macmillan to Eden, in 
which Macmillan noted that the Arms Deal was a very serious issue. On it Eden as was 
his wont, scribbled, "Yes, very grave". 17 Indeed the initial reaction on the part of the 
British government was very strong indeed. Harold : Macmillan expressed the following 
view on the .' 3rd September, for communication via the Washington Embassy to Dulles, 
The news of the proposed deal between Nasser and the Russian Government for 
the supply of munitions of the order sugggested is a serious blow to all our 
interests in the Middle East. I am sure the American Government will agree that 
this cannot be allowed to ýo on. ls 
14 Descent to Suez. p. 27S. 
15 PRE I 11/1291, Sir P. Dixon from the UK. Delegation at the United Nations, New York to 
London, 22nd September, 1955. 
16 FO 371 1 136' 3 JE 1194 1-40, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Cairo to F. O., ' Ist September, 1955. 
There is further detail on this in Kyle's recent book, Sue, -, p. 74. The Americans seem to have had a 
rather better information network set up in perhaps because there was more respect 
remaining for them among members of Nasser's vºovemment than there was for the British. See 
FRUS 1955-57. Vol. XIV. pp. -IS 1,483-S4 and 492-93. 
17 PRENI 11/1=91, Minute for Prime Minister from the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, 22nd 
September, 1955. 
18 PRENI 11/1291. F. O. to Washington Embassy. from Macmillan for Duliks, September 23,1955. 
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The views minuted in the Foreign Office were more particular as to the threat that the 
Soviet move posed for the British position in the Middle East. In a minute of the 23rd of 
September to Macmillan Shuckburgh made the following terse estimation of the 
ramifications for British policy of the Soviets' move, 
We are faced with the disagreeable truth that we must somehow keep Egypt on 
our side even to the extent of paying a very high price which may well include 
having to abandon Israel. It has long been evident that we were retaining our 
position and interest in the Middle East only because the Russians were not 
interfering. Once they start bidding for Arab support as they are now doing we 
are compelled either to outbid them or to lose the main source of power on 
which our economy now depends. I) 
Shuckburgh's fright seems to have taken him to the extent of considering dropping 
support for Israel completely in the prosecution of Britain's policy in response to the 
Soviet move. Sir Harold Caccia's note on the above minute was rather more restrained in 
its summing up of Britain's position in the liuht of this development. Although Soviet 
competition would have to be dealt with vigorously, he wondered if before giving up 
Israel completely the British might not have to Let rid of Nasser, "Especially if he 
becomes publicly committed to the (arms) contract". An opinion that sounds an ironically 
percipient note in the light of what was to happen shortly thereafter. 200 The gut reaction 
of the British underlines the novelty of the situation that they faced. The Soviets were on 
no accounts to be left to pull of their coup and enter for the first time into the Middle East 
as an active political player. Shuckburgh in particular seems to have been keenly aware 
that Britain's position, hardly strong without Soviet competition, was now little short of 
parlous. 
However the initial reaction was softened in a surprisingly short space of time as it 
became clear that the Arms Deal would have to be accepted as a fact of life. 21 There was 
indeed very little that the British could have done to force the Egyptians to change their 
minds. 
Immediately after the British became aware of what was afoot there followed the 
process of clarification. The Ambassador in Cairo, Humphrey Trevelyan, attempted to 
fain from the Egyptians confirmation that the deal had actually done through and specific 
19 FO 371 113674, Shuckburgh to Macmillan 23rd September 1955, quoted in Kyle op. cit. p. 106. In 
his diary entry for 22nd September Shuckhurgh put the same analysis in more dramatic language. 
"The folly and fragility of our Palestine policy is beginning to come home to roost at last. As long 
as the Russians played no role in the ME we were just able to run with the hare and hunt with the 
hounds. But now they are ohviously beginning to make a hid for Arab support". Descent to Suez, 
pp. 278-279. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. Kyle puts it rather effectively as follows, 
What is intriguing is to follow the traces of Britain', line towards Nasser's Egypt through the 
next few months. It started with Harold Macmillan's instinctive reaction to the arms deal- 
"This cannot he allowed to go on"-changed to "I do not wish to reproach Nasser unduly" in a 
cable to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan. the ne British Ambassador in Cairo. 
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details as to what the Soviets were offering. In a telegram to London of the 26th 
September Trevelyan reported a conversation vv ith the Commander in Chief of the 
Egyptian army, with whom he had dined the previous night. The Commander had 
confirmed that the deal had been concluded and justified it by reference to the Egyptians 
need for arms in the face of the threat from Israel, arms which they seemed able to get 
only from the Soviets. It was emphasised that the Arms Deal had been undertaken not 
out of choice, but out of necessity. The Egyptian army, it transpired, wished to continue 
with British training, the Soviet connection was purely for the supply of essential 
equipment. In a following telegram Trevelvan made clear that the Commander's 
confessions were not literal but implicit in what he had said. Trevelyan came to the 
conclusion that the British Government would have to assume the American reports that 
the Arms deal had been sealed to be reliable. 2 An opinion which gives an interesting 
oblique hint at the origin of Britain's information. 
Trevelyan took a relatively tolerant view of the Egyptian move, a tolerance of 
Egyptian foibles which was not, sadly, to be shared in Downing, Street over the coming 
year. He summarised the motives behind it as follows, 
In the last six months the Israelis have demonstrated their military strength and 
their readiness to use it. Nasser has told me that his policy and thinking has been 
dominated since February by his fear of Israeli intentions, which has increased as 
a result of the Israeli elections and expansionist speeches made during the 
campaign by Ben Gurion and Beigin. His major preoccupation had become the 
strenýtheniný of the Egyptian forces to meet the Israeli threat. 2, 
The Egyptians could hardly be blamed if, despite their best efforts to find a western 
alternative, the only willing supplier of the needed arms had been the Soviet Union. The 
Ambassador pointed out that it seemed that the Soviets had "offered him (Nasser) arms in 
the spring when resentment at the Turco-Iraqi pact was at its height and the impact of 
neutralist influences at Bandoeng fresh. " Yet it was not until after intensified efforts to 
gain arms from the West had failed that Nasser had been forced back onto the Soviet 
offer. The British policy of trying to maintain a balance between the Israeli and Arab 
sides in the Middle East had apparently afforded the Soviets their opportunity to move 
into the area as a political force, hence Shuckburgh's agonised comments on the need to 
drop the Israelis altogether. 24 Trevelyan saw no reason to doubt that Nasser only turned 
to the Soviets in desperation, what had happened was not part of a fundamental change in 
the policy and alignment of his regime. Nasser's Egypt remained basically anti- 
Communist. The Ambassador advised against the taking of any harsh retaliatory action 
22 PREM 11/ 1291, Telegrams No. 1319 and No. 1320, from the British Embassy Cairo to the F. 
26th September. 1955. 
23 PREN1 11/1291, Telegram No. 1325 from the British Emhas.. Cairo to the F. O., 26th September. 
1955. 
ý4 See Suez. pp. 7-76 for an examination of . An`lo-Eý, \ rtian relations in the lead up to the Czech Arms 
Deal. 
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counselling that they should at least wait and see how bid, the arms deal was actually to 
be. 25 
Macmillan's reply of the 26th September to the above series of telegrams was, 
however, still rather tart in tone. He telexrammed back to Cairo as follows, 
I can understand Nasser's motives in turning to the Russians for arms though as 
you know he exaggerates in saying that he has obtained "nothing" from us. I do 
not wish to reproach him unduly but rather to bring home to him that he has 
underestimated the risks for himself and for Egypt in such a course. With the 
best will in the world we cannot regard this action as anything but a grave dander 
to Egypt's relations with the West. It is not at all consistent with the spirit of the 
Anýlo/Eýyptian treaty on Suez. Nasser himself has frequently made the point, 
when discussing Middle East defence, that by this treaty and the mention of 
Turkey in the reactivation clause, he in effect entered into a defence relationship 
with the West. 
Macmillan went on to rail against the absurdity, in the light of the 1954 Anýlo-Egyptian 
agreement, of having Soviet aircraft on Egyptian airfields. Furthermore, Macmillan 
complained, Nasser was hardly being frank over details and his assertion that there had 
been no agreement with the Soviets over technicians, did not impress at all. Macmillan 
considered it an "equivocal statement". The presence of Soviet technicians in Egypt 
would, he went on, be "quite incompatible with the base agreement". 26 
He suggested that the real answer to Nasser's anxieties over Israeli defence 
expenditure was to work for a general settlement for the Arab/Israeli dispute, to which 
end, he added, the British Government intended "to make a further serious effort" to jet 
talks between the Egyptians and Israelis going. Not only was a satisfactory solution to 
the areas problems at stake, but also British and American aid in the development of the 
Egyptian economy. Macmillan concluded as follows, "it would be folly to throw away 
these prospects for the sake of an obviously baited arms offer from the Russians". 
However the most dramatic action which Macmillan took was a direct approach to 
Molotov, who was also attending the United Nations at New York. Shuckburjh, who 
had accompanied Macmillan to New York in his capacity as the Foreign Office chief for 
Middle East affairs, records in his diary of the 26th September that "H. M. seems keen on 
taking it up with Molotov. " Dulles and Macmillan met that evening and according to 
Shuckburah, who was present, 
25 PREM 11/1291. Telegram No. 1327 from the British Embassy Cairo to the F. 0., 26th September, 
1955. 
26 PREM 11/1291, Telegram No. 846 UK. Delet! ation to the UN, New York to the F. 0. Addressed 
to Cairo telegram No. 88 of September 27th. Macmillan's complaint continued and in referring to 
the effect that the deal would have on domestic politics made the following concise summation of 
the effect of the deal. "British public opinion will he astonished to learn that before we have even 
completed our withdrawal from Suez under the agreement which was designed to establish new 
relations of co-operation and friendship with Egypt. the Russians are moving in. " He went on to 
warn that Nasser should also take into account Israeli opinion and the destahilising effect the deal 
would have on the situation in the Middle East in __eneral. Macmillan cautioned of the dangers of 
an arms race from which no one. least cat all Egypt. would benefit. 
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[G]ot more and more worked up against the prospects of a Soviet arms deal 
with Egypt as they warmed to the subject. The thought of Soviet technicians 
sitting on the airfield we built, and to which ke have to return in case of an 
emeruency under the Treaty, was too much for RM., and Dulles could not bear 
the Egyptian ingratitude for all the money US has spent on her. So they decided 
to ýo for %, Iolotov... 27 
This Macmillan did "after dinner" on the 28th September when he attempted to 
lecture Molotov on the intricacies of the balance of power in the `fiddle East. However, 
in the words of the Macmillan's own record, Molotov, phlegmatic as ever, 
[R]eplied that, although Mr. Dulles had spoken to him on this subject already, he 
was perhaps insufficiently briefed. At the time when he had left Moscow he 
knew that "not one rifle and not one bullet" had been sold to Egypt. He knew, 
however, that certain requests had been made to Soviet representatives. 28 
Molotov then turned to an exchange of information between East and West on their 
respective supplies of arms to the Middle East. Macmillan records that he "naturally 
fluffed the answer to this question. "29 
This suggestion was clearly not received too seriously by Macmillan. Eden, on the 
other hand, seems to have been quite taken by the concept, novel though it was. In his 
reply to Macmillan of the 28th September he suggested that it might not be such a bad 
idea after all, particularly if the alternative was an arms race in the Middle East. 'O He 
expressed the hope that Macmillan, Dulles and Pinay would agree to take Molotov at his 
word. Indeed this belief, that in the rational exchange of views solutions were to be found 
for most international problems, seems to have been something of a leitmotif in Eden's 
diplomacy. ' 1 However, it was not an opinion that was widely shared either in the Foreign 
Office or by Macmillan's American and French colleagues. ''- 
27 Descent to Suez, pp. ? 80-281. 
3 Or perhaps, ý, iven his declining authority, Molotov was hein, -, 
honest 
29 PREM 11/12291, Telegram No. 848, from UK. DeleLation UN to F. 0., 28th September, 1955. 
30 PRENI 11/1291, Tele`_ram No. 1304, London to UK. Delegation UN. to Secretary of State from 
Prime Minister. ^Sth September. 1955. 
31 See Full Circle, p. 9 for Eden's own outline of his rational on re-entering the UN in 195 1 as the 
new Foreign Secretary. In this he tended to look at international problems from the other end of the 
telescope to Churchill, whose summits were conceived with consciously vague agendas. The idea 
being that out of discussions on the broad sweep a more detailed settlement could be worked out. 
Eden on the other hand took matters from the small up to the general. In this his sugvested 
approach to Bulganin over the Czech Deal was typical. Shuckburgh's comments on "shades of W. S. 
C. " below were in consequence possibly a little unfair. 
322 Shuckhurgh made the following comment in his diary on 28th September on Eden's telegram, 
I had been worrvin_t a little as to whether London would think we have made a mistake in 
approaching Molotov . heut Egypt (though' actually Dulles did it first, on his own, and there 
was really no option for us) \. ýhen a telegram arrived from the P%l ur-ging us on in the most 
explicit terms - in tact even suggesting that we should agree to tour-power consultations on 
Middle East matters, and the he (A. E. ) should if necessary telegraph to Bul`_anin. Shades of 
W. S. C.! H. \l. was verv much surprised at this, and said that it was the same illusion that 
Winston had. that there is a sort of : 1uh of men at the Summit. There is no such thing as 
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Macmillan's reply of the same day was noncommittal. Deferring first of all to the 
need for consultation with the Americans and then the French, he went on to point out the 
danger of bringing in the "Russians on too wide a front". Although he did think it might 
have been possible to narrow the consultations down specifically to the Palestine 
problem. 33 
Eden answered on the 29th September that he quite understood that the Russians 
were not wanted in on all Middle Eastern affairs. However over the arms deal he seems 
to have been quite convinced of the benefits of some kind of mutual discussion. Enclosed 
with the telegram was a draft of a letter for Bulcranin pointing out the nature of the 
Western policy of arms control in the Middle East. )ý In consequence of Eden's prodding 
Shuckbur; h was despatched to Washington for consultations on this issue with Dulles on 
the 29th. 35 Macmillan followed him there on the 1st October. 
Shuckburýh found the State Department "much concerned" about the problems 
attendant on any such invitation to Niolotov. Although they were not entirely negative, 
they were "anxious" to find means of keeping, discussion limited to the arms deal. '6 
Meanwhile Macmillan was enýaýiný in further after dinner "footsie" in the company of the 
Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs himself. After asking for clarification as to quite 
exactly what "exchange of information" meant, Macmillan was entertained to a rather 
vague and inconclusive conversation. At the end of which Molotov, with engaýiný 
candour, added that he had not yet received any further information from his own 
Government. '? Clearly Macmillan was not ýettiný far in his attempt to reason with the 
Soviets directly. 
Bulganin in that sense. " He can also see that A. E. is anxious to make peace all over the place, 
without much regard for the consequences. " 
Shuekburgh then suggested that the best way around Eden would be to push matters towards the 
UN, already involved in Palestine, and so try to limit any discussion merely to the Palestine 
problem. Descent to Suez, p. 282. 
33 PREM 11/1291, Telegram No. 865, UK. Delegation UN to F. 0., to Prime Minister from 
Secretary of State, 28th September, 1955. 
34 PREN1 11/1291, Telegram No. 1327, London to UK. Delegation UN, to Secretary of State from 
Prime Minister, 29th September, 1955. 
35 For the comments that Shuckhurý; h committed to his diary see Descent to Suez, pp. '283-284. He 
seems to have reluctantly conceded that "since we almost certainly can't stop Cairo, there is no 
alternative to trying Molotov. " But he strongly emphasised the need to keep discussions limited 
specifically to Palestine by dealing with it through the Security Council. On p. 284 follows a more 
acid commentary on the Eden approach as "even more ridiculous than that of approaching 
Eisenhower over Dulles". and how closely Eden seemed, in a "perverted way", to be modelling 
himself on Churchill. Perhaps, though, Eden's appeal to Buk-, anin displayed a more astute 
perception of were power really lay in the Soviet leadership and in the development of Soviet policy 
towards Egypt. 
36 PREMt 11/1291. Telegram No. 2323, Washington Embassy, Shuckhur<_h to 1-'K. delegation UN, 
29th September, 1955. 
37 PRENI 11/1291, Telegram No. 881, UK. Delegation to UN to F. 0., from Secretary of State, 29th 
September. 1955. Either Molotov was ling quite brazenly, or. perhaps more probably, this is a 
striking indication of how tenuous his hold over the formulation of Soviet foreign policy was 
becoming. 
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The general Foreign Office view at this point still seems to have been that the deal 
should be stopped at all costs. In a Telegram to Macmillan of the 30th September Sir 
Harold Caccia put forward what might be termed an intermediate position. The first aim 
was to stop the deal and the second to demonstrate to the Egyptians that "the policy of 
concluding, such deals behind our backs does not pay", almost like chastising an errant 
school boy. This was to be done by an extra round of goodies for pro-Western states, 
particularly Iraq, and American adherence to the Baghdad Pact. However Caccia, and the 
collective view of the Foreign Office, was on the whole against punitive sanctions, 
Our dislike at this early stake of a policy of "squeezing Egypt" is that it might 
help to make a national martyr of Nasser in Egypt and gain rather then lose him 
support elsewhere. It may be that later we should consider holding up sterling 
balance releases or getting the Americans to make it clear that there would be no 
money for the High Aswan Dani or other projects. But we are extremely 
doubtful whether that would be wise policy at this stage. 'S 
Caccia concluded that they "were no more enthusiastic than the Americans about taking 
the Russian deal to the Security Council" Strangely, Eden minuted on this telegram "I 
strongly agree with it all" 
On the 30th Eden, harried the hapless Macmillan with a further telegram. Quite 
obviously the adverse reaction which his idea had produced had forced a certain 
tempering of tone. Now he wanted merely to "warn them (the Soviets) of the frass", in 
the process of which reference could be made to Anglo-American policy on arms 
control. '` Dulles however remained unimpressed with the British suggestion. 40 
On the Ist October Trevelyan sent a report to London which further clarified the 
situation in Egypt. After a meeting with Nasser himself, Trevelyan had been unable to 
persuade the Egyptian Government to change its mind and reject the Soviet offer. Nasser 
it seemed was adamant that he had no alternative liven the position of Israel. Moreover, 
"he said that he must tell me frankly that it would be impossible to abandon the deal. If he 
41 did, there would be a revolution in the army the next day". 
38 PREM 11/1291, Telegram No. 1349, From F. 0. to New York, for Secretary of State from Sir H. 
Caccia, 30th September, 1955. 
39 PREM 11/1291, Telegram No. 1340, F. 0. to New York, for Secretary of State from Prime 
Minister, 30th September, 1955. The telegram was sent off in reaction to Macmillan's initial 
suggestion that he should first sound out Dulles. This Eden thought "An excellent plan... ". 
40 PREM 11/1219, Telegram No. 2339, Washington Embassy to UK Delegation UN, to Secretary of 
State from Shuckhur, h, 30th September, 1955. Shuckburgh reported that Dulles considered it 
would `_ive the Soviets too great an opportunity to widen out the discussion onto other Middle 
Eastern matters. 
41 PREM1 11/1219, Telegram No. 1361. from Cairo to F. 0., Ist October, 1955. This was also sent 
to the Embassies in Washington and Moscow as well as the UK delegation, New York. In telegram 
No. 1360 of the same date, Trevelyan outlined the beginning of his conversation with Nasser. He 
also reported that it har! been revealed that morning in an .a rah News Agency interview with Nasser 
that the arms were actually to come from Czechoslovakia. Trevelvan thought this made no 
difference to the situation. Nasser confined his comments on specitic details merely to confirmation 
of where exactly the arms were to come from. 
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Trevelyan himself \. as of the opinion that, although Nasser probably exaggerated the 
weakness of his position, nevertheless, 
On reflection, I can see no hopeful course for the moment other than to press 
here and in Israel for a Palestine settlement without insisting on a prior 
abandonment of Egypt's arms deal. I doubt whether we can stop the deal in 
present circumstances unless we buy the Egyptians off with a more attractive 
offer or buy Molotov off at probably a stiff price. 42 
These reports seemed to persuade Eden and Macmillan that there was no point in 
taking further measures with the Egyptian Government to try to stop the deal. On 
October 3rd Macmillan reported the state of play in America to be as follows. 
In the light of the reports of our Ambassador from Cairo we do not believe it 
possible to force Nasser to call of the deal altogether by threats of retaliatory 
measures. I had, of course, specially in mind Trevelyan's warnings on this point 
to which you called my attention. So we shall have to live with it, even if we can 
limit it. Our interest, therefore, is not to represent it as a great diplomatic defeat 
but rather to try to minimise it and concentrate on increasing our benefits, moral 
and material to the other Arab States. the Americans accept this general policy 
and will follow it as far as they are able. ' 4 
Interestingly, this seems to indicate that Eden came round more quickly than Macmillan to 
an acceptance of the deal as fait accompli. 
Macmillan and Dulles met on the 3rd October and more or less finally set the Anglo- 
American attitude. 44 Both tended to take a relatively beniun view of the motives behind 
Nasser's move. Dulles made the quite acute comment that Egypt seemed to be acting in 
the manner of Tito in trying to get the best ti-onm both sides in the Cold War. He 
considered that the Soviet$' arms deal would only become critically important if it were to 
lead to an extension of their role in the Middle East generally. 
Macmillan's line was though subtly different. He emphasised that from the reports of 
British and American Ambassadors in Cairo, it seemed that Nasser had felt there to be no 
alternative to the deal. Nasser "was a bit shaken by the reaction of the West" and did not 
want to "quarrel with the western powers". He was, according to this line of argument, 
forced into the hands of the Soviets against his better judgement and regretted it. 
Although accepting, that the deal could not now be stopped Macmillan thought they 
should still try to force Nasser to give them details of exactly what was involved in the 
deal, and get an undertaking that he would not allow Soviet technicians into Egypt. This 
4" PRENI 11/1219. Tele__ram No. 1365, From Cairo to F. 0.. 2nd October, 1955. Trevelvan and the 
American representative in Cairo. \1r. Allen, had i : cries of conversations with Nasser from which 
Trevelyan c nie to the conclusion . looted above. 
43 PREM 11/12-19, Telegram No. 2362, From \Vashin , ton to London, for Prime Minister from 
Secretary of State. 3rd October, 1955. 
-14 PREM 11/1-291. 
Record of a Meeting' Between Mr. Dulles- and the Secretary of State, Held at the 
State Department Washington on 3rd October, 1955. 
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was as deep as Macmillan's analysis seems to have gone. It was Dulles who made the 
following very acute summary of what the Soviets \. %-ere now about, 
These events flowed from the Geneva Conference and from all that was implied 
in the relaxation of tension between the Soviet Government and the Western 
Powers. There had been a complete chanue in Soviet policy in that instead of 
treating everyone who was not on their side as an enemy they were now seeking 
to flatter and penetrate more independent States. This %ý as likely to be most 
dangerous for the Western position, and incidents such as the Czechoslovak- 
Egyptian arms deal were likely to happen in all sorts of countries. 45 
The discussion ended with agreement that conversations with the Soviets on the Middle 
East were not a good idea, both because of the possibility of ýiving away too much on 
Western policy and of Soviet devilment. And indeed on this issue that is very much were 
it was left to lie. To the "amazement" of Macmillan and Shuckburyh, Eden sent off a 
message to Bulganin on his own initiative on the 4th October, after it received Cabinet 
approval on the same day. However it was a message that the Foreign Office had 
succeeded in emasculating by excising the invitation to discussions between the two 
sides. 46 
Macmillan did not take Dulles' analysis of the change in the Cold War particularly to 
heart. When he addressed the Cabinet on the issue of the arms deal on the 4th October he 
merely stated that, 
The implications of these developments were serious. It seemed likely that, with 
the situation in the Far East stabilised and a situation of stalemate in Europe, the 
Russians were turning their attention to the Middle East. 47 
Macmillan expanded on this idea in the Cabinet of the ? 0th October saving, "[I]n the 
Middle East the Russians had clearly embarked on a deliberate policy of opening another 
front in the cold war". 48 
Nor was Macmillan to limit his point of view merely to the ears of the Cabinet. On 
17th December, 1955, he broadcasted a chatty resume of the state of foreign affairs on 
the B. B. C. Home Service. He explained why the Government had not been willing to 
accede to Soviet requests for the disbanding of NATO and the banning of nuclear 
weapons at the Geneva Summit. Then he described the stalemate that had descended on 
45 Shuckhurgºh has some interesting comment in his diary entry of 3rd October on this meeting, which 
he attended, 
Dulles treated us to a very interesting, philosophical statement about methods of handlin`, the 
Soviet "new policy". He said that if we consider ourselves entitled to goo visiting Moscow, 
talking to the Russians, dealing between East and how can wC complain about small 
countries like Egypt doing the same. " 
This hardly -seems to be the narrow minded, bigoted Dulles of popular le__end. The inverted 
commas around "new policy" are also interesting,. Descent to Siren, p. 'S 
46 CAB 1 , S, CN1(55), 34th Conclusion. Minute 8,4th October. 1955. Also Descent to Sue-,, p. ? 86. 
4; ibid. 
48 CAB 1_3, C\1(55), 36th Conclusions Minute 1.20th October. 1955. 
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Europe after the failure of the Foreign Minister's Conference that October. As at the 
same time the situation in the Far East had calmed down, the Soviets were now turning 
their attentions to pastures new, 
[T]he Russians have opened up, as you have seen, a new front in the `'fiddle 
East. They looked about there and found that in that part of the world they 
could do great damage to ourselves and our friends. Why is this'? Partly because 
the Middle East is one of the great stores of oil which is now being developed 
increasingly year by year... So obviously, if the Russians can het some control of 
the Middle East or at least throw it into turmoil, they can cause discontent and 
perhaps revolution among the peoples there and deal a serious blow to the 
economy and standard of living of the West. 49 
Macmillan ended with a stirring call to the British people to resist the Soviets in their 
"turning to Asia", in the same manner as they had resisted them in Western Europe. 
However, this is surely a little too facile. M'lacmillan's analysis viewed the change in 
the Soviets foreign policy as little more than a matter of tactics. Denied opportunity in 
the old battle grounds they were simply in the process of turning to new areas where there 
were opportunities. Yet the change was surely of a profounder nature than that, beyond 
merely the implementation of policy or the opening of a "new front". As Dulles had 
pointed out, in his meeting with the British on the 3rd October referred to above, there 
was a radical alteration going on in the fund, -os )sof policy, a view that by the end of the 
1955 had much currency in the Northern Department. - This was a concept which British 
politicians do not seem quite to have grasped at this point. Eden's comments at the 
Cabinets of the 4th and 20th October did nothing to expand on or detract from his 
Foreign Minister's view. Indeed his most striking idea on the 4th was on the question of 
Britain's role in the world in general. After concentrating on the effects of the Soviet's 
move specific to the British position in the Middle East, he went on to assert, in the words 
of the Cabinet minute taker, 
Our interests in the Middle East were greater than those of the United States 
because of our dependence on Middle East oil, and our experience in the area 
was greater than theirs. We should not therefore allow ourselves to be restricted 
overmuch by reluctance to act without fill American concurrence and support. 5° 
Evidence that Eden conceived of Britain's world role in singularly independent terms. 
THE ASWAN DAM RIPOSTE 
It is clear that Eden and Macmillan were rattled by what the Soviet Union had achieved in 
concluding its deal via the Czechs with the Egyptian Government. The extremity of the 
initial reaction can be explained by reference to shock as much as am-thing else. The 
49 A copy of this address is to be found in the Northern Department tiles at FO 371 116695 NS 
10520/40. 
50 CAB 128. CM(55). 36th Conclusions Minute 1,20th October . 1955. 
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Soviets had in A. Rubenstein's words "leapfro ged" over the painstaking defence 
structure the British had been developing through the Baghdad Pact. Yet, although they 
were impressed by the novelty of Soviet Foreign Policy in September 1955, they were not 
yet quite aware of what the significance of that novelty was. It was Dulles whose 
judgement proved more perceptive in this matter. The Cold War changed in 1955 and the 
Czech Arms deal was as important a part of that change as the Geneva Conference which 
preceded it. 51 British policy in the Middle East, and the rest of the "under developed" 
world, could no longer be conceived in the way it had been. The Soviet Union had 
entered the contest for political favour and influence in areas previously denied it. 
Although it was to take a little more time for the exact formulation to work its way up 
through the Foreign Office, in practice British policy quickly had to accommodate itself to 
a new situation. The attitude that the British Government took to the financing of the 
Aswan Dam was the first clear example of this. 5-' 
It soon became apparent that the Soviets were not to be content to let the matter rest 
at the supply of armaments. On the 10th October the Soviet intention to offer finance for 
the Aswan Dam, amongst other projects, was made public in Cairo. 5' On the 14th 
October Trevelyan made the following estimation of the E<7vptian attitude to the Soviet 
offer, 
If the Russians make offers which will ostensibly enable Egypt to accelerate her 
development projects, the Egyptians will find them very attractive. The 
Egyptians may want to show their political independence by accepting some 
Russian offers, but they may also want to show the West that they have not 
fallen completely into the Communist lap. 4 
Shuckburuh in his diary entry for the 17th October looked back on a "desperately busy 
week" and concluded that his "main objective now is to prevent Egypt taking economic 
aid from USSR - e. g. for the High Aswan Dam ,. 
55 It was directly in terms of 
competition with the Soviet Union that the British Government now set about canvassing 
support for a Western counter bid. 
51 Most studies of Soviet policy toward the Third World take the Czech arms deal as their starting 
point e. `_. A. Rubenstein op. cit. or F. Fukuvama and A. Korbonski (eds. ). The Soviet Union and 
the Third World, the Last Three Decades. It was effectively the first salvo in the "new cold" war 
that Dulles referred to in his discussion with Macmillan above. 
5? Diane Kunz in The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, pp. 48-57, set,, the Anglo-American bid 
to finance the Dam in the context of a new "economic diplomacy". 
53 R. Lamb, op. Cit., p. 173. Lamb makes reference to a Foreign Office paper at FO 371 11806, in 
which it was stated that "there was a serious danger that the Xl iddle East "will slip away from us... 
the Egyptians, the Saudi Arabians, and now the Russians are making great efforts to undermine our 
position and spending large ,, ums of money"". It \V pointed out that the Middle East was not only 
vital as a source of oil, but it also provided Britain with some E600 millions in earnings on assets 
held in the area, which agent I considerable to payiný_ for Britain's energy requirements. 
Eden's approach to the Middle East when talkin_, with the Soviet leaders whilst they were in London 
during April. 1956. informed by such considerations. see Chapter S. 
54 PREý, t 11/1282. Telegram No. 14-12, Cairo to F. O., 1-4th October. 1955. 
i nvice', r, r t, ) . 
Cuv- n -'U0 
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At the Cabinet meeting, of ? 0th October the Chancellor of the Exchequer raised the 
issue of the need to gain American support for the financing of the Western offer. '' It 
was pointed out that at least half of the necessary money would have to come from the 
United States as Egypt could certainly not afford the £33-£-46 million the Dam was 
estimated to cost. This information, along with the rational that underlay British policy, 
that is the forestalling of the Soviets, was relayed to the Washington Embassy on the same 
day. 57 In the following negotiations with the Americans it transpired that they tended to 
view the situation in a less dramatic light. At the Cabinet meeting on the ? 5th October it 
was even suggested by Eden that Britain might try to put forward a package without 
American support, such was the importance he attached to it. The Cabinet `linutes record 
his opinion as follows, 
The Prime Minister said that this contract, if it could be secured for the 
consortium, would provide the most effective counterpoise possible to Russian 
penetration in Egypt for it would give us a controlling influence over the Nile 
waters... But it would be essential to act quickly if we were to avoid the risk of 
the contract slipping through our hands. -ýx 
American reluctance inight be stepped around by approaching private American 
construction firms individually, or by going alone into the deal with the Europeans. 
Although the finance ministers at the meeting were rather less enthusiastic about this idea 
than Eden, nonetheless it is a striking indication of how seriously the Government, and 
Eden in particular, took the threat of Soviet economic diplomacy in Egypt. 59 
It was not until the 17th December that the Western offer was finalised by the World 
Bank and the United States and that was only after further agonisino, flutters that Nasser 
was leaning towards the Soviets after all. 60 In the aftermath of an eruption of 
nervousness on the 27th November Trevelyan telegrammed to London that Nasser, "has 
not vet made up his mind to get the darn financed from the Communists", and that though 
he had authorised tentative negotiations with the Soviets he still would prefer to accept a 
Western offer. 61 However, ultimately it was the British and Americans who were to balk 
at carrying the project through despite painstaking negotiations up to the Summer of 
1956. But this an issue to which we shall return later. 
56 CAB 12S, CM1(55), 36th Conclusion, Minute I. 20th October. 1955. 
57 PREM I1/12S2. Tele_., ram No. 4831, F. O. to Washington, ? 0th October, 1966. 
58 CAB 128, CVl(55), 37th Conclusions Minute 3,25th October, 1955. 
59 The President of the Board of Trade, Peter Thornycrott, and the Chancellor, R. A. B. Butler. 
60 For detail on the discussions see he Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, pp. 52-55. 
61 PREM1 11/1282, Telegram No. 1815, Cairo to F. O. Shuckhurgh put the panic rather luridly in his 
diary. 
Thera is a terrific scare that the Egyptians are going to give the Aswan Dam Project to the 
Russians. It begins to look as if Nasser is even more unreliable than he seemed, and may even 
he consciously I 
handin, 
_ 
over his country to Communism. But I do not quite believe that. I 
think he thinks himself supremely clever, and i: playing East off against West to the last 
moment. 
f, ceei, t to Sue7_ n i(>> 
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**x 
In September, 1955, the British Government faced a radical new departure in Soviet 
foreign policy. Although it was not yet fully apparent to many in London, not least 
Macmillan and Eden, quite how profound this development was, Whitehall was 
sufficiently exercised by the Soviet diplomacy to undertake an expensive and uncertain 
counter attack in the shape of the Aswan Darm proposal For the first time London felt it 
had to take account of an intrusion of Soviet political influence into an area of traditional 
British pre-eminence. This was an intrusion which was to develop far outwith the 
confines of the Middle East even as 1955 came to an end. With the Bul(yanin and 
Khrushchev tour of India and Burma British observers of the Soviet Union began to see a 
very clear pattern emerging. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Soviet Economic Diplomacy in the "Under-developed World" 
Bulganin and Khrushchev go to Asia 
"The moment of decision is upon us in a big way on world economic policy. So long 
as the Soviets had a monopoly on covert subversion and threats of military aggression, 
and we had a monopoly on Santa Claus, some kind of seesaw game could be played. 
But now the Soviets are muscling in on Santa Claus as well, which puts us in a terribly 
dangerous position". 
C. D. Jackson 
The Czech-Egyptian arms deal was not to be the only new adventure in Soviet foreign 
policy during 1955. In late November and early December, 1955 Bulganin and 
Khrushchev went on an extended propaganda drive around India and South East Asia, 
spreading economic blandishments and anti-Western vitriol wherever they went. 
Before going on to examine the effect which this had upon the British understanding of 
Soviet foreign policy, there follows a precis of the itinerv. 
The tour provided the Soviet leaders with an opportunity to pay back the visits 
which Nehru and U Nu, the Premier of Burma, had made to Moscow earlier in 1955. 
Khrushchev and Bulganin caused the greatest publicity splash whilst in India from 18th 
November to Ist December, being given a tumultuous welcome by the Indian people. 
From the Ist December to the 7th they moved on to Burma where their rhetoric 
seemed less effective on a popular level, but their economic assistance was more 
warmly received by the Burmese Government. As a coda the Soviets went to 
Afghanistan where their contact with the public was severely circumscribed by the 
antediluvian Afghan Government. The Afghan leader's logic did not go so far, 
however, as to temper their enthusiasm for Soviet economic aid. All in all it was 
judged in Moscow to have been a considerable success. 1 
It was less successful in maintaining the Geneva Spirit, already considerably 
reduced by the beginning of the tour. The British, as the former colonial power, felt 
targeted by the comments which Khrushchev and Bulganin had felt it appropriate to 
make. Khrushchev in particular had said some things which were not to be forgotten 
easily in London. Whilst in India Khrushchev blamed Britain directly for the partition 
of the old Empire on its dissolution and went so tar as to claim in a speech of the 24th 
November at the Indian-Soviet society reception in Bombay that "the British, French, 
and Americans started the Second World War, sent troops against our country and 
I At least it we jud__e by the reports which BuIganin and Khrushchev `_ave to the Supreme Soviet on 
the 0th December which were puhlished in Prctv(Irc of the same clay. There are English translations 
or these speeches in The Current Dicce. cr o'1 the Soviet P, *cýv,. v. Vol. VII. No. 51. pp. 13-17 and No. 
pp. 1-4-20. See Soviet Fr, rei, r, POIic\" Sluice tý Hr; Mir I/. pp. 148-163 for an evaluation of the 
si niticance of Khrushchev'. new p lice O, ard the °, inJer-developed" world. 
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these troops were the troops of Hitler's Germany". '- This was the most notorious 
outburst of a number of tub-thumping speeches which Khrushchev gave. Bulganin 
maintained rather more reserve, but in essence dealt with similar themes. 
Moreover, there was unease in Whitehall as to the implications of the tour for 
future Soviet foreign policy. The emphasis which the Soviet leaders had placed upon 
economic assistance and the suitability of Soviet models of economic development to 
the "under-developed" world heralded a serious challenge to residual British economic 
interests in India and South East Asia. It is this analysis of the Soviets activities and 
their implications for Britain in turn which the following chapter will examine. 
Not content merely to look on, the visit in January, 1956, of Eden to Washington 
was conceived as something of a counter blast. However the understanding of Soviet 
foreign policy held in Whitehall was not, as we shall see, always identical to that of 
Downing Street. 
THE BRITISH ANALYSIS 
The British interpreted Bulganin and Khrushchev's tourism on two levels. For the 
Politicians the most important consideration seems to have been the spleen that had 
been vented in Britain's direction, both implicitly and directly. This caused a great 
deal of offence in London, even to the extent of bringing the planned visit by the 
diumvirate to Britain into doubt. Eden and the Cabinet spent a substantial length of 
time discussing this question and it was not until February 1956 that they finally 
decided that they should not cancel their invitation to the Soviets. Khrushchev and 
Bulganin were apparently blithely unaware of the contradictory impressions that the 
two sides to their policy of peaceful coexistence were creating. 
However there were also important long term developments which were of more 
concern in Whitehall. Firstly the Soviets' tour signified to British officials a new 
enthusiasm for Asia in preference to Europe as the cold war's battle ground. Although 
this point was equally obvious to politicians, where Civil Servants and their masters 
differed was in the appreciation of quite how fundamental a change in the Soviet's 
attitude to the cold war that this development implied. Secondly it seemed to the 
Foreign Office, as well as the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Supply, that the armoury the Soviets were using was profoundly different from that to 
which they had become used. The Asian tour underlined the fact that the new and 
crucial weapon in the fight for political influence in the area was to be economic aid. 
Aid to non-aligned countries, which despite tending to an anti-western bias. were by no 
stretch of the imagination Communist. This was complementary to the military 
Published in Pravda and Izvestia, 26th November. There is a translation of the speech in The 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VII. No. 4S. pp. 3-. 4. Indeed there is 3 pretty full 
compendium of the Bulg. nin and Khrushchev South East Asia Opus in Vol. VII of the Current 
Digest. 
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assistance which had heralded the Soviet's dramatic entrance into third world politics 
in Egypt. By the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956, British officialdom was 
already quite familiar with the new policy which Khrushchev gave his ideological 
imprimatur to. 
There was indeed some consideration outwith the Foreign Office given to the issue 
of Soviet economic diplomacy in the "under developed" world immediately before 
Bulganin and Khrushchev's tour. 3 As was discussed in the previous chapter concern 
for Soviet activity in this area had been growing since 1954. The Minister of Supply. 
Reginald Maudling, expressed his worry about the potentialities of the Soviet economy 
in the fight for influence in the non-committed world in a letter to R. A. Butler of 24th 
November, 1955. 
I believe I have mentioned to you before my concern that the Russians may 
start using their economic strength in the cold war. With the resources they 
have and, even more important, the control over their economy and their 
export prices that they can exert, it is clear that they could easily stage a major 
economic offensive and it is difficult to see why they have not done so 
before. ` 
He went on to question what the British attitude should be if the Soviets were to 
expand from their first moves in the Middle East, particularly of course in arms, and 
their offer of a steel mill to India. Should they attempt to forestall the Soviets at every 
turn, or given the hideous expense of such a policy, would it be better to "call their 
bluff". 
The Treasury also took a relatively sanguine view of the Soviet economy's 
capabilities. In their opinion, although heavy industrial products tended to be crude by 
Western standards, they were competitively priced and might even have certain 
advantages in third world markets. Sir. G. L. F. Bolton sent his positive analysis of 
Soviet economic potentialities to Sir Leslie Rowan on 19th December, 1955, a letter 
which Rowan thought important enough to circulate around a number of departments 
including the Foreign Office. Bolton came to the following conclusion, 
3 FRUS 1955-57, Vol. IX, pp. 8-10. There were also those in America who were becoming 
concerned. On 10th November, 1955, C. D. Jackson an ex-special assistant to the President sent a 
letter to Nelson Rockefeller, who was still a special assistant, emphasising his concern for the new 
Soviet economic policy. He expressed himself pithily, if rather simplistically as follows, 
The moment of decision is upon us in a big way on world economic policy. So long as the 
Soviets had a monopoly on covert subversion and threats of military aggression, and we had a 
monopoly on Santa Claus, some kind of seesaw dame could be played. But now the Soviets 
are muscling in on Santa Claus as well, which puts us in a terribly dangerous position. 
Needless: to say this analysis ignores the substantial role already played covertly by the US in 
operations such as the overthrow in 1952 of the Prime Minister of Iran. 
4 FO 371 116716 NS 1123/16, Maudlin__ to Butler, 24th November, 1955. Clearly Soviet economic 
potential was very soon to he cashed in. Maudlin_, 's letter was timely. The Chancellor's response. 
dated 6th December after the deluge had begun. was to suggest the initiation of further study and 
discussion. These studies formed the briefs background for the Washington Conference. see below. 
2 
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We are now faced by the entry into world trade, not only as a seller but as a 
buyer as well, of a power disposing of far greater resources, human technical 
and material, than, for example, Japan, when she emerged in the latter years 
of the 19th century as an industrial power... There is no prospect of stopping 
this development (except by force) than there was of stopping the expansion of 
North America, and it is in North American terms that we should think of the 
emerging economic power of the Soviet Union and its satellites. ' 
As far as the Foreign Office was concerned the "economic offensive" had in fact 
already begun. On December 2nd, 1956, Sir William Hayter sent a despatch to 
London which examined the situation vis a vis Soviet-British trade over the past year. 
Although he cane to the conclusion that there had been little increase in Soviet trade 
with the West generally over the period and did not think that it was likely any would 
happen in the future, Soviet external trade policy had undergone an important change 
in other directions. 6 Hayter drew attention to a particular trend which he thought had 
disturbing implications for the future. 
There is however one field in which a dramatic change has occurred, i. e. 
Soviet trade with the Middle East and South East Asia. Though the direct 
effect on British trade is not yet great. this development is potentially 
dangerous to us both politically and economically.? 
Furthermore, as Mauclling did, Hayter thought that the Soviet command economy 
had certain advantages over the West in using economic aid in the battle for political 
influence. It could target the projects of greatest political impact, and undertake them, 
regardless of their basic commercial viability. Western businessmen were not free to 
act with such financial indiscretion. Nor was Western aid necessarily exploited to best 
propaganda advantage. Businessmen acted as individuals, and their assistance was 
5 FO 371 116716 NS 1123/20, Bolton to Rowan, 19th December, 1955. 
6 FO 371 116716 NS 1123/12, Sir William Hayter. Moscow, to Selwyn Lloyd, London, 2nd 
December, 1955. Hayter thought that the Soviets would buy from the British what they needed if 
the prices were competitive, but that they would be more likely for political reasons to favour West 
Germany. He summed the situation up as follows, 
Foreign trade does not represent more than I% of the dross national product of the Soviet 
Union, and it is estimated that four fifths of that trade is carried on within the Soviet orbit. It 
seems to me unlikely that the Soviet Union will ever expand its trade with the West very 
significantly. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would rely on the West... 
7 ibid. Hayter went on to detail some of the indicators of this new trend, 
Mr. Malcolm Macdonald's (the High Commissioner in India] despatch no. 160 of November 
15 notes that Indo-Soviet trade has expanded six times since 1953. The Soviet Union has been 
a major participant in trade fairs throughout the N1 iddle East and South East Asia, Soviet 
technicians are erecting a steel plant in India and the services of Soviet technicians are offered 
abroad. The satellites are playing a large part in this campaign. I note that it is estimated that 
the Soviet bloc could export to the free world 000 million worth of capital equipment 
annually; this might have a telling effect if directed towards undeveloped countries. 
Hohler in his reply to the above despatch did hover question the ti`, ure of £500 million. He 
suggested that it was probably a typing error as according to all their information the ti__ure was 
about half the Embassy's estimate. 
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often hidden in wider international frameworks, such as the Colombo Plan. 
Meanwhile the Soviets, acting on the level of a collective state, could draw out 
maximum political kudos from their economic aid. Also, Havter cautioned that Soviet 
capabilities should not be underestimated, either in technology or in their ability to 
produce the kind of capital equipment that the "Under Developed" World needed. He 
concluded his report as follows, 
I am not competent, nor have I the facts here, to decide how great is the 
Soviet threat to areas where our political and economic influence has not 
hitherto suffered serious challenge except fi" m an ally. [my italics] I do not 
think that we have yet much to fear in the world as a whole from the Soviet 
Union as an external trader. But in certain areas, particularly the under 
developed countries, on which it seems that the Soviet Government is now 
concentrating its attention, we have much to lose and I do not think we shall 
hold our around without great effort. 
Not only were Soviet methods new, but she was also expanding into terra nova. 
This is a point which was to be repeated again and again by British officials and 
politicians in the succeeding months. The cold war was expanding its scope. 
The Northern Department expressed strong agreement with this in its reply to 
Hayter's despatch. 8 In his minute on it of December 30th H. A. F. Hohler, in line 
with Hayter's time scale, commented that the change in Soviet policy had been 
developing over the past 18 months. Unlike Maudling the Foreign Office was aware 
that matters had been coming to a head for some time. The despatch, according to 
Hohler, was opportune as Whitehall was abuzz with what the Soviets were trying to do 
in Asia, which had been dramatically underlined by Bulganin and Khrushchev's 
flamboyant progress. 9 
However as far as the politicians were concerned the most immediate problem 
caused by the Soviets' Asian antics was their inflammatory rhetoric. This comes out 
quite clearly as the main concern in Eden's brief treatment of the effects of the tour in 
his memoirs. 10 The first indication given to the Foreign Office of the unease that 
8 ibid. Hohler made the following comment in his reply, 
Your despatch... of December ? about Soviet trade policy has been read with very great 
interest in Whitehall. It arrived most conveniently at a time when everyone here in London 
was devoting much thought to the significance of the Soviet economic drive in the under- 
developed countries, and to the relationship between this and the prospects for our own and 
other western trade with the Soviet Union. 
9 See above on the Northern Department's view of Soviet interest in the third world from early 1955 
and below for the British Ambassador to Burma's interesting view on the length of the "economic 
offensive's" gestation. 
10 Full Circle, pp. 354-355. In this two page treatment Eden deals specifically with whether or not the 
visit by Bulý_anin and Khrushchev to Britain should be allowed to `; o on, giving 
his rationag6ehind 
the decision not to cancel. In only one sentence does he refer to the matter of deeper concern in the 
Foreign Office, and for that matter in other Departments of State. namely the Soviet economic 
offensive in Asia. 
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Khrushchev's comments were causing Eden was reported to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick by 
Macmillan in a minute of the 5th December. ýE He commented that some of the Prime 
Minister's Cabinet colleagues were pressing him to send a message to the itinerant 
evangels, intended to lead either to the end of anti-British propaganda or the 
cancellation of the visit to Britain. Macmillan was "not very keen" on this idea and 
thought that it would be better to await the Soviet leaders' return home before taking 
any action. In the meantime he asked if Hayter could be quizzed as to exactly what the 
Soviets were trying to achieve. Whether they really wanted to go on with the visit, or 
were they attempting to push the blame for cancellation on the British? 
Before Hayter's reply came through, the Cabinet met on the 6th December to 
discuss how they should react to Khrushchev's speechifying. 12 There was no 
discussion at all of the implications of economic diplomacy for Britain's position. 
More crucial to the Cabinet seems to have been the question of national honour. The 
Marquis of Salisbury in particular considered that if the Soviets had not withdrawn 
their calculated insults by the time of the April visit, it would cause great damage to 
British prestige if it were not cancelled. However Salisbury, a man for whom 
questions of personal integrity and self-respect were unusually important, was 
something of a lone voice. 13 The "general view", according to the minutes, was more 
hesitant and a decision was deferred until further discussion and consultations had 
taken place. Presumably this referred, amongst other things, to the Embassy's view on 
what the Soviets were attempting to achieve. 
The Cabinet then generally agreed the following rationale behind the Soviet's 
actions, 
[I]t might be that having concluded that the risk of early nuclear war was 
slight, they saw the immediate struggle for power in terms of a struggle for 
influence over Eastern peoples, and had decided that abuse would help them 
in undermining the confidence of Eastern countries in Western powers. 
There was no mention at all of the role played by economic aid in the realisation of 
this Soviet objective. The Cabinet conclusions present an interesting and rather 
immature view of what peaceful co-existence actually meant. 
In spite of the provocation which had been offered it was too early yet to take 
the view that peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union was unattainable 
and until we were in a position to bring all the neutral powers into the 
It was obvious that the direct references to Britain must cause offence in this country and make 
many doubt the value of a visit from the Soviet leaders in such circumstances. It also seemed 
clear that Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev vvvere, fi. r the present, more interested in 
making friends and it fluencing people in Asia than in Europe. [My Italics[ 
11 FO 371 116687 NS 1051221115. Minute from Macmillan to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. 5th December. 
1955. 
12 PREM 11/1606, CN1(56), 45th Conclusions, : Minute 3.6th December. 1955. 
13 See Anthony Erlen, pp. 365-371 and 381. Rhodes James makes clear that this side to Salisbury's 
nature had led him to risk resignation threats on a number of occasions. 
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Western orbit it would remain to our advantage to pursue a policy of peaceful 
co-existence, if the terms on which it could be secured were not humiliating. 
Clearly the executive still cherished the Churchillian idea of a grand settlement of 
differences that would lead to a general peace, on all levels of Great Power activity. 
Equally clearly, at least in retrospect, and in prospect by early 1956, this was not what 
the Soviet themselves wanted. 
It was pointed out by persons unnamed in the Cabinet minutes that over the years 
some pretty stiff things had been said by members of British Governments about the 
Soviet Union. Having agreed that excerpts from both the most notorious of 
Khrushchev's speeches and the most acrid British comments should be circulated 
together, the Cabinet deferred its decision until further discussion. Indeed the decision 
was not to be made for some time. The next Cabinet meeting to consider the matter 
was not held until the 11th January, 1956 and only by the 16th of February was a 
definite decision made in favour of going ahead with the visit. In between there was to 
be some degree of humming and hawing between the Moscow Embassy and London. 14 
Hayter's response to Macmillan's inquiry came back in two telegrams of the 7th 
December. 15 He argued that the Soviets had not intended to make quite the anti- 
British splash that they had. Rather they became carried away by their own rhetoric. 
Hayter also made a clear distinction between Bulganin and Khrushchev, the latter being 
the main perpetrator of offending propaganda. 16 The Northern Department was not so 
charitable in the construction which it placed on events. 17 They agreed with the view 
that the Cabinet had taken the previous day. Is Nevertheless the Department did not 
think that the Soviets were trying to get the British to cancel the visit. All effort, they 
thought should be taken to ensure that the odium of cancellation should fall on the 
Soviets. After considering a variety of possible reactions, the best seemed to be a calm 
and measured public answer to Khrushchev's "slanders" by either the Prime Minister 
or Foreign Secretary. This was the line which Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick had taken and 
14 PREM 11/1624, CM(56), 3rd Conclusions, Minute 4.1 l th January, 1956 and CM(56), 15th 
Conclusions, Minute 7, dated 16th February 1956. 
15 FO 371 169487 NS 105 12/119. Moscow Telegrams No. 1443 and 1444,7th December, 1955. 
16 Although he admitted that this might have si-nit ed little more than the differences in their two 
personalities. 
17 FO 371 116687 NS 1051? / 119. Minute by J. G. Ward. 7th December. 1955. 
18 Ward added the following to the Cabinet's opinion. 
There also seems force in the Yugoslav Ambassador's comment to Sir I. Kirkpatrick that the 
Soviet leaders are probably victims of their own propaganda and genuinely believe much of the 
abuse they level at the Western record in Asia. In any case, this anti-British campaign in India 
fits in with recent manifestations of a sharper Soviet policy shown at Geneva and by their drive 
in the Middle East. 
This seems rather ; loser to the appreciation of the South East Asia tour's significance which was 
eventually to prevail. 
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which Eden was to take in the House of Commons on the 12th December. As regarded 
the actual visit itself Macmillan chose, in line with the Cabinet, to defer his decision. 19 
Thus Eden, by way of a stop gap measure. in his reply to the adjournment debate 
on the 12th December, rebutted the specific Soviet allegations about British 
colonialism. In response to Khrushchev's charge that Britain had sought to steal the 
last crust of bread from the mouths of the Burmese, he pointed out that in reality 
substantial economic aid had already been given by Britain through the Colombo Plan 
since 1951.20 He argued that it was in fact the Soviets who were the modern 
colonialists and that they had been recognised as such by politicians in non-committed 
countries. It was on this point that the matter was allowed to rest, at least in the public 
eye, until the final decision about the visit had been made. 21 
Expanding a little from the narrow theme of Khrushchev's rhetoric, in a letter 
dated December 13th 1955, Sir William Hayter offered his interim comment on the 
significance of recent events in relation to Soviet foreign policy. 22 Although deferring 
any more permanent assessment until matters had been made clearer at the meeting of 
the Supreme Soviet scheduled for December 23rd, the wisdom of which the Northern 
Department entirely agreed with, lie did make the following points. 23 Europe had 
apparently been "put on ice" at Geneva and now the Soviets were turning to pastures 
19 This he scribbled on the 8th December at the end of Ward's 7th December, Northern Department 
minute. 
20 Khrushchev made a variety of such accusations while in Burma, for example at Mandalay airport on 
6th December, of which a translation is in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VII, No. 49, 
p. 6. Khrushchev also repeated his peculiar analysis of the cause of World War II at Rangoon in 
which Hitler acted as Mr. Chamberlain's poodle. Khrushchev went on to cite the Crimean War as 
evidence of Britain's undying hostility towards the Soviet Union without any apparent irony. He 
also made much of the Soviet's ability to absorb Burmese rice surpluses. His diatribe was duly 
printed in Pravda 7th December, 1955. There is a translation in the Current Digest, Vol. VII, No. 
49, pp. 6-9. On the Colombo Plan See Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, pp. 743-750. 
21 Hansard, Vol. 547. Clos. 955-957. There followed an analysis of peaceful coexistence on similar 
lines to that of the Cabinet's on the 6th December. After reasserting that "fundamentally" 
Communist policy aimed at world domination he went on to say, 
How then-and here I come back to the Asia problem-can there he real co-existence between 
Soviet Russia and ourselves, since we would never accept Communism or they, presumably, 
the kind of Parliamentary system in which %%e believe'' Well, we have always been willing to 
try to work out this problem, and we are still willing to do it now, because we cannot believe 
that any Government, knowing the real nature and consequences of modem war. would lead 
their country to the brink. But, co-existence, if it is to succeed, has to he a two way traffic, 
and equal tolerance and understanding has to he shown by the countries on either side. 
Eden had clearly not yet cottoned on to the idea that what the Soviets were up to in Asia was in truth 
all part of their peaceful coexistence policy. Indeed there is something of a logical hiccup here. 
After asserting that Communism did still want to dominate the world, he then expressed the 
implicitly idle hope that the Soviets could he made, somehow, to agree to forget their reason for 
existence. 
22 FO 371 122782 NS 1021/8, Sir William Hayter to dlr. J. G. Ward. Moscow, 13th December, 
1955. 
?3 The Northern Department was also in a`_reement with the preliminary assessment which Hayter went 
on to lay out. FO 371 122782 NS 1021/8, Minute by qtr. J. G. Ward, 20th December, 1955. 
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new in Asia. 24 Bulganin's and Khrushchev's romp to Burma was the most significant 
indication of this fundamental geographical shift in their interests. 25 This was by now 
becoming something of a commonplace. Hayter made the following wry comment on 
where the summer Summit amity fitted in, 
In this context the proposed visit to England is probably a slight 
embarrassment. It was accepted in the full flush of the July Geneva 
bonhomie, but is now somewhat inhibiting when the policy is one of attacks 
on the Western position in Asia, and to a lesser extent N. A. T. O. 
However considering that the acceptance of a British invitation for a Parliamentary 
visit had just been published in the Soviet papers, Hayter did not think that Bulganin 
and Khrushchev wanted to cancel. 26 With this J. G. Ward in London also agreed. 
There was no mention of the role of Soviet economic power in their diploºnacy, the 
letter being conceived as an answer to the specific problem of where the proposed visit 
to Britain fitted in. The letter met with the approval of Sir lvone Kirkpatrick and was 
passed on to No 10 where it "was read with great interest" according to the note of 
appreciation which Ward sent of to Moscow in reply. Clearly the Embassy's view on 
the points above was not uncongenial to that of Eden. 
24 This very much calls to mind the view that Macmillan tool of Soviet policy by late 1955, See 
above. 
25 FO 371 116694 NS 10520/6. Mr. H. A. F. Hohler in a letter of 13th December to N. J. A. 
Cheetham of the British Delegation to NATO headquarters commented that the slant of the Soviet's 
propaganda was another indication of where their interests had turned. 
[Cheetham had rather condescendingly suggested that Khrushchev's comments on the causes of 
World War Two were for the consumption of the "gullihie illiterates" of Asia] I do not think 
that in general Soviet propaganda to illiterate or semi-illiterate peoples tends to dwell very 
much on the origins of the Second World War, as the peoples in question can only have a small 
interest in matters so far removed from their own experience. Khrushchev and Bulganin's 
descent into South-East Asia is a new development in Soviet policy, and the main lines of 
Soviet propaganda which they have been concerned to put across have dealt with the history of 
problems nearer to hand to their audiences. 
26 Hayter made the following comment on the personal morality of the Soviet leaders, 
A rather disquieting feature of recent weeks has been the increase in unashamed mendacity, 
both in the speeches of Soviet leaders and in the press. Khrushchev must know perfectly well 
that his account of the causes of the last war, (that Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union with 
the connivance of the West) his description of the partition of India and his statement that the 
people of Kashmir has made its choice in favour of India are all inaccurate and misleading, and 
the servile press here follows this lead with alacrity. 
H. A. F. Hohler. however, in his letter quoted ; hove I footnote "' I of 13th December thought that, 
"it is very likely that Khrushchev himself believes in the version of history which he sought to 
propagate in South-East Asia, and which stems after all from the basic premises of Communist 
dogma, that there is an irreconcilable opposition between capitalism and Communism, and that 
capitalism breads war". 
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THE VIEW FROM THE EMBASSIES AND THE HIGH COMMISSION 
The importance of economic aid in the Soviets' strategy became even more apparent to 
British observers as 1955 wore to its end. Reports were sent to London from the 
Embassies in Burma, Afghanistan and the High Commissioner in India, giving their 
assessment of what the Soviet's tour had achieved. It was clear to all three posts that 
the most singular development was the Soviet use of economic power in an attempt to 
undermine western influence. Khrushchev's rhetoric had, in their opinion, been the 
least successful part of his diplomacy. More dangerous in the long term was the aid 
which the Soviets were now prepared to offer to noncommitted Asian countries. 
Particularly in Burma the Soviets made very effective use of this new asset in their 
flirtation and the British Embassy in Rangoon expressed its grave concern for the 
consequences of this success. In India and Afghanistan a more phlegmatic attitude 
prevailed on the part of British officials towards the Soviet achievement. Largely, it 
would seem, because Soviet offers of economic goodies met with much less 
receptiveness, or were much less efficacious. there than in Burma. 
The South East Asia and Middle East Department of the Commonwealth 
Relations Office put out the following preliminary appreciation of the Soviet's 
intentions in India, dated 17th December, 1955. They considered that the Soviets had 
had two main objectives, 
(a) To persuade Indian government that policy of non-alignment was 
compatible with close political relationship with Soviets and that Soviet policy 
was to support the aspirations of peoples in Asia against Western Powers who 
still have imperialist designs. (b) To make a direct appeal to the people of 
India by playing to the crowd. 
At the level of P. R. the tour had been an undoubted success. It was, the C. R. 0. 
observed somewhat condescendingly, the kind of thing the Indian people enjoyed. 
However, Government circles and "the more responsible newspapers" had quickly 
become disturbed by the vehemence of the Soviet's anti-Western speechmaking. 
Indeed they thought that the propaganda aspect might actually have been counter 
productive. Nor had the Soviets succeeded in pressing their economic or military 
favours on the Indians. Overall the only advantage gained might have been in 
Communism's popular appeal. 27 
27 PREM 11/1606. Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office No. 368, to UK. High 
Commissioners. 17th December, 1955. On the issue of economic aid it made the following 
comment: "the economic announcement makes it clear that the Soviets have failed in their objective 
of concluding precise economic arran`ºements during the 'sit which would bind the economies of 
the country closely together and enable Soviet technicians to enter India". Technicians seem to have 
been regarded as a particular hughear in the mid-1950's. The report concluded that to the official 
mind the tour may have highlighted the attracti' cne'. ut the Commonwealth and the dangers of co- 
operation with the Soviets. 
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This initial prognosis was further expanded on in a C. R. 0 circular to U. K. High 
Commissioners of 28th December, 1955, which was produced after consultation with 
the High Commissioner in India himself. '-8 It made a similar assessment to that above 
about the effect of the visit on the population. It considered that Bulganin's and 
Khrushchev's championing of the anti-colonialist and non-aligned causes had won them 
sympathy. Indeed they even considered that their flattery of India's policy had resulted 
in a less critical Indian attitude towards Soviet activities. This they feared might lure 
Nehru further into the Bear's den than perhaps he had bargained for. Yet even so the 
anti-Western acid which they had spilt had caused some offence in Government and 
journalistic circles. Although the Soviet visit seemed to have enjoyed little tangible 
economic success, fears were expressed for what might yet happen on this still novel 
front. There had been a commitment to sell a further one million tons of Soviet steel 
to India, but this was not considered important. More ominously, despite the lack of 
public agreements on economic aid or arms supply which the British had feared would 
be made, they were worried that behind the scenes negotiations had been started 
towards more substantial Soviet involvement in the Indian economy. There was 
concern that the long-term situation might still move in the Soviet's favour because of 
their ability to offer very large Financial inducements. It was this. rather than 
Khrushchev's hyperbole, that posed the most serious threat to the Western interest. 29 
Overall they considered, due to the lack of any tangibly immediate result, that, "in 
terms of immediate practical results visit has in the main been less value to the Soviet 
Leaders than was to be feared". 
This rather sanguine view of the Soviets achievement was not reflected by the 
Burma Embassy's report on the road show halt in their patch. Indeed the Burma leg 
saw the most vicious and specifically anti-British attacks, delivered in a series of 
impassioned speeches by Khrushchev. The British Ambassador, Mr. Gore-Booth, in 
his despatch of 19th December put the visit in the context of a growing Communist 
campaign in the "under-developed" world. A campaign which he dated back to 1954, 
The visit marked a climax of Communist psychological, political and 
economic penetration, begun by the visit of Chou En-lai to Rangoon in the 
summer of 1954, furthered by the Burmese Economic Mission to Moscow and 
the Satellite capitals in February 1955. and by U Nu's [The Burmese Prime 
28 PREM 11/1606, Outward Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office No. 384 to UK. 
High Commissioners, 28th December. 1955. 
29 This matter was to cause increasing concern. The effect of Soviet economic penetration into India 
was the subject of a Commonwealth Relations Office Brief of 23rd January for the Washington 
Conference, FO 371 123203 ZP 28/90. It stressed the importance of encouraging* the Americans to 
increase their aid to India as a means to forestall the Soviets, 
They [the Americansi have been inclined in the past to talk of restricting their aid to India. As 
is said in SSC(56)4 [a Cabinet Office Brief by the Treasury which I have sadly been unable to 
trace], which has been prepared as a Brief on the Soviet Bloc's economic offensive for use 
during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. we do want tu ur, e the Americans to give 
more aid to India. 
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Minister] subscription to the doctrine of positive coexistence on the occasion 
of the visit of Marshal Tito in February last. 'O 
Khrushchev, Gore-Booth conjectured, saw Burma as an Indian and British sphere of 
influence. 31 This was not a situation which Khrushchev was prepared to allow to 
continue, 
As the Soviet visit progressed it seemed to be the intention of the visitors to 
deliver direct blows at the British position in Burma and, having undermined 
our economic position here, to inflict the maximum damage on our surviving 
influence to remove a barrier to long-term Soviet plans for the Communist 
domination of Burma;... 
Interestingly though Gore-Booth did not consider that the most publicised and 
obviously anti-western part of the visit, the speechmaking, had had a particularly 
important impact. Khrushchev's antics were an "interesting example of the diplomacy 
of appealing to the people over the heads of their Government", but little more. On 
the whole, he thought, the Burmese had already passed through their intense anti- 
colonial phase immediately before and after independence and so Khrushchev had 
failed quite to hit the right note. Moreover the behaviour of the Soviet contingent had 
been "boorish and inconsiderate by any standards", to the extent of causing 
embarrassment to the Burmese leaders. Although some noted hot beds of Communism, 
such as the University, received the speeches enthusiastically, more dangerous to 
Western interests in the Embassy's opinion was the economic aid that the Soviets had 
offered. 
If the propaganda speeches were addressed to the youthful and semi-literate, 
the economic results were such as to appeal direct to the Government. At one 
stroke the Soviet leaders gave the impression of removing the Burmese fears 
of a rice surplus by simply offering to take it whatever its size. This was the 
supreme gesture of Russia's ability and willingness to help Burma in her 
economic problems and in the implementation of her development 
programme, so recently placed in jeopardy by the failure of the rice market. 
The implication was obvious. The Soviet Union could help where the West 
30 PREM 11/1606 DB 1631/25, British Embassy Burma. Mr. Gore Booth to Mr. Macmillan, dated 
19th December. 1955. The quote continues 
Chou En-lai had beguiled U Nu with his personal mixture of charm and impressiveness, and 
had inflated his confidence in his ability to handle the Communist powers. Thakin Tin in his 
[economnic] mission to Moscow had revealed Burma's financial plight. her desperate anxiety for 
her economic future, and [particularly for her rice trade], in the absence of any help from the 
West; Marshal Tito's theories had spread before U Nu the vision. particularly attractive to 
him, of serving the cause of peace by treating the Communists and the West on equal terms. 
31 Largely due to Tito's 1955 February visit and the surprise he expressed at the extent of surviving 
British "traditions. ideals and influence". These opinions. he thought, may well have arrived in 
Moscow via Bel_ýrade. 
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had failed, and where the United States had aggravated Burma's troubles by 
her surplus rice disposal policy. 32 
There was little doubt in the Embassy that the success of the Soviet visit had 
hinged on their ability to buy the Burmese with massive economic subsidies. 33 This 
was the crucial difference between it and the Indian leg of the tour. Whereas little in 
the way of economic blandishment had been accepted, or perhaps offered, in India, 
Burma had been eager for anything that the Soviets had to give and the Soviets had 
come bearing a wide variety of gifts. This is what caused the rather different British 
assessments of the tour's success. Even in India unease was expressed that more 
Soviet aid might be in hand for the future. Economic diplomacy had clearly become 
central to the new Soviet foreign policy. ' [t had also become a matter for brave 
concern to British observers in the Field. 
The last stop of the tour in Afghanistan was by contrast a much less spectacular 
affair. Largely because of their authoritarian and reactionary nature, the Afghani 
leaders were keen to play clown the importance of the visit. There was to be no 
repetition of the grandiose and "surprising spectacle" that had lilt India and then, going 
up a gear, swept on to Burma. 35 The visit was advertised as routine and Khrushchev 
was not allowed opportunity for further posturing as demagogue. This was a visit 
between leaders. Furthermore, Afghanis did not want to indulge in "unnecessary 
burning of Western bridges", according to the British assessment. 36 
32 Since the 1930's American agricultural policy had been geared to stimulating production and 
sponsoring price stability by lush government subsidy. This resulted in huge surpluses which by the 
1950's had reached embarrassing proportions. At the start of his administration Eisenhower set out 
to introduce some kind of market discipline. but without success. See Charles C. Alexander, 
Holding the Line, the Eisenhower Presiclc'Hc-v, 195? -1961, p. 39 and pp. 163-164. Also, Elmo 
Richardson, The PP eS"iclency (yDºt"ighr D. Eiseºrhuºº"c'r, 1). 47. The depression of prices caused by 
this on world-wide markets for agricultural produce was substantial, a problem to which the Soviets 
seemed to offer the Burmese a quick solution. See also FRUS 1955-57, Vol. IX; pp. 13-18, "Study 
Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, Soviet Economic Penetration". 4th April, 1956. 
33 On this the Burma Embassy report ended, 
Thera seems little doubt that in the present circumstances it is this economic element in the 
Soviet approach to Burma which contains the most serious threat both to British interests and 
to Western influence `_enerally. The threat is the more serious because it is hard to brin`_ home 
to the Burmese leaders the clanger in which they are placing themselves. 
34 There is an interestinu, aside in Gore-Booth's account on the nature of the Chinese-Soviet 
relationship, 
One is bound to ask oneself whether the visit was undertaken in consultation or competition 
with the Chinese. There is in Rangoon little evidence on which to build an answer. The 
disposal to North Vietnam of rice acquired by the Soviet Union from Burma argues a 
considerable degree of Sino-Soviet co-operation. On the other hand, there is little doubt that 
Soviet and Chinese efforts to penetrate Burma contain an element of competition. We shall 
watch closely for any indications one way or the other. 
35 This was Churchill's description, Soviet Foreignº Puli -v Since Stalin, p. 308. 
36 PREM 11/ 1606 DA 10338/1. Sir Daniel Lascdlle, to Selwyn Llovd, Despatch No. 76.23rd 
December. 1955. He referred to the "resolute and able evasion, vasion of attempts to get them to criticise 
the Baghdad Pact" a" evidence of the Afghani un%%ºIIºngne, to do more damage to Western contacts 
then entirely necessary. 
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Indeed, the British Embassy in Kabul displayed similar sang-froid to the C. R. O. in 
its view of the impact of the Soviets' visit. 37 The Soviets had made substantial offers 
of economic aid and diplomatic support for Afghani efforts to break the large ethnic 
Afghani minorities from the West of Pakistan. The Afghanis hoped to use Soviet 
support to force the creation of a new "Pushtunistan" on the countries eastern border. 38 
However the British did not think, on past form, that Afghanistan would give much in 
return. They had always proved adept at accepting subsidies without any feeling of 
obligation and there was no reason why this should not apply to Soviet monies as much 
as those of British India. 
Even so Lascelles feared that the reactionaries in power, who would be "First in 
the firing line" in the event of a Communist take over, were not "fully conscious of 
having brought their country into peril of extermination. " The Soviet threat loomed in 
a more direct and traditional way than in either Burma or India. The subtleties of 
economic diplomacy were in consequence of rather less importance. He ended his 
despatch with an expression of unvarnished contempt for Afghanistan's leaders, "they 
are merely ignorant, over-confident and grasping gamblers with a dislike of the West 
which is a by-product of their territorial `_reed" . 
Clearly in the case of India and Burma although the inflammatory rhetoric had 
been the greatest cause of concern in the Cabinet, those on the ground took a relatively 
dim view of its efficacy. Indeed although it may have won the Soviet leaders some 
popularity among the masses, its effect on Governing circles tended if anything to be 
negative. More important to British observers in South East Asia, and particularly 
Burma, were the attempts that had been made to exert Soviet influence through 
economic aid. For the first time the Soviets were trying to use their economic muscle 
to buy political influence in countries which remained resolutely non-communist. The 
direct threat that this posed to British and Western interests was keenly felt in 
Whitehall. This was the issue which was to concern it as Eden and Lloyd prepared for 
their departure to Washington in January 1956.39 By mid-December studies had 
37 Dallin argues that althou`ºh small, AfLhanistan was at that point attracting considerable attention 
because of its strategic position in relation to the Middle East. He .; omments. "the visit proved to 
be of considerable importance. It was more than .a new stage in Soviet relations with Afghanistan; it 
affected the entire power structure of the Near East". Sovier Furei, ' ,i Policy After Stalin. p. 311. 
38 See Sovier Foreign Policy After Stalin, pp. 312-313 on this issue. Pushtu was one of the variants of 
the Afghan language's name. This would, if achieved, have substantially weakened Pakistan, 
member of the despised Baghdad Pact and recipient of large amounts of American military and 
economic aid. The Soviets, the British Embassy reported, had offered to the Afghanis a loan of 100 
million US dollars. 
39 FO 371 116716 NS 1123/4. One western politician particularly concerned by this economic 
offensive was Lester Pearson the Prime Minister of Canada. Maudlin`º, whilst visiting Canada, sent 
a note to Lloyd of the 6th December 1955, gºivin_º Pearson's view, 
I also had a word with him about a particular hohhyhorse of my own at the moment, which is 
the need to organise our defences against the new Russian economic war... I find that Pearson 
is also keenly interested in this point and I gather he m as thinking of raising it at the NATO 
meeting. His idea is that we should consider . allin`_ the Russian bluff by Some such step as 
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already been put in hand and they were to provide much of the material for the 
Washington Conference briefs. 40 Evelyn Shuckburgh graphically expressed this 
concern for the tide of events in his diary, 
Clark [Sir William Clark, Deputy High Commissioner in Delhi. 
. . tells me that Nehru has given us explicit assurances of his continued independence of 
policy, refusal to buy arms from Russia. etc., but in the lucid watches of the 
night I could not avoid the conclusion that all of Asia is moving steadily out 
of our ambit and that our Western civilisation will soon be strangled and 
subjected, with its bombs unusable in its pocket. Fortunately in the daylight 
such gloomy prognostications are overlaid by veneers of busy confidence. 41 
Nor was there to be a let up in Bulganin and Khrushchev's boorish behaviour 
towards Britain at the 4th Session of the Supreme Soviet from the 26th to 30th 
December 1955. Cecil Parrotr the Minister at the Moscow Embassy, sent a gloomy 
report to London dated 6th January. 42 The main iteni had been a "long and 
objectionable" survey by Khrushchev on foreign affairs, the gist of which was a further 
dig at the old colonial powers, chief of whom was Britain. Western economic aid was, 
according to Khrushchev, nothing more than an age old vice wearing a new hat. 
Although he included a few flattering comments as to the present character of the 
British people, Parrot concluded, 
But these perfunctory insertions did nothing to alter the fact that this speech, 
so far from furthering his alleged object of reducing tension, can have done 
nothing but raise it; and it was obvious from his delivery that he enjoyed the 
whole proceeding g. 
Just as disturbing, from Britain's point of view, was the self assurance with which 
the Soviet leaders had made their commnments. The East Asian tour had considerably 
boosted their confidence and this was reflected not only in Khrushchev's Supreme 
Soviet speech but also in Bulganin's New Year toasts, 
In one of the toasts which he proposed at the New Years party at the Kremlin 
Bulganin said: "May 1956 be a better year than 1955 has been, but 1955 was 
a very good year indeed". He received much applause for this statement. 
The Soviet leaders seem to be saying in effect that there defensive positions 
asking them to come in with us on a big scale in helping, the under-developed areas, on 
condition that the aid were channelled through some United Nations oruanisation. 
40 FO 371 116716 NS 112-3/14. At FO 371 123199 ZP 2S/6, there is a note by Patrick Hancock of 
the Foreign Office for the Secretary of State setting out the Prime Minister's main concerns as to 
what they wanted from the talks. There follows it summary of the Treasury and Foreign Office 
briefs. Sadly as they were subsequently classed as Cabinet papers they were removed from 
departmental tiles to the Cabinet Office. As tar it, I am aware from the Cabinet indexes, these briefs 
are not available to public scrutiny. Their titles wwrere. "Russian Capabilities, Russian Intentions and 
Action Already Taken by the United Kingdom". 
41 Descent to Sue:. p. 3 10. 
42 FO/371 122765 NS 101512, Despatch from Mr Parrot. \1os w, to Northern Department, 6th 
January. 1956. 
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are in good order and that their offensives on the other fronts are going very 
well. Sooner or later the weight of the offensive will be again directed against 
Europe. 43 
Not only were the Soviets engaging in a novel form of cold war, but they also 
seemed supremely confident that they would win it. It is then hardly surprising that so 
much attention should have been given by the British in the lead up to the Washington 
Conference to this very problem. 
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. 
The Washington Conference which took place at the end of January, 1956, was 
conceived not only as a reaction to the direct political threat that the new Soviet policy 
posed, but also as a propaganda counter attack. Eden's treatment of the meeting in his 
memoir is instructive. Although he dates its genesis back to the failure of the Geneva 
Foreign Ministers' Conference in November and the lack of agreement over 
Germany's future, lie points out that the most immediate problem seemed the situation 
in the Middle East, 
This was the main topic which I wished to discuss in the United States. 
Soviet arms continued to flow into Egypt from Czechoslovakia, and Moscow 
was showing an increasing determination to intrude into Middle Eastern 
affairs. This was traditional Soviet policy, making itself felt at a time of 
growing confidence. 44 
This is despite the concern in Whitehall that the Conference should deal with the most 
disturbing recent development, the Soviet's flexing of their economic muscle. 
In a telegram to the Washington Embassy of December 28th Eden had made very 
similar priorities clear as those laid out in his memoir. He added in reference to the 
proposed joint declaration that, 
I would like us to be able to set down to`ether in plain and simple terms what 
it is that our two countries should stand for in world policy; what we believe 
should be the pattern of international relations and our own beliefs in civil 
43 Parrot made it further interesting comment can the indication this seemed to give of Khrushchev's 
political strcnLth. 
In comparison to the relatively unobtrusive role he played in the last session of the Supreme 
Soviet in August, he seemed now to stand as the arbiter of the whole of Soviet policy, both 
internal and external. While Khrushchev was speaking, Molotov sat in the back row and 
indeed took no active part in the session at all. 
44 Full Circle, p. 331. Quite what is meant by traditional Soviet policy is not made clear. It was 
apparent to the Foreign Office that what the Soviets were doing; was something new. Re above, e. g. 
Descent to Suet. pp. 278-279. Perhaps the great statesman was referring to Imperial Russia's 
fishing for influence in the region throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. Although that had 
really more in common with Stalin's bullying tactics in his policy towards Middle Eastern States 
contiguous with the Soviet 
Union after 1945. See SuViet Forei, rr Policy After- Stalin pp. 20-21 and 
pp. 101-110, also Galia Golan. Soviet Policies in f he Middle East pp. 8-9. 
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rights and individual freedom. This seems all the more important now when 
the Russian vehemence in Asia and elsewhere may have created a certain 
reaction against them. We must show that we have a positive face to match 
their barbaric garb. 45 
Eden had obviously digested something of the opinions expressed by his officials in the 
field, at least as far as Soviet rhetoric was concerned. Capital was to be made out of 
the unease that the Soviets' had caused their hosts. The Washington Declaration was 
conceived as a specific reply to Khrushchev's acrid attacks on the west in South East 
Asia. The Conference, in Eden's view, was to address the problems that the Soviets' 
policy had created for the west. But these were not necessarily the same kind of 
problems which his permanent officials were discussing in preparation for meeting the 
Americans. Eden concentrated in particular on the difficulties that Britain now faced 
in the Middle East. It was in basis to be another opportunity to go over a number of 
old chestnuts, including American involvement in the Baghdad Pact. Arguably it was 
Eden's understanding that savoured of traditionalism, rather than Soviet policy. There 
was no mention of the Soviet Asian tour and the impact of economic diplomacy on 
Britain's position. Eden's myopic view was to have a stultifying effect on the 
Conference. 
In the minutin; that was spawned before the Conference a different view emerges 
of what it was about. Not only was there concern as to what should be done about the 
new Soviet offensive, but it was frankly admitted by some that Britain was in a very 
poor position to do much herself. There was, in certain cases, a clear understanding of 
the profound implications for Britain's position in the world of the Soviets' move 
towards a global policy under Khrushchev. 46 On 3rd January, 1956 Guy Millard, one 
of Eden's private secretaries, made the following comments in an aide memoire for his 
master, 
You may wish to be reminded before your next meeting on Washington 
preparations, that you said that you would like to discuss the question of 
economic aid for the Middle East and other under-developed countries. The 
points which you had in mind were I think the following: Are we going to try 
to meet the threat of Russian economic penetration wherever it appears, by 
outbidding them for offers of economic support? Or would it be better to 
invite the Russians to match their promises with performance, in the 
expectation that they will not in fact be able to do so? If the latter policy is 
considered too dangerous, then where are we to find the extra resources which 
45 PREM 11/1334, Telegram No. 6200, Prime Minister to Washington Embassy, 128th December, 
1955. In a Foreign Office telegram of the same date the toIlowin`_ was but top of the agenda. 
"World Review - Russian intentions. car. ºhilihr. and tactics. and counter measures with special 
emphasis on the Middle East and Asia". PREM II/ 133-1. Tclc__ram No. 6200, Foreign Office to 
Washington. 
46 On the dramatic change which Khrushchev initiated in Soviet toreign policy and the development of 
its role as a -, Iohal superpower see Alvin Ruhenacin. Moscmt 'slhir"dl World Strategy. pp. 19-31. 
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we shall need to devote to economic aid'? 1i e can only come from economies 
in the military sphere. 47 
Millard's note went on to suggest that money might be found through a reduction in 
the size of the British army in Germany. There was, though, no indication that Britain 
might not be capable of coping with the situation, even if with difficulty. Others were 
less sanguine. 
In a minute of 10th January, 1956 Peter Thornt coF) President of the Board of 
Trade, went even further in his gloomy prognosis of Britain's financial ability to meet 
the new challenge of Soviet economic diplomacy. In the process of stating trade 
matters which had been of particular concern to his department and the Americans he 
began with the following, 
THE ECONOMIC COLD WAR: We need the U. S. to give all financial 
assistance possible towards paying for large capital projects in the Middle East 
and South East Asia as a counter to Russian penetration: for economic reasons 
we hope that this aid would as far as possible be "untied" to U. S. exports. " 
Clearly the gloss that Eden lays on the Washington visit in his memoirs will not 
entirely do. The Government was well aware that any departure into the realms of 
economic diplomacy would have to be paid for out of already strained budgets. 
Thorntjc, wft went even further, insisting that an essential purpose in discussions with 
the Americans must be to persuade them to undertake the main Financial burden in any 
economic counter offensive. The British. lie blatantly admitted, were dependent on 
American strength in this new cold war as Britain simply (lid not have the wherewithal 
to meet the Soviet challenge. Nor was Thorn : 's a lone voice. In a telegram from 
Eden to the Washington Embassy of ? 8th January, 1956 sent whilst en route, he passed 
on the government's assessment, and that most definitely included his officials, of what 
Britain wanted from the Conference. It started, 
(1)General: (a) acceptance by the United States of nature and scope of the 
Soviet threat, notably in the Middle East. (b) Understanding that the United 
Kingdom will continue to do all it can; but main share of any new economic 
measure must fall on the United States. (c) agreement on continuous 
consultation for balanced programme of aid. (i) to allies, c. f. Baghdad pact 
and (ii) to uncommitted countries c. f. Sudan, Libya. Indonesia and India. 
Implicit in this was the need to persuade the Americans of the seriousness of the 
situation and the minute continued to make this quite explicit. 48 Indeed it seems that 
47 PREINI 11/1334 Note for the Prime Minister hy G. E. : MM(illard. 3rd January. 1956. It continued 
interestingly as follows. "one possibility might he to withdraw a Division from Germany. But we 
might have to face the. risk that the Americans would wish to do the same. This is a point which 
you said that you might want to discuss with the President. It might be that General Gruenther 
could `_et along now with fewer divisions". 
48 The penny. in relation to what the Soviets meant by peaceful co-existence. seemed to have dropped 
at least with the Civil Service drafters. 
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the British did not think that their ally viewed the Soviet economic threat with 
sufficient gravity. In a Minute of 30th December by Patrick Hancock of the Foreign 
Office for Lloyd, Eden's main concerns for the Conference were set out. They 
concentrated very heavily on the Russian "probing... all round their periphery" and 
what should be the appropriate western response. Hancock went on to comment, 
The P. M. 's points (a), (b) and (c) [summarised above] had been in the 
forefront of our minds in making preparations for the discussions in 
Washington. This particularly since Mr. Dulles opined at the last NATO 
meeting that the Russians had only a surplus of obsolescent arms, technicians 
and hot air. We do not agree with this view, which we think dangerously 
complacent. 49 
Hancock went on to outline the Treasury and Foreign Office briefs, which put forward 
the very serious view the British took of Soviet capabilities. These were to be sent to 
the Americans in advance of the Washington meeting. 
The picture is perhaps a little reminiscent of that in 1946-47 in Greece, Iran and 
Turkey. In 1955 Britain faced a new Soviet threat with which she was not 
economically competent to cope. This was certainly not the first time that Britain had 
felt disadvantage by an inadequate economic performance, however her inadequacies 
were being probed in a new and taxing way . 
The Soviets were now biding to replace 
western markets for raw materials and to supply manufactures and development aid to 
governments which were not Communist and in which Britain still had considerable 
economic interests. Once more she was forced to turn to the United States. Just as in 
1946 there was also apprehension expressed that the Americans would need persuading 
both of the threat's seriousness and Britain's own financial inadequacy. 50 In fact, 
according to their advisers, Eden and Lloyd were supposed to be going to Washington 
in 1956 with something of a mendicant air. 51 
In our view the Russian threat of con/)etirive cu-cxisrelice [mv italiesi is serious in itself and 
requires strenuous efforts to hold our allies and uncommitted countries. It is essential we agree 
on the nature and de-ree of the Russian threat. It so, we should have fruitful discussions on 
problems in various parts of the world, of which the Middle East is the most threatened. 
49 FO 371 123199 ZP 28/6, F. O. minute by Mr P. F. Hancock, 30th December. 1955. 
50 FRUS 1955-57, Vol. IX, pp. 10-12. Eisenhower certainly scans to have been rather less panicked 
in December. 1955 than were the British. In a letter to Dulles of the 5th December, 1955 from his 
retreat at Gettysburg he concentrated on the innate economic strengths of America and the free 
world, although he did vo on to acknowledue that the Soviets had the advantage of attack and could 
concentrate their aid more effectively. Eisenhower'. more reassuring assessment has stood the test 
of time rather better than that of British officialdom. 
51 This is very clearly expressed in the C. R. O. Brief of 23rd January. 1956. FO 371 123201 ZP 
28/90. on India and Soviet economic penetration already lluOted above. Its conclusions demonstrate 
something of the illusion that officials seem to have Iahoured under in reuard of what the 
Conference was actually for. "the forthcoming visit to Wa. hiný-ton will deal with the steps necessary 
to counter the Soviet economic offensive. In SSC4 it IS : ut ested that the Americans should be 
asked to give special consideration to India. " lt then %vent on to outline the matters of detail which 
could be discussed if the issue provoked further conversations and the pressure that should be out on 
the Americans to increase the amount of aid they were giving. As it turned out the Washington 
Conference hardly touched on what the C. R. 0.. clearly thought was its main function. 
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On this Lloyd is rather more candid in his memoirs than Eden. He makes the 
following point, 
Those who contend that Suez was a watershed in our national history often 
maintain that Eden's Government still regarded Britain as capable of 
independent action on a global scale. It needed Suez, they say, to convince us 
that we were no longer a great power. This is very wide of the mark. We 
knew the facts only too well. During our talks in Washington [in January, 
1956], Eden put in a paper on our economic situation. The Second World 
War had turned us from the world's greatest creditor to the world's greatest 
debtor. We could not undertake any more external commitments. 52 
The record is very 111UC11 on the side of Lloyd's account, although there is a point on 
which he subtly obfuscates. 
Oddly enough despite the crystal clarity with which the Civil Service summed up 
what Britain wanted out of the Conference, the actual negotiations in Washington were 
something of a disappointment. There was little discussion of either economic 
diplomacy or the need for America to take pay for most of the work. Conversations 
concentrated on the general European situation, the Middle East and the need to find a 
solution for the Arab-Israeli problem, the Buraimi Oasis dispute between the Sultan of 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. China and atomic natters. '' The issue of Soviet economic 
diplomacy was most directly addressed during the visit to Canada that followed after 
the Washington discussions ended. There Lester Pearson, as Reginald Maudlin'), had 
commented, seemed to have niade something of a speciality out of the issue. 
There was one discussion between Lloyd and Dulles on the issue of Soviet 
economic penetration in the "under-developed" world during the Washington leg of the 
trip. On February ist they net in the State Department to discuss the issue as well as 
the progress of the World Bank's discussions with Nasser over the Aswan Dam. The 
Americans do indeed seen to have taken a more casual attitude than the British. The 
following exchange serves to illustrate this difference, 
Mr Allen [of the State Department] said that there was a point of view that we 
should carry on as though the Russians had made no move in the Middle East. 
If the Russians were prepared to offer impossible terms such as the loan to 
Egypt of $600 million for 50 years at 2 per cent, we should not pay much 
attention. Sir Harold Caccia remarked that unfortunately some projects were 
too dangerous to treat in this way. 54 
52 Suez 1956. p. 42. He went on to say, "Our gold and dollar reserves only covered three months' 
imports. All this made the safeguarding of our -supplies of oil from the Middle East the more 
important. What we did not foresee were the actions that would he taken against us by the United 
States Government". 
53 See Suez 1956, pp. 41-42. There is a bulky print record of the Washington discussions in PREM 
11/1334. Also the American record at FRUS 1955-57. Vol. X. pp. 304-312 and Vol. XI, pp. 467- 
68. 
54 PREM 11/1334, Record of a Meeting Between Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Dulles in the State Department 
on Wednesday, Ist February, 1956, at 10.30. 
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However there was basic agreement between the tv. o sides that as they could not 
be expected to undercut every offer the Soviets made, the Western response would 
have to be flexible. Yet there was no mention of the need for American to take the 
main part of the financial burden. Nor was there even any discussion of the necessity 
to take concrete measures to counter the Soviets' move. The matter was taken no 
further than an agreement that a "mechanism should be set up through the British 
Embassy in Washington for the exchange if information on Soviet economic 
penetration". This seems pretty small beer in comparison to the grandiose objectives 
which had been set out during British preparations for the Conference. On the Aswan 
Dam, perhaps the most singular example of the way the new cold war was to be 
fought, discussion amounted to little more than Dulles informing Lloyd that 
negotiations between Nasser and the World Bank were close to collapse. This Dulles 
blamed on Nasser and went on to suggest that he did not even think the Egyptian 
economy was strong enough to sustain the expense. Lloyd made a suitably non- 
descript noise in return. 55 
Equally in Canada, although Lester Pearson was much concerned by the need to 
respond to the Sovie& new strategy, discussions with the British did not get much 
beyond agreement to exchange information. 56 On the 7th February Eden, Pearson and 
Lloyd in Ottawa discussed the issue leaving the matter hanging on the need for further 
consultations. Just as in the United States nothing concrete was decided upon at all. 
Much of the Washington Conference's time was in fact taken up by rather windy 
rhetoric, the chief of which was the Joint Declaration. 57 it emphasised the principles 
of freedom and individualism which it stated the Free world stood for against those of 
collectivist darkness. 58 Eden also delivered speeches to Congress and the Press which 
played on similar themes and underlined the important change which seemed to have 
occurred in the Cold War. 
The Declaration was written with Khrushchev's rhetoric in South East Asia very 
much in mind. On 6th January Evelyn Shuckburah, who was to take part in the final 
process of drafting in Washington, minuted Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick about his concern 
that the Declaration should have some relevance to Asia. He hoped that it would not 
55 ibid.. "Mr. Selwyn Lloyd sui=gested that if it meant we gained an element of control over the 
Egyptian economy [which was exactly why Nasser was "o against the conditions the World Bank 
was trying to impose, it might he advantageous. hut at present our contributions to the Dam looked 
like a reward for vice". This was a very half hearted defence of it project which in the aftermath of 
the Czech-arms deal the British had been hysterically keen should tall to the West. 
56 The discussions lasted from 3rd to Sth February'. There is a print copy of the minutes at PREM 
11/1334. 
57 See Descent tu Suez, pp. 32S-332. Most of January 31st and February Ist were taken up by the 
drafting of the Declaration and Com. munieluý. Shuckhurgh did not have a very high opinion of the 
performance of Eden and Lloyd at the conference, "I envy the . Americans having Ike and 
Dulles to 
deal with over their foreign affairs. It seems to me that these two have continuity of policy, serious 
ideas and courage, and that our team by comparison i,, frivolous". Descent to Suez, p. 330. 
58 Miscellaneous No. 1 (1956), Cmd 9700. 
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be confined to "stale cliches from the European cold war". 59 And indeed the finished 
product made substantial reference to what had already been achieved by the West in 
the way of economic aid in Asia, moreover insisting that such aid was not intended to 
increase Western economic or political power. Yet the Declaration and its following 
Communique were confined to very broad generalities. No specific new proposals 
were brought forward at all in answer to what the Soviets had embarked upon in Asia, 
rather they contented themselves by a well worn reference to the Colombo Plan. 
Similarly Eden's speech to the U. S. Congress on the 2nd of February, 1956 
confined itself to the general. It did make a very clear analysis of the way in which the 
threat from the Soviet Union had changed. 60 In the face of thermo-nuclear 
annihilation a "mutual deterrent" against war on a world scale had been created. 
However this had not led to peace, but rather forced the rivalry down to a subtler plain 
of economic blandishment and political influence. 
Brought to a halt in Europe, Soviet expansion now feels its way south and 
probes in other lands. There is nothing particularly new in this. You can 
read it all in Russian imperialist history. But the emphasis has changed, and 
the symbols and methods too. This is a struggle for men's minds, once 
expressed in these regions by conflicting faiths, but now in rival ideologies. 
From the Kremlin streams forth into the lands of what we call the Middle 
East, and into all Asia, a mixture of blandishments and threat, offers of arms 
and menaces to individuals, all couched in terms of fierce hostility for 
Western ideals. 
Eden continued to look at the ways in which the west should respond to this new 
challenge. As in the declaration, there was nothing more than vaugery on Anglo-U. S. 
unity, the settlement of regional conflicts and the flexibility of approach that should be 
taken in seeking to counter Soviet economic aid. Eden did not even make reference to 
the need for America to take the major part in this new campaign. His emphasis was 
firmly on partnership. 6 t 
By way of contrast the discussions between Eden, Lloyd, Eisenhower and Dulles 
while the former were in Washington concentrated on details rather than a general, 
fundamental reappraisal of where the cold war was going and what needed to be done 
about it by whom. On this point Lloyd's account is a little misleading. He gives the 
impression that it was Eden who "put in a paper on the economic situation" which 
clearly laid out Britain's financial weakness. during the talks. 62 This would have been 
59 Descent to Suez, p. 317. 
60 Extract from the Congressional Record (Senate) for 2nd February, 1956,91956 (Cols. 1627 and 
1628). 
61 Opinions differed on the effectiveness of Eden'- speech. According to Shuckhurgh. both he and Sir 
Leslie Rowan thought at the time that the speech was poor even though it seemed a popular success, 
Descent to Suez. p. 332. Lloyd in his memoirs . on"iders it to have been "brilliant" and "perhaps 
the best feature of the Conference", Suez 1956. p. 42. which possibly says more about Lloyd's view 
of what the visit itself achieved than Eden's spe hmakin_-. 
62 Suez 1956. p. 42. 
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entirely in line with the objectives which had been set out before the British arrived in 
Washington by the Civil Servants. However the only paper that resembles Lloyd's 
outline in his memoirs was not in fact delivered by Eden, nor written by him. It was 
entirely the work of permanent officials at the Treasury and designed, on the 
suggestion of Sir Leslie Rowan, to be left with the Americans and Canadians as a kind 
of aide memoirei3 After making clear the financial and economic precariousness of the 
British position, with particular reference to the inadequacy of British gold and dollar 
reserves, it underlined the following point, "[w]e cannot take any more external 
commitments". The note finished with a futile opinion as to the purpose of the 
"Statement at end of meeting". "We hope this can contain both declaration and 
definite decision for actions, which are essential in present dangerous situation". Such 
expectations of concrete proposals were to be frustrated. The Statement was to be no 
more than a banal assertion of Anglo-American unity. 
The clear implication of Civil Service opinion was that the Americans would need 
to be invited to take the lead in this new cold war. Yet there does not even seem to 
have been an attempt by Eden or Lloyd to make such an invitation during the 
discussions. The minuting and briefing for the Washington visit makes quite plain that 
the Civil Service's main concern, and indeed that of a number of politicians, notably 
Thornyo t, was the Soviet's economic offensive in Asia and the need to persuade the 
Americans to pay for counter measures. Lloyd's memoir gives the impression, by 
reference Rowan's note, that Eden had a clear appreciation of the predicament that the 
British found themselves in early 1956. However the opinions that the aide memoire 
so pungently expressed were those of officials and not Eden. The "paper" was in fact 
in the nature of a round robin letter. 
This gap between official advice and the politicians' activities came out in the 9th 
February, 1956 report to the Cabinet on what the Washington visit had achieved. 
Neither Eden nor Lloyd once mentioned economic diplomacy, concentrating instead on 
the minutiae of Anglo-American relations and the general position in Europe. Eden 
63 FO 371 123203 ZP 28/94. Sir Leslie Rowan's coverin`_ note of the 28th January suggested that the 
aide nernoire should he left with the President. The Treasury note went as follows. 
Our mad or problem is the magnitude of U. K. 's continuing external commitments. Last war 
turned us from world's `_reatest creditor to world's `'reatest dchtor. Our ; gold and dollar 
reserves are now only about $2,100 million. These are hacking for the whole sterling system, 
which finances halt' the world's trade and payments and for which there is no alternative. 
These reserves are entirely inadequate... equal to under 25 % of cost of our imports... we 
cannot take any more external commitments. 
Compare this to Lloyd's summary of "Eden's paper" in Suez 1956, p. 42, 
The Second World War had turned us from the World's greatest creditor to the world's 
greatest debtor. We could not undertake any more external commitments. Our __old and dollar 
reserves only covered three month's imports. 
The phrasing is too similar for mere coincidence. 
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reported that on Germany the two sides held very similar opinions. 64 However, there 
was some divergence over European unity and the Messina Conference. On the 
Middle East both sides reaffirmed the validity of the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 and 
agreed that more effort was needed on the settling; of the Arab-Israel tension. Yet 
despite British eagerness to drag them in, the Americans remained unwilling to do 
much more than give moral and some economic support to the Baghdad Pact. On 
other areas of concern in the area, in particular the Buraimi dispute and Saudi misuse 
of financial muscle, the Americans had made soothing noises in response to British 
complaints. China and Chiang Kai-Shek remained a source of disagreement. Eden 
ended his report by reference to the discussions on Atomic energy. Here he expressed 
the hope that information that the President had agreed to pass on would save some 
money. 
At this point it would be instructive to recall the objectives which were set out by 
officials for the talks as discussed above. Despite their advice and concern with 
fundamentals of strategy, discussions did not get beyond immediate details which had 
been British concerns long before any great change in Soviet policy had been 
perceived. Such brief reference as there was to economic diplomacy did not make 
clear British inadequacies or come to any concrete decisions for action. More 
important to Eden seenis to have been the formulation of high sounding oratory. It is 
therefore little wonder that Lloyd expressed his disappointment with what the 
conference had achieved in his memoirs. 
The talks in Washington with Eisenhower and Dulles were rather 
disappointing. I have always been doubtful about highly publicised meetings 
between heads of government. 65 
They had in fact hardly touched at all on priorities which the Civil Service, if not the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, clearly perceived. It almost seems that as soon 
as the two statesmen stepped off the Queen Eli, -. aherh they conjured a new agenda of 
their own in blithe disregard for their advisers in the Treasury, Foreign Office and 
Board of Trade. After expressing his opinion on the success of the proceedings 
Lloyd's account goes on to make an interesting comment on the incompetence of 
Heads of State in dealing with issues of policy, 
If there has been full preparation before and there is some specific and 
realisable objective they may be successful. After a good dinner at the 
Embassy in Moscow in 1959 I told Khrushchev and Macmillan what I thought 
64 PREM 11/13334, a draft minute of 9th January. 1956 by Sir Ivonc Kirkpatrick for the information of 
the Americans laid out the British position on Germany. It made clear that there had been no change 
in British policy since the Geneva failure. The Wet German population and Adenauer seemed to 
have taken the end of hopes for reunification well. and the primary objective was therefore to build 
on this and draw Germany into the Western European ý: ommunity. Thus the West would make 
certain that even after Adenauer. West Germany would he sutticiently anchored to resist such 
temptations as the Soviets might offer. 
65 Sues 1956, p. 40 
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of them. I said: If one side says 3 and the other side says 5, you Heads of 
Government are competent to agree on 4. It' it is more complicated than that, 
you have not the time to prepare adequately or to be properly briefed on 
detail; you will probably do more harm than good. I do not think that either 
was very pleased, but it is so and when it is seen that nothing important is 
achieved at a Summit Meeting there will be a feeling of anti-climax. This 
applied to our meeting in Washington. 66 
Both Eden and Lloyd were very hard worked amen, but even at that it is striking 
and somewhat mysterious that their actions should have been at such variance with the 
advice of their experts. Moreover it is very odd that they should deal so lightly with a 
matter which had become of crucial concern to Whitehall in the aftermath of the 
Bulganin and Khrushchev tour of South East Asia. This is an important point which 
surely would bear further examination. For it was Eden and the Egypt Committee, 
and not the permanent officials, who jealously guarded the decision making process 
through the Suez Crisis. 
Y 
The Washington Conference proceedings were vapid and in consequence are generally 
considered of small importance. And yet in January 1956 permanent officials, if not 
quite all politicians, perceived that a crucially important development for the future of 
Britain's role as a great power had occurred. The Soviet leader's tour in Asia signified 
a further step towards a global policy. Whitehall realised all too well that as the Soviet 
super power moved out into the wider world, British power would be forced to recede 
before it. Just as in 1947, the crucial objective then became to get the Americans to 
take their place. Lloyd's memoir implicitly admits that this is where the significance 
of the Washington Conference lay. Although in a limited way Eden was trying to 
increase American support for Britain's position by securing an American commitment 
to the Baghdad Pact, he put the emphasis in his conversations with Eisenhower and his 
speeches on partnership. Yet matters had long gone beyond this point. The reality of 
Britain's dependence on American economic muscle in this new economic cold war 
was readily admitted by the likes of Sir Leslie Rowan and Peter Thorney fs4r It would 
take Suez for the scales to fall completely from Eden's eyes concerning, economic 
weakness. 
Bulganin and Khrushchev's tourism at the end of 1955 played an important part in 
the British Government's (if not Eden's) understanding of the changing nature of 
Soviet foreign policy. By the 20th Party Congress more or less all the innovative 
themes which were to be raised by Khrushchev had been put into practice during the 
following year. The "Zone of Peace", for example, was an established fact of Soviet 
foreign policy in British eyes by the end of 1955. However, the importance of this 
66 ibid. pp. 40-41. 
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change and its implications for Britain had not been fully digested by Eden. It was not 
until after Bulganin and Khrushchev extended their tourism to include Britain that the 
gap between the permanent officials' understanding of the limits of Soviet style 
coexistence and the Prime Minister's was fully closed. 
Chapter- 8 
The Impact of the 20th Party Congress and the Soviet Visit to Britain 
Taking Tea with Dukes and Duchesses 
"Back at Number 10, I had to decide what our policy should now be. The present 
Soviet rulers had as much confidence as their predecessors in the ultimate triumph of 
communism. They were unshakeable determined. The methods they would employ 
might be different from those of Stalin and they might be harder to meet... We had to 
consider the adjustments needed in our policies to cope with a new situation, for a new 
situation it undoubtedly was". 
Anthony Eden 
Our attention must now turn to developments after the visit to Washington which were 
further to confirm the Northern Department in its analysis of Soviet foreign policy. 
The 20th Party Congress provided a theoretical proof for what had already become 
apparent in practice. It was also increasingly difficult for Eden to evade the 
fundamental importance of what had happened in the Soviet Union, the visit of 
Bulganin and Khrushchev to Britain in April of 1956 was to prove particularly 
important in this context. 
Consequently, the issue of a response to the Soviet "economic offensive" which 
had been put on a backburner during the visit to Washington, basically relegated to 
discussions with the Canadians, became increasingly important. Indeed the wider 
realities of peaceful coexistence in a thermonuclear age were to provide much of the 
inspiration behind the defence and foreign policy review which Eden presided over in 
the lead up to the Suez Crisis. There were even those who argued that the manner in 
which international rivalry was developing and would in future express itself might 
provide Britain with a way out from her financial difficulties. Impecunity, as ever, 
provided a powerful stimulus to innovation. 
However, the long-term significance of all of this is less important for the 
purposes of this thesis than the evidence it provides for changing British perceptions of 
Soviet policy. By the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of July, 1956 in 
London there was essentially a consensus within the British Government, both in terms 
of what was happening in the Soviet Union and its significance. The gap between the 
opinions of permanent officials and politicians had been closed. The crises in Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East which degenerated into violence during the second half of 
the year Fitted quite comfortably into this new framework. 
The process of sorting out what implications this analysis had for British policy in 
turn was disrupted by Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. This, effectively, is 
the point at which the curtain falls upon my research. However. I shall, amongst other 
things. suggest in my conclusion that the British Government's _inderstanding of 
Soviet 
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foreign policy had a profound and often undervalued influence upon Eden's reaction to 
this "theft". 
THE PARTY CONGRESS 
As the Soviet Communist Party geared up towards its Twentieth Party Congress the 
attention of the British Embassy in Moscow was focused on the implications which it 
might have for Khruslhchev's position within the leadership. In preparation for the 
main event, the Communist Parties of the Republics which made up the Soviet Union, 
as was the tradition, held their own congresses. Sir William Hayter, in a despatch of 
the 3rd February, 1956, commented on the prominence which had been given to 
Khrushchev at a number of these events. This indication of the First Secretary's 
growing importance was further bolstered by shifts in the Party hierarchy which 
seemed to favour his supporters. Hayter concluded that the all Soviet Congress was 
likely to be the vehicle for a substantial entrenchment of Khrushchev's position once 
more at the expense of both Malenkov and Molotov, although he very much doubted 
that Khrushchev would be powerful enough to assail directly their personal positions 
on the Presidium. 1 The British Embassy's attention at this point was Firmly set upon 
the implications which the Congress might have for the future of the Soviet leadership. 
However, it soon became apparent that the 20th Party Congress was not merely to 
be another demonstration of Khrushchev's command of political infighting. Although 
there could be no doubting that his position was enhanced by the Congress there was 
no indication that any decisive move towards a despotic grasp on power had been 
made. Furthermore, in some ways the Congress manifested the limitations of 
Khrushchev's position as much as the strengths. '- It was, rather, in the arena of 
1 FO 371 1227767 NS 1017/4, Despatch, Hayter to Selwyn Lloyd, 3rd February, 1956. The 
difficulties which Ponomarenko and Shatalin were facing in the process of re-election and the 
promotion of Dudorov as Minister of Internal Affairs were adduced as further evidence of 
Khrushchev's rising influence. The former were, of course, "Malenkov men" and the later was a 
"Khrushchev man". Hayter also thought that the 1955 plan results and the 1956 Budget seemed 
increasingly to suggest that there had been a very real division over economic policy in 1954/55, 
rather than merely it political struggle dressed up in industrial clothing. The 1955 Plan results in 
particular showed a very sharp change in economic policy in the course of the year. with a shift back 
to heavy industrial production. FO 371 122862 NS 1102/6. Despatch, Chancery, Moscow to 
Northern Department, 7th February, 1956. This view had already been put forward tentatively by 
the Embassy to the Northern Department in the immediate aftermath of Malenkov's fall almost a 
year earlier, FO 371 116638 NS 1017/37, Letter from Hayter to Hohler, 18th February, 1955. See 
Power and Policy, pp. 270-271. 
2 FO 371 122770 NS 1015/109, Despatch, Hayter to Lloyd, 8th larch. 1956. In this the Embassy 
provided a detailed analysis of changes in the Party's composition and the effect of the Congress on 
the leadership. Khrushchev's "authority" seemed to have been substantially increased but, 
[I]n attacking the cult of the individual personality, many members of the Central Committee 
may have wanted to warn Khrushchev as much as anyone else that there must be no more 
Stalins. The re-election of the same eleven members of the Presidium, and the tone of personal 
authority with which many of them spoke. also suggests that Khrushchev's power is genuinely 
limited by the need to a`_ree with his closest colleagues. In short. I think that the 20th Party 
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general policy that the Congress was to provide most of its interest. The two speeches 
which Khrushchev delivered, on the 14th February in public and the 24th February 
notoriously in private, were provoking. The first excited by its ideological novelty and 
the second startled by its historical candour. 3 
At the beginning of the Congress British observers suffered a bout of deja vu. 4 
This was not because they did not understand the importance of the ideological 
innovations contained in Khrushchev's 14th February speech, but that they seemed 
little more than the logical corollary of the practice of Soviet foreign policy over the 
previous three years, and in particular 1955.5 The new formulations on different paths 
to socialism, the nonsense of war in a thermonuclear age and peaceful competition did 
not cut a great deal of ice in London. The implications of the Secret Speech took a 
little longer to become clear, not least because the Congress had ended before news of 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin began to filter through to the western world. As 
far as British observers were concerned it was this aspect of Khrushchev's reformism, 
when they were fully apprised of it, which was the most unusual. 
In a despatch of the 29th February, 1956, Sir William Hayter did go so far as to 
suggest that, 
It is probable that the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party will be 
chiefly remembered for the promulgation of the two new doctrines on the 
possibility of future wars and on differing ways to socialism. 6 
Hayter was particularly impressed that the Congress had ended the Soviet Communist 
Party's long adherence to the doctrine of the inevitability of war. As late as 1953, he 
pointed out, Stalin had been underlining it in his Economic Problems of Socialism. 
Indeed, Stalin was now altogether passe, 
Congress has increased Khrushchev's authority and stature; but it has made it more unlikely 
than ever that he will become personal dictator. 
3 English translations of both speeches, Khrushchev's Central Committee Report and the Secret 
Speech are respectively to he found in Leo Gravliow (ed. ), Current Soviet Policies 11, The 
Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Parry Congress and its Aftermath, pp. 29-59 and pp. 
172-188. The former was published by Pravda on the 15th February, 1956, the latter is in the 
English translation of Khrushchev's own apologia, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 341-353. For 
detailed treatment of the domestic and political importance of the Secret Speech in particular see 
Khrushchev, the Years in Power, pp. 66-74: Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, pp. 33-39 and 
Power and Policy, pp. 263-291. On Khrushchev's ideological innovations in foreign policy which 
were outlined in his Central Committee Report see "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign 
Policy". pp. 237-260 and Soviet Foreign Police, pp. 61. 
4 There is a very bulky printed record of the avalanche of reports and despatches which Sir William 
Hayter sent hack to London on the Congress at FO 371 122770 NS 1015/109. 
5 Edward Crankshaw argues in his 1966 hook, Khrushchev, a Biography. p. 227, that the importance 
of these modifications - which amounted to a rewriting of Leninism - was not gasped in the West at 
the time because of the not unnatural tendency to regard all statements of policy as exercises in 
deception". Crankshaw's comment is not entirely applicable to the British Foreign Office. They 
did not discount Khrushchev's theonsing as bogus. but rather tended to down play its practical 
importance as they considered it already to have been put into effect. 
6 FO 31 122770 NS 101 / 109. Despatch. Hayter to Lloyd. 29th February, 1956. 
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Lenin was the dominating figure of the 20th Congress, which was represented 
by most speakers as a loyal return to his teachings, and it is indicative of the 
practical approach of the present Soviet leadership that even Lenin can be 
repudiated when it suits their book.? 
However, in a further despatch specifically on the Congress' treatment of foreign 
policy issues Hayter was less enthusiastic. 8 He pin-pointed the three most important 
themes, already stated, which Khrushchev had raised in his speech of the 14th 
February and which had not been substantially added to or modified by any subsequent 
comment. Hayter went on to present a summary of the salient points. 
Khrushchev had begun his speech by stressing the economic confidence with 
which the Soviet Vnion faced the West-9 He continued to "contrast the behaviour of 
the war-mongers with that of the peace-lovers", a theme which fitted in well with his 
development of the new "Zone of peace" doctrine. t0 After a few relatively moderate 
gibes against colonialism, Khrushchev had once more emphasised his Government's 
desire for better relations with Western Powers, particularly Britain and France; 
although Hayter pointed out that nothing new was on the table regarding any 
outstanding international questions such as Germany. Finally Khrushchev's attention 
had turned to the favourite topic of the moment, peaceful coexistence. Although 
admitting that the report's tone had been reasonable, Hayter made of it a withering 
summary, 
The report in general is characterised by a more marked degree of dishonesty 
than one is accustomed to expect even from Soviet leaders. Khrushchev 
cannot really be so ill-informed as to believe that shrinking Western domestic 
markets are a feature of the Western economic scene. Nor, of course, can he 
believe the fiction, repeated once again, that Hitler was helped by the West. 
He does not pause to reconcile his praise for the heroic struggle of the 
communist parties abroad with his ardent advocacy of the five principles 
[Nehru's five principles of neutralism]. His "zone of peace" concept is a 
patently dishonest attempt to suggest that the states concerned are following 
7 ibid. 
8 FO 371 122770 NS 101 /109, Despatch, Hayter to Lloyd. Ist March. 1956. 
9 ibid., Hayter took pleasure in exposing Some of the flaws in Khrushchev's assessment of the 
economic situation, 
In stressing the embarrassment for capitalism of the expansion of the socialist market, the 
Soviets are of course being; thoroughly inconsistent. If the expansion of the socialist market is 
intensifying the difficulties of the capitalist world, why the impassioned plea for a greater 
volume of trade which figures in a later section of the report'? Why rail against the stultifying 
effect on East/West trade of discriminatory practices by the West, if by following these 
practices capitalism is contributing to its own decay'? For there is no question of the socialist 
camp requiring this commerce; "The development of the countries of socialism", says 
Khrushchev, "is characterised by their complete self-sufficiency... ". Once again the 
fraudulence of Soviet pretensions to favour an expansion of trade with the West stands 
exposed. 
10 ibid., Hayter interpreted this to include at least India, Burma, Indonesia. Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria 
as well as neutral countries such as Austria and Finland. 
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the same foreign policy as the Soviet Union. He is apparently unconcerned by 
the inconsistency between condemnation of the policy of "massive retaliation" 
and his own threat of a "crushing repulse to the aggressors". And he caps it 
all by characterising perversion of the truth as a peculiarly bourgeois vice. 
The Ambassador concluded his despatch thus, 
To the extent that it is covered by this despatch [i. e. foreign policy], the Party 
Congress can only be regarded as a grandiloquent restatement of Soviet 
foreign policy in its ideological context. As such it is of interest, but I can see 
no sign of any new line eºnerging. 
This was, essentially, the view which the Embassy and Northern Department were 
to share even after maturer reflection. It was also the view which the Northern 
Department was to pass on to the rest of Whitehall. Ideology was all well and good, 
but the writing had long been on the wall. In his report for the first quarter of 1956, 
Hayter downplayed the significance of both the end of Lenin's dogma that war formed 
an integral part in the fall of capitalism and the new latitude afforded in a nations 
struggle towards socialism. Furthermore, he added a heavy dose of ulterior motivation 
to his analysis, 
These two innovations are interesting and important in form, but they imply 
not so much a change in Soviet foreign policy as the supply of new 
implements for executing existing policy. Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability 
of war was an obvious handicap to a government preaching peace and co- 
existence, and its elimination was clearly only a matter of time. the new 
theory of the parliamentary road to socialism is clearly a useful weapon in the 
present campaign for popular fronts and for the conciliation of nationalist 
movements with parliamentary beliefs. 12 Neither of these two new doctrines 
really fundamentally alters the direction which Soviet foreign policy has been 
pursuing since the death of Stalin. 13 
In its treatment of external relations there was little in the ? 0th Party Congress to 
change the apprehension of Soviet foreign policy which the British Government had 
11 FO 371 122768 NS 1015/60, Minute by Northern Department, 24th March. 1956. This minute was 
entitled Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU and was printed for the consumption of the rest of 
the Foreign Office and other Government Departments. It considered that the Party Congress "put 
the seal" on the "steady evolution" of Soviet policy since Stalin's death and that this "achievement" 
was considerable given the apparent veneer of unity which the leadership had maintained at the same 
time. However, the organic nature of these changes was once again emphasised, growing as they 
did from the Soviet Government's attempts over the recent past to come to terms with a 
thermonuclear age. The Americans had come to very similar conclusions. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 
XXIV, p. 59 Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, 
Washington. ? 
7th February. 1956. For Charles Bohlen's personal recollections see Witness to 
History, pp. 393-396. 
12 ibid., Northern Department pointed out that Khrushchev's emphasis on different paths was not 
entirely new as this had been Khrushchev'. theme on his vo. it to Belgrade in the first half of 1955. 
The credence __iven to the parliamentary process was. however, quite novel. 
13 FO 371 122769 NS 1015/88, Despatch. Hayter to Lloyd. 4th April, 1956 and Minute by R. A. 
Hibbert, 5th April. 1956. The Northern Department was in appreciative agreement with the 
Embassy's prognosis. 
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developed since 1953, and particularly in the course of 1955. There was certainly no 
hint that the Cold War was coming, even ever so slowly, to an end. 14 Khrushchev's 
innovations were explained by Hayter and the Northern Department too adequately 
within the existing framework for there to be any need of a re-evaluation. Indeed, 
there seemed good reason for greater concern as to the efficacy of Soviet foreign 
policy in its continuing attempt to undermine the West. In all of this the British 
probably did under-estimate the importance of the doctrinal innovations which 
Khrushchev had launched and certainly do not seem to have been aware of the 
implications which they had for Sino-Soviet relations. 15 
However, Khrushchev's savaging of the Stalin legacy fitted a little less 
comfortably into the pattern because of its violence. It was not quite so easy to see 
what the Soviets had to gain by such a move. Clearly Khrushchev was taking a 
considerable risk in damming the marl with whom so much of Communism's 
credibility, within and without the Soviet Union, was inextricably bound. 
The first indications that there had been a secret side to the Congress' proceedings 
were reported by the Embassy in a telegram of the 12th March. 16 It seemed from 
"fairly well authenticated rumours" that Khrushchev had kept his most caustic remarks 
about Stalin to a special meeting at the very end of the Congress. Details at this point 
were sketchy, but the basic outline was apparent. 17 There were further intimations that 
14 FO 371 122765 NS 1015113, Despatch, Hayter to Lloyd, 17th February, 1956. In his immediate 
reaction to Khrushchev's 14th February speech which Eden read and agreed with, Hayter 
philosophised, 
A genuine agreement to live and let live with an expanding Marxist State is a contradiction in 
terms. The only hope is that this State should cease to he expanding, cease to be genuinely 
Marxist... Are there any traces in this speech of the beginning of such a process? It is, I fear, 
too early to answer this question in the affirmative. The process, if ever it begins at all, will 
certainly be an unconscious one, and long after the regime has become essentially conservative 
it will continue, like the regimes that grew out of the French and American revolutions, to 
intone revolutionary slogans... I do not think that there is anything in this speech which would 
justify us in believing that this stage has now been reached, consciously or unconsciously. On 
the contrary it threatens us with new and more insidious dangers. 
Hayter was though rather tickled by Khrushchev's proposal to set up "hoarding schools", largely as 
an attempt to deal with increases in hooliganism among the Soviet young. The Winchester educated 
Ambassador could not but notice overtones of Dr. Arnold in the rhetoric used to candy the idea by 
the Communist Party's First Secretary. 
15 On this see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sinu-Soýº4et Conflict, 1956-61. pp. 39-65, and David Floyd, 
Mao against Khrushcheº'. Both Zagoria and Floyd in a sense a`*ree with the Foreign Office view of 
1956, in so far as the impact of doctrinal reform on Sine-Soviet relations was to take a couple of 
years to come to its bitter fruit whereas the division over the secret speech and de-Stalinisation 
became more immediately apparent. 
16 FO 371 122767 NS 1015/43, Telegram No. 263, Hayter to London. 12th March, 1956. For the 
American reaction which was not appreciably different from the British see FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 
XXIV, pp. 72-108. For Khrushchev's account of the genesis of the Secret Speech see Khrushchev 
Remembers, pp. 3341-35-3). 
17 ibid., Stalin, it seemed, had tortured and killed to the extent that his lieutenants answered his 
summons in fear of their lives. Khrushchev had also accused Stalin of ignoring warnings about 
Germany's surprise attack in 1941 and of having "liquidated" 30.000 of the Soviet armies best 
officers. 
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Stalin was also about to be publicly thrown from his place of honour, literally in the 
removal and destruction of the many monuments to his vanity. 18 
Over the following days the trickle of evidence increased, leading the Embassy to 
conclude that the Soviet Government was attempting to transmit the revelation of this 
new Stalin to its people gently, so as to cushion the shock. 19 By the end of March 
sufficient information had become available for Havter to send a full despatch on the 
subject to London. 20 Indeed by this point it reasonably accurate account of what 
Khrushchev's speech contained had already appeared in the Western press. '-1 Hayter's 
despatch fleshed out a little upon the content of the speech. However, the biggest 
question left in the minds of foreign observers was not about the actual text, but about 
causation. Hayter stressed that it was not so much the theme of anti-Stalinism which 
was new, but the vehemence of its expression, 
Stalin was gradually assuming life-size, and if this process had been continued 
the "cult of the individual" could, in the course of a few years, have been 
eliminated without any psychological upheaval... But Khrushchev and his 
colleagues have not been content with this, and have decided to tell the Soviet 
people the whole truth, or a great deal of it, about Stalin's tyrannical ways. 
Why should Khrushchev have decided on this new approach? Hayter did not think 
that the explanation would be found by reference to the Cold War as the confessions of 
the Congress were much more likely to harm the unity and credibility of the 
"international Communist movement" than they were to aid it. '-'- Rather he suggested 
that there were three factors at work. Firstly. the Cult of Stalin stood in the way of the 
modern society which the Communist leadership was attempting to create in the Soviet 
18 FO 371 122767 NS 1051/54. Despatch, Moscow Chancery to Northern Department, 15th March, 
1956. By this point it was known that Khrushchev had also castigated Stalin's self glorification and 
made some reference to the Doctor's Plot. However, the impact upon graven images was yet 
limited, 
Although Khrushchev is reported to have said that statues of Stalin would gradually be reduced 
in number, we have so tiºr only heard of one hein`* removed - from the entrance of the hall of 
the Moscow Conservatory. It seems rather unusual for Soviet musicians to be in the political 
avant `; adle. 
This situation was very soon to change. 
19 FO 371 122767 NS 1015/55. Telegram No. 302. Hayter to London. 19th March, 1956. Hayter 
reported that "many sources" confirmed the existence of a letter outlining Khrushchev's criticism of 
Stalin which was being read Out at ad hoc meetings of Party Members in "Soviet institutions and 
factories". 
20 FO 371 122767 NS 1015/67. Despatch. Hayter to Lloyd, 23rd March, 1956. So quick had details 
filtered out to the West that Havter thought the Soviet leadership must have intended Khrushchev's 
Secret Speech to he secret only in name. Copies had been available for purchase at a Danish 
Embassy reception on the 11th March. 
21 The Tunes. 17th March, 1956. 
Robert Rhodes James is, presumably, not referring to the opinion of the British Government when 
he asserts that Khrushchev's, "Islensational repudiation of Stalin had led some to believe that he was 
likely to he less assertive of Soviet policies outside Russia. a delusion that was to be swiftly dashed 
by experience of this cruel, cunning, but not wholly unattractive villain". See Anthony Eden, pp. 
433-434. 
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Union. Stalin had stood for the stifling of individual initiative, a quality which was 
essential for the further development of the Soviet economy. 23 Secondly. it may have 
been that Khrushchev felt it necessary to finish the Congress with his expose in an 
attempt to will around party members who were not impressed by the new line which 
had been promulgated during the previous days. 24 In this Hayter was referring to the 
rank and file and not a clique within the leadership. Thirdly, there was perhaps a less 
"rational" factor to be considered. Stalin's worms might finally have taken a 
posthumous opportunity to bite back after years of humiliation and suffering at his 
hands. 25 Hayter was quite clear that whatever the leadership's motivation may have 
been the policy was fraught with dangers, 
Once again they have ignored the effect on foreign Communist Parties. They 
have deliberately taken the risk of offending a large proportion of their own 
people. They have laid themselves open to the charge of doing nothing to 
restrain Stalin during his lifetime. All this is a measure of their personal 
hatred of Stalin and their confidence in the strength of their own position now. 
The Foreign Office's understanding of why Khrushchev had indulged himself did 
not change greatly over the coming months, not even after the final appearance of a 
complete text of the speech on the 4th June. 1956 by the good office of the US State 
Department. The resignation in this same month of both Molotov and Kaganovich 
from their Ministerial posts did lead to some speculation as to the importance of 
Khrushchev's speech in respect of his control over the leadership. However, 
particularly in the case of Kaganovich, the issue was by no means clear to British 
observers. 26 But, in the main, Hayter's emphases on the need to foster the initiative of 
the Soviet citizen and less rational impulses seemed sound. E. E. Orchard, in an 
23 Hayter to Lloyd, 23rd March, 1956. Haytcr reflected, "they [the Soviet leaders] want to turn the 
Soviet people into a progressive, efficient, enterprising. scientifically-minded nation; in fact to turn 
the Soviet Union into a kind of Socialist United States of America... It is easy to imagine that they 
felt hampered everywhere by the heritage of Stalin". The failure to shuffle off the legacy of Stalin 
was, of course, to play a fundamental role in the ultimate collapse of Soviet power. 
24 ibid. Hayter reported that it seemed, "very likely that after Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's speeches at 
the congress many delegates.. may have defended Stalin and criticised the new line". 
25 ibid. Hayter postulated, "the Soviet leaders may have wanted for a long time to remove the 
innumerable monuments to so repulsive a memory. But it is only now, in the flush of confidence 
after the 20th Party Congress. that they have felt able to take the decisive step to blacken Stalin's 
name" . 
?6 On the Ist June Molotov resigned in favour of D. T. Shepilov who at this point was a pronounced 
Khrushchevite and apostle of liberalisation. Kaganovich followed on the 6th June. leaving his 
position as Chairman of the State Committee on Labour and the Wage Question. see Power and 
Policy, p. 291. There was some debate as to the importance of Ka_ganovich's decline, not least 
because Khrushchev had made references in the secret speech to both his and Molotov's Stalinist 
past which implicated them in the appointment of Yezhov and thus the purges of the thirties. The 
truth of the matter was not entirely clear to the Foreign Office at the time, FO 371 122771 NS 
1015/122. Despatch, Moscow Chancery to Northern Department, 15th June, 1956. and Minutes by 
T. E. Bridges, 28th June. 1956, ans! E. E. Orchard. 30th June. 1956. Molotov's position was also 
the subject of some speculation, not least because of favourable references in Voprns-v Istorii to his 
role in 1917. It seemed he was down, but not yet quite Out. 
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Information Department Minute of the 13th June, went so far as to liken the Secret 
Speech to the Jewish Day of Atonement, 
The Russians remain an emotional people and Khrushchev may have felt that a 
major act of collective political expiation, redeemed by the transfer of guilt to 
Stalin as the scapegoat, would re-enthLIse Soviet society with some of its old 
Communist fervour... the denunciation of Stalin is also a token of greater 
personal security. it is quite possible that the intelligentsia and administration 
will exercise greater initiative the more they sense they are safe. 27 
The 20th Party Congress acted as a grand confirmation of the Foreign Office's 
assessment of Soviet policy over the previous year or more. So much so that it seemed 
at the time to be rather unremarkable in most aspects. The Secret Speech was the one 
truly surprising development, apparently owing as much to emotion as rational 
calculation. Certainly it was very shortly to have a calamitous impact upon the 
stability of the Soviet Common wealth. 28 However, more immediately important in 
influencing the attitude of Her Majesty's Ministers was Bulganin's and Khrushchev's 
descent on Britain from the 18th to the 27th April, 1956. 
THE VISIT 
Khrushchev's and Buläanin's visit to Britain was witness to some very frank talking, 
particularly on the side of the hosts. However, possibly the most important impact of 
the event was the influence it had upon Eden's appreciation of Soviet foreign policy. 29 
The analysis which the Northern Department had developed during 1955 finally seems 
to have been fully taken on board as a consequence of the impressions which were 
garnered by both Eden and Lloyd, although there was still to be flickers of the vanity 
of statesmanship. 30 
27 FO 371 122771 NS 1015/127, Minute by E. E. Orchard, 13th June, 1956. Orchard further 
commented that this last point was something of a two-edged sword and that the "initiative" of the 
Russian people might not always work to the advantage of the Soviet Government. He had begun 
his piece as follows, "although there is every sign that Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin is the 
culminating point of a long process which began within three weeks of his death, its emotional 
impulsiveness and unexpected (though qualified) historical realism have injected the most potent 
stimulant yet into the post-Stalin system". There was also a Northern Department submission on the 
issue at FO 371 122771 NS 1015/117, which has not been released under the thirty year rule. It 
seems, however, unlikely that this would contain any great difference of opinion. 
28 By the summer of 1956 it was clear that the Soviet Government was having second thoughts about 
the wisdom of de-Stalinisation. particularly in relation to Eastern Europe. FO 371 122785 NS 
1021/50, Despatch. C. Parrot, Moscow to F. 0., 27th June, 1956 and minute by T. Brimelow, 21st 
August, 1956. 
29 For an appreciation of its place in the Soviet 'schema see. Diaren« in Europe, pp. 68-70. 
30 FO 371 122821 NS 10522/307. Telegram No. 2172, from Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Roger Makins. 
Washington. 18th April. 1956. Clarification of Soviet intentions was the main British objective. 
The talks were justified to the Americans by Lloyd in the following terms. "we are not optimistic of 
achieving si: _nificant results, hut we may have the opportunity of the probing the Soviet mind. I 
need hardly say that we shall take care not to prejudice the interests cat our allies or to get out of step 
on matters which are of joint allied concern". He then went on to list British objectives which I 
paraphrase as follows. Firstly, new light on Soviet thou. hts on the international situation and what 
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There had, of course, been some debate within Government as to whether the visit 
should be allowed to go ahead as a consequence of Khrushchev's virulently anti-British 
rhetoric in the previous year. However, diplomacy prevailed over amor propre, not 
least because the Soviets made it quite clear that they very much wanted the visit. 31 
Hayter observed the Soviet's concern for the success of the venture in his report for the 
first quarter of 1956 , "relations with the United Kingdom reached a high pitch of 
synthetic cordiality, in Moscow at any rate,... in preparation for the forthcoming visit 
of the Soviet leaders to Great Britain". 3- He ww . 1s even invited to address the Soviet 
people via television in the lead up to the visit. a novelty which seems to have been 
carried of with some aplonib. 33 
British pique was confined to the trimming of the programme of events which was 
4 to be enjoyed by the plenipotentiaries of Socialism. I Even so they were subjected to 
an intensive introduction to what Whitehall considered the essentials of British 
civilisation which included Oxford University, a nuclear reactor and Holyrood Palace 
as well as tea with her Majesty. 35 This rather narrow slice of British life was reflected 
in the apartments chosen for the Soviets in Claridges Hotel. 36 
their ainis really are. Secondly. to repeat criticism of Soviet policies and acts. Thirdly, to probe the 
possibility of new departures to settle hi-1 issues. Fourthly, to cast light on the situation in the 
Soviet Union, particularly after the deposition of Stalin. Fifthly, to ask the visitors to clarify their 
recent repudiation of the doctrine of inevitable contli: t and how they propose to operate peaceful 
coexistence and competition. Sixthly, to take them LIP on their desire tor closer contacts. 
31 FO 371 122817 NS 1052/187, Minute, H. A. F. Hohl: r. lath March. 1956. 
32 FO 371 122769 NS 10 15/88, Quarterly Report. Hay ter to Selwyn Lloyd, 4th April, 1956. 
33 FO 371 122820 NS 1052/292, Despatch, Hayter to Northern Department, 20th March, 1956. In a 
letter of the Ist April the Northern Department . ongrttuktted Hayter on successfully walking the 
tightrope between servility and offence. The text of Havter's broadcast was also published in 
Pravda, 20th March. , 
34 FO 371 122809 NS 1052/20, Minute by H. A. F. Hohler, 5th January 1956, submitting reduced 
programme of events. At FO 371 122832 NS 105_' 583. H. A. F. Hohler gave the following 
justification for the visit despite the adverse turn of the international atmosphere after Geneva in 
July in a brief dated 30th April, 1956, prepared for Selwyn Lloyd's meeting with the West German 
Foreign Minister Herr von Brentano, 
We nevertheless decided to persevere with the visit as we felt that the increase of tension made 
talks with the Soviet leaders more, rather than less, necessary. For this purpose London was 
the most suitable place. Our perseverance has hen justified in the course of the long and 
strenuous talks which took place during the visit. 
35 Hayter records in his memoirs misgivings about the itinerary, A Double Life, p. 137, 
The programme that had been designed for them was not one I should have chosen myself; it 
took them to a number of historical and beautiful places, but neither of them had any visual 
sense or interest in history, and they saw little of the modern industrial or agricultural areas in 
which Khrushchev at least would have been really interested... 
Hayter expressed these reservations at the time in FO 371 122838 NS 1052/606, Minute, Sir 
William Hayter, 3rd May, 1956. Khrushchev had -ýpccitically made comment at the and that he 
would have preferred to see more farms and tactonc:. ý. although Hayter thought Khrushchev most 
relaxed "at a tea-party in Holvrood Palace attended by -verv duke and duchess in Scotland". 
36 Peter Wright in Spycwclwr, The Candid! Awohl (). %, ralY!! \ Oj (r Settiur Intelligence Officer, pp. 72-73, 
recalls the hugging, of Khrushchcv's suite by : NI15 . t7- a . onsidcrahle technical achievement which 
produced little, apart trum the following, "he I Khru!. h: hcv I wiLs an extraordinarily vain man. He 
stood in front of the mirror preening himself fur hours at a time, and tossing with his hair parting. I 
recall thinking that in Eden. Khrushchev had found the perfect match". 
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There had, indeed, already been something of a precursor in the visit during 
March of Malenkov in his diminished capacity as Minister of Electric Power 
Stations. 37 Hugh Gaitskell in particular seems to have gained a very positive 
impression after a total of five hours of conversation with Malenkov. This experience 
provided a pointed contrast with the disastrous hospitality which the Labour Party 
offered Khruslhchev. 38 
Those planning the event in the Foreign Office were much concerned with the 
potential for embarrassment of Khrushchev's habit of extempore speechifying. 39 He 
had afterall built up a substantial reputation in the held since 1953. This was the main 
factor behind the relatively limited exposure to the Great British public which the 
Soviet leaders were afford, although there was also some concern that the wrong sort 
of people, that is extreme left sympathisers. might provide a supportive audience. 40 
Given the debacle which Khrushchev's one substantial ad hoc contribution caused 
within the confines of a House of Commons function room in the company of the 
Labour Party, caution over Khrushchev's behaviour was probably justified. 41 Less so 
was concern for the reaction of the British people. In fact Khrushchev and Bulganin 
faced a politely indifferent and at times even hostile populace. So much so that Hayter 
thought it must have been a confusing experience for the Soviets, given that the 
capitalist government seemed more genially inclined to them than the oppressed 
proletariat. 42 
37 There is a record of this visit at FO 371 122953 NS 163 10 and 122954 NS 16310. 
38 See Phillip Williams, Huh Gair. vkell, p. 412 and also Phillip Williams. cd.. The Diaty of Hugh 
Gaitskell, pp. 482-493 which contains a record of the conversations. In Harry Hopkins account of 
the 40's and 50's, The New Look, p. 385. there is a striking photograph. taken during the visit, of 
Malenkov in festal mood sar wiched between two members of the Dagenham girl pipers band 
dressed as extras from Brig O'Doon. 
39 There is a large amount of material on preparations for the visit at FO 371 l? '8l? NS 1052,1 2813 
NS 1052 and 122814 NS 1052. 
40 Khrushchev complains of this in his memoir. Khrushchev Remembers. p. 409. Lloyd is quite 
specific on the issue. Suet 1956, pp. 62-63, "it had been feared that their visit would provide an 
opportunity for large left-wing demonstrations". The Northern Department's minuting in 
preparation for the 17th April makes clear that they expected the Soviet leaders would, behave as it 
was in their interests to put on a good international show. However, the risk of exposing so volatile 
a man as Khrushchev unchaperoned was not to he taken, FO 371 122813 NS 1052/96. Northern 
Department Minute. Ist March, 1956. 
41 FO 371 122810 NS [052/31, Minute by H. A. F. Hohler, 23rd January, 1956. Ironically at this 
point Hohler was expressing concern that such a meeting fitted in with other Soviet attempts to get 
J(i"ý with European Socialist Parties. He hinted darkly "the idea may have emanated from a 
Russian source. " Dulles was to take comfort from the dinner, illustrative as it was of the difficulties 
the Soviets would face in encouraging co-operation between Communists and Socialists in Western 
countries. FRUS 1955-57. Vol. XXIV. p. 118. % emorandum of Discussion at 289th Meeting of the 
National Security Council. Washington. 2Sth June. 1956. 
42 FO 371 122834 NS l052'606. Minute. Haytcr. 3rd May. 1956. On the diplomatic niceties of the 
translation of "hot). hood see also, -1 Double Lije. p. 137. 
Charter S Page 179 
A desire to oil the wheels of diplomacy also informed the Foreign Office's attitude 
to the substantial mail which was received from the public on the visit. Most of it, 
although not all, was hostile and consequently fobbed of. 43 
Eden is quite clear in his memoirs that the main benefit gained by the encounter 
was the chance to speak plainly with the Soviets and develop some deeper mutual 
understanding. 44 Indeed he went to considerable lengths to ensure the talks were 
accorded the kind of secrecy which he thought their importance demanded. 45 
Khrushchev, in contrast, seems to have been rather less impressed by the business side 
of the visit. 46 Quite probably this is a reflection of the much more substantial impact 
which Eden's experience had upon his estimation of the enemy than vice-versa. 
The formal talks held at the start of the visit in Downing Street gave the habitual 
issues of East West debate, inevitably, a British twist. 47 The two most lively 
discussions were held over colonialism and Middle Eastern affairs, as might be 
expected given the difficulties which the British had faced as a consequence of Soviet 
foreign policy over the previous year. 
The first meeting gave Eden a chance to hit back at the Soviet rhetoric in India and 
South East Asia. 48 According to the British record, at least, he did so with some 
dignity and force. Khrushchev and Bulganin asserted that their speeches had 
denounced colonialism in the abstract rather then the British particular, consequently 
they considered Britain's offence to have been caused of misunderstanding. So far as 
Britain was in the process of decolonialisation they were in fact offering a backhanded 
compl i ment. 49 Eden was, however, not prepared to let the matter rest so easily, 
suggesting that if this was the Soviet view they should publicly compliment Britain's 
conversion of Empire into Commonwealth. There was also some attempt by the other 
British Ministers present. R. A. B. Butler and Selwyn Lloyd, to pin the colonialist tag on 
the Soviets. Khrushchev responded by stressing peaceful evolution as the means by 
which he hoped socialism might be achieved in other countries. There was, he insisted, 
no threat of Soviet interference abroad, whether through force or subversion. 
43 For example FO 371 122810 NS 1052/34, letter from Mr Barnett Janner MP, President of the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews, 6th January, 1956. This letter asked for an interview with 
Khrushchev in order to raise some less than diplomatic questions. The Northern Department palmed 
off this request, as so many others, with formulaic and vague platitudes. 
44 Full Circle, pp. 354-366. There is a substantial printed record of the formal talks. informal 
conversations and impressions of the Soviet leaders at FO 371 122836. 
45 There was even considerable reservations about showin`_ the minutes to the Americans: FO 371 
122834 NS 1052/605, %tinute by J. G. Ward, 7th May, 1956. 
46 Khrushchev Remembers, p. 404. Khrushchev's account dwells on the sight seeing rather than the 
plain talking. "substantively cur talks didn't add much to what had come out of our Geneva 
meeting". 
47 The old, but persistent chestnuts included European Security, German reunification. disarmament, 
strategic controls on East-West trade and, as Eden puts it in his memoir, "the hardy biennial so 
grimly described as "Cultural exchanges"". Eden'. love cat flowers provided in this metaphor a 
pungence generally lacking, from his prose, Full Circle. p. 360. 
48 FO 371 122836, Record of First Plenary Meeting. 19th April, 1956. 
49 Ibid. Khrushchev went :o tar as favourably to compare the French habit of clinging on in Indo- 
China and North Africa with Britain's more gracious retreat from Empire. 
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Selwyn Lloyd also took the opportunity to quiz the Soviets directly about their 
commitment to peaceful coexistence. As the record puts it. "the Foreign Secretary 
said that there was a view in this country that the new developments in the Soviet 
Union were only a change of tactics". Which point Bulganin replied to, after some 
diversion, 
They [the Soviets] were amused by the suggestion that recent steps taken by 
them merely had been a change of tactics. He referred to the Austrian State 
treaty and the communiques after their visits to Yugoslavia and India. It was 
impossible to imagine that the recent Congress simply represented a change in 
tactics. New principles had been set forth relating to both to their internal and 
to their foreign policy. 50 
The discussion ended with a bland endorsement of the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of others. 
The second meeting on the 20th April was specifically concerned with the Middle 
East and provides an interesting indicator of the British Government's understanding of 
its vital interests. It is important to understand that the following statement was not 
merely an expression of personal opinion, but the considered view of the British 
Government which had been established in discussions before the Soviets' arrival. 51 
The memo of the 20th April exchange records, 
The Prime Minister referred to a natter which affected the position of the 
United Kingdom. We were dependent in our industrial life on outside 
supplies of oil. Without that oil we should have unemployment and we should 
slowly starve to death. Our Russian friends would understand that we were 
not prepared to allow that to happen. For us the supply of oil, mainly from 
the Persian Gulf area was literally vital. 
Eden went on, in a melodramatic flourish which probably owed rather more to his own 
inspiration, 
He thought that he must be absolutely blunt about the oil because we would 
fight for it. 52 
50 ibid. 
51 FO 371 122827 NS 1052/485, Record of Discussions held in the Prime Minister's Office at the 
House of Commons, 16th April, 1956. At this meeting, the following advice had been t'iven, 
There was some discussion of the briefs on the Middle East. Sir William Hayter expressed the 
view that the best line to take on this was to bring home to the Russians the seriousness of the 
subject, by explaining the vital nature of our interests. They should be made to realise that 
interference in the Middle East was a serious matter. 
Eden's account cat' the negotiations in Full Circle tends tu over emphasise the role he personally 
played in deciding the British Position. Havter , gas. eßt course. in Britain for the duration of the 
Soviet visit. 
52 FO 371 122536. Record of Second Plenary \Ieetin_. 20th April. 1956. Eden's concern for 
"unemployment" provides a quaint contrast with Conservative politicians Ot our own day. Perhaps 
the Suez Crisis would not have led to Such a mess it dir. , "vlaior had been in har`e. 
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Such frankness seems to have startled Khrushchev. 53 
Eden's bellicosity is probably more illuminating of his own frame of mind than it 
was influential over Soviet foreign policy. Not least because by November of the same 
year his threat was proved most emphatically to be sincere. This was not to be the 
only expression of concern regarding Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Eden 
extended a number of feelers in an attempt to sound them out on the coordination of 
action in the interest of peace, in particular over Palestine. '- An equitable settlement 
of Arab-Israeli disputes would, of course, greatly have been to Britain's advantage. 55 
Khrushchev was not prepared to play ball. 
The talks were supplemented by informal conversations which went over much the 
same ground although at times in a more whimsical style. Selwyn Lloyd especially 
employed a twee line in diplomatic euphemism, referring to intelligence sources as 
"little birds" whilst discussing with Khrushchev the problem of Soviet arms supplies to 
Yemen and the Middle East in general. 56 These contacts were, in their way, valuable 
in affording the British a chance to get to know the Soviet leaders and to evaluate the 
relationship between them. 57 It seemed quite clear that Khrushchev was the man in 
authority, although there was more debate over the quality of his personal relations 
with Bulganin; Hayter thought them to be excellent. 58 
However, the Soviets were not about to make unguarded comments on matters of 
policy. Despite considerable priming on the issue of de-Stalinisation neither Bulganin 
53 Ibid. The record continues, "Mr Khrushchev said that the Prime Minister would hardly find 
sympathy with the Soviet Government if he said that he was prepared to start a war. They, for their 
part, would only resort to war if an attack were made on them or on the Warsaw Pact countries". 
Khrushchev also went on to raise Soviet concerns over the Baghdad Pact. Eden reports this 
exchange accurately in Full Circle, pp. 358-359. Lloyd talks about this session as the "one occasion 
when they [the talks seemed to approach a flash point", Sue; 1956, p. 62. Also see Evelyn 
Shuckburgh's diary entry for the day which records the reaction of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, also 
present at the Downing Street talks, Descent to Suez, p. 354. 
54 FO 371 122827 NS 1052/492, Record of Conversation between Eden and Khrushchev 18th April, 
1956. This was indeed one of the first serious issues which Eden raised with Khrushchev in a 
private dinner at Claridges on the 18th April immediately after the Soviets had arrived in London. 
Khrushchev's response, according to the record of Thomas Brimclow who was translating, was not 
encouraging, "Khrushchev said that he did not see how they could intervene in something that was 
up to the Israelis and Arabs to settle". Also Ivone Kirkpatrick's report of the visit to Pearson Dixon 
at the United Nations: FO 371 121236 V 1054/105. Letter, Kirkpatrick to Dixon, 1 1th May, 1956. 
55 See Descent to Suez, pp. 209-366. This aim consumed much the most frustrating part of Evelyn 
Shuckburgh's time after 1954. 
56 Khrushchev's account of this makes rather more of the "birdie" metaphor than Lloyd's. Khrushchev 
retorted that Britain was just as guilty of selling arms in the area. Possibly something was lost in 
the translation of his following remark, "wouldn't it he nice if Al the birdies started chirping the 
same thin., in both our ears - that we should assume a mutually hinding, obligation not to sell arms to 
anyone". 
ýKhrushcheº' Remembers, p. 404. See Site: 1956. p. 63 for an entertaining account of the 
journey to Harwell atomic power -station 
during which the "birds" did their chirping. Also FO 371 
122831 NS 1052/573, Record of a Conversation between S. S. O. F. A. and Bulganin and 
Khrushchev on the Journey between London and Harwell, 21 ý%t April. 1956. 
57 At least this was Selwyn Lloyd's opinion. Suez 1956. p. 62 
58 FO 371 122834 NS 105"606, Minute, Sir William Hayter. 3rd May. 1956 and Minute, H. A. F. 
Hohler, 3rd May, 1956. Hohler pointed out the Npccial police interpreter. a Mr Perry. had detected 
signs of strain between the two. The Northern Department tended towards Hayter's view. 
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or Khrushchev gave anything away, saving that they agreed it was a good thing. 
Indeed, on the 19th April, in the aftermath of dinner at 10 Downing Street Churchill 
adopted the curious role of Stalin's advocate commenting to Bulganin that he "had 
always found Stalin as good as his word and a great war leader, but could not speak of 
pre-war events. " Bulganin limited himself to confessing that lie "had advised" 
Khrushchev to make his Secret Speech. 59 The Soviet leaders proved no more candid 
abroad than when at home. 
Eden informed the British public in a television broadcast after the departure of the 
Soviet leaders that the talks were "the beginning of a beginning°. 6o The hope was that 
this dialogue might continue and produce more substantial results than the bland 
communique which was issued jointly in London-61 There were even plans made for a 
return visit by Eden to Moscow. 62 Overall the "Bulge and Khrush" tour proved a high 
point of goodwill between Britain and the Soviet Union, carrying the "spirit of 
Geneva", albeit in a rather scaled down form, into 1956. 
There were two notorious incidents which might have turned the aftermath rather 
more sour, but neither had any substantial impact. The clash between Khrushchev and 
the Labour Party was clearly no responsibility of the Government. It was caused by a 
combination of Khrushchev's bombastic extempore speech, made at the request of 
junior members of the Labour group. including lames Callaghan, and the insistence by 
Gaitskell that the issue of Soviet maltreatment of Social Democrats in Eastern Europe 
should be raised. Matters were made considerably worse by George Brown's 
combative response to Khrushchev. who was later to observe that if he were British he 
would be a Conservative voter. 63 
The Commander Crabbe Affair was potentially much more embarrassing. It was 
also fogged in considerable mystery which a House of Commons debate on the 10th 
May, 1956 did nothing to disperse. 64 It seems that a relatively minor official had 
sanctioned an attempt by the retired Commander Crabbe to examine underwater the 
hull of the Soviet leader's cruiser at anchor in Portsmouth. This was in contradiction 
of Eden's explicit and very sensible instructions that no such secret operations should 
occur during the visit to Britain. Crabbe's decapitated body was washed up some time 
later. However, the Soviets were just as keen as the British to further the atmosphere 
59 FO 371 122830 NS 1052/551, Record of Conversations at the Dinner at No. 10 Downing Street, 
April 19th. 1956. Eden later again introduced the subject of co-operation over Palestine into 
conversation with Buivanin to little suc ss. 
60 There is a copy of the address at FO 3-1 122835 NS 1052/630. 
61 This was published in a House of Commons White Paper. Cmd. 9753. April. 1956. 
62 The plan was to visit the Soviet Union later in the same year as a means of keeping the process 
going. There is a melancholy tilt full with the ephemera of futile or anisation at FO 371 122837 
NS 1052. Also Full Circle, p. 362. The Suez and Hungarian crises made such a visit impossible. 
63 Khrushchev'' account and that of Brown and Gaitskell. unsurprisingly, do not agree, see 
Khru lichee Remembers. hp. 41'1-413. George Brown. In Wv Wen'. pp. 69-75, Hugh Gairskell, pp. 
413-414. The Diary of Hu, i'h Guirskell. pp. 505-5 I S. also . -Indru,, v Eden. p. 434. 
64 Hcuc. curd Vol. 552. cols. 1760-1764. 
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of cordiality and so they graciously made no tuss. 65 Indeed, the controversy 
surrounding the incident tends to act in the historiography as something of a 
distraction. 66 
What was much more important than botched espionage or international glad- 
handing was the final push which the visit gave Eden in reconsidering Soviet foreign 
policy. Hovering behind the pleasantries remained the darker competitive side of the 
Soviete new talk of coexistence. On occasions it came unpleasantly to the fore, as 
during the discussion on the Middle East. Eden comments in his memoirs that he was 
quite aware of the limits of Soviet amiability. Indeed in private he dwelt on this as the 
most important lesson of the visit. He recalled his thoughts on returning from waving 
Bulganin and Khrushchev off at Victoria station, 
Back at Number 10,1 had to decide what our policy should now be. The 
present Soviet rulers had as much confidence as their predecessors in the 
ultimate triumph of communism. They were unshakeably determined. The 
methods they would employ might be different fror» those of Stalin and they 
might be harder to meet. Many influences had served to bring about this 
change, including the power of the nuclear deterrent as a major influence 
against world war. We had to consider the adjustments needed in our policies 
to cope with a new situation, for a new situation it undoubtedly was. 67 
It would seem that in terms of the Foreign Office assessment of Soviet policy which 
Eden had essentially ignored during his January visit to Washington, the penny had 
finally dropped. 68 This was one of the most important factors which lead him to call 
for a fundamental re-evaluation of Britain's defence policy which took place in early 
July, 1956.69 
65 FO 371 122885 NS 1216/9, Telegram No. 603, Hayter to F. 0.. 10th May, 1956. Hayter made the 
following, assessment of the Soviet response on the 10th Flay, 
Since my return Bulganin and Khrushchev have been effusively friendly to me... It seems 
therefore that they are anxious to keep up it favourable atmosphere its regards Her Majesty's 
Government, while continuing attacks on the Labour Party, and this coupled with the silence 
of the Soviet press, makes me think that they are unlikely to exploit the frogman incident and 
that the least Said soonest mended should he our motto. 
Also see Anrhonv Ecleu, pp. 436-438, Full Circle. pp. 165-366 and Khº"ushc"hev Remembers, pp. 
411-412. 
66 For example Lord Blake's treatment of the Soviet visit is entirely taken up with the Crabbe farrago, 
The Decline of Power, pp. 360-36 1. The errant M 16 officer. Nicholas Elliott is about to publish his 
memoirs, The Guardian. 12th January, 1994. Needless to say he passes the accusation of 
incompetence further up the chain of command. 
67 Full Circle. p. 362. Also Descent to Sue:, p. 353; Shuckburgh, in response to William Barker's 
impression that Eden was falling for Bul`_anin and Khrushchev's charm, expressed the following 
confidence, "1 told him that A. E. always looks as if he is falling, for that kind of thing: but that in 
reality he has a very shrewd idea of what he is up against". Barker, an expert on Soviet affairs, was 
assisting with interpretation. 
68 This was also the line which Lloyd took in conversations with the German Foreign Minister, von 
Brentano during his April visit to London. T 234/67. Record of Meeting in Foreign Office at 3 
p. m. on Monday. 30th April. 1956. 
69 FO 371 123 187 ZP 514?. Eden to Lloyd. 31st May, 1956. Eden set out the parameters for this 
review in Full Circle, p. 363. Sidney Aster picks up the point in his biography of Eden. 
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This review was to raise some interesting points about the future of Britain in a 
world which was increasingly defining international rivalries in economic terms. 70 
Indeed, there had already been rumblings about the pointlessness of preparation for all- 
out war when the Soviet Union was unlikely to choose such a destructive course of 
action. Sir Christopher Steel, head of Britain's permanent delegation to NATO in 
Paris, pointed out in a despatch of the 26th April, 1956 that even if hostilities were to 
begin despite Soviet intentions, as the defence of the West depended on the use of 
nuclear weapons, "[Western Europe] would be smoking and impassable wilderness in 
which man's only thought would be self-preservation and where organised existence, 
let alone organised warfare had practically ceased-. 71 Of what value would a few extra 
tanks and aeroplanes be then? Eden was himself at last grappling with the response 
Britain ought to make to so profound a change in the context of Cold War rivalry. 72 
The review reveals a considerable amount on the opinions held at the top level of 
Government about Britain's future as a world power and the means by which she was 
to secure it. Alongside an awareness of her smallness in comparison with the 
continental giants of America and the Soviet Union, not to mention the potential of 
China, India or Canada, there was also the problem of keeping up with the industrial 
competition provided by a renascent West Germany. Much had been achieved since 
1945, but most of the money had come from America and no great power could long 
survive dependent upon charity. However. great store was laid by "prestige" factors 
which increased Britain's ability to intluence events and the question was set 
confidently in terms of how Britain was to maintain her status amongst the first rank of 
states. 73 Although there may have been some who wondered whether she should really 
be there at all, their voice did not survive the drafting of position papers. 74 
These issues are not of immediate interest to this thesis. Yet there are profound 
problems here for any explanation of Eden's behaviour during the Suez Crisis. Why 
confusingly given exactly the same title as Robert Rhodes James' hook. Anthony Eden, pp. 138-140. 
Civil Servants had been preparing papers for such a review since at least March, substantially before 
the Soviet visit kindled Eden's enthusiasm for the venture, FO 371 123187 ZP 5/30G, Sir R. Powell 
Ministry of Defence to P. H. Dean. F. O., 28th March. 1956. 
70 There is a considerable amount of material in the F. O. tiles, FO 3: 1 123187,123188 and 123191, 
but the relevant Cabinet papers do not seem yet to he open. 
71 FO 371 123187 ZP 5/31G, Sir C. Steel, UK Permanent Delegation, Paris to Sir R. Powell, 
Ministry of Defence, 26th April, 1956. This despatch was a thoughtful piece on Britain's future 
defence requirements. It was used by officials from the Treasury. Defence Ministry and Foreign 
Office in the drawing up of "The Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs". 
72 William Clark. From Three Worlds, Memoirs, p. 165. In his diary entry for the 19th June, 1956 
Clark. Eden's press adviser, thought this one of the main . 
justifications for his continued support of 
the administration. 
[Ylet for all my personal dislike of the PM... I do realise that in politics he stands for what is 
best and most liberal and central. It is he who has seen the possibility of reducing our vast 
burden of conventional arms in the light of the hydrourn bomb and the change in Russia; he 
has seen the change from Cold War to the trade struggle and told the nation about it... 
73 FO 371 123191 ZP 9/12. The Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs. This was put 
forward for the consideration of the Ministerial committee set up by Edon. 
74 FO 371 123191 ZP 9/5. Minute by Sir H. Caecia. 30th April. 1956. 
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should a Government apparently so clearly aware of its precarious dependence on 
American financial strength and the importance of prestige in its foreign policy, 
recklessly gamble with both'? 75 
To return to matters more immediate, Soviet deeds continued to confirm their 
words. In the first half of 1956 there was an increasing amount of evidence feeding 
back to Whitehall further illustrating the new methods which the Soviets had adopted 
in their engagement with the West. 
ECONOMIC COLD WAR 
Whitehall's concern over the use of economic power in the advancement of Soviet 
influence was particularly acute in the case of Egypt. Although this was by no means 
the only cause of friction between Nasser and the British, it seems to have played an 
increasingly important role. By the summer of 1956 it provided Eden with one of his 
main arguments against continuing Anglo-American support for the funding of the 
Aswan High Dam. This reversal of the British Government's initial enthusiasm is a 
measure of how far Anglo-Egyptian relations had deteriorated in less than a year. That 
it was Dulles who chose, on the 19th July, to break the arrangement off abruptly was a 
consequence of different American tactics rather than any trans-Atlantic disagreement 
over strateýy. 76 The episode provides an interesting indication of the seriousness with 
which the British Government as a whole now viewed "peaceful competition". It also 
betrays a dangerously feverish streak in Whitehall's assessment of Egyptian politics. 
On the 19th April, 1956, the British Ambassador in Cairo sent to London a clear- 
headed analysis of the threat which Soviet involvement in Egypt posed. 77 It outlined 
the general conditions which had over the previous year favoured Soviet foreign policy 
in the Middle East. 78 The rise of Arab nationalism and the decline of colonialism had 
75 See Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diploinarv of the Sue: Crisis, pp. 186-194 on the importance of 
having money". The final refuge taken by Kunz's explanation of British policy in the mysteries of 
"mid-summer madness" would probably not satisfy most historians of the Crisis, but I think she has 
a point. 
76 There is a considerable controversy over this, see Keith Kyle, Sue;, pp. 123-130; The Economic 
Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, pp. 65-72; Anthony Eden, pp. 445-453: Suez, 1956, pp. 68-72 and 
Full Circle, pp. 419-422. Also FO 371 119058 JE 1422/297G. Minute by D. A. H. Wright, 27th 
November, 1956 on Harold Caccia "slin`ºin`g mud Of our own making" at Mr. Hoover in 
Washington over the American termination of the dang project. The matter is best summed up by 
Kunz on p. 71 of her book, 
As Makins [British Ambassador in Washington] had indicated, British officials had not yet 
decided to inform the Egyptian Government about the Aswan decision. However, their 
objections were a matter of form rather than substance, and they recognised that given 
American circumstances and the fact that this was mainly American money. Dulles had the 
right to make the decision. Furthermore. British officials betrayed a sense of relief that the 
irksome dam problem was solved. 
77 FO 371 1 18846 JE 1024/I, Despatch, Sir Humphrey Trevdlyan to Selwyn Lloyd. 19th April. 1956. 
78 ibid., Trevelyan dated the launch of the Kremlin', IleWW 
\liddIC Eastern policy quite specifically to a 
Soviet Foreign ºMinistrv announcement of the 16th . Aril, 1955. This had been immediately before 
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created an ideal environment in which their new emphasis on "blandishments and aid" 
could play merry havoc. The Czech Arms deal and anti-Isreali posturing were now- 
bolstered by the switch of Egyptian staple produce, cotton and rice. from glutted 
Western to Communist markets. All of which increased the opportunities for Soviet 
"technicians" to apply directly their baleful intluence over Egyptian affairs. 
Although at this point the Embassy % as Careful to keep the issue in perspective, 
there was no doubting that the relationship posed a serious problem for Britain. 
Trevelyan cautioned, 
I cannot emphasise too greatly the necessity for contriving some means 
whereby Egyptian cotton can be marketed through Western channels and 
Egypt's deficits with the Sterling area and Western Europe liquidated, if 
Egyptian economic dependence on the Soviet Bloc is to be limited. 79 
However, the Cairo Embassy maintained a sober attitude towards Egypt's 
connection with the Soviet Union, a sobriety which was increasingly at odds with 
opinions held in London. Up to the final moments of the Western proposal for the 
Aswan High Dam, Trevelyan continued to think that Nasser would always prefer 
dealing with Britain or America over the Soviet Union, despite persistent rumours to 
the contrary. These rumours came to a crescendo during the visit of Demitri Shepilov, 
the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Egypt in June, 1956.80 Furthermore, Trevelyan 
advised London that even accepting the project's political and financial problems, it 
offered too 111UC11 by way of advantage merely to be abandoned, particularly if, 
subsequently, the Egyptians were to Find a Soviet alternative. 81 Trevelyan was not 
prepared quite yet to regard Nasser as an unsalvageable victim of the Soviet Union. 
This view was in contrast to the opinions of important figures within the Foreign 
Office. On the 7th June, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick made the following guarded reference 
to the British attitude towards Nasser in a conversation with Eugene Black of the 
World Bank, 
the opening of the Bandoeng Conference of non-aligned states, thus the announcement had initially 
been interpreted by the Foreign Office as no more than propaganda. 
79 ibid.. Trevelyan did express some reservations rewarding the capacity of Communist markets to 
absorb Egyptian production. Furthermore, he had considerable doubts about the ability of 
technicians to interfere with Egyptian society given the stridently hostile attitude which Nasser's 
Government took a`_ainst indigenous Communists. However, his concern for the impact of cotton 
exports seemed to have been shared by Kaissouni. the pro-Western Egyptian Minister of Finance, 
FO 371 119055 JE 1422/206G, Telegram No. 1086. Trevelyan to F. O., 21st June, 1956. 
80 FO 371 113847 JE 1025/10, Despatch. Trevelyan to Lloyd. 28th June. 1956. 
81 FO 371 119055 JE 1422/206G, Telegram No. 1087. Trevelyan to F. 0., 21st June, 1956. 
Trevelyan insisted, somewhat inelegantly, 
I can only repeat my view that, however distasteful it may he to maintain our otter in the light 
of recent political developments here, the situation is essentially no different from that which 
lead us to make the offer in December, 1955. and that it is in our interests to conclude the 
negotiation on the aides memoirs.. in view of the most serious effect on Egyptian future 
relations over many years with the West, if the Communists are to build the dam. 
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I did not say very much about our attitude except to remark that it seemed to 
me to be a matter of assessing the political situation in Egypt. If Nasser was 
really committed body and soul to the Russians, as many people thought, the 
building of a Dam by some Russians would only be of marginal importance. 82 
This coy reference to British opinion was, in fact, indicative of the consensus view of 
the Foreign Office. Archibald Ross, responsible for the African Department, deployed 
the following argument against the Dain in a paper dated 25th June, 1956, written for 
the benefit of the Prime Minister. 
When the plan was mooted there was a reasonable prospect that the Czech 
Arms Deal would be, as Nasser assured us, "once and for all" and that he 
would keep other Soviet technicians out of Egypt if lie obtained help for the 
Dam from the West. This hope has been progressively contradicted by 
events. The Russian grip on Egypt is already considerable. and it is too late 
to keep the Russians out. Indeed, whether Nasser realises it or not, he 
probably could not now free himself from them if he wanted to. 83 
Ross pointed out that favours for Egypt created tensions with more reliable and less 
courted states such as Iraq and besides which there was the problem of financing the 
British contribution. By this point a dangerous combination of impotence, frustration 
and fatalism had come to dominate Whitehall's thinking on the issue. 
All of these arguments, with a little pepping up of metaphors, were in turn 
coin municated to Dulles via Sir Roger Makins as reasons why the British Government 
was having very serious second thoughts. s-t Ultimately, the case against proved 
irresistible. What was the point in spending scarce resources in attempting to tilt the 
political balance in Egypt when it looked increasingly likely that Western money could 
have little impact. The British thought that the best policy would be to let the matter 
chunter on without abruptly turning Nasser down, although he was effectively being 
written of as a loss to the Soviets. 85 Dulles, forthright as ever, took more decisive 
action. 86 
82 FO 371 1199055 JE 1422/190G, Minute by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 7th June. 1956. The World 
Bank was to loan the largest portion of the monies needed to finance the Aswan High Dam, the 
United States and Britain providing the rest through grant aid. Black, the American President of the 
Bank. was its main representative throughout the tortured and ultimately futile process of 
negotiating detail. See The Economic Diplumncy uj*the Suez Crisis, pp. 58-72 and Suez, pp. 82-85. 
83 FO 371 119057 JE 1422/270G. Minute by A. D. M. Ross, 25th June. 1956. Ross had just taken 
over Evelyn Shukbur`: h's position in charge of the Levant and African Departments, see Descent to 
Suez, pp. 356-358. Shuckburgh's attitude toward the clans and Soviet influence in Egypt was at one 
with that of the Foreign Office, "tant pis". If Vassar wanted to play with tire, the best way to teach 
the error of his ways would be to let him burn his Lingers. 
84 FO 371 119056 JE 1422/225; Telegram No. 3153 from F. O. to Washington, 10th July, 1956. 
"... Nasser is already enmeshed in the Soviet net" was ; uhstituted for Ross' "Russian grip". This 
Telegram was drafted in close consultation with the both Eden and Macmillan. 
85 FO 371 119056 JE 1422"37G. Minute by A. D. M. Ro-,.,. I3th July, 1956. 
86 Kunz argues this had more to do with Dulles' desire tee demonstrate domestically his "dominance" in 
the development of American torei`m policy. She alum) : u-__ues that this was al clear attempt on the 
part of the Americans to exert economic influence on Egypt by administering a salutary shock. In 
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By the summer of 1956 not only was the British analysis of Soviet polic}, 
increasingly emphasising the importance of economic aid as a conduit of political 
influence, it also accorded it a singular success in the case of Nasser. 87 Yet there was 
little consideration given to the implications this might have for the British position in 
Suez. If Nasser really was "enmeshed" by the Soviet's intrigue, Western access to the 
Canal was surely already imperiled. Indeed one Foreign Office official of the time in 
looking back has commented that the main reason Nasser's nationalisation came as 
such a surprise was because of this preoccupation with Soviet intentions, by 
comparison with Soviet aid the amount of money canal revenues would have yielded 
for canal building seemed relatively trivial. ss That in the long-term Trevelyan's view 
was to prove more sound does not diminish the importance of the British Government's 
gloomy prognosis at the time. s9 
As might be expected, thought was being given to the means by which the West 
should, in more general terms, respond to this type of economic challenge. From the 
start of 1956 there had been British consultations with allies as to how western aid 
might best be deployed and increased in order to counter Soviet policy. This had been 
one of the main issue discussed during the visit of Eden and Lloyd to Canada in 
February, in contrast to its treatment whilst the pair were in Washington. At this point 
there had been agreement on little more than informal consultations. 90 
This process took up much of the time devoted to the issue in the first half of 
1956, both with individual allies and within NATO. There was considerable 
discussion over how best to target and coordinate aid to make maximum impact against 
the Soviet bloc. The one issue over which Whitehall had no doubts was that the 
British Government could simple not afford to spend any more money itself, how 
convenient it would be if others might supply that which was lacking. Western 
Germany in particular was targeted as an ally who had as yet contributed very little 
development aid. The visit of Herr von Brentano, the German Foreign Minister, 
between 30th April and 3rd May, 1956 provided an ideal opportunity for the raising of 
the issue-91 
The first proposal which the British put forward concerned the formation of a 
group of "blood donor" nations who could channel aid to areas most at risk from the 
this Dulles' policy was a resounding failure. The Economic Diploºnoct' of the Suez Crisis, pp. 71-72 
and pp. 192-194. 
87 CAB 130/113. GEN/518/6/2(d), Revise; Egypt, Note by the F. 0., 23rd June, 1956. It was 
thought politic to tone down this conclusion at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference as it 
was likely that the Indians and Sri Lankans would pass the information on to Nasser. 
88 This is the view of Sir Harold Beeley in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds. ), The Special 
Relationship curd. -1ºr lo-American Relations since 1945, pp. '_85-93. 
89 See Suez, pp. 550-55 1. Also see Sphinx and Commissar for a detailed treatment of the bumpy 
history of Soviet-Egyptian relations up to Saclat. 
90 PREM I 1/ 1334, Record of a discussion. Ottawa, on 7th February. 1956. 
91 FO 371 120805 VEE 10055/30. F. O. Brief, . Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, 30th April, 1956. 
There is a hill record of the conversations at T '- 34/67. 
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Soviet offensive which were thought to be the Middle East and South East Asia. 92 
They were keen that this organisation should be separate from both NATO and the 
United Nations. 93 In the first case it was important that aid should not carry with it 
too obvious a political purpose, precisely the accusation which the west was making 
about the Soviet's activities. 94 In the second case, Soviet presence in the United 
Nations would make it almost impossible to maintain the political ends for which the 
aid was, of course, intended. Whitehall wanted, not unnaturally, both to have its cake 
and to eat it. 
Prospective confederates in the venture had rather different ideas. The Germans 
had already expressed a preference for developing existing structures within NATO, 
Brentano had spoken along these lines whilst in London. The Americans proved not 
especially keen to reach any Final decision, not least, perhaps. because it was they who 
would have to provide the lions share of any increased Financial commitment to 
development aid. This had been made quite plain in January by British permanent 
officials whilst in Washington with Eden and Lloyd. Indeed the British were at times a 
little irked by their attitude. 95 However, the most substantial diversion was provided 
by the French. They put forward a plan in May which allowed for the channelling of 
aid through the United Nations and it was this plan which dominated much of the 
discussion on the issue up to and after the Suez Crisis broke. Predictably, it was 
christened after its chief sponsor Christian Pineau, who was at this point the French 
Foreign Minister. Needless to say, the British were none too impressed, not least 
because there was already a UN agency, SUNFED, which was co-ordinating 
development aid. 96 
It is hardly surprising, given her financial embarrassment, that Britain was unable 
to stamp her leadership on the argument over how to respond to the challenge of Soviet 
economic aid. The one nation with sufficient muscle to draw the Western Allies 
together, the United States, seems to have reacted to the threat with considerably more 
sang froid. Furthermore, inter-allied discussions were soon to be side-tracked by the 
92 ibid., At least these were the areas in which the British felt their own interests were most threatened. 
93 Although the British were favourahly inclined towards expanding NATO's "non-military activities" 
at a time when direct Soviet aggression seemed less likely. Nevertheless. it NATO were to have 
become the main conduit for development aid some members of the Commonwealth, notably India, 
would he profoundly unhappy. CAB 130/113, GEN/518/6/3(b). Cabinet Committee on 
Commonwealth P. M. 's Meeting, Note by F. 0., 14th June, 1956. 
94 There was also the problem of fractious and impoverished allies within NATO, to wit Greece and 
Turkey. FO 371 120804 VEE 10055/4G, Letter from J. E. Coulson to D. A. H. Wright, 
Washington. 5th April, 1956. In a reply of 18th April to Coulson's letter Caccia laid out the 
Government's "blood donor" idea. The Problem of Turku-Greek relations would not arise because 
they would not be invited to join the select gathering. However, the Americans expressed 
considerable concern over this issue. 
95 FO 371 120809 VEE 10055/135. Minute by R. A. Hibbert. 13th Au`_ust. 1956. In commenting on 
a State Department positional paper which had been sent by the Washington Embassy, Hibbert 
complained that although a balanced approach was to he recommended, the Americans "now seem to 
be in danger of under-estimating the Soviet threat". 
96 FO 371 120810 VEE 10055%165. Minute by P. H. Gore-Booth, 31st October, 1956. SUNFED 
stood for Special United Nations Fund for EconomiL: Development. 
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onset of a more immediate crisis in Egypt. Yet, this should not be allowed to mask the 
gravity which the British Government accorded to the issue in the first half of 1956. 
Although incapable of doing very much herself. Britain was acutely aware that 
something needed to be doile. 97 Eden's press adviser William Clark recalls in his 
memoirs, 
What was horrifying was our impotence in Britain, which had nothing to do 
with whether Eden was a strong Prime N, nister. The fact was that Britain 
was weak, especially in the new cold war of economic aid. We could not 
make it worthwhile for Baghdad to stay with the West, nor Persia where there 
was bound to be trouble soon. Nor India nor Cylon. America could do this; 
but in election year would not. 98 
JC }C S, C 
By 1956 the main lines of Soviet foreign policy seemed confirmed. There were new 
developments, not least the radical turn which was given to the programme of de- 
Stalinisation at the 20th Party Congress, but overall the Soviets seemed concerned with 
consolidating the changes in their presumptions and tactics which had developed since 
1953 and particularly during 1955. Furthermore, Eden was finally awakened to the 
real importance of what was going on, a fundamental re-shaping of the context, 
although not the nature, of the Cold War. Indeed, in one key area, Egypt, the Soviet 
Union's new approach was undeservedly credited with a most spectacular success. A 
start was also made on the process of assessing the implications for such developments 
on British policies in turn. 
There were, however, still differences between the Prime Minister and his 
officials. The process of drafting the briefs for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Conference at the end of June 1956, provides an interesting vignette of the aspirations 
to which those in high office are peculiarly vulnerable. 99 The Northern Department 
expressed irritation with the recasting given by Sir Norman Brook to their brief on 
Soviet policy. They had attempted to give it "a somewhat gloomy ring, partly 
because we were concerned to provide Ministers with a corrective to Mr. Nehru's 
excessively optimistic outlook". 100 Brook had toned down the difficulties caused by 
Soviet penetration in Africa and the Middle East and introduced vague and generalised 
talk about a "major change in Soviet foreign policy" which seemed to hint at 
97 There is a valuable Treasury summary of the British attempt to co-ordinate a counter to Soviet 
economic diplomacy, dated 11th September, 1956 at FO 371 120809 VEE 10055/130G. This was 
written for the benefit of the British delegation due to attend the annual IMF meeting in 
Washington. It dates the problem hack three years. commenting that "the tempo of this drive has 
greatly increased over the rast year". 
98 From Three Worlds. p. 163. 
99 Full Circle. pp. 375-377. 
100 FO 371 122785 NS 1021/5?. Minutes by Northern Department and J. G. Ward, 21st June. 1956. 
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something more than the Foreign Oi'tiLC's limited expectations for peaceful 
coexistence. Patrick Dean explained that this had been dune as, 
Sir Norman Brook thought it woulcl be useless to put before the Prime 
Minister something which he would not willingly accept and he therefore 
suggested a redraft which in his view was closer to the Prime Nlinister's way 
of thinking and would be easier to put across to the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers without arousing their hostility. 101 
Eden, it seems, still harboured Churchillian hopes for the possibilities of statesmanship 
in East-West relations. 
However, the view of Soviet foreign policy which was presented to those trusted 
amongst the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at the conference was essentially no 
different from that of the Northern Department. This select group included the 
"white" commonwealth plus Pakistan, but not India. %ý. 'hich is an interesting reflection 
of the Commonwealth's strenngtlhs. The Kollo ing -analysis was put forward by Eden 
for their consunmption, 
The main threat to our international position is now political and economic 
rather than military... Big change is realisation by Soviet leaders of what war 
waged with thereto-nuclear weapons would meeatn. Now unlikely that, 
tempted by an enormous superiority in conventional forces, they will take 
action liable to result in a major war. 10' 
This is a quite reasonable summary of the view of Soviet policy which had matured in 
the Foreign Office before the end of 1955 and became a general perception the 
following summer. The change in Britain's view of the Soviet threat was firmly 
established. 
'IA June, 1956. Dean thought it possible to 101 ibid.. P. Dean and Sir I. Kirkpatrick, Minutes of - 
change certain key phrases. but Kirkpatrick did not think the issue Of Sufficient importance to cause 
a fuss. Sadly the brief on Soviet policy is not yet open to public inspection, despite the availability 
of most of the others. 
102 CAB 13011 13, GENS 18i6' 30. Defence Policy. Vote: or "Additional" Meeting with Prime Ministers 
of Canada. Australia. New Zealand. South Atrica. Pakistan and the Federation [Rhodesia and 
Nvasalandl, 30th June. 1956. Eden spoke alonv these lines at the first meeting of this __roup on the 
3rd Jule. 1956. although service : hier seemed rather te'. keen on the idea of major cuts in 
conventional defence co mmittmments. FO 37 1 123) 187 ZP 5,47 . 
Minute by P. Mallet, 4th July, 1956. 
Conclusion 
The British Government's understanding of Soviet policy changed markedly in the period 
after Stalin's death. Indeed on the arguments laut forward in this thesis we might go 
further and assert, according, to western perceptions, that 19 55 was the pivotal year in this 
process and that by 1956 Khrushchev's innovations were firmly established. 
As far as the British understood it Malenkov had presided over a transitional phase in 
Soviet history. From the perspective of the 20th Part, Congress of 1956 it was clear to 
British observers that many of the ideological formulations had roots that went back at 
least to 1953. However, it was only in 19» thattlie debate between "conservative" and 
"liberal" elements within the Soviet leadership came to some kind of resolution. 
Consequently, Ntalenkov's foreign policy appeared to otter very little that seemed new. 
It conceived of Moscow's international interests in much the same way as Stalin had, 
although there might have been some change in presentation it went little further than 
that. This repackaging of Soviet foreign policy did in itself cause problems for British 
interests, particularly over the rearmament of Germany, but did not necessitate any re- 
evaluation of British foreign policy in turn. 
In this environment negotiations were conceived of by Eden and his officials as a 
hollow game of diplomatic advantage. The one exception was the problem of Indo- 
China. Here there was sufficient community of interest in avoiding a disastrous escalation 
of the conflict, and sufficient statesmanship on the part of France, for a compromise to be 
worked out. Churchill's view was rather different, but then Churchill's political career was 
littered with many romantic but lost causes. A summit meeting, with Nlalenkov must be 
added to the list. 
I955 and 1956 were to be much more exciting years. Although the fundamental 
objective set by either side remained constant, the means by and manner in which these 
objectives were to be realised altered radically. On the simplest, but not necessarily least 
important plain, Soviet and Western leaders tigere pleasant to each other in public as they 
had never been since the end of World War [I. In more concrete terms the Soviets gave 
up their faith in achieving the world socialist utopia through Lenin's "frightful collisions" 
and a more pacific, thought nonetheless "competitive", emphasis on economic 
developments emerged. Furthermore the Cold War was changing in more than just means 
and mores. The scene of battle shifted from that which had become so familiar by 1953. 
the old certainties of Churchill's iron curtain and stalemated confrontation in the Far East 
were superseded by what might be termed a war of movement on a global scale. 
This change had much to do with the development of new weapons technology and 
in particular the hydrogen bomb. For the first time it became apparent that wars could no 
longer be conceived in terns of winning and loosinu sides. Global war could not now be 
considered as a rational extension of external policy, however desperate the 
circumstances. British military planners were relatively quick in coming to this conclusion 
which contributed to the Duncan Sandes defence revie\ý in 1957. It as a defence review 
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which, in all probability, would have been completed under Eden in 1956 if it had not 
been for the Suez Crisis. 
Yet more important in terms of the Cold \\'ar were the innovations in Soviet policy 
which similar conclusions about thermonuclear war led to under the leadership of 
Khrushchev. Although there is some debate, [r example Shulman. as to when the 
beginnings of "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet thinking should be dated, there is little 
doubt, and this very much applies to the vie%ý s of British observers, that it was not until 
1955 that it really took ofd'. Indeed, even as late as February, 1955 it looked as if the stale 
certainties of high Stalinism were about to re-trench themselves. Only after Khrushchev's 
political ascendancy had been established did any radical departure from the past occur. 
With the signing of the Austrian State Treaty of that April it was apparent that something 
rather different was about to break upon the world. 
The change in Moscow's attitude was reflected in a tow-sided Soviet policy which 
seemed to the British at times more than a little self-contradictory The danger of 
thermonuclear annihilation led the Kremlin to attempt a cooling down of the international 
atmosphere. This they achieved with some success at the Geneva Summit of 1955 and in 
their goodwill meetings with the French and British through 1956. The visit of 
Khrushchev and Bul anin to London in April of that year marked for Britain a high point 
in the charm offensive. Yet this did not mean that the Eastern lion was prepared to lie 
down with the k'estern lamb. Although there may have been an element of "wedge 
driving" in the Soviet courtship their main concern, as far as the British interpretation 
went, was to avoid the irrational negation of' all that they had been working towards. 
New means were developed to facilitate the defeat of capitalism which were not 
synonymous with global apocalypse. Domestically, the need to overtake the West in 
terms of industrial output was stressed. This theme was given increasing importance 
through 1955 and emphasised at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Sir William Hayter 
thought it part of the explanation for the violence of Khrushchev's attack upon Stalin in 
his Secret Speech. Internationally, the use of economic strength in the continuing 
competition between East and West was also crucial and it was this point which was to 
pose the greatest challenge to Britain's world position. 
The Soviets bean to turn their attentions towards the independent countries of the 
"under-developed" world (Khrushchev's "zone of peace") which Stalin, and indeed 
Stalinists such as N/lolotov, had tended to dismiss as puppets of the West. Khrushchev 
conceived his foreign policy in a global rather than a European context. Unlike Stalin he 
was not prepared to limit direct probing, to areas immediately contiguous with the Soviet 
Union itself. For the first time the Soviets began actively to cultivate the attention of 
existing regimes in Asia and Africa by of erinu to supply economic aid and military 
hardware. Up until 1955 Soviet activity in the area had largely consisted of supporting 
communist states, parties and insurgents, particularly in Korea and Vietnam, although 
Stalin's support for the Chinese Nationalists before 1949 was something, of an exception. 
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Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence involved the Soviet Union in the existing, structures of 
avowedly non-communist states such as India and EL, pt, states in which Western 
influence had up till that point dominated unchallenged. It was this aspect of the Soviet's 
new policy which caused the most concern in Whitehall. 
It became slowly apparent to British politicians that the Geneva cordiality was not 
going, to lead on to a grand Churchillian settlement of the Cold War, or even a 
gentlemen's agreement to ditfer. The Geneva SLI11111111 xý as not to lead on, as had been 
hoped, to a process of negotiation terminating with a resolution of the conflict. In fact it 
was to make Britain's world position more difficult to maintain. The rules, rather than the 
object of the game, were changing. 
Although the realisation of this dawned on officials in the Northern Department by 
the end of 1955, it was not until after the Soviet visit to Britain in April, 1956, that it had 
become clear to Eden that the Soviets posed a ne%% type of threat rather than a 
diminishing threat. The most dramatic herald of this policy- as the Czechoslovak arms 
deal with Egypt in September. 1955, followed quickl\' in November and December by 
Bulganin's and Khrushchev's economic diplomacy cum publicity drive in South East Asia. 
The Soviets were bidding to replace Western influence in areas of traditionally exclusive 
British interest. Furthermore in the case of Egypt and the Middle East these . sere, of 
course, areas considered vital to the maintenance of Britain's economic well being. It was 
for Britain not merely a matter of nursing her imperial pride, but insuring her industrial 
future. Eden made quite clear to Khrushchev whilst he as in London that the key issue 
was access to oil and that Britain would go to very considerable lengths to guarantee it. 
The British Government was also aware that this as not a threat which she had the 
resources to deal with. In the immediate panic of the Eur ptian arms deal Eden turned to 
the United States as the main source of finance for the Aswan Darn project which was 
also considered a target for the Soviet predator. Equally, in the first half of 1956 when 
the scope of Soviet economic diplomacy had become apparent it was the Americans to 
whom the British turned. The "economic offensive", as it had become known, was taken 
very seriously in the highest circles in London. more seriously it seems than in America 
for obvious reasons. Indeed by the summer of 1956 the Soviet policy had been accorded 
a singular success in the case of Egypt. For Britain the stakes included parts of the world 
which were vital to her survival and also, perhaps perceptions of her own inadequacy 
increased the sense of anxiety which at times bordered on despair. Egypt, once more, was 
the cause of great anguish. Britain's world role was shrinking, further in the face of a new 
form of super-power competition which was in the process of development. As in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, central to her policy was the need to bring the 
United States into areas '0 hich she no longer had the power to control. 1 This was 
t Indeed, Selwyn Lloyd sought to . 
dustily Suez a" the means by , %hich this end was achieved. Suez, 
1956. P. 25o. Also, The Economic Diploinoo' c? /' tl, e Suer Cº"i. ci. c, pp. 153-185. Donald Neff, 
Warriors (it Sue:. Eisenhower takes America two the Middle E(L, t in 1956 and David Devereux. The 
Formulation (? t* British Defi'mrc e Police towards the A iclclle East. 1948-1956, pp. 153- 185. On 
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especially evident in Eden's increasing effort to Induce the Americans to take an active 
role in the Baghdad Pact and in Whitehall's attempt to encourage the Americans in 
countering the Soviets economic diplomacy . 
It is in this context that the Soviet intervention in the "under-developed" world had a 
further knock-on-effect. For the first time countries such as Egypt enjoyed a free market 
in arms supply. Ironically, the Soviets introduced choice into an area which had 
previously been monopolised by the West. if not Britain herself Whether or not the 
rather hysterical claims that the British made for the efficacy of Soviet military and 
economic aid as a conduit for political influence were true, Britain now faced nationalist 
regimes which had an unprecedented freedom of manoeuvre. No loner dependent on 
Western sources of aid and materials, Nasser extended his weings. both metaphorical and 
literal, as never before. 
In retrospect British fears were e\auuerated. Ho« ever, Whitehall was not alone in 
attributing too great a potential to economic diplonmacy. Khrushchev himself proved to be 
over sanguine in the hopes he had for this ne' törne of Soviet influence. The crucial point 
as regards understanding Britain's policy is that officials and politicians did actually 
believe that the Soviet economy had the capacity, realised and potential, to pose a very 
serious threat. It was compared to the rise of America's industrial strength in the 19th 
century. No one at the time could foresee that the 1950's were to prove the high point for 
Soviet economic development rather than a launching, pad into stratospheric growth. the 
electronic revolution of the 60's and 70's was to leave the Soviet Union staýýering a long 
way behind as it sank into stagiation and Ultimately dereliction. This was all yet for the 
future. As far as British observers at the time understood. Soviet domestic economic 
strength would not only pose a direct challenue to the West, it %%ould also increase their 
ability to out-bid in economic diplomacy. Furthermore, it is easy to forget that the British 
were facing a direct challenge in areas of the \ý orld v hich were of the greatest importance 
to her between 1945 and 1955. Prior to 1955 the only substantial power in the Middle 
East that the British had to compete with in peace-time had been the United States, after 
1956 the British were only too glad when the Americans seemed to contemplate taking 
over. It is hardly surprising that she tended to exaggerate the possible effect of Soviet 
interference, given the stakes for which she thought she was playing. As Eden said on a 
number of occasions, the British Government was not prepared to let Britain be slowly 
throttled. \Vhat is important is that the British Government perceived Egypt to be 
dangerously close to Soviet domination, if not already quite lost to the enemy. 
By 1956 the Cold war was a different thing, from that which it had been in 1954. 
Khrushchev had entered the Soviets into a race to out produce and out develop the 
capitalists. Areas of the world which had been ignored by the Kremlin were for the first 
Britain and American hoIi,: y in the attermath ut WOlid War II scc. H. B. Ryan, The Vision of 
Anglo-. - lneric a. the US-UK Alliance and /u' E/, ic Col, l War. and ; ra"er J. Harhutt. Churchill, 
America. (111(1 the Orii , nl'. o'1 the Cole! Wirr. A hroadcr u\ crvicw i, pr ided by D. Cameron Watt, 
Succ"eedlin lohn B11l1:. 411cc'ric"u ill Plat, . 
1900-/9'5. , 
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time since the 1920's considered crucial auents in undernminim. t the West. Economic and 
military aid were the means to influence the alkmments of governments which were 
beyond direct political control. It was against this back<<round that the Suez Crisis 
exploded in the summer of 1956. 
Although it was not originally intended that this thesis should stray into the murky 
and often dredged waters of the Suez Crisis itself, it seemed important to make some 
mention of it, at least to mark out ground for future research. The Cold War. as Gladwyn 
Jebb had said in 1950, was the overall context in which Britain formulates her foreign 
policy. 2 Therefore, it seems inevitable that as it expanded to take in the peacetime politics 
of the Middle East, it should also have had an important effect on Anglo-Egyptian 
relations. The burden of the above is that it did crucially poison the British view of Egypt 
through 1955 and 1956. It allowed Nasser an unprecedented freedom of action and 
created an atmosphere of ; general despair in British policy makin` circles. Against this 
background the desperation of Eden's actions in the October and November of 1956 seem 
rather less out of proportion to the surrournciinUs 
There are those who argue that the Cold War had nothing to do with British policy in 
the Middle East. Britain, they assert, was merely trying to retain her position of imperial 
dominance and that the Suez Crisis must be pl: iced in the context of her attempts post 
1945 to deal with the problem of Egyptian nationalism. \V Scott Lucas has recently 
written a book on Suez which develops such an interpretation. However, this overlooks 
the fact that from 1955 Britain was forced to deal with a new form of Soviet intrusion. 
No more was Britain's anti-Soviet planning conceived merely as part of her military 
strategy, but in terns of political influence during, peacetime and the Middle East was one 
of the main targets of Soviet interest. 
It is this general context which has been too much ignored by Historians. The actual 
details of British complicity in the Israeli attack on Egypt have in themselves acted as 
something of a distraction. Too much time has been spent in the particular 
circumstances to unckerctranA rrofrij the overall framework in which British policy was 
being made, and this contra Scott Lucas, was a Cold War framework and not one limited 
to the Middle East. It is little wonder, given this shortcoming, that the role of the Soviet 
Union during the crisis tends to be ignored or dismissed with the lightest flick of the hand. 
Although the Soviet role in the actual events was indeed limited, it is impossible to 
understand the background to the crisis and British thinking during 
it. without an 
appreciation of the influence that by 1956 the Soviets had developed, or at 
least the 
British thought they had developed, in the area. Consequently, I suggest that this thesis 
must rest on the side of Keith Kyle who suns up Eden's thinking as follows, 
I 
Quoted by Anne Del-_hton in Anne Dzighton (;: J. ), Bi wain and the Fi, -. %r Cald Ww". p. 1. This 
volume of essays contains one by W. Scott Lucas. "The Path to Suez: 
Britain and the Stru__, --IC 
for 
the fiddle East. 1953-56". which condemns as simplistic attempts to interpret the 
Crisis as a Cold 
War conflict. Editor and contributor do not seem to he in harmony-. 
Cc)ndu"ioýn / Pa-c 197 
Eden say Nasser acting as Russia's stooue to destroy the political and 
commercial basis of Britain's cheap file! supply in the diddle East Having dot 
control of the Suez Canal, he would succeed in all his conspiratorial plans and 
thus acquire hegemony over oil states lit- e KLM-alt, Iraq and even Saudi Arabia... 
The oil companies would be nationalised, the prices sour upwards and the 
European economies, just rescued at high cost by the Marshall Plan, would be 
put in immense jeopardy. 3 
It would be foolish to claim that there '\ ere not a range of other factors involved, not 
least Eden's own standing within the Conservative Parte, but it is equally foolish to 
overlook so fundamental a matter as the impact of So% iet foreign policy. Sir William 
Hayter goes so tar in his memoirs to lay the blame for both the Hungarian and the Suez 
Crisis on the new foreign policy which Khrushchev had set in motion in 1955. This is 
perhaps what you might expect from an e\-British Ambassador in Moscow, but it 
underlines the turbulence caused by \'Iosco'. '. 's dual policy of relaxation of tensions and 
continued competition. 
Both Suez and Hungary were the consequences of actions taken by the Soviet 
Government. But they were undesired and unforeseen consequences, inspired by 
the unpredictable reactions of others to Soviet actions de`igned to produce 
different results, and they caused the Soviet Government to adopt courses which 
they did not intend to follow and which vitiated their own previous policies. In 
Hungary the policy of cautious relaxation of pressure had led to an explosion. In 
the Middle East Soviet sapping, and mining at Western positions, while 
outwardly professing to respect them, caused the Western Powers to react with 
unexpected violence ... 
4 
There is not enough space to say as much on the Soviet Union and Suez as I would like, 
but there are problems here which I look ior-ww and to examining in `greater 
detail in the 
future. 
Something ought, perhaps, to be said by ww ay ot'a codicil on the connection between 
the Suez Crisis and the problems which the Soviet Union encountered in Hungary toward 
the end of 1956. In particular, the impact of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and 
Israel upon the Soviet decision to use force against Imre Nay's revolution. In his memoir 
Hayter provides a clear account of his opinion at the time closely based on Foreign Office 
papers and the diary of his wife. 5 His conclusion seems sensible and balanced. The 
3 Suez, p. 554 
4A Double Life, p. 152. Hayter considers that it was this violence that forced Khrushchev to make 
his belligerent outburst, threatening "rocket attack: ". in order that Soviet prestige be maintained in 
the Arab World. Thus he betrayed the good-%% Ill v. hach in 1955 his diplomacy had built up with the 
West. This view has been developed by several studies of the Soviet role in the Middle East post 
1955. See for example 0. M. Smolensky'., article "\lo,,: ow and the Suez Crisis, 1956: A 
Reappraisal". Political Science Quarrerhv Vol. LXXX (December. 1965) and Galia Golan, Soviet 
P. (; C; tj in i/u' Middle Ecrm. The ke point i, that \los o%% made its threats after it had become 
publicly clear that the United States moulcl not iipport it, errant allies. For a discussion of the 
British reaction see Sue:. pp. 456-60. 
5 .4 
Double Life. pp. 142-154. Havter does nothin_, to hide hi, 
distress 
at the foolishness of military 
intervention in Suez. Indeed he sites it as one ot the reason, that '. . avcd his decision to leave the 
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Soviet Union conceived of Nagy's announced desire to %,.: ýhdra%ý completely from the 
Warsaw Pact as a direct challenge to their- siren tlh in Europe. So vital as the 
maintenance of this position that it is very doubtful that the Soviet leadership could have 
taken any other action than to invade Hungary. Howwz'. er. there can be little doubt that 
the embroilment of Britain and France in a similarly nmurk\ enterprise in Egypt served to 
strengthen the hand of those such as Zhukov who advocated a violent solution to the 
problem of too much reform in Hungary. At a crucial point the British and French 
Governments made it much easier for Khrushchev to accept e\treme action and for him to 
get away with it. 
By the end of 1956 "peaceful coexistence" had gone throuS-1h something of a refining 
process. The exuberance of amity which Khru hchev had displayed darin`, the Geneva 
Conference, 1955 and in London, 1956 had been dulled by Hunv_ary and Suez. In this the 
British thought that he had forced himself into an own uoaI However, these two crises 
did not fundamentally alter the British idea of Soviet torek n policy Ina brief of the 11 th 
February, 1957, the Northern Department advised Sekmi Lloyd that, 
Although the Hungarian Crisis has shown the Soviet Union's readiness to defend 
its vital interests by force... they understand the danUers of nuclear weapons and 
wish to avoid courses of action which might bring the risk of war. "Peaceful co- 
existence" is probably only temporarily in suspense 
Indeed it was vital to the success of Soviet toreign policy that this be so, 
[b]ecause their [Soviet] long-terns strategy must still be to turn the flank of the 
Western Powers by nleans of penetration of underdeveloped countries and 
agitation against the Colonial Powers. They have their eves on Africa as well as 
Asia and the Middle East. 6 
Seen in this context the Soviet involvement in Egypt becomes symptomatic of a profound 
development. Britain was not only dependent on American power, as the events of 
October and November, 19-56, cruelly proved. She was also being squeezed by the 
extension of Soviet political influence into the wider world. This involved the Soviets in 
areas which Britain had formerly held unchallenged except by indigenous nationalist 
forces and at times her erstwhile allies. As superpower rivalry extended onto a global 
theatre, Britain found herself increasingly pushed out of the running. The superpowers 
were to take an ever increasing share of the limelight in this new Cold War as the 
traditional European Powers found that they had not the resources to compete. 
To read foreign policy histories of the period one might at times almost think that 
developments in the Soviet Union were peripheral if not irrelevant to understanding the 
Foreign Office shortly after his return to London in 1957. Sir Le lie Fry. the British representative 
in Budapest during 1956. laid emphasis upon the military realities of Soviet thinkin__. a neutral 
Hungary was simply unacceptable to them. FO 71 l 'S665 NH 1017/3, Fry, Budapest. to Hayter, 
London, 21st November. 195 '. 
6 FO 371 128989 NS 1021.5. F. O. Minute. R. H. A. Elihhrrt. I Ith February. 1957. Baer for the 
Secretary of State on his Visit to Portu__aI. 
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dynamics of British policy itself This was not so Soviet policy changed in profound 
ways between 1953 and 1956, at least this was the perception amongst Foreign Office 
officials and British politicians of the time. It is clear from the available records that by 
1956 they felt they were being forced to respond to a radically new kind of Soviet threat. 
Moreover the context of international rivalr\ within which this threat was set had also 
changed with the advent of thermonuclear weapons. The British Government found itself 
reassured in regard of the unliklihood of World War Three. Hoxýever, it also drew some 
less comfortable conclusions about the trend Soviet foreign policy was taking in other 
directions. British power was in fact shrinking betöre a new Cold War where economic 
rather than military muscle was the deciding factor. This competition, in the guise of 
Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World, has orily just cone to an end. 
Appendix 
Foreign Office Officials 
The following will provide a brief resume of the careers of the key Foreign Office 
officials whose opinions provide much of the raw material for this thesis. These are 
not intended to be exhaustive, but to provide some idea of where individuals Fitted into 
the overall structure of the Foreign Office and the experience which he or she had of 
foreign affairs. It will be obvious from what follows that the division between 
specialist and generalist was very clear in relation to the career paths which individuals 
took. 
The main source for this endeavour is the Foreign Office List, which provides an 
interesting reflection of the institution's ethos in itself. Whose Who has also been used 
to supplement the List which is not entirely complete in its information about staff 
members. One short word ought to be said about jar`on. When a person is said to 
have been awarded an "allowance" for a language it means that they have attained 
sufficient aptitude in it to be given a Financial bon-u. ý. 
Brimelow, Thomas. Joined the Foreign Service in 1938, becoming probationer 
Vice Consul at Danzig. During 1942 he was transferred to the Moscow Embassy and 
in 1945 to the Northern Department in London. In 1948 he was promoted to become 
the Consul in Havana before returning to Moscow in 195 1 where in the same year he 
gained an allowance for knowledge of Russian. He played an important role in the 
Embassy Chancery collecting basic data on Soviet Affairs and producing analysis. 
After a spell in Ankara between 1954 and 1956 he returned to London to become Head 
of the Northern Department. Between 1973 and 1975 Brimelow enjoyed the eminence 
of Permanent Under-Secretary and was subsequently elevated to Parliament as Lord 
Brimelow. 
Conolly, Violet. 1943 appointed as an Attache at the Embassy in Moscow. In 
1946 she was transferred to London as an Assistant in the Research Department. In 
1953 she became an Adviser on Soviet Affairs in the Northern Department acting as a 
link between Northern and Research Departments. Her influence on thinking about 
the Soviet Union was thus considerable. She maintained this position throughout the 
fifties, going on to a notable career as an economic analyst. A good example of the 
genre is Siberia Totlay and Tomorrow: a Stu(ly of' Economic Resources Problems and 
Achievements, which was published in 1975. 
Conquest. George Robert Acworth. Joined the Foreign Service in 1946 and 
remained there until 1956 working in the Research Department. He left for a varied 
career in Soviet History and Poetry. He was visiting Poet at the University of Buffalo 
in America during 1959-60 and Literary Editor of the Spectator, 1962-63. He has 
published a number of books including, Power and Polity in the USSR (1961), The 
Great Terror (1968). Inside Stalin's Secret Poýlicc (1985) and Harvest of Sorrow 
(1986). The first of these works is much relied upon in Chapter 1. 
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Gascoigne, Sir Alvery Douglas Frederick. fought in the First World War and 
joined the Foreign Office in 1919. Enjoyed a varied career including the position of 
Consul General for the Tangier Zone and Spanish Morocco between 1939 and 1944. 
He was promoted in 1946 to become the UK Political Representative with the rank of 
Ambassador in Japan where he stayed until 195 1. At this point he was transferred to 
Moscow as the Ambassador, serving up to his retirement in 1953. As such his name 
and opinions figure prominently in the second chapter. 
Grey, Paul. Joined Foreign Service in 1933 and transferred to Rome in 1935, 
returning to the Foreign Office in 1939. After a spell as Private Secretary to the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State between 1941 and 1943 he held a variety of 
posts, within the foreign office as Head of the South East Asia Department and abroad 
in Rio de Janeiro, the Hague and Lisbon. In 1951 he was promoted to the position of 
Minister as the Moscow Embassy where he remained until 1954, acting as the Charge 
d'Affairs. As such he frequently acted as an understudy to the Ambassador. During 
1954 he was appointed an Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and in 1957 
he became the Ambassador at Prague. 
Harrison, Sir Geoffrey Wedgewood. Began his Foreign Office career in 1932, 
went to Japan in 1935 were he gained an allowance for Japanese. There followed a 
variety of postings including that of Minister at the Embassy in Moscow between 1947 
and 1949. He returned to London in 1949 and became the Head of the Northern 
Department until he was promoted to the rank of Deputy Under-Secretary of State and 
as such he superintended the Northern Department (although Deputy Under-Secretaries 
generally had a number of Departments to look after and in this Harrison was no 
exception). In 1954 Sir John Ward took over the responsibility. During 1956 
Harrison went on to become the Ambassador to Rio de Janerio. 
Hayter, Sir William Goodenough. Ambassador from 1953 to 1957, prior to 
which he had had a varied career in the Foreign Service from postings in Shanghai 
before the war to Washington between ' 1940 and 1944. Immediately before going to 
Moscow he was the Minister at the Embassy in Paris. In early 1957 Hayter returned 
to London as a Deputy Under-Secretary of State and was, for a brief period, the 
superintendent of the Northern Department. In 1958 he left the Foreign Office to 
become the Warden of New. College Oxford where he stayed until 1976. He 
considered resigning over the Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Crisis in the 
autumn of 1956 and something of the horrer he felt over that folly seems to have 
influenced his decision to leave in 1958, although there was also the more positive 
appeal of Oxford. 
Hibbert, Reginald Alfred. After serving in the Forces between 1942 and 1945, 
Hibbert joined the Foreign Office in 1946 and during 1947 was stationed at the 
Bucharest Embassy. In 1950 he returned to London where he remained until 1952 
when he was sent to Vienna. In 1954 he became a member of the Northern 
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Department before setting out for Guatemala in 1957 were he acted as Charge 
d'Affairs in 1958 and 1959. Hibbert might be termed a Northern Department regular 
whose opinions played an important role in the formulation of minutes, briefs, etc. 
Hohler, Henry Arthur Frederick. Appointed to the Foreign office in 1934, 
Hohler was sent to the Budapest Embassy in 1936 where he received an allowance for 
Hungarian in 1937. In 1941 he returned to London from whence he was posted to 
Berne, Helsinki and finally in 1949 to Moscow where he was promoted to the rank of 
Counsellor. In 1951 he was appointed Head of the Northern Department which 
position he held until during 1956 he went to the Embassy at Rome as the Minister. 
Thus, Hohler held a key post through the period covered by this thesis. As the man 
immediately responsible for the Foreign Office's assessment of Soviet Affairs his 
opinions play a very important role in my interpretation, second only to that of the 
Ambassador who was supported by the staff of the Moscow Embassy's Chancery. 
flutchinss, Raymond Francis Dudley. Employed as a Senior Assistant, working 
in the Soviet Section of the Research Department. In 1958 he was promoted to 
Research Assistant Grade 2 and also qualified for an allowance in Russian. Hutchings 
was one of the "backroom boys" who produced detailed assessments of Soviet affairs. 
Jellicoe, Earl. Worked in the German Department of the Foreign Office between 
1945 and 1948. In 1948 he was transferred to the Washington Embassy and from 
thence to Brussels during 195 1. After Brussels he returned to London in 1953 and 
joined the Northern Department which lie left three years later to become the Deputy 
Secretary General of the Bagdad Pact. Subsequent to a career in Conservative politics 
he became Leader of the House of Lords from 1970-1973. Another Northern 
Department regular. 
Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone Augustine. Fought with some distinction in the First 
World War and entered the Foreign Service in 1919. After a wide variety of postings 
in the inter-war period he became the Director of the Foreign Division of the Ministry 
of Information in 1940. Between 1950 and 1953 he was the UK High Commissioner 
for Germany after which he was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office from 1953 to 1957. As such he was the presiding eminence at the 
Foreign Office for much of the period covered by this thesis. Most important 
Northern Department minutes filtered upwards to Government Ministers through his 
hands. 
Morgan, Henry Travers. Served in the Forces between 1939 and 1946. In 1946 
he became a member of the Permanent UK Delegation to the U. N., moving in 1948 to 
the Embassy in Moscow. During 1950 he was transferred to the Northern Department 
where he stayed until 1954 when he went on to Mexico City. 
Mason. Sir Paul. Joined the Foreign Service in 1928 and enjoyed a wide variety 
of postings including Pra`ue. Lisbon and Sofia. In 1951 he was promoted to the 
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position of Assistant Under-Secretary of State and in 1954 he became Ambassador at 
the Hague. 
Orchard, Edward Eric. Posted to the Moscow Embassy Chancery between 1948 
and 1951 and in 1952 transferred to London as a Senior Assistant working in the 
Research Department. In 1957 he returned to Moscow. Orchard's role was similar to 
that of Raymond Hutchings. 
Roberts, Sir Frank. Joined the Foreign Office in 1930 and after a number of 
postings, including Cairo where he gained an allowance for Arabic. he was appointed 
Minister plenipotentiary to Moscow in 1945. His rise continued and in 1949 he 
became the Deputy High Commissioner in India. In 1952 he achieved Ambassadorial 
rank as the UK representative at the Brussels treaty Commission. He was transferred 
to Belgrade as the Ambassador in 1954 and from thence he became the Permanent UK 
representative to NATO in 1957. Between 1960 and 1968 he was Ambassador to both 
the Soviet union and West Germany. His observation of the changing relationship 
between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs from 1955 to 1957 played an important role in 
the development of Britain's understanding of Soviet foreign policy. 
Steel, Sir Christopher Eden Joined the Foreion Office in 1927 and 
enjoyed a wide variety of diplomatic and political postings before and during the war. 
In 1945 he became a Counsellor and Head of the Political Division of the Allied 
Control Commission for Germany (British Element). Between 1949 and 1953 he was 
the Minister in the Washington Embassy. From thence he was appointed the UK 
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council in Paris and in 1957 he 
became the Ambassador in Bonn. During his time in Paris he maintained close contact 
with the Northern Department as a principle source of information and analysis of 
Soviet affaires. In turn he furnished the Foreign Office with a wider understanding of 
the views of Britain's allies concerning the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 
Sykes, Richard Adam. Started his Foreign Office career in 1947 and rose 
quickly through a number of posts, including Nanking and Peking to become a First 
Secretary in 1952. In the same year he began work at the Northern Department with 
responsibility for Soviet Affairs. In 1954 he became Private Secretary to the Minister 
of State and then went abroad during 1956 to Brussels and 1959 to Santiago. Between 
1952 and 1954 he played a similar role to the of Earl Jellicoe and R. A. Hibbert. 
Uffen, Kenneth Janes. Joined the Foreign office in 1950 and during 1953 he 
was both promoted to Second Secretary and attached to the Northern Department, 
where he stayed until 1955 when he was transferred to Buenos Aires. 
Ward, Sir John Guthrie. Started his Foreign office career in 1931 and was sent 
to a wide variety of posts in the following years. These included Bagdad where he was 
given an allowance for Arabic in 1934. In 1950 he became the UK Deputy High 
Commissioner on the Control Commission for Germany until during 1954 he returned 
to London and was promoted to the level of Deputy Under-Secretary of State. In this 
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role he superintended the Northern Department up tu his 1957 posting as Ambassador 
at Buenos Aires, acting as the link between the Department and Sir hone Kirkpatrick. 
Watson, John hIugh Adam. Began his service with the Foreign Office in 1937. 
Another official to have earned an allowance for Arabic. during a sojourn at Cairo in 
1943. Became the Information Liaison Officer at the Washington Embassy in 1950 
where he stayed until transfer back to London as the Head of the African Department. 
Whilst in Washington he had a considerable amount of contact with the Northern 
Department, particularly in the relay of American assessments of Soviet developments. 
WWWallinger, Sir Geoffrey Arnold. Joined the Foreign office in 1926 and served 
in a wide variety of places including Chungking and Cape Town. In 1949 he became 
Minister Plenipotentiary at Budapest and after a spell as Ambassador in Bangkok he 
was transferred to Vienna in 1954 at the same rank. Wallinger was fortunate to be in 
Vienna at the right moment as it was in 1955 that the negotiations towards an Austrian 
State Treaty came to fruition and he played an important role in the process as the 
British representative. In 1958 he went on to represent Her Majesty in Rio de Janeiro. 
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